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our sister Circuits," is far from lucid. Substantial confusion exists
regarding what distinction, if any, exists between a "designated
public forum" and a "limited public forum."'
I. INTRODUCTION
More than twenty-five years after the United States Supreme Court, in
Perry Education Ass 'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n,2 purported to define
and elucidate the components of its "public forum" doctrine, the meaning-
and legal significance-of the "limited public forum" concept remains star-
tlingly unclear. Confessions of uncertainty by courts as to the meaning of
this term-and its relationship to its doctrinal siblings, the "designated" pub-
lic forum and the "non-public forum"-are, in fact, surprisingly common in
reported judicial decisions.3 At the same time, the body of rules created by
the Supreme Court governing access by citizens to governmentally con-
trolled properties and channels of communication for the purpose of expres-
sion has been subjected to much criticism, usually and primarily on the
ground that these rules, in their entirety, are unduly restrictive of freedom of
expression. 4 Often such criticism has been accompanied by thoughtful sug-
1. Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 975 (8th Cir. 2006). The court's definition of a
designated public forum is itself reflective of the confusion of which the court speaks.
2. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
3. See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc'y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 865 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006);
Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 765 n.6 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Although the Supreme
Court and the circuits have clarified the functional difference between the designated and
limited forums, the precise taxonomic designation of the latter remains elusive."); Goulart v.
Meadows, 345 F.3d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 2003); Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1074
(9th Cir. 2001) ("The designated public forum has been the source of much confusion....
'The contours of the terms "designated public forum" and "limited public forum" have not
always been clear."') (quoting Diloreto v. Downey Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d
958, 965 n.4 (9th Cir. 1999)); Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 914 (10th Cir. 1997).
4. See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 993-97 (Foundation
Press 2d ed., 1988); G. Sidney Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U.
ILL. L. REv. 949, 949 (1992); David S. Day, The Public Forum Doctrine's "Government
Intent Standard": What Happened to Justice Kennedy?, 2000 MICH. ST. L. REv 173, 174
(2000); David S. Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, 78 IOWA L. REv. 143, 145
(1992) [hereinafter Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine]; C. Thomas Dienes, Com-
ment, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 109, 109-22 (1986); Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading
Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70
VA. L. REv. 1219, 1223-25 (1984); Ronnie J. Fischer, Comment, "What's in a Name?": An
Attempt to Resolve the "Analytic Ambiguity" of the Designated and Limited Public Fora, 107
DICK L. REv. 639, 640-42 (2003); Steven G. Gey, Reopening the Public Forum-From Side-
walks to Cyberspace, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1535, 1565 (1998); Calvin Massey, Public Fora, Neu-
tral Governments, and the Prism of Property, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 309-10 (1999); Matthew
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gestions of alternative approaches that would be more protective of speech.5
But, to paraphrase Marc Antony,6 I come to decipher the "public forum"
doctrine, not to denigrate it.
The purpose of this Article is not to argue that the "public forum" doc-
trine is too speech-restrictive, but rather to simply try to make a contribution
toward clarifying the meaning of the mysterious and perplexing "limited
public forum." I do criticize the Court, however, for allowing the confusion
surrounding this concept to fester and persist. And, in trying to make sense
of what the Supreme Court has said and done with respect to this concept,
and thus to arrive at a workable understanding thereof, I will briefly consider
whether any such understanding makes sense within the larger context of
facilitating freedom of expression. But my focus will remain primarily a
pragmatic one, accepting the broad outlines of what the Supreme Court has
done, under the heading of the "public forum" doctrine, with the relatively
modest goal of trying to eliminate (or at least minimize) needless confusion
in the application of these rules.
The importance of this legal doctrine can hardly be doubted. It is com-
monplace for citizens to seek to engage in communicative activities on (or
via) governmentally controlled properties (or channels of communication)
other than those that have traditionally been available for expression, and
case law reflects that they have done so with regard to a wide variety of such
"non-traditional fora"-ranging from government office waiting rooms,7 to
college campus lawns,8 to national cemeteries,9 to name just a few examples.
In each such instance, when the government actor in charge of the forum
D. McGill, Unleashing the Limited Public Forum: A Modest Revision to a Dysfunctional
Doctrine, 52 STAN. L. REv. 929, 938-42 (2000); Edward J. Neveril, Comment, "Objective"
Approaches to the Public Forum Doctrine: The First Amendment at the Mercy of Architec-
tural Chicanery, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1185, 1186-87 (1996); Robert C. Post, Between Gover-
nance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REv.
1713, 1745 (1987); Keith Werhan, The Supreme Court's Public Forum Doctrine and the
Return of Formalism, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 335, 343 (1986). Less critical views of the public
forum doctrine are offered in Lillian R. BeVier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In
Defense of Categories, 1992 Sup. CT. REv. 79, 80-81 (1992), and Richard B. Saphire, Recon-
sidering the Public Forum Doctrine, 59 U. CIN. L. REv. 739, 741 (1991). See also Frederick
Schauer, Comment, Principles, Institutions, and the First Amendment, 112 HARv. L. REv. 84,
84-86 (1998).
5. Farber & Nowak, supra note 4, at 1239-45; Fischer, supra note 4, at 670-73; Gey,
supra note 4, at 1566-76; Post, supra note 4, at 1765-84; Massey, supra note 4, at 334-51;
McGill, supra note 4, at 953-57.
6. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JuLIus CAESAR, act 3, sc. 2.
7. E.g., Make the Road by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2004).
8. E.g., Gilles v. Blanchard, 477 F.3d 466, 467 (7th Cir. 2007).
9. E.g., Griffin v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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denies access, and the speaker cares enough to bring suit, a decision must be
made, under governing legal principles, as to the nature of the forum: Is it
"closed," so that access may presumptively be denied, or has it been
"opened," so that access must presumptively be granted? The government
actor may place the forum "off limits" to expressive activity, in which case
the property (or channel) in question will be deemed a "non-public forum."'
If, on the other hand, the government actor has opened, for expressive activi-
ty, a property (or channel) that need not have been so opened, we then have a
"forum by designation" or "designated public forum." The government actor
is not completely free, even in the non-public forum, to deny access for ex-
pressive activity, but the level of judicial review that will be employed in
such cases is relatively low and deferential to the government, at least in
theory. In the designated public forum, on the other hand, a more rigorous
level of judicial review is (theoretically) employed. So the label matters.
The "mystery" of my title is really twofold, as reflected in the two ma-
jor questions to be pursued in this Article: First, how does the concept of the
"limited public forum" fit into this scheme? To put it another way, what is
the legal significance of that label? Second, how do we know when we have
a limited public forum, as opposed to a non-public forum? To put that ques-
tion another way, what criteria (if any) may dependably guide us in deciding
whether a limited public forum has been created? A subsidiary question
here, of potential significance, is: How do we decide for whom such a forum
has been opened?
Part II of this Article will explain how pertinent United States Supreme
Court opinions have given rise to, and perpetuated, the mystery of the limited
public forum, and extract the clues the Court has provided to the solution of
this mystery. Part IH will summarize the treatment of the limited public fo-
rum concept by federal appellate courts in recent years, highlighting the ex-
tent to which some of those courts have been misled by what the United
States Supreme Court has said and done. Finally, Part IV will consider the
workability of an approach guided by what appears to be the proper under-
standing of the United States Supreme Court's collective teachings concern-
ing the limited public forum.
10. Because we are dealing, by definition, with public-and not private-property, the
term is something of a misnomer. It would be more accurate to speak, in such a case, of a
"public non-forum," but we appear to be stuck, at this point, with "non-public forum."
[Vol. 33
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II. AMBIGUITY AND LACK OF CLARITY AT THE SUPREME COURT LEVEL
A. The Early Cases: Decisions Without Rules
The history of the public forum doctrine at the United States Supreme
Court level-and the philosophical underpinnings thereof-have been
described quite satisfactorily elsewhere." Suffice to say, here, that a theme
that made its first appearance in a United States Supreme Court opinion in
1966, namely that "[t]he State, no less than a private owner of property, has
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated,"' 2 soon led to fairly clear implications that limitations on
expressive activity in a governmentally controlled property that was not a
"4public forum" would be subjected to a significantly lower level of judicial
scrutiny than would otherwise be the case. 13  No explicit statement was
made, in the cases of the 1970s, regarding the level of scrutiny to be
employed in such a case, but clearly the Court, once it declared that a
government property was not a "public forum," was not going to adhere to
the emerging rule that discrimination against speech on the basis of content
would be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. 14 Conversely, the Court was
quite hospitable to the claims of speakers in settings which were
characterized as "open"'5 or "public" fora. 16 Not until 1983, in the Perry
decision, did the Court attempt to impose structure and clarity upon this body
of case law involving access by speakers to non-traditional governmentally
controlled fora.17
11. See Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, supra note 4, at 147-59; BeVier,
supra note 4, at 82-100; Dienes, supra note 4, at 111-17; Post, supra note 4, at 1718-58;
Werhan, supra note 4, at 343-404.
12. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,47 (1966).
13. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 128-32
(1981); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 134 (1977); Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974).
14. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 536, 540
(1980).
15. City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429
U.S. 167, 175 (1976). Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), differed in that the forum at
issue was described as "limited," and "generally open [for use by] student groups." Id. at 272,
277.
16. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975).
17. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 55 (1983).
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B. The Trouble with Perry18
Justice White's majority opinion in Perry represented a major step for-
ward doctrinally, but nonetheless fell well short of achieving optimum clarity
in its explication of governing rules. Justice White set forth, in this opinion,
the tripartite breakdown of governmental "fora" in language that continues to
be quoted regularly.' 9 The first category, he stated, consists of "places which
by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and
debate," embracing (at least) "streets and parks."2 "In these quintessential
public forums," he went on to say, restrictions on expression would be eva-
luated pursuant to the tests usually employed to gauge the constitutionality of
content-based or content-neutral regulations of speech. 21 "A second catego-
ry," he continued, "consists of public property which the State has opened
for use by the public as a place for expressive activity. 22 (Immediately a
clear, if ultimately insignificant, semantic contradiction arose: How can a
place devoted to expression "by government fiat"--ostensibly in the first
category of forum-not fall into this second category?)23 This second cate-
gory is important because, Justice White instructed us, the First Amendment
"forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to
the public even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place."24
At this point a key point was made in a footnote: "[a] public forum may be
created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups... or for the dis-
cussion of certain subjects., 25 A significant caveat was added: "[a]lthough a
State is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the facility, as
long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional
public forum ' 26 (thus introducing the term "traditional public forum" to de-
scribe the first category in this taxonomy).
Finally, he addressed the third category, described simply as "[p]ublic
property which is not by tradition or designation a forum for public
communication. 27 In such locations, it was revealed for the very first time,
18. Other critical evaluations of Perry have been offered by Farber & Nowak, supra note
4, at 1255-57; Gey, supra note 4, at 1548-50, 1578-80; Post, supra note 4, at 1750-56.
19. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 44-46.
20. Id. at 45.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. The terminology has been criticized by Professor Post as well. Post, supra note 4, at
1758 ("The reference to 'government fiat' is ill-considered.").
24. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
25. Id. at 46 n.7.
26. Id. at 46.
27. Id.
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"the State may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative
or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an
effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose the
speaker's view., 28 Oddly, it was not until later in his opinion that Justice
White gave this third type of governmental property a name, and he did so
only in passing, while adding important content to its definition: "[i]mplicit
in the concept of the non-public forum," he wrote, "is the right to make
distinctions in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity. 2 9
Distinctions of this kind, he continued, "are inherent and inescapable in the
process of limiting a non-public forum to activities compatible with the
intended purpose of the property. 3 °
Thus, the following important precepts had now been established: First,
that streets and parks (and later, sidewalks) 3' were "traditional" public fora,
subject to the usual principles of First Amendment analysis; 32 second, that
government actors might, as a matter of discretion, create "designated" pub-
lic fora, which would be subject to those same First Amendment rules, at
least as long as they retained their status as fora opened for expressive activi-
ties; and third, that even with respect to those governmentally owned proper-
ties which the government was entitled to make "off limits" for expressive
activity, there were limits on the government's power to do SO. 33 The last
proposition was surely the most surprising, and the most welcome from the
28. Id.
29. Perry, 450 U.S. at 49.
30. Id.
31. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
32. The "traditional public forum" category may be a "closed" class, in the sense that
only streets, sidewalks, and parks-the kinds of government property which, generally, have
been available for expressive activity-can fall within the category. As Justice Kennedy
stated in Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 678 (1998),
"[t]he Court has rejected the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its his-
toric confines," citing International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (ISKCON),
505 U.S. 672, 680-81 (1992). It is thus the least troublesome of the "forum" categories, yet
questions do arise as to its application to unconventional sidewalks. See United States v.
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 727 (1990); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 497 (1988) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Grace, 461 U.S. at 179-80. Lower courts have extended the category so as to
encompass arguably comparable governmental properties. See, e.g., ACLU of Nev. v. City of
Las Vegas, 333 F.3d 1092, 1103 (9th Cir. 2003) (publicly-owned pedestrian mall); Pouillon v.
City of Owosso, 206 F.3d 711, 717 (6th Cir. 2000) (city hall steps); Warren v. Fairfax County,
196 F.3d 186, 189 (4th Cir. 1999) (outdoor area in front of county government center). The
United States Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari in a case raising the question of
whether a particular municipal park is a traditional public forum. Summum v. Pleasant Grove
City, 483 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1737 (Mar. 31, 2008). See
generally Neveril, supra note 4. See also Saphire, supra note 4, at 745-50.
33. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
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standpoint of maximizing freedom of speech; no prior United States Su-
preme Court decision had spoken of, much less relied upon, the concept of
viewpoint discrimination, which was now declared to be intolerable even in a
"non-public forum., 34 And while earlier "non-public forum" decisions at the
United States Supreme Court level had typically offered ad hoc justifications
for the exclusions at issue,35 it was now clear, for the first time, that some
level of justification-satisfying a test of "reasonableness"36-was in fact
required.37 In all of these respects, the opinion in Perry was quite helpful.
But with respect to the concept of the "limited" public forum, the opi-
nion was distinctly unhelpful. First, as with the term "non-public forum,"
Justice White used the term "limited public forum" only in passing, never
defining it despite the fact that this opinion was the occasion for his grand
elaboration of the three-part "forum" categorization scheme; readers of the
opinion were thus left to infer that the "limited" public forum was the afore-
mentioned forum "created for a limited purpose such as use by certain
groups ... or for the discussion of certain subjects. 38
Second, and most inexcusably, the legal significance of the label was
never made explicit in Justice White's opinion. He stated that the designated
public forum would be treated as if it were a traditional public forum, but
said nothing, in general terms, as to how the constitutionality of an exclusion
of a particular speaker from a designated public forum limited for "use by
certain groups" would be assessed. He did, however, provide some pretty
good clues to the solution of this mystery. The most helpful clue emerged
from his response to the argument made by the excluded teachers' union,
Perry Local Educators' Association (PLEA), that the mailbox system had
"become a 'limited public forum' from which it may not be excluded be-
cause of the periodic use of the system by private non-school connected
34. See id. at 46. The dissenters in Perry, of course, believed that the school district's
exclusion of the rival teachers' union from the interschool mail system did indeed amount to
viewpoint discrimination. Id. at 56 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But the majority disagreed. Id.
at 49 n.9 (majority opinion).
35. See Jones v. N.C. Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 133-34 (1977); Greer
v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838-40 (1976); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298,
302-03 (1974).
36. While this requirement of "reasonableness" has at times been lightly equated with the
familiar "rational basis" level of scrutiny. See, e.g., Dienes, supra note 4, at 117; Massey,
supra note 4, at 313, lower court decisions appear to refute this unsupported conclusion. See
infra note 276 and accompanying text. See also ISKCON, 505 U.S. at 690-92 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (finding a ban on leafletting in a non-public forum unreasonable, and maintaining
that "we have required some explanation as to why certain speech is inconsistent with the
intended use of the forum.").
37. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
38. Id. at 46 n.7 (citation omitted).
[Vol. 33
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groups. 39  PLEA's core grievance, of course, was that its access to the
school mail system was terminated subsequent to the certification of its rival,
Perry Education Association (PEA), as the exclusive bargaining representa-
tive for the teachers in the school district; PEA, of course retained access to
the mailboxes.4 But, in addition, the school district did "allow some outside
organizations such as the YMCA, Cub Scouts, and other civic and church
organizations to use the facilities."'" Had the mail system thus become a
limited public forum, as PLEA contended? No, replied Justice White, add-
ing: "This type of selective access does not transform government property
into a public forum. '42 He went on to add the following paragraph, which is
the major clue to which I have referred:
Moreover, even if we assume that by granting access to the
Cub Scouts, YMCA's, and parochial schools, the [sichool [d]istrict
has created a "limited" public forum, the constitutional right of
access would in any event extend only to other entities of similar
character. While the school mail facilities thus might be a forum
generally open for use by the Girl Scouts, the local boys' club and
other organizations that engage in activities of interest and educa-
tional relevance to students, they would not as a consequence be
open to an organization such as PLEA, which is concerned with
the terms and conditions of teacher employment.43
The implications of this dictum seem clear: In a limited public forum,
we must first identify the speakers to whom the forum has been opened-the
favored class of speakers, if you will-and then ask whether the speaker who
seeks access to the forum-the challenger-is an "entit[y] of similar charac-
ter" to those to whom the forum has been opened.44 In other words, we must
ask whether the challenger falls within the favored class of speakers. If the
answer is "yes," then that challenger enjoys a "right of access" to the forum.
To put it another way, a limited public forum would be "open" to speakers
who fall into the same class as those to whom the forum has already been
opened. But as to a speaker who does not fall into the favored class, what
then? The answer to this question would appear to be provided by the way
the Court treated PLEA's attempt to gain access to the school mail system:
Justice White asserted that "the school mail system" (vis-a-vis PLEA, in any
39. Id. at 47.
40. Id. at 40-41.
41. ld. at47.
42. Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.
43. Id. at 48.
44. See id.
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event) was "not a public forum," and fell within the "third category" (later
equated, implicitly, with the term "non-public forum") of the new taxono-
my.45 So it would appear, from the totality of the Perry decision, that a li-
mited public forum will be treated as either a traditional public forum or a
non-public forum, depending on whether the challenger does or does not fall
within the favored class of speakers. 46
The other clue, in Perry, that supports this conclusion-and, in particu-
lar, the conclusion that a limited public forum will be treated as a traditional
public forum if the challenger falls within the favored class of speakers-is
the citation of Widmar v. Vincent7 as an example of a public forum "created
for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups. 48 Widmar, of course,
involved a state university that "routinely provide[d] University facilities for
the meetings of registered [student] organizations, 4 but subsequently de-
cided that it would violate the Establishment Clause if it were to continue to
make those facilities available to a religious student organization.' The stu-
dent organization sued, and prevailed.5 1 Justice Powell's pre-Perry reason-
ing regarding the public forum issue, on behalf of the Court's majority, was
as follows:
Through its policy of accommodating their meetings, the Uni-
versity has created a forum generally open for use by student
groups. Having done so, the University has assumed an obligation
to justify its discriminations and exclusions under applicable con-
stitutional norms. The Constitution forbids a State to enforce cer-
tain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public, even if
it was not required to create the forum in the first place....
* * * With respect to persons entitled to be there, our cases
leave no doubt that the First Amendment rights of speech and as-
sociation extend to the campuses of state universities.
Here [the University of Missouri] has discriminated against
student groups and speakers based on their desire to use a general-
ly open forum to engage in religious worship and discussion....
In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public forum
based on the religious content of a group's intended speech, the
45. Id. at 46, 48.
46. This understanding is essentially shared by Professor Buchanan and Professor Wer-
han. See Buchanan, supra note 4, at 960, 965; Werhan, supra note 4, at 406 n.346; see also
Fischer, supra note 4, at 671-72; McGill, supra note 4, at 942.
47. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
48. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7.
49. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265.
50. Id. at 265 & n.3.
51. Id. at 267.
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University must therefore satisfy the standard of review appropri-
ate to content-based exclusions. It must show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrow-
ly drawn to achieve that end.52
Again, Widmar was cited in Perry, as an example of a case involving a
limited public forum (despite the incongruous reference by Justice Powell
here, to "a forum generally open to the public"); the university facilities were
made available, for expressive purposes, only for student organizations.53
The excluded speaker was a student organization. 4 The Court in Widmar
appears to have decided that the excluded speaker fell into the class of
speakers to whom the forum had been opened.55 That finding, along with the
recognition that the exclusion was based on the content of the speech in
question, led to the application of strict scrutiny-exactly as it would have
had the restriction been applied in a traditional public forum.56 If, on the
other hand, a non-student organization (the local chapter of the American
Civil Liberties Union, for example) had sought access to the university's
facilities and been rebuffed, those same university facilities would
presumably have been treated as a non-public forum with respect to this
speaker that did not fall within the favored class.
Assuming that I am correct about Perry's implicit instructions
concerning restrictions on speech within a limited public forum, another
perplexing question arises: Why was not the teachers' mailbox system in
Perry deemed to be a limited public forum? By saying that the mail system
fell "within this third category" (non-public forum) and that it was "not a
public forum,' 57 Justice White pretty clearly declined to deem it a limited
public forum. But why was not it, given the fact that it appeared to have
been opened to some, but not all speakers? Granted, calling it a limited
public forum would presumably not have changed the result in this case
(since Justice White regarded the forum as closed to the challenger), but the
question remains important for the sake of understanding, generally, when
we have a limited public forum (thereby necessitating the subsidiary inquiry
as to whether the challenger is within the favored class of speakers) and
when we have a non-public forum (in which case no such inquiry is
required).
52. Id. at 267-70 (citations and footnotes omitted).
53. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 263).
54. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265 n.2.
55. See id. at 269-70.
56. Id.
57. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46, 48.
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The same question may be asked with regard to the earlier United States
Supreme Court decisions which were predicated on the absence of "public
forum" status, all of which involved fora that had been opened to some
speakers, but not to the challengers: Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights58 (in
which the transit system "car cards" were available to most advertisements,
but not to political campaign ads); 59 Greer v. Spock ° (in which some
speakers and entertainers, but not political speakers, had been given access to
the military base);6 and, Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,
Inc. 62 (in which some speakers had been allowed to address the prisoners, but
the prisoners' union could not).63 When no speaker has been given access to
the forum (as in Adderley v. Florida)6' the non-public forum label is easily
applied. But, when is a property properly deemed to be a non-public forum
when it has been opened to some (but not all) speakers? Lehman, Greer, and
Jones can be rationally viewed, in retrospect, as examples of limited public
fora, along with Widmar, yet Justice White cited Greer and Lehman, in Perry
in support of his pointed assertion that "selective access does not transform
government property into a public forum."65 Moreover, as noted earlier,
Justice White also stated that "[i]mplicit in the concept of the non-public
forum is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject
matter and speaker identity." 6 But, why is a forum in which such subject-
matter distinctions have been made not a limited public forum? What
distinguishes Widmar, the quintessential limited public forum case, from
these others?
Justice White sheds little light in Perry on this key question, as he spent
most of his time (regarding the classification of the forum) making the
obvious point that the school mail system was "not held open to the general
public. '67 Even after having said that, and while purporting to explain why
the mailboxes did not amount to a "limited public forum," he simply
reiterated that "there is no indication in the record that the school mailboxes
and interschool delivery system are open for use by the general public."68
58. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
59. Id. at 304.
60. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
61. Id. at 838 n.10.
62. 433 U.S. 119 (1977).
63. Id. at 121, 134.
64. 385 U.S. 39 (1966). See also U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic
Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
65. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983).
66. ld. at 49.
67. Id. at 47.
68. Id.
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No, of course there was not, but, again, why was not the system a limited
public forum? In this regard, his next sentence may have had more
significance than was apparent at the time: "Permission to use the system to
communicate with teachers must be secured from the individual building
principal., 69 (We will return to that point later on.)70 It was at that point that
he made his statement that "selective access does not transform government
property into a public forum" '71 (even a limited public forum, apparently)
which was followed by his suggestion that, even if it were a limited public
forum, that would create a right of access "only to other entities of similar
character. 7
2
The mysterious matter of when we have a limited public forum is
perhaps all the more significant when one considers how rarely one is likely
to encounter a designated public forum that is not limited-i.e., "public
property which the [S]tate has opened for use by the public as a place for
expressive activity. ' 73 The reader will no doubt recognize this language as
the description of Justice White's second category of forum, a description
which was followed by three citations: Widmar, City of Madison Joint
School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations Commission,74
and Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad.75 In fact, none of those cases
involved a forum that was opened to the general public for expressive
activity on an unlimited basis. Indeed, Widmar and City of Madison are the
cases which Justice White cited in the footnote in which he added that a
public forum might be created on a limited basis, either for use "by certain
groups" (citing Widmar) "or for the discussion of certain subjects" (citing
City of Madison, which involved speech at school board meetings, limited to
"school board business").76  As for Conrad, it involved access to a
municipally owned theater, which, by its very nature, certainly could not
have been opened to all speech by all speakers.77 So, Perry left careful
students of First Amendment law wondering, not only when a limited public
forum might have been created, but when the entire category of designated
public fora might be encountered as well.78
69. Id.
70. See infra text accompanying notes 127-33.
71. Perry, 460 U.S. at 47.
72. Id. at 48.
73. Id. at 45 (emphasis added).
74. 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
75. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
76. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7.
77. See Conrad, 420 U.S. at 546.
78. A case which Justice White did not cite, but might have, as presenting an example of
a designated public forum not limited by subject matter or speaker identity is Heffron v. Int'l
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A final point with regard to Perry speaks to another perplexing aspect
of the limited public forum inquiry: If the Court had deemed the school mail
system to be a limited public forum, and if that meant (as it would appear to)
that the system would thus be open to "entities of a similar character" to
those speakers presently granted access thereto, why would PLEA, the rival
teachers' union, not be an "entity of a similar character?" Could it not be
credibly argued that the system had been opened to teachers' unions, of
which PLEA was one? (Indeed, it had previously been opened to both
teachers' unions.)79 Pretty clearly, the majority viewed the mail system as
being open not to teachers' unions generally, but only to the union that had
been certified as "the exclusive bargaining representative" of the local
teachers (along with the Cub Scouts and others, of course).80 That is not an
irrational conclusion by any means, but it does serve to illustrate the
inescapable corollary that, even if a limited public forum has been created,
the fate of the challenger will depend upon how the court characterizes the
class of speakers to whom the forum has been opened. In Widmar, by way
of contrast, the Court appeared to view the forum as having been opened to
student organizations, which included the religious challenger. 8' Why, it
may sensibly be asked, did the Court not view the forum as opened only to
non-religious student organizations, in which case the challenger would not
have fallen within the favored class of speakers?82
C. The Ambiguity of Cornelius
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal De-
fense & Educational Fund, Inc.,83 written in 1985, is notable primarily for its
elaboration upon Perry's minimal pronouncements regarding the designated-
public-forum concept.84 It was another case, like Perry, in which the Court
might have found that a limited public forum had been created, but instead
Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654-55 (1981), in which Justice White
himself wrote the majority opinion upholding a time, place, and manner regulation applicable
to a state fairgrounds-a forum which presumably need not have been opened for expression,
but was.
79. See Perry, 460 U.S. at 48..
80. Id. at 55.
81. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981).
82. For a nuanced analysis of Widmar, see Post, supra note 4, at 1749.
83. 473 U.S. 788 (1985). Although the majority in this case consisted of only four Jus-
tices, with three Justices dissenting and two not participating, the O'Connor opinion is consis-
tently treated as the opinion of the Court. See, e.g., Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 826 (9th
Cir. 2007); Parks v. City of Columbus, 395 F.3d 643, 647 (6th Cir. 2005).
84. See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802.
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deemed the intangible "forum" ("a charity drive aimed at federal em-
ployees")85 to be a non-public forum. 86 The oft-quoted general explanation
offered by Justice O'Connor included the following language:
In addition to traditional public fora, a public forum may be
created by government designation of a place or channel of com-
munication for use by the public at large for assembly and speech,
for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain sub-
jects....
The government does not create a public forum by inaction or
by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening
a nontraditional forum for public discourse. Accordingly, the
Court has looked to the policy and practice of the government to
ascertain whether it intended to designate a place not traditionally
open to assembly and debate as a public forum. The Court has al-
so examined the nature of the property and its compatibility with
expressive activity to discern.the government's intent....
... We will not find that a public forum has been created in
the face of clear evidence of a contrary intent.. . nor will we infer
that the government intended to create a public forum when the na-
ture of the property is inconsistent with expressive activity .... In
cases where the principal function of the property would be dis-
rupted by expressive activity, the Court is particularly reluctant to
hold that the government intended to designate a public forum.
87
The key consideration, it is now clear, is the intention of the relevant gov-
ernment actor. But how is a court to determine whether that government
actor (a) intended to create a public forum open to a limited class of speak-
ers, on the one hand, or (b) intended to maintain a closed, "non-public" fo-
rum, even while "permitting limited discourse," on the other? The very fact
that a speaker has been excluded from the forum may be seen as evidence of
intent not to create a public forum, and the government actor can be ex-
pected, in any conflict that leads to litigation, to take the position that it had
no intention of opening a public forum. If the fact that some speech has been
permitted in the forum does not necessarily count against the government,
what will? Citations to prior decisions were sprinkled throughout
O'Connor's discussion, with cases like Widmar offered as examples of situa-
tions in which the government actor did have the intent to create a public
85. Id. at 790.
86. Id. at 806.
87. Id. at 802-04 (citations omitted).
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forum,"8 and cases like Lehman offered as examples of cases in which the
government actor did not have such intent.89 But did any of that suffice to
provide the necessary guidance?
As to "the nature of the property and its compatibility with expressive
activity,'"90 furthermore, could that possibly point toward a finding of intent
to create an open forum? A finding of incompatibility would understandably
support the conclusion that the government actor did not intend to create a
public forum (as in Adderley and Greer, the cases cited in support of that
proposition by O'Connor),9' but why would the fact that the challenger's
speech is compatible with the nature of the forum tell us anything about the
intentions of the relevant government actor? And what exactly is meant by
this notion of "compatibility?" Was Lehman's political campaign advertise-
ment incompatible with the "car cards" to which he was denied access?
Were PLEA's mailings incompatible with the school mailbox system in Per-
ry? Would it have been incompatible with the Combined Federal Campaign
(the charity drive in Cornelius) to have included the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund? The answers to these questions, unless we are to
understand "compatibility" to mean the absence of any persuasive reason for
excluding the speaker from the forum, would appear to be "no." Yet the
arguable compatibility of speaker and forum appeared to count for nothing in
each of these cases.
Cornelius is also notable because of the powerful dissenting opinion of
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan, that the decision inspired.
Blackmun issued a fundamental critique of the Court's public forum doc-
trine, but, for the purposes of those of us who seek merely to understand, and
not to criticize, the most striking aspect of Blackmun's opinion is his ulti-
mate description of how, in his view, the doctrine works:
The Court's analysis empties the limited public forum concept
of meaning and collapses the three categories of public forum, li-
mited public forum, and non-public forum into two. The Court
makes it virtually impossible to prove that a forum restricted to a
particular class of speakers is a limited public forum. If the Gov-
ernment does not create a limited public forum unless it intends to
provide an "open forum" for expressive activity, and if the exclu-
sion of some speakers is evidence that the Government did not in-
tend to create such a forum no speaker challenging denial of access
88. Id. at 802.
89. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 803-04.
90. Id. at 802.
91. Id. at 804.
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will ever be able to prove that the forum is a limited public forum.
The very fact that the Government denied access to the speaker in-
dicates that the Government did not intend to provide an open fo-
rum for expressive activity, and under the Court's analysis that fact
alone would demonstrate that the forum is not a limited public fo-
rum.
92
Was he correct in this assessment of the state of affairs to which the Court's
public-forum jurisprudence had led? Or was he missing something-and, if
so, what? Interestingly, Justice O'Connor, in her majority opinion, said not a
word about Blackmun's dissent-no "Justice Blackmun overlooks" or "Jus-
tice Blackmun misunderstands." Why? Why not reassure her readers that all
is not as bleak as the dissenters suggest? Why not explain, to Justice Black-
mun and the rest of us, that it really is still possible for a court to properly
conclude that a government actor intended to create a limited public forum,
and suggest how such a conclusion might be reached? One can only wonder
how she, and the Justices who joined her in the majority, reacted to Black-
mun's assertions. Did they simply feel that the majority opinion was clear
enough, and that Blackmun's view of the matter was misguided?93  Or did
they perhaps believe, in their heart of hearts, that, as a practical matter, he
probably had it right, and that limited public fora were, like other endangered
species, theoretically extant but not likely to be seen very often?
92. Id. at 825 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). Seven years later, in the
ISKCON decision, Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, and Souter, quickly echoed Blackmun's concerns, in a single sentence regarding "the
so-called 'designated' forum. The requirements for such a designation," he wrote, "are so
stringent that I cannot be certain whether the category has any content left at all." Int'l Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (ISKCON), 505 U.S. 672, 697 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Consider also the words of Professor Post, commenting on Cornelius:
[T]he focus on intent had the virtue of candor, for it tactfully withdrew the concept of the li-
mited public forum as a meaningful category of constitutional analysis....
Cornelius shrinks the limited public forum to such insignificance that it is difficult to im-
agine how a plaintiff could ever successfully prosecute a lawsuit to gain access to such a fo-
rum. If the reach of the forum is determined by the intent of the government, and if the exclu-
sion of the plaintiff is the best evidence of that intent, then the plaintiff loses in every case.
Post, supra note 4, at 1756-57 (footnote omitted); see also Timothy Zick, Speech and Spatial
Tactics, 84 TEx. L. REv. 581, 615 n.230 (2006) (characterizing the limited public forum as "a
doctrinally incoherent concept").
93. Professor Post's critique of Cornelius, quoted in part at supra note 92, continued:
There is only one way out of this vicious circle, and it is not very satisfactory. It would require
the Court to distinguish between the intent to include the class of speakers or subjects of which
the plaintiff is the representative, and the intent to exclude the plaintiff. One problem with this
distinction is that it is precious and in practice unworkable.
Post, supra note 4, at 1757. (But is it unworkable?)
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D. Kokinda Keeps the Mystery Alive
Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion in United States v. Kokinda94 at-
tained instant notoriety by virtue of its surprising refusal to treat a "postal
sidewalk" as a traditional public forum, but that, of course, is not the focus of
this article.95 But, even if one accepts the plurality's resolution of that pre-
cise question, why was this particular post office sidewalk not a limited pub-
lic forum? Here is O'Connor's response to that argument:
The Postal Service has not expressly dedicated its sidewalks
to any expressive activity. . . . No Postal Service regulation opens
postal sidewalks to any First Amendment activity. To be sure, in-
dividuals or groups have been permitted to leaflet, speak, and
picket on postal premises, but a regulation prohibiting disruption,
and a practice of allowing some speech activities on postal proper-
ty do not add up to the dedication of postal property to speech ac-
tivities. We have held that "[t]he government does not create a
public forum by ... permitting limited discourse, but only by in-
tentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse."
Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added). Even conceding that
the forum here has been dedicated to some First Amendment uses,
and thus is not a purely non-public forum, under Perry, regulation
of the reserved non-public uses would still require application of
the reasonableness test.
96
A number of questions are raised by this analysis. First and foremost is
the question of why a government property on which citizens "have been
permitted to leaflet, speak and picket" was not a limited public forum. 97 (The
meaning of the word "permitted" may or may not have relevance here. Did
O'Connor mean to suggest that those speakers sought, and were granted,
permission to leaflet, speak, and picket? Or were their leafleting, speaking,
and picketing merely tolerated by those in authority? Again, the distinction
may or may not be significant.) The challengers, who had engaged in the
solicitation of political contributions on the postal sidewalk, were convicted
of violating a federal regulation that prohibited "'[s]oliciting alms and con-
tributions, campaigning for election to any public office .... and displaying
94. 497 U.S. 720 (1990).
95. Critical evaluations of that aspect of Kokinda can be found in Gey, supra note 4, at
1580-82; Day, The End of the Public Forum Doctrine, supra note 4, at 189-91; Michael J.
Mellis, Modifications to the Traditional Public Forum Doctrine: United States v. Kokinda
and Its Afternath, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 167, 174-88 (1991).
96. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730 (O'Connor, J., plurality) (citations omitted).
97. See id.
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or distributing commercial advertising on postal premises. ' '98 Since only
certain kinds of speech were expressly prohibited on these premises, is it not
fair to conclude that, by implication, all other forms of speech were allowed
at this location---especially when other forms of speech were, in fact, al-
lowed at this location? The dissenters thought so.99 As for the members of
the plurality (given O'Connor's focus on the absence of any regulation open-
ing the premises for speech), one wonders whether anything short of an ex-
press written proclamation would have sufficed to make this property a li-
mited public forum.
Particularly intriguing, and thus worth restating, is the last sentence in
the above-quoted passage: "Even conceding that the forum here has been
dedicated to some First Amendment uses, and thus is not a purely non-public
forum, under Perry, regulation of the reserved non-public uses would still
require application of the reasonableness test."1° Note first the somewhat
odd terminology that Justice O'Connor used; while appearing to consider
(for just one brief moment) what the outcome would be if the postal sidewalk
were a limited public forum, she chose to use the words "and thus is not a
purely non-public forum," rather than the more obvious (and less trouble-
some) phrase, "and thus is a limited public forum." How exactly are we
supposed to understand the phrase "not a purely non-public forum?" Are
there degrees of non-public-forum-hood, some being more "pure" than oth-
ers? (Forgive me, but the word usage cries out for such an irreverent re-
sponse.) Alternatively, had the limited public forum concept come to be
viewed with such distaste that the term could not be used even when it was
the obvious term to use? Note further the inelegant, and tortured, use of lan-
guage later in the sentence-namely, her reference to "the reserved non-
public uses."' 0 ' Was she perhaps intending to refer to speech to which a li-
mited public forum had not been opened?
Strange semantic choices notwithstanding, that sentence can be seen as
helpfully reinforcing the rule, implicit in Perry, that, in a limited public fo-
rum, expression which does not fall within the class of speech to which the
forum has been opened may be regulated to the same extent as it could be in
a non-public forum. That is to say, O'Connor can be understood to have said
98. Id. at 724.
99. Id. at 750 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Noting the limited restrictions of expression
contained in the regulation, Justice Brennan concluded: "The Government thus invites labor
picketing, soapbox oratory, distributing literature, holding political rallies, playing music,
circulating petitions, or any other form of speech not specifically mentioned in the regulation."
Id.
100. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730 (O'Connor, J., plurality).
101. Id.
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that, even if the postal sidewalk were a limited public forum, it had not been
opened up for solicitation of monetary donations, and thus the prohibition of
such solicitation need only be reasonable (and, of course, not discriminate on
the basis of viewpoint). The only difficulty with this interpretation is that the
sentence is too unclear to allow us to proclaim its meaning with any confi-
dence.
E. ISKCON and Rosenberger: Misleading Statements Emerge
The 1992 case typically referred to as ISKCON-International Society
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee 102-- was not one that allowed for any
serious argument that the forum in question (a publicly-operated airport ter-
minal) was a limited public forum. It is included here only because Chief
Justice Rehnquist, in his cursory review of the forum categories in his major-
ity opinion, said this:
The second category of public property is the designated public fo-
rum, whether of a limited or unlimited character-property that the
State has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public.
Regulation of such property is subject to the same limitations as
that governing a traditional public forum.' 0 3
But, of course, regulation of speech in a limited public forum will not neces-
sarily be evaluated as if the property were a traditional public forum. This
imprecise statement, which had no bearing on the decision, might have had
the effect of over-valuing speech in a limited public forum, but in fact there
is no reason to think that the statement has had any effect at all on relevant
case law.
Regrettably, that cannot be said of Justice Kennedy's unhelpful pro-
nouncements in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virgin-
ia,1°4 decided in 1995. It should be understood, at the outset, that, because
the free-speech issue in this case was resolved by the majority purely on the
basis of its (questionable) finding of viewpoint discrimination, it was com-
pletely unnecessary to categorize the forum-a public university fund, cha-
racterized by Kennedy as "a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial
or geographic sense."' 05 And, in fact, while Kennedy may have appeared to
102. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
103. Id. at 678 (citation omitted).
104. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
105. Id. at 830.
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conclude that the fund was a limited public forum (as some courts"0 6 and
commentators °7 have asserted) nowhere in his opinion did he clearly and
unequivocally do so (although doing so would have been correct). Rather,
he sprinkled a couple of general statements that made reference to the limited
public forum concept into a confused paragraph whose primary thrust was
that viewpoint discrimination will not be tolerated.'0 8 Here, offered in its
entirety (aside from citations) because of the influence it has had on lower
courts, is that regrettable paragraph, which followed a paragraph which
spoke only about content and viewpoint discrimination (and said not a word
about public fora):
These principles provide the framework forbidding the State
[from] exercis[ing] viewpoint discrimination, even when the li-
mited public forum is one of its own creation. In a case involving
a school district's provision of school facilities for private uses, we
declared that "there is no question that the District, like the private
owner of property, may legally preserve the property under its con-
trol for the use to which it is dedicated." The necessities of confin-
ing a forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was
created may justify the State in reserving it for certain groups or
for the discussion of certain topics. Once it has opened a limited
forum, however, the State must respect the lawful boundaries it
has itself set. The State may not exclude speech where its distinc-
tion is not "reasonable in light of the purpose served by the fo-
rum," nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis of its
viewpoint. Thus, in determining whether the State is acting to pre-
serve the limits of the forum it has created so that the exclusion of
a class of speech is legitimate, we have observed a distinction be-
tween, on the one hand, content discrimination, which may be
permissible if it preserves the purposes of that limited forum, and,
on the other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed
impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the
forum's limitations."°9
The careful reader will, I trust, join me in observing that, while it may
appear that Justice Kennedy categorized the forum in question as a limited
public forum, by making reference to the concept two or three times in the
106. E.g., Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 345 n.10 (5th Cir. 2001); Sum-
mum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 915 (10th Cir. 1997); Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v.
Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543, 1549 (llth Cir. 1997).
107. McGill, supra note 4, at 929; see also Gey, supra note 4, at 1563, 1565.
108. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-29.
109. Id. at 829-30 (citations omitted).
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course of this discussion, he really never explicitly did so. What matters
more, however, is that he intertwined these references to the limited public
forum with indirect references to the non-public forum concept, and with the
general prohibition of viewpoint discrimination. Why? What was the need
for this discussion, when all that needed to be said was that viewpoint dis-
crimination is unacceptable, regardless of the nature of the forum? In mid-
paragraph, he actually included a statement that might have been helpful (if
elaborated upon) in clarifying the law of the limited public forum: "Once it
has opened a limited forum, however, the State must respect the lawful
boundaries it has itself set."' ° But that statement, too, was unnecessary, in
this case, given his finding of viewpoint discrimination. Unfortunately, what
many lower courts have extracted from this discussion is the combination of
that sentence with the sentence that follows, leading to the (mis)understand-
ing that what he said was this: In a limited public forum, exclusion of a
speaker must be reasonable and must not discriminate on the basis of view-
point. That statement is true, of course, because unreasonableness or view-
point discrimination will invalidate a restriction even in a non-public forum,
so of course it will invalidate a restriction in any forum. But Kennedy's
combination of sentences has led many lower courts to the misguided con-
clusion that he asserted that these are the only grounds for invalidating a pro-
hibition of speech in a limited public forum."' But he did not say that, in so
many words, and, if he had, one would have to wonder why the limited pub-
lic forum was suddenly being equated, for all intents and purposes, with the
non-public forum.
F. Forbes to the Doctrinal Rescue?
Somewhat ironically, Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Arkansas
Educational Television Commission v. Forbes,"2 decided three years after
Rosenberger, is arguably the United States Supreme Court's majority opi-
nion that provides the most guidance with respect to distinguishing between
a limited public forum and a non-public forum. (I say that this is somewhat
ironic because it is also arguably the least satisfying of the United States Su-
preme Court's public-forum decisions, in terms of its result)."3  Ralph
110. Id.
111. E.g., Shero v. City of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2007); Husain v.
Springer, 494 F.3d 108, 121 (2d Cir. 2007); Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J., Inc. v.
Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 526 (3d Cir. 2004); DiLoreto v. Downey Unified Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196 F.3d 958, 965 (9th Cir. 1999).
112. 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
113. But see the discussion of Forbes in Schauer, culminating in this suggestion:
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Forbes, an independent candidate for Congress in Arkansas, sought to partic-
ipate in a televised debate to which only the Democratic and Republican
candidates had been invited by the debate's organizer, AETC, described as
"an Arkansas state agency owning and operating a network of five noncom-
mercial television stations."' 4 The organizers of the event denied Forbes'
request, because they had "'decided to limit participation in the debates to
the major party candidates or any other candidate who had strong popular
support'"l.. 5-a class of speakers which, in the view of the organizers, did not
include Forbes.'1 6 Was the debate a limited public forum? A panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit thought so, and Judge Arnold's ex-
planation is notable for its forcefulness:
We can say without reservation, . .. that the forum in this case, the
debate, is a limited public forum. Just as the university in Widmar
created a limited public forum by opening its facilities to regis-
tered student groups for expressive speech, AETN, by staging the
debate, opened its facilities to a particular group--candidates run-
ning for the Third District Congressional seat....
The debate was surely a place opened by the government for a
limited class of speakers. What was that class? Was it all candi-
dates for Congress legally qualified to appear on the ballot, or was
it simply the Republican and Democratic candidates? The latter
answer, which essentially is the position espoused by defendants,
is not supportable either as a matter of law or logic. Surely gov-
ernment cannot, simply by its own ipse dixit, define a class of
speakers so as to exclude a person who would naturally be ex-
pected to be a member of the class on no basis other than party af-
filiation. It must be emphasized that we are dealing here with po-
litical speech by legally qualified candidates, a subject matter at
the very core of the First Amendment, and that exclusion of one
such speaker has the effect of a prior restraint-it keeps his views
from the public on the occasion in question."
l7
But a majority of the Supreme Court held that the state agency could
limit the class of favored speakers in the way in which AETC had limited
Although the doctrinal structure of the majority opinion in Forbes is focused on public forum
doctrine... in the end it is the institutional character of public broadcasting as broadcasting,
heightened here by the involvement of broadcasting professionals in the very decision under
attack, that appears to have determined the outcome of the case.
Schauer, supra note 4, at 91.
114. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 669.
115. Id. at 670.
116. See id. at 670-71.
117. Forbes v. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n, 93 F.3d 497, 504 (8th Cir. 1996).
25
: Nova Law Review 33, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
NOVA LAW REVIEW
it." 8 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy ultimately deemed the debate
to be a non-public forum."9
Kennedy began his "forum" discussion in the usual fashion, briefly de-
scribing each of the three categories of forum and correlating the categories
with the applicable constitutional tests.12 0  In the process of doing so, he
made this very helpful statement regarding "designated" public fora: "[i]f
the government excludes a speaker who falls within the class to which a des-
ignated public forum is made generally available, its action is subject to strict
scrutiny."' 2' This statement-which really pertains to the concept of a li-
mited public forum (the term I wish Kennedy had used)-was a most wel-
come reinforcement of the rule implied by Perry's suggestion that "entities
of similar character" would enjoy a right of access to a limited forum. 2 2 But
even this helpful dictum was flawed, because, by referring only to "strict
scrutiny," it ignored the possibility that a distinction among speakers might
not be content-based.
23
Moving to the third category of fora, Kennedy made this intriguing
statement: "[o]ther government properties are either non-public fora or not
fora at all."' 24 "Not fora at all?" What did that mean? Did not the tripartite
regime set forth in Perry represent the entire universe of governmentally
owned properties and channels of communication? Perhaps he had in mind
the kind of case in which the inherent need for the exercise of governmental
discretion-as in public broadcasting, generally, 25 or the selection of books
by a public library' 26-- is deemed to render any "forum" analysis inapplica-
ble.
118. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 669.
119. Id. at 680. Surprisingly, the three dissenters did not adopt the position taken by the
court of appeals. See id. at 690 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Said Justice Stevens, writing for
himself and Justices Souter and Ginsburg: "The dispositive issue in this case . . .is not
whether AETC created a designated public forum or a non-public forum .... but whether
AETC defined the contours of the debate forum with sufficient specificity to justify the exclu-
sion of a ballot-qualified candidate." Id.
120. Id. at 677-78 (majority opinion).
121. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 39-46.
123. Kennedy, of all Justices, must have known that, since, in ISKCON, he concurred in
the judgment on the grounds that the airport terminal was a public forum, but the ban on soli-
citation was a reasonable (content-neutral) time, place and manner regulation. See Int'l Soc'y
for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (ISKCON), 505 U.S. 672, 683 (1992) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
124. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677.
125. Id. at 675.
126. See the plurality opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist in United States v. American
Library Ass'n, finding forum analysis incompatible "with the discretion that public libraries
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But why did Kennedy overturn the conclusion of the Court of Appeals
that the debate in Forbes was a limited public forum? In fact, he never even
used that term, addressing instead the question of whether the debate was a
"designated" public forum, and finding that it was not.'27 In the process, he
set forth a relatively extensive explanation of the governing criteria, which
deserves quotation at some length:
To create a forum of this type, the government must intend to
make the property "generally available," to a class of speakers....
A designated public forum is not created when the government al-
lows selective access for individual speakers rather than general
access for a class of speakers .... The basis for the holding in Per-
ry was explained by the Court in Cornelius: "In contrast to the
general access policy in Widmar, school board policy did not grant
general access to the school mail system. The practice was to re-
quire permission from the individual school principal before
access to the system to communicate with teachers was granted."
And in Cornelius itself, the Court held the Combined Federal
Campaign (CFC) charity drive was not a designated public forum
because "[t]he Government's consistent policy ha[d] been to...
require agencies seeking admission to obtain permission from fed-
eral and local Campaign officials."
These cases illustrate the distinction between "general
access," which indicates the property is a designated public forum,
and "selective access," which indicates the property is a non-
public forum .... [T]he government does not create a designated
public forum when it does no more than reserve eligibility for
access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose mem-
bers must then, as individuals, "obtain permission" to use it.
128
Kennedy then applied those considerations to the case at hand, as follows:
Here, the debate did not have an open-microphone format....
AETC did not make its debate generally available to candidates for
Arkansas' Third Congressional District seat. Instead, just as the
Federal Government in Cornelius reserved eligibility for participa-
tion in the CFC program to certain classes of voluntary agencies,
must have to fulfill their traditional missions." 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003). See also Nat'l
Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 586 (1998). A lower court decision (involv-
ing plaintiffs who were denied the opportunity to speak at town meetings) in which the public
forum analysis was somewhat inexplicably deemed to be "inapposite" is Cumin v. Town of
Egremont, 510 F.3d 24, 25 (1st Cir. 2007).
127. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 678.
128. Id. at 678-79 (citations omitted).
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AETC reserved eligibility for participation in the debate to candi-
dates for Third Congressional District seat .... At that point, just
as the Government in Cornelius made agency-by-agency determi-
nations as to which of the eligible agencies would participate in the
CFC, AETC made candidate-by-candidate determinations as to
which of the eligible candidates would participate in the debate.
"Such selective access, unsupported by evidence of a purposeful
designation for public use, does not create a public forum." Thus
the debate was a non-public forum.'
2 9
At long last, we had been given some concrete guidelines. But, are they
sufficiently concrete? The key distinction, it seems, is that between "general
access for a class of speakers," on the one hand, and "selective access for
individual speakers," on the other. But it has never been clear how to distin-
guish "general" from "selective" access, words that were not new to this opi-
nion. Here, however, there was the added contrast between access "for a
class of speakers" and access "for individual speakers." But how helpful is
that? If we focus on the application of these principles to this very case, it
seems fair to say that the "selective access" which Justice Kennedy found
here was extended to a "class" of speakers (congressional candidates), and
not to randomly-selected individuals. Indeed, Kennedy stated, in that part of
his discussion, that the government in Cornelius "reserved eligibility for par-
ticipation in the CFC program to certain classes of voluntary agencies.""13
So, the "selective access" that defeats a finding of a limited public forum
may, it seems, be either "random" access or access that is extended only to
persons or groups that fall into a defined class of speakers. In the former
instance, in which disparate speakers have been allowed access on a sporadic
basis, we would apparently lack the crucial evidence of a governmental in-
tent to open the property to a "general class" of speakers. In the latter in-
stance, it is apparently a second step that really counts toward a finding of
"selective access"-the selection of speakers, by the relevant government
actor, within a defined class. Given this second understanding of "selective
access," the ability to distinguish it from "general access for a class of speak-
ers" remains elusive.
Potentially more helpful, however, is the fact of Justice Kennedy's re-
peated references, in this mini-tutorial, to the concept of "permission." The
need to obtain "permission" on an individualized basis, as a condition of
access to the forum at issue, he explained, is a key characteristic of a non-
public forum, even in situations that look like "general access" cases, and
129. Id. at 680.
130. Id. at 680 (emphasis added).
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explains why Perry and Cornelius (in which such permission was required)
did not involve limited public fora. Widmar, in contrast, was viewed as in-
volving a situation (again, the availability of university facilities to registered
student organizations) in which individualized permission was not required;
the property was "generally available" to all members of the favored class of
speakers. The last sentence of his statement of general principles, quoted
above, can thus be seen as capturing the essence of his message: "[T]he
government does not create a designated public forum when it does no more
than reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a particular class of speak-
ers, whose members must then, as individuals, 'obtain permission' to use
it.' 3' As the quoted statements make clear, this "permission" factor had
been highlighted in Cornelius,132 over a decade earlier, but Kennedy's disser-
tation in Forbes put the spotlight on this variable in a much more emphatic
way. 133
Two major questions immediately come to mind with regard to this
suggested key to the limited public forum puzzle: First, is it workable, and
second, does it make sense? We will return to those questions shortly.
G. Good News Club: A Big Step Backward
Whatever contribution to clarity may have been made by Forbes was
needlessly and regrettably undercut by Justice Thomas' pronouncements in
the 2001 case of Good News Club v. Milford Central School. 34 The Good
News Club sought access, on an "after hours" basis, to public school facili-
ties that had been opened to use by other outside organizations for various
expressive purposes.135 The forum in question appeared to be a limited pub-
lic forum, the parties agreed on that characterization, and Justice Thomas,
writing for the Court majority, was willing to assume that this was the proper
category. 36 But, as in Rosenberger, the category of forum was unimportant,
given the majority's (questionable) finding of viewpoint discrimination. 37
Here, however, is what Thomas said next, concerning the applicable consti-
tutional test:
131. Id., at 679 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 804 (1985)).
132. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 803--04
(1985).
133. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679-80.
134. 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
135. Id. at 102-03.
136. Id. at 106.
137. See id. at 107.
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When the State establishes a limited public forum, the State is
not required to and does not allow persons to engage in every type
of speech. The State may be justified "in reserving its forum for
certain groups or for the discussion of certain topics." The State's
power to restrict speech, however, is not without limits. The re-
striction must not discriminate against speech on the basis of
viewpoint, and the restriction must be "reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum."'
' 38
The first three assertions in that paragraph are unexceptional, and clearly
accurate. The last sentence is not inaccurate, because those limitations apply
regardless of the nature of the forum, but the problem, as in Rosenberger,
39
is the immediate juxtaposition of (a) statements describing the nature of a
limited public forum with (b) the two-part test governing the constitutionality
of restrictions on speech in a non-public forum. The reader-unless he
knows enough to recognize the incongruity between this presentation and
earlier pronouncements concerning these matters-may be justified in con-
cluding that the Court had just stated unambiguously that an exclusion of any
speaker from a limited public forum would be subject only to that two-part
test. Understandably, but regrettably, that is how some lower federal courts
have understood Thomas' statement of governing legal doctrine. 40
H. Synthesizing the Supreme Court's Limited Public Forum Jurispru-
dence
1. The Court's Pronouncements
While the Justices have, over the years, made frequent use of the term
"limited public forum," the Court has never defined, or adequately explained
the meaning of, that concept. The closest the Court has come to defining the
term was its initial indication, in Perry, that a public forum might "be created
for a limited purpose" 14'-a statement made in a footnote which sprang from
Justice White's discussion of the second public forum category, a category
that now dependably bears the label "designated public forum." Can there be
any reasonable doubt, then, that the limited public forum is a sub-category of
the designated public forum category? The further discussion of the limited
138. Id. at 106-07 (citations omitted).
139. See supra text accompanying notes 104-11.
140. E.g., Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md., Inc. v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch.,
457 F.3d 376, 382-83 (4th Cir. 2006); Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617,
626 (2d Cir. 2005); Chiu v. Piano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 346 (5th Cir. 2001).
141. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983).
[Vol. 33
30
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss2/1
2009] ONGOING MYSTERY OF THE LIMITED PUBLIC FORUM 327
public forum concept in Perry,4 2 furthermore, augmented both by 1) the
reaffirmation of Perry's implications in ISKCON14 3 and Forbes 44 and 2) the
constant citation (and description) of Widmar with approval, make clear
enough how a court is to evaluate limitations on speech in a limited public
forum: The court should first determine the class of speakers to whom the
forum has been opened, and then decide whether the excluded speaker falls
within that favored class; if the speaker falls within the favored class, the
forum should be treated as if it were a traditional public forum, but if the
speaker falls outside of the favored class, then the forum should be treated as
if it were a non-public forum. Occasional inconsistent, ill-considered pas-
sages (in the Court's Rosenberger 45 and Good News Club'46 opinions),
which suggest that the limited public forum is, in every case, to be treated as
if it were a non-public forum, should be viewed as just that-ill-considered,
and inconsistent with the more logical and coherent statements made in Per-
ry and Forbes-and, accordingly, ignored.'47
With regard to the challenging task of deciding when a limited (or des-
ignated) public forum has been created, two majority opinions are dominant:
The seminal opinion by Justice O'Connor in Cornelius, making clear that the
government's intent is the key, 148 and Justice Kennedy's opinion in Forbes,
with its emphasis on a speaker's need to obtain permission as the major vari-
able distinguishing "selective" access from "general" access.
149
2. The Court's Rulings
With regard to the proper understanding and treatment of the limited
public forum, there are few specimens to consider, since the Court has not
found any governmental property to be a limited (or designated) public fo-
142. See id. at 46-47.
143. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee (ISKCON), 505 U.S. 672, 678-79
(1992).
144. See supra text accompanying notes 121-22.
145. See supra text accompanying note 109.
146. See supra text accompanying note 138.
147. It should be noted, however, that a further note of uncertainty regarding these matters
was sounded by Justice Breyer, in dictum, in a plurality opinion in 1996, in which he declined
to apply the public forum doctrine to an unconventional setting ("leased access" cable televi-
sion channels). Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 749
(1996). Writing for four Justices, in clear reference to the concept of the limited public forum,
he stated, somewhat cryptically: "Our cases have not yet determined, however, that [the
G]overnment's decision to dedicate a public forum to one type of content or another is neces-
sarily subject to the highest level of scrutiny." Id. at 750.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 87-89.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 128-31.
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rum since the pre-Perry decision in Widmar, which, while it pre-dated the
Court's crystallization of its governing categories and rules, still stands as the
preeminent example of a limited public forum.15 We can draw little guid-
ance from what the Court has actually done, then, with regard to the limited
(or designated) public forum.
We can, however, inquire as to whether the Court's pre-Forbes rulings
support the primacy of "permission" as the key variable explaining when we
have merely "selective," as opposed to "general," access to a forum which
has been opened to at least some speakers. (The distinction would rather
clearly seem to be irrelevant in cases, like ISKCON151 and United States
Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'n,152 in which there is no
evidence that the property has been opened to anyone for expressive purpos-
es). Bearing in mind that an earlier opinion may understandably fail to shed
light on the existence or non-existence of a factor whose significance was far
from clear at the time the opinion was written, and recognizing that some
prior rulings may simply not conform to a mode of analysis that did not
emerge until years later, we are nonetheless compelled to observe that the
pattern of prior decisions is not consistent with regard to Kennedy's thesis in
Lehman (involving rapid transit system advertising spaces)153 and Greer (in-
volving political campaigning on a military base)1 54 do appear to take their
places comfortably alongside Perry and Cornelius as cases involving situa-
tions in which a prospective speaker needed to obtain permission from a con-
trolling governmental authority as a condition of access to the property in
question. In Kokinda, as was observed earlier, citizens had "been permitted
to leaflet, speak and picket" on the postal sidewalk, 55 but it is unclear wheth-
150. The other case cited in Perry as an example of a "limited" forum, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7
(1983), City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Public Employment Relations
Commission, 429 U.S. 167 (1976), in which a school board meeting was generally open to
members of the public for comments, spoke neither of forum categories nor of any level of
judicial review. In his majority opinion for a unanimous Court (which ruled in favor of the
excluded speaker), Chief Justice Burger said merely that "[w]here the State has opened a
forum for direct citizen involvement, it is difficult to find justification for excluding teachers."
Id. at 175. The Heffron decision of 1981, as noted earlier, is perhaps the only true example, at
the Supreme Court level, of a designated public forum not limited as to subject matter or
speaker identity. See Heffran v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
654-55 (1981). But the decision teaches us nothing, with respect to the problems at hand,
since the government actor in that case made no attempt to exclude the speakers from the
forum.
151. 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
152. 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
153. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 303-04 (1974).
154. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976).
155. United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990).
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er the word "permitted" denoted (a) that those speakers had been required to
ask and receive permission, or (b) that the presence of those speakers had
merely been tolerated.
But of the three cases cited in Perry as examples of designated public
fora, only one-City of Madison-seems to fall into the "open to all speak-
ers, no permission required" category (keeping in mind that the forum was a
school board meeting, so that only speech related to "school board business"
was permitted). 156 Widmar, in contrast (and notwithstanding its treatment by
Justice Kennedy in Forbes), does not seem to have involved a "no permis-
sion required" situation, as this sentence from Justice Powell's majority opi-
nion reveals: "From 1973 until 1977 a registered religious group named
Cornerstone regularly sought and received permission to conduct its meet-
ings in University facilities."1 57
(Each of these rare exemplars of the limited public forum concept, it
should be noted, differs from the more typical such case in that, in each, the
government actor in direct control of the forum was not actually motivated
by a desire to exclude the challenger for any reason relating to the effect of
the speech on the forum.) In City of Madison, the speaker who was supposed
to be barred from the forum-by a state labor-relations statute-had actually
been permitted to speak by the school board at its meeting; litigation ensued
only after a third party, after the fact, challenged the legitimacy of the school
board's action.158 In Widmar, university officials sought to bar the religious
student group from using the school's facilities for expressive purposes, but
only because those university officials feared that continuing to grant access
to the religious group would violate the Establishment Clause;159 the Su-
156. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983)
(citing City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 429
U.S. 167 (1976)). In Minnesota State Board. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271
(1984), Justice O'Connor distinguished City of Madison, stating that the school board meet-
ings "at issue there were 'opened [as] a forum for direct citizen involvement,'. . . and 'public
participation [was] permitted."' Id. at 281. The First Amendment was violated, she went on
to say, "when the meetings were suddenly closed to one segment of the public even though
they otherwise remained open for participation by the public at large." Id.
157. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981). See also Chess v. Widmar, 635 F.2d
1310, 1313 (8th Cir. 1980). The other pertinent Supreme Court case involving a state univer-
sity, Rosenberger (in which Justice Kennedy may have appeared to find that the fund in ques-
tion was a limited public forum, but actually made no such explicit finding), was also a setting
in which an application was required. Rosenberger v. Rector & Vistors of Univ. of Va., 515
U.S. 819, 823 (1995). Permission was required as well in Good News Club, a case in which
the parties stipulated that the school premises constituted a limited public forum. Good News
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001).
158. City of Madison, 429 U.S. at 172.
159. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 265 n.3.
33
: Nova Law Review 33, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
NOVA LAW REVIEW
preme Court could have resolved the dispute by deciding only-as it did-
that the Establishment Clause concern was groundless.' 6°
The third decision put forth in Perry as an example of a designated pub-
lic forum, Conrad, not only involved a governmentally-controlled property
(a municipally operated theater) whose use was made available only through
an application process,16 ' but appears to be completely out of sync with later
decisions. A majority of the Court, speaking through Justice Blackmun,
found fault with a municipal board's rejection of an application to stage a
controversial musical stage play at the theater in question. 62 Key to the de-
cision was Blackmun's preliminary conclusion that the theater in question
was a "public forum[] designed for and dedicated to expressive activities.' 63
But surely this was not a governmental forum that had been opened to any
and all members of a particular class of speakers, with no discretion reserved
to the officials in charge of the property.
Other decisions simply do not fit as comfortably into either the "permis-
sion required" or "no permission required" paradigms. Hazelwood School
District v. Kuhlmeier, 64 for example, which extended the public forum doc-
trine to the public school setting, involved a claim by student staff members
of a high school newspaper that their First Amendment rights had been vi-
olated when certain student-authored articles were removed from the news-
paper prior to its publication.'65 Justice White, for the majority, found, in
effect, that the newspaper was a non-public forum. 166 The newspaper had
arguably been opened to written expression by a particular class of speak-
ers-namely, student members of the newspaper's staff-and it did not ap-
pear that a formal system was in place pursuant to which "permission"
needed to be obtained before an article could be published. 167 But the key to
the decision was the undeniable maintenance of ultimate control over the
contents of the newspaper by the journalism teacher and the school princip-
al.' 68 Forbes itself, ironically, involved no requirement that permission be
160. Id. at 273-75.
161. Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547-48 (1975).
162. Id. at 562.
163. Id. at 555.
164. 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
165. Id. at 262.
166. Id. at 270.
167. Id. at 268-70.
168. See id. at 269. Pervasive governmental control of the forum can be seen as explain-
ing the result in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119 (1977),
as well. A lower court decision placing primary emphasis on "whether the government has
exercised a sufficient degree of control over the forum" is Pocatello Education Ass'n v.
Heideman, 504 F.3d 1053, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007).
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granted as a condition of access to the forum in question, a one-time tele-
vised candidates' debate. Access was allowed, instead, on an "invitation-
only" basis.' 69
We may conclude, then, that most, but not all, of the Court's precedents
support Justice Kennedy's attempt to explain them in Forbes. Based primar-
ily on Forbes itself, and to a lesser extent Hazelwood, we might also con-
clude, for the sake of achieving greater descriptive accuracy, that what has
mattered, almost always, in the cases in which a denial of access to a forum
has been upheld by the Supreme Court, is the presence of a governmental
"gatekeeper" of sorts-meaning, a government actor who, either through a
process of inviting certain speakers, requiring speakers to obtain permission
to speak (and granting it only sometimes), or otherwise exercising ongoing
control over the expressive enterprise, made it quite clear that the govern-
ment did not mean to open the forum to all speakers falling within a particu-
lar class. We will return to the question of whether this "gatekeeper" con-
cept provides a workable and sensible basis for distinguishing between des-
ignated and limited public fora, on the one hand, and non-public fora, on the
other.
III. How HAVE THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS UNDERSTOOD "THE
MIDDLE CATEGORY?"
Our understanding of "the middle category"' 170 of governmental fo-
rum-focusing primarily on the limited public forum but, of necessity, em-
bracing as well the designated public forum-may be enhanced by a consid-
eration of how federal appellate courts (who have had many more opportuni-
ties than has the Supreme Court to address these issues) have dealt with it.
What do these courts understand to be meant by the phrase "limited public
forum?"' 1  What legal consequences flow from that label? Have lower
courts found designated and limited public fora, and, if so, to what extent
have they been guided by Justice Kennedy's opinion in Forbes in reaching
such results?
169. Ark Educ. Television Comm'n v Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 670 (1988).
170. The term is commonly used to embrace the designated and limited public forum
concepts. See, e.g., Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 765 (5th Cir. 2005).
171. For a fairly comprehensive review-with a somewhat different focus-of lower court
case law in this area, as of 2002, see Fischer, supra note 4, at 657-70. See also Mary Jean
Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement Relationships: New Extensions
of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 80-100 (2004).
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A. Competing Understandings of the Terminology
The federal courts of appeals remain strikingly divided with respect to
their understanding of what it means to pin the label "limited public forum"
upon a governmentally controlled property or channel of communication. At
the risk of over-simplification, these courts can essentially be placed into one
of two groups: Those who, like your humble author, are guided by the im-
plications of Perry and Forbes, and those who have been influenced primari-
ly by the misleading statements made in the Rosenberger and Good News
Club decisions.
In the first group are, most dependably, the Second and Fourth Circuit
Courts of Appeals. The Second Circuit's understanding, dating back more
than twenty years, 172 was perhaps best expressed in the following passage
from a fairly recent decision:
A subset of the designated public forum, the "limited" public
forum, exists "where the government opens a non-public forum
but limits the expressive activity to certain kinds of speakers or to
the discussion of certain subjects." . . . In limited public fora, strict
scrutiny is accorded only to restrictions on speech that falls within
the designated category for which the forum has been opened....
As to expressive uses not falling within the limited category for
which the forum has been opened, restrictions need only be view-
point neutral and reasonable. 17
3
The Second Circuit has, moreover, actually utilized this approach. 174
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, while employing uniquely
creative (but dispensable) terminology, appears rather clearly to be in agree-
ment with the Second Circuit, as this (necessarily) lengthy excerpt from a
fairly recent Fourth Circuit decision reveals:
172. Calash v. City of Bridgeport, 788 F.2d 80, 82 (2d Cir. 1986).
173. Hotel Employees & Rest. Employees Union v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Parks &
Recreation, 311 F.3d 534, 545-46 (2d Cir. 2002) (citations omitted); accord Make the Road
by Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2004); Fighting Finest, Inc. v. Bratton,
95 F.3d 224, 229 (2d Cir. 1996); Travis v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 692
(2d Cir. 1991). But see Amidon v. Student Ass'n of State Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, 508 F.3d
94, 100 (2d Cir. 2007); Husain v. Springer, 494 F.3d 108, 121 (2d Cir. 2007); Peck v. Bald-
winsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617,626 (2d Cir. 2005); Gen. Media Commc'n v. Cohen,
131 F.3d 273, 278 n.6 (2d Cir. 1997).
174. Travis, 927 F.2d at 693 ("Travis's program was the same type as a previously permit-
ted use. Even if the forum was limited, Travis, being within the category for which use had
been permitted, could not be denied access absent a sufficient constitutional justification.").
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When a particular forum is classified as a designated/limited
public forum, "[tiwo levels of First Amendment analysis" apply:
the "internal standard" and the "external standard." The "internal
standard" applies to situations where "'the government excludes a
speaker who falls within the class to which a designated [limited]
public forum is made generally available."' In this situation, the
government's "'action is subject to strict scrutiny."' In other
words, "as regards the class for which the forum has been desig-
nated, a limited public forum is treated as a traditional public fo-
rum." On the other hand, the "external standard" "places restric-
tions on the government's ability to designate the class for whose
especial benefit the forum has been opened." We explained that
"once a limited forum has been created, entities of a 'similar cha-
racter' to those allowed access may not be excluded." The gov-
ernment's designation of the class for the "external standard" is
"subject only to the standards applicable to restrictions on speakers
in a non-public forum," namely that "the selection of a class by the
government must only be viewpoint neutral and reasonable in light
of the objective purposes served by the forum."' 175
And, as in the Second Circuit, this approach has actually been used by the
Fourth Circuit.
176
The Third, Eighth, and Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals appear to be
in agreement. 177 In addition, panels of the Sixth 178 and Eleventh 79 Circuits,
175. Goulart v. Meadows, 345 F.3d 239, 250 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting that court's en banc
opinion in Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186, 193-94 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal citations
omitted)). Accord ACLU v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438, 443 (4th Cir. 2005).
176. Goulart, 345 F.3d at 251 ("[T]o determine which standard to apply to the Board's
exclusion of the plaintiffs in this case, we must determine whether homeschoolers as a group
are an entity of a 'similar character' to those groups permitted to use the community cen-
ters.").
177. See Preminger v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 517 F.3d 1299, 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en
banc); Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967, 976 (8th Cir. 2006); Griffin v. Sec'y of Veterans
Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2002); U.S. v. Goldin, 311 F.3d 191, 196 (3d Cir.
2002); Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. PA Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 255 (3d Cir.
1998). But see Child Evangelism Fellowship of N.J. Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386
F.3d 514, 526 (3d Cir. 2004). Note, however (as reflective of the persistent confusion in the
use of public forum terminology), that the court in Preminger stated that a "designated" public
forum "is an area dedicated by the government for a certain class of speakers." Preminger,
517 F.3d at 1311.
178. Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 354 (6th Cir. 2001). This decision can also be
understood as having, alternatively, viewed the restriction as content-based and employed
strict scrutiny. Id. at 355. See also Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, Tenn., 221 F.3d
834, 843 (6th Cir. 2000).
179. Rowe v. City of Cocoa, Fla., 358 F.3d 800, 802-03 (11th Cir. 2004); Crowder v.
Hous. Auth. of Atlanta, 990 F.2d 586, 591 (11th Cir. 1993).
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albeit with far less explication of general doctrinal understanding, have ap-
plied time, place and manner analyses to content-neutral restrictions on
speech in limited public fora.
In contrast, a number of other federal appellate courts, taking seriously
the misleading discussions in Rosenberger180 and Good News Club,181 treat
the limited public forum designation as if it were synonymous with "non-
public forum"' 82-sometimes even while stating that the "limited public fo-
rum is a sub-category of a designated public forum!' ' 183 A panel of the Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit even referred to "a non-public forum (some-
times called a limited public forum).'" ' 4
Recognizing that lower court judges must defer to the United States Su-
preme Court when it comes to constitutional pronouncements (at least when
they are clear and consistent), one may nonetheless wonder how any reason-
able jurist could believe that, in a scheme apparently comprising four catego-
ries, two of them--one labeled "limited" and one labeled "non"-are to be
treated as exactly the same. What meaning is assigned to the word "limited"
if that equation is made? While some of us are inclined to perceive the
phrase "limited public forum" in a "positive" way, connoting a place that has
been opened to expression, but on a limited basis (a glass half full, if you
will) it appears to be possible to think of "limited" as having a primarily
"negative" connotation, tending to denote that the property is presumptively
"closed" to expression (i.e., a glass half empty). Thus, one panel of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals stated that "a given forum may be designated for
180. See supra text accompanying note 109.
181. See supra text accompanying note 138.
182. See, e.g., Cumin v. Town of Egremont, 510 F.3d 24, 28 (lst Cir. 2007); Ridley v.
Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 76 n.4 (1st Cir. 2004) ("We adopt the usage equating
limited public forum with non-public forum and do not discuss the issue further."); Hopper v.
City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1075 n.8 (9th Cir. 2001) ("This categorization admittedly leads
to the strange semantic result that a limited public forum is not actually a public forum.");
Summum v. Callaghan, 130 F.3d 906, 916 n.14 (10th Cir. 2007) ("We use the term 'limited
public forum' here to denote a particular species of non-public forum ...."). Even one com-
mentator has asserted that "the 'limited public forum' is a subset of the 'non-public' forum."
Dolan, supra note 171, at 77. Similar confusion pervades the discussion in Leslie Gielow
Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1357, 1370-71 & n.l 17 (2001).
The Ninth Circuit, in particular, has been persistent in taking this approach. Ariz. Life Coal.
Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 969 (9th Cir. 2008); Flint v. Dennison, 488 F.3d 816, 831 (9th
Cir. 2007); Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 908 n.8 (9th
Cir. 2007); Cogswell v. City of Seattle, 347 F.3d 809, 814 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 1043 (2004); Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 48, 329 F.3d 1044, 1049 (9th Cir.
2003).
183. Hopper, 241 F.3d at 1074.
184. Ridley, 390 F.3d at 76.
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one class of speaker or speech, and still 'limited' with respect to others.' 85
But a panel of the Tenth Circuit, using terminology that threatens to compli-
cate matters to an intolerable degree, stated that "a designated public forum
for a limited purpose and a limited public forum are not interchangeable
terms, 186 thus giving no meaning to the latter phrase.
B. "Middle Category" Decisions
1. Rulings
The United States Supreme Court, of course, has not found a govern-
mental property to be a limited (or even a designated) public forum since
Widmar in 1981. Dissenting in Cornelius in 1985, Justice Blackmun com-
plained that, given the approach set forth therein, the Court had made "it
virtually impossible to prove that a forum restricted to a particular class of
speakers is a limited public forum., 187 His core reasoning, shared by critics
of the Court's public forum doctrine, is worth restating:
If the Government does not create a limited public forum unless it
intends to provide an "open forum" for expressive activity, and if
the exclusion of some speakers is evidence that the Government
did not intend to create such a forum, no speaker challenging deni-
al of access will ever be able to prove that the forum is a limited
public forum. 188
Was Justice Blackmun right? Has it proven to be virtually impossible
to persuade a court that a governmental property or channel of communica-
tion is a designated or limited public forum? The good (and perhaps surpris-
ing) news, for partisans of freedom of expression, is that it has not. 89 A
185. Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 766 (5th Cir. 2005). The Fifth Circuit has
given hints of agreement with the understanding of "limited public forum" shared by the
Second and Fourth Circuits, but has stopped short of taking such an approach unambiguously.
Id. at 769; Chiu v. Piano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 347 (5th Cir. 2001). The two opi-
nions cited in this note project, more than anything else, a sense of uncertainty concerning the
terminology. Id. at 345-46; Faulkner, 410 F.3d at 765 n.6.
186. Callaghan, 130 F.3d at 916 n.14.
187. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 825 (1985)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (internal citation omitted). See supra text accompanying note 92.
189. The discussion of cases that follows is not intended to be exhaustive, and is based
primarily on a consideration of federal appellate decisions rendered subsequent to the Su-
preme Court's 1998 decision in Forbes. Note, too, that cases discussed herein in which the
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number of recent holdings of federal appellate courts indicate that designated
and limited public fora do exist.
The public university setting has yielded the most persuasive examples
of unlimited designated fora. At least two appellate courts have held the
outdoor open areas of such campuses to be designated public fora,9 ' but
since, in one of those cases, the areas in question appear to have been opened
only to members of the university community, 91 the court probably should
have found a limited, as opposed to an unlimited, public forum (since the
challenger was a student group, the distinction would not have affected the
subsequent analysis). In each of these cases, the open nature of the forum
was presumptively important, as the court, in each case, went on to find that
a content-neutral restriction failed intermediate scrutiny. 92 Another court
properly found that a bulletin board on a state university campus, open to use
by the general public, was a designated public forum.'93
Lehman notwithstanding, at least three federal appellate courts have
found public-transit system advertising spaces--on the exterior panels of
buses1 94 or in subway and railroad stations195-to be designated public fora.
The forum, in each case, might well have been deemed a limited, as opposed
to an unlimited forum because, in each, the forum was open only to advertis-
ing (admittedly broadly defined) and in one of the cases, the governing poli-
cy excluded several categories of ads. 196 (The persuasiveness of these courts'
reasoning will be considered in the next section). The court went on to rule
in favor of the challenger, on the merits of its First Amendment claim, in
each of the three cases; in two of the three, the court found that a content-
based exclusion would not withstand strict scrutiny,'97 but found as well in
court is seen as having found a "limited public forum" do not include cases in which that
phrase was understood by the court to be synonymous with "non-public forum."
190. Bowman v. White, 444 F.3d 967,979 (8th Cir. 2006); Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410
F.3d 760, 769 (5th Cir. 2005).
191. See Faulkner, 410 F.3d at 768.
192. Id. at 772; Bowman, 444 F.3d at 981-82.
193. Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858
(2001). Because the Court went on to find that the removal of the plaintiff's handbills
amounted to viewpoint discrimination, the finding of a designated public forum turned out to
be unnecessary to the resolution of the case. Id.
194. United Food & Com. Workers Union Local 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth.,
163 F.3d 341, 355 (6th Cir. 1998); N.Y. Mag. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 136 F.3d 123, 130 (2d
Cir. 1998).
195. Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 244 (3d Cir.
1998).
196. United Food, 163 F.3d at 353.
197. Id. at 355; Christ's Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 255.
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the alternative, that the exclusion was not even reasonable, 98 thus rendering
the forum categorization non-dispositive.
Another court held that when city officials extended a general invitation
to artists to display their works in the hallways of city hall, they created a
designated public forum.' 99 (The persuasiveness of this holding will also be
considered in the next section). Again, the court probably should have found
(at most) that a limited public forum had been created, since the forum had
been opened only to works of art (which, however defined, would surely
leave out some other forms of expression); but again, the distinction was
unimportant here because the plaintiffs were indisputably artists. The court
went on to rule that the content-based exclusion of the plaintiffs' works
failed to satisfy strict scrutiny. 2°
Appellate courts have also discerned the existence of limited public fora
in the truest and most meaningful sense. An easy example, given the United
States Supreme Court's decision in City of Madison, is a case in which a city
council meeting, at which city residents or taxpayers were permitted to
speak, was deemed to be a limited public forum.2°' (The court then upheld
what it saw-questionably-as a content-neutral restriction on comments by
nonresidents).2 °2  Another good example is a city's "voters' pamphlet,"
which was limited to "'statements by a candidate . . . about the candidate
himself or herself,' 20 3 thus obviously limited by both content and speaker
identity.204 (But while the court correctly deemed the pamphlet to be a li-
mited public forum, it incorrectly subjected the content-based limitation to
only the reasonableness level of review, and upheld it). 205 Yet another good
example is a case involving access to the outdoor areas of a public university
campus, held to be a limited public forum open to members of the university
community but not to outsiders (including the plaintiffs). °4
In addition, at least one appellate court found meeting rooms in a coun-
ty community center to be limited public fora,2"7 but held that the challengers
198. Christ's Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 255; United Food, 163 F.3d at 358.
199. Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1081 (9th Cir. 2001).
200. Id.
201. Rowe, 358 F.3d at 802.
202. Id. at 803.
203. Cogswell v. City of Seattle, 347 F.3d 809, 811-12 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting WASH.
REV. CODE § 29.81A.030(3) (2003)).
204. Id. at 814.
205. Id. at 814, 818.
206. ACLU v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438, 444 (4th Cir. 2005).
207. Goulart v. Meadows, 345 F.3d 239, 251 (4th Cir. 2003). Another court made the
credible determination that a meeting room in a public library was a limited public forum, but
treated the limited public fora as equivalent to non-public fora, and upheld the exclusion of the
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(two families seeking to use the facilities for "homeschooling") did not con-
stitute "an entity of a 'similar character' to those groups permitted to use the
community centers. 2 °8 Another court held that a state's specialty license
plate program was a limited public forum open "to only nonprofit organiza-
tions with community driven purposes" that complied with certain additional
requirements.209 A far less obvious example of a limited public forum, final-
ly, is a university yearbook, which was deemed to have been opened to the
yearbook's student editors (including the plaintiffs herein). 2 0 The court went
on to find that the challenged government action-confiscation and ban on
distribution of the yearbook, based in part on its content-failed every level
of judicial review, including reasonableness.2t
2. "General" or "Selective" Access?
a. Use of the Forbes "Permission" Factor
In the post-Forbes federal appellate cases in which the forum had been
opened to some, but not all, speakers, thereby necessitating a ruling as to
whether "general" or merely "selective" access had been granted, the "per-
mission" factor identified by Justice Kennedy in Forbes has not been consis-
tently utilized. Some courts have (reasonably) deemed fora to be "non-
public," despite the fact that some speakers had been granted access thereto,
with no explicit consideration of the fact that speakers needed permission as
a condition of access,1 2 while other courts have ignored the existence of
plaintiff therefrom. Faith Ctr. Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 908,
910 (9th Cir. 2007). A comparable decision is Child Evangelism Fellowship of New Jersey
Inc. v. Stafford Township School District, in which then-Judge Alito made the defensible
finding (with minimal explanation) that a school district's practice of distributing certain
community-group materials to students-through flyers and posting, etc.-had the effect of
creating limited public fora. 386 F.3d 514, 526 (3d Cir. 2004). But, per Rosenberger, he then
appeared to subject the exclusion of plaintiffs' materials from these media of distribution to
only the lowest level of judicial review, but ultimately found that the exclusion was view-
point-discriminatory. Id. at 528.
208. Goulart, 345 F.3d at 251.
209. Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 970 (9th Cir. 2008).
210. Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 353 (6th Cir. 2001). See also Husain v. Springer,
494 F.3d 108, 125 (2d Cir. 2007) (reaching the same conclusion with respect to a college
student newspaper).
211. Kincaid, 236 F.3d at 354-56.
212. E.g., Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 77-82 (1st Cir. 2004); Uptown
Pawn & Jewelry, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 337 F.3d 1275, 1280 (1 th Cir. 2003).
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permit requirements in finding that designated fora had been created.213 But
other courts have given great weight to the permission factor, sensibly find-
ing only selective access-and, accordingly, non-public fora-when permis-
sion was required as a condition of access.214
A number of other courts, meanwhile, have addressed the permission
factor in ways that both (a) suggest the possibility of some judicial resistance
to its influence, and (b) raise questions as to its meaning and utility.
One such case is Goulart v. Meadows,"5 in which two "homeschooling
mothers" sought to use space at a county community center "for meetings of
a geography club and a fiber arts club. 2 16 A written Community Center Use
Policy governed access to the county's community centers, and required
written applications for use of any such center to be submitted to a
"Recreation Coordinator," who had "'the right to refuse or revoke any appli-
cation not in accordance with"' the Use Policy. 2 7 That policy, as modified,
did "not permit homeschool instructors to use the community centers to offer
homeschool educational classes intended to satisfy state educational re-
quirements. 21 8  The uses for which access was sought in this case were
deemed by the Recreation Coordinator to run afoul of that restriction.219 So,
had the county afforded "general" or merely "selective" access to these
community centers? Was it not clear that permission was required, as a con-
dition of such access, thus pointing to the conclusion that access was "selec-
tive?" The court thought otherwise, as the following key paragraph reveals:
We are not persuaded that the community centers at issue in this
case are non-public fora. First, the Recreation Coordinators at the
213. E.g., Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 970 (9th Cir. 2008); Bowman v.
White, 444 F.3d 967, 976-80 (8th Cir. 2006); Justice for All v. Faulkner, 410 F.3d 760, 767-
69 (5th Cir. 2005). See also Amandola v. Town of Babylon, 251 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir.
2001).
214. E.g., Perry v. McDonald, 280 F.3d 159, 167-69 (2d Cir. 2001); Putnam Pit, Inc. v.
City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834, 843-44 (6th Cir. 2000). See also Make the Road by Walk-
ing, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 145-47 (2d Cir. 2004). Note, too, that courts that inappro-
priately equate the concepts of "non-public forum" and "limited public forum" have at times
given weight to a permission requirement in finding the existence of a "limited" public forum,
but treated that "limited" public forum as if it were a non-public forum. E.g., Faith Ctr.
Church Evangelistic Ministries v. Glover, 480 F.3d 891, 908-10 (9th Cir. 2007); Hills v.
Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist., No. 48, 329 F.3d 1044, 1049-50 (9th Cir. 2003). See also
Campbell v. St. Tammany Parish Sch. Bd., 231 F.3d 937, 941-42 (5th Cir. 2000).
215. 345 F.3d 239 (4th Cir. 2003).
216. Id. at 241.
217. Id. at 242.
218. Id. at244.
219. Id. at 244-45.
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community centers make only ministerial judgments because they
are allowed to deny an application only if it is "not in accordance
with the provisions outlined in the [Use Policy]." In other words,
if a proposed user falls within the confines of the Use Policy, the
application will be granted. Here, permission to use the communi-
ty centers is not "selective," but is "granted as a matter of course"
to all individuals or groups who fall within the Use Policy. In ad-
dition, Calvert County has intentionally made the community cen-
ters generally available to certain types of expressive activity. For
example, the community centers are open to a wide variety of in-
structional activities .... We classify the community centers as
designated or limited public fora and will analyze the restrictions
here accordingly.
220
The challengers were nonetheless unsuccessful, because the court went
on to find, sensibly, that they did not fall within the category of speakers to
whom the forum had been opened.221 But, given the fact that a formal appli-
cation for use of community center facilities was required, and that such an
application could be (and was, in this case) rejected, was the court's interme-
diate conclusion in this case-that the community center was a designated
public forum, to which access had been granted on a general basis222 -
consistent with what Justice Kennedy said in Forbes? His assertion, again,
was this: "[T]he government does not create a designated public forum
when it does no more than reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a
particular class of speakers, whose members must then, as individuals, 'ob-
tain permission,' to use it."' 223 Does that not describe the situation in Goulart,
or are we to correctly understand that there is no real permission requirement
when "permission" is "'granted as a matter of course"' (to some speakers, at
least) by the rules that govern the forum?
Two decisions involving access to public transit systems show even less
commitment to the Forbes permission factor as a potentially dispositive cri-
terion. In the first, Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Southeastern Pennsyl-
vania Transportation Authority (CBM),224 the transportation authority,
SEPTA, allowed paid advertising in its rail and subway stations, but rejected
an anti-abortion advertisement submitted by the challenger, CBM.22 5
220. Goulart, 345 F.3d at 250-51 (citations omitted).
221. Id. at255.
222. Id. at 251.
223. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998) (citation omit-
ted).
224. 148 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 1998).
225. Id. at 244.
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SEPTA's written policy governing such advertising included the following
language:
All advertising displays shall be of an appropriate charac-
ter and quality, and the appearance of all displays shall be accepta-
ble to SEPTA. No libelous, slanderous, or obscene advertising
maybe [sic] accepted .... All advertising determined by ...
SEPTA, in its sole discretion, as objectionable.., must not be uti-
lized on any SEPTA vehicle or facility. SEPTA shall have the
right to immediately remove any advertising material which has al-
ready been applied, in the event that ... SEPTA deems material
objectionable for any reason ....226
Despite this evidence that SEPTA retained tight control over the forum, the
United States Court of Appeals rejected SEPTA's argument that no designat-
ed public forum had been created.2 7 In doing so, Judge Roth made the fol-
lowing striking assertions:
[T]he fact that SEPTA has reserved for itself the right to reject ads
for any reason at all does not signify, in and of itself alone, that no
public forum has been created. In [a prior decision], we warned
that "standards for inclusion and exclusion" in a limited public fo-
rum "must be unambiguous and definite" if the "concept of a des-
ignated open forum is to retain any vitality whatever." . .. [T]he
fact that the government has reserved the right to control speech
without any particular standards or goals, and without reference to
the purpose of the forum, does not necessarily mean that it has not
created a public forum.
22 8
Looking at SEPTA's past practice, the court found that SEPTA had "ac-
cepted a broad range of advertisements for display,' 229 including two adver-
tisements pertaining to the subject of abortion. 3 ° Judge Roth was thus led to
this result:
We conclude then, based on SEPTA's written policies, which
specifically provide for the exclusion of only a very narrow cate-
gory of ads, based on SEPTA's goals of generating revenues
through the sale of ad space, and based on SEPTA's practice of
226. Id. at 250-51.
227. Id. at 252.
228. Id. at 251 (citation omitted).
229. Christ's Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 251.
230. See id.
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permitting virtually unlimited access to the forum, that SEPTA
created a designated public forum.
231
SEPTA's argument based on its "'tight control' over the forum," and the fact
that its permission was required, was explicitly rejected, largely because "at
least 99% of all ads [were] posted without objection by SEPTA, ' '232 and those
few ads to which SEPTA had previously objected (resulting in their modifi-
cation) were objectionable for reasons unrelated to the content of CBM's
proposed advertisement.233 Strict scrutiny was thus called for, but the court
went on to hold that the rejection of CBM's advertisement could not even
withstand the test of reasonableness. 34
The second of these public-transit cases is United Food & Commercial
Workers Union Local 1099 v. Southwest Ohio Regional Transit Authority.35
The transit authority, SORTA, allowed paid advertising on its buses, and had
accepted an ad from the union, UFCW, but rejected a second such adver-
tisement submitted by UFCW.2 36 SORTA's advertising policy, according to
Judge Moore, "specifically excludes '[a]dvertising of controversial public
issues that may adversely affect SORTA's ability to attract and maintain
ridership,' and requires that all ads 'be aesthetically pleasing and enhance the
environment for SORTA's riders and customers and SORTA's standing in
the community."
237
UCFW's second advertisement, which essentially conveyed a pro-union
message, was rejected by SORTA's general manager-"who must approve
every wrap-around bus advertisement"-because he deemed it "aesthetically
unpleasant and controversial., 238 The union sued, the District Court entered
a preliminary injunction in its favor, and the Court of Appeals affirmed.239
In his opinion for the court, Judge Moore quoted the key pronounce-
ments from Justice Kennedy's Forbes opinion, but then proceeded, in es-
sence, to decline to be governed by them, saying this:
Discerning whether the government permits general access to
public property or limits access to a select few does not end our
inquiry, however, for we must also assess the nature of the forum
231. Id. at 252.
232. Id.
233. See id.
234. Christ's Bride Ministries, 148 F.3d at 255-57.
235. 163 F.3d 341 (6th Cir. 1998).
236. Id. at 346-47.
237. Id. at 346 (citation omitted).
238. Id. at 347.
239. Id. at 347, 364.
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and whether the excluded speech is compatible with the forum's
multiple purposes. The government's decision to limit access to
the property is not dispositive in answering whether or not the
government created a designated public forum. Rather, we must
also examine the relationship between the reasons for any restric-
tion on access and the forum's purpose. A contrary rule that fo-
cused solely on whether a speaker must obtain permission to
access government property "would allow every designated public
forum to be converted into a non-public forum the moment the
government did what is supposed to be impermissible in a desig-
nated public forum, which is to exclude speech based on con-
tent."
240
While the court's solicitude for freedom of expression is admirable, it is dif-
ficult to reconcile this language with the thrust of Forbes. Pursuant to a
proper understanding of the concept of the limited public forum, moreover, a
government actor is permitted to limit access to a designated public forum on
the basis of the content of speech.24 Judge Moore continued his lengthy
explication of these matters by positing that "the courts will infer an intent on
the part of the government to create a public forum where the government's
justification for the exclusion of certain expressive conduct is unrelated to
the forum's purpose, even when speakers must obtain permission to use the
forum. 242 But it is hard to understand why the government's justification
must be related, somehow, to "the forum's purpose," when the Supreme
Court has stated repeatedly that the key to the classification of a forum is the
government actor's intent.243 That perceived requirement, however, played a
major role in leading the court to the conclusion that a designated public fo-
rum had been created here, as the court-looking past SORTA's written pol-
icy to focus instead on its practices-found "no established causal link" be-
tween SORTA's stated goals "and its broad-based discretion to exclude ad-
vertisements that are too controversial or not aesthetically pleasing."2" The
court was willing to "assume that those seeking access to SORTA's advertis-
ing space must first obtain permission from SORTA, and that this permission
is not granted as a matter of course,"245 and yet still managed to conclude
"that in accepting a wide array of political and public-issue speech, SORTA
has demonstrated its intent to designate its advertising space a public fo-
240. United Food, 163 F.3d at 350-51 (citations omitted).
241. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
242. United Food, 163 F.3d at 351.
243. See id. at 350.
244. Id. at 354.
245. Id. at 353.
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rum.'2 46 As in the Christ's Bride Ministries case, the court went on to find
that the transit authority's action could survive neither strict scrutiny nor the
reasonableness test.247 Judge Wellford, concurring, agreed that the rejection
of the union's advertisement was unreasonable, but did not agree with the
conclusion that SORTA had created a designated public forum.
248
A variation on this theme, finally, is the situation in which it appears
that no formal permission is required, but a question remains as to whether or
not the government actor has retained sufficient control over access to the
forum to compel the conclusion that the forum is non-public. Such a case is
Hopper v. City of Pasco,249 in which the plaintiffs were two "artists whose
works were excluded from public display at the Pasco City Hall Gallery in
Pasco, Washington, because city officials deemed their art too 'controver-
sial."' 250 Local artists were invited to display their works in the public hall-
ways of a new city hall.251 While a notice inviting such submissions included
the statement that "all works will be screened for content and professional
presentation, ' 252 the Court of Appeals described the situation as follows:
[T]he arts program was run without any pre-screening process, and
the city provided no further definition or guidance as to what kind
of work would be considered inappropriate. There was no selec-
tion process to monitor quality, content, or controversy. As a re-
sult, the Arts Council rejected no artwork during the entire length
of the program .... Nor did the city review works prior to their
placement in the gallery.253
But the city manager "assumed the Arts Council, [which actually adminis-
tered the program] would screen for content," and the city manager's assis-
tant "testified that he expected and trusted [the director of the Arts Council]
to make sure that no 'offensive or politically-motivated art' would be
shown.' '2' As it turned out, one plaintiffs sculptures were removed from the
display, and the other plaintiff's prints were never displayed--despite having
been submitted for display-in both cases because of their potentially offen-
246. Id. at 355.
247. United Food, 163 F.3d at 355-58.
248. Id. at 364-65 (Wellford, J., concurring).
249. 241 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001).
250. Id. at 1069-70.
251. ld. at 1070.
252. Id. at 1071.
253. Id. at 1071-72.
254. Hopper, 241 F.3d at 1072.
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sive content. 5 Had the city created a designated public forum? Despite the
written notice indicating that works would be "screened for content," and
despite the undeniable fact that an artist's work would not actually be exhi-
bited unless the Arts Council chose to display it, the Court (saying nothing
explicitly about "permission") held that a designated public forum had in-
deed been created, explaining its conclusion as follows:
It is undisputed that Pasco opened its display space to expressive
activity by retaining the Arts Council to manage a gallery with ex-
hibitions by local artists. This evinces an intent to create a desig-
nated public forum . . . . The city's so-called policy of non-
controversy became no policy at all because it was not consistently
enforced and because it lacked any definite standards. Prior to the
exclusion of the works at issue here, the city neither pre-screened
submitted works, nor exercised its asserted right to exclude works.
... Given the undisputed facts in the record concerning the selec-
tion and screening process for art to be displayed at City Hall (or
rather, the lack thereof), we conclude that the city retained no
substantive control over the content of the arts program. 25 6
"Having effectively opened its doors to all comers," the Court went on to
say, the city "has failed to exercise the clear and consistent control over the
exhibits in city hall" required to establish a non-public forum. 257 The Court
went on to find that the city could not satisfy the requisite strict judicial scru-
tiny.258 A dissenting judge, viewing summary judgment in favor of the chal-
lengers as inappropriate, did not believe that the record clearly established
that a designated public forum had been created. 59
At the lower-court level, then, it seems fair to conclude that Forbes has
not, through its emphasis on whether "permission" is needed, provided the
kind of bright-line test that it might have appeared to provide. Cases of the
kind which I have just described raise serious questions, moreover, as to
whether "permission" is an unambiguous, and therefore, workable, concept.
Is "permission" required, so that access to the forum should be viewed as
"selective" rather than "general," in every instance in which, due to physical-
ly limited resources (because, for example, there are a limited number of
buses or rooms in community centers available at any particular time) it is
necessary to employ a procedure whereby a speaker must make application
255. Id. at 1073.
256. Id. at 1078.
257. Id. at 1080.
258. Id. at 1081-82.
259. Hopper, 241 F.3d at 1083-92 (Gould, J., dissenting).
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for access to the forum at issue? If so, should the fact that permission is
technically required lead to a "selective access" conclusion even if permis-
sion is always (or virtually always) granted? Should it matter, furthermore,
why access might be denied by the governmental gatekeeper, or does it suf-
fice that the system in place contemplates that access may sometimes be de-
nied?
b. Is "Standardless Discretion" Relevant?
As the preceding discussion reveals, courts have at times been influ-
enced in determining whether a designated public forum has been created, by
the perception that the relevant government actor has effectively been given
unlimited discretion to grant or deny access to the forum in question; the
existence of standardless discretion has, in those cases, been held against the
government. Thus, in the CBM case, the court reiterated the assertion of an
earlier Third Circuit panel that "'standards for inclusion and exclusion' in a
limited public forum 'must be unambiguous and definite' if the 'concept of a
designated [public] forum is to retain any vitality whatever,"260 and went on,
in the process of reaching the conclusion that a designated public forum had
been created, to observe that "[t]here is no policy, written or unwritten, pur-
suant to which CBM's ads were removed., 261 In the United Food & Com-
mercial Workers case, the court employed some of the language from the
CBM opinion to make the same point more explicitly.2 62 "[I]f the 'concept of
a designated open forum is to retain any vitality whatever,' we will hold that
the government did not create a public forum only when its standards for
inclusion and exclusion are clear and are designed to prevent interference
with the forum's designated purpose.2 63
In the Hopper case as well, the court quoted the heart of the statement
about standards made in the CBM opinion, adding, somewhat cryptically in
the midst of its discussion of the forum issue, that "[c]ourts have also been
reluctant to accept policies based on subjective or overly general criteria.' '264
The theme was echoed in the court's later statement that "[t]he city's so-
called policy of non-controversy [with regard to the display of art at city hall]
became no policy at all because it was not consistently enforced and because
260. Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 251 (3d Cir.
1998) (quoting Gregoire v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1365, 1375 (3d Cir. 1990)).
261. Id. at 254.
262. United Food & Com. Workers Union Local 1099 v. Sw. Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth.,
163 F.3d 341, 352 (6th Cir. 1998).
263. Id.
264. Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067, 1077 (9th Cir. 2001).
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it lacked any definite standards. 265 Still later in its discussion of the forum
issue, the court said this:
[D]espite its stated policy of avoiding "controversial art," Pasco
never established criteria by which to assess whether or not a work
would fall within the policy. Instead, application . . . was left en-
tirely to the discretion of city administrators.
The potential for abuse of such unbounded discretion is heigh-
tened by the inherently subjective nature of the standard itself. A
ban on "controversial art" may all too easily lend itself to view-
point discrimination, a practice forbidden even in limited public
fora.2
66
The court's conclusion, with respect to the classification of the forum, was,
again, that "[h]aving effectively opened its doors to all comers, subject only
[to] a standardless standard," the city had failed in its attempt to persuade the
court that the art exhibit was a non-public forum.26 7 The existence of stan-
dardless discretion thus clearly seemed to bother the court and bolster its
conclusion that a designated public forum had been created.
But the question must be asked: Why must the gatekeeper of a go-
vernmental forum be limited by definite standards, in the exercise of discre-
tion regarding access to that forum, in order for the forum to be deemed non-
public? Indeed, what does the issue of standardless discretion have to do
with the ostensibly governing criterion of the government's intent to create,
or not to create, an open forum? Forbes itself appears to contradict such
reasoning, as reflected in the complaint of Justice Stevens, in his dissenting
opinion, that "the Court barely mentions the standardless character of the
decision to exclude Forbes from the debate.
2 68
It bears mentioning that the issue of standardless discretion has come
into play in yet another way in some lower-court decisions involving public
forum determinations-namely, as a basis for finding forbidden viewpoint
discrimination. The link between standardless discretion and the potential
265. Id. at 1078.
266. Id. at 1079.
267. Id. at 1080. What the court actually said at this point was that "Pasco has failed to
exercise the clear and consistent control over the exhibits in city hall that our cases require to
maintain a limited public forum." Id. But it must be understood that, in the Ninth Circuit, the
"limited" public forum has been consistently equated with the "non-public" forum. See supra
text accompanying notes 180-84.
268. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes , 523 U.S. 666, 684 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). He went on to deplore the "arbitrary definitions of the scope of the forum," and
AETC's "entirely subjective, ad hoc judgments about the dimensions of [the] forum." Id. at
690.
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for impermissible viewpoint discrimination is well-established, as Justice
Brennan's majority opinion in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing
Co.269 makes clear:
[T]he absence of express standards makes it difficult to distinguish
... between a licensor's legitimate denial of a permit and its illegi-
timate abuse of censorial power. Standards provide the guideposts
that check the licensor and allow courts quickly and easily to de-
termine whether the licensor is discriminating against disfavored
speech. Without these guideposts, post hoc rationalizations by the
licensing official and the use of shifting or illegitimate criteria are
far too easy, making it difficult for courts to determine in any par-
ticular case whether the licensor is permitting favorable, and sup-
270pressing unfavorable, expression.
The danger of content and viewpoint censorship, he went on to say, "is at its
zenith when the determination of who may speak and who may not is left to
the unbridled discretion of a government official. 27'
According to some federal appellate courts, standardless discretion does
not simply create a danger of viewpoint discrimination, but, in essence,
amounts to such discrimination, serving as a basis for invalidating a regulato-
ry scheme even in a non-public forum. 272 Thus, in the words of one court,
"viewpoint neutrality requires not just that a government refrain from expli-
cit viewpoint discrimination, but also that it provide adequate safeguards to
protect against the improper exclusion of viewpoints. 273 But it is the exer-
cise of viewpoint discrimination-as opposed to simply the potential there-
fore-that, according to the Supreme Court, will invalidate a denial of access
to a non-public forum. As one court has observed, moreover, "[a]ll of the
modem cases in which the Supreme Court has set forth the unbridled discre-
tion doctrine have involved public fora, and no Supreme Court case has sug-
gested that the doctrine is applicable outside the setting of a public forum.
2 74
Thus, while judicial wariness of standardless discretion even in non-public
fora is commendable, the willingness of some courts to equate such discre-
269. 486 U.S. 750 (1988).
270. Id. at 758.
271. Id. at763.
272. Child Evangelism Fellowship of S.C. v. Anderson Sch. Dist. Five, 470 F.3d 1062,
1069 (4th Cir. 2006); Summum v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995, 1007-09 (10th Cir. 2002);
Amandola v. Town of Babylon, 251 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir. 2001). See also DeBoer v. Vill. of
Oak Park, 267 F.3d 558, 572-74 (7th Cir. 2001).
273. Child Evangelism Fellowship of Md., Inc. v. Montgomery County Pub. Sch., 457
F.3d 376, 384 (4th Cir. 2006) (emphasis in original).
274. Griffin v. Sec'y of Veterans Affairs, 288 F.3d 1309, 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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tion with viewpoint discrimination must be regarded as highly questionable
under prevailing legal doctrine.
IV. CAN A MEANINGFUL "LIMITED PUBLIC FORUM" CATEGORY EXIST?
While lower courts have discerned the existence of designated and li-
mited public fora more frequently than pessimistic readers of pertinent Su-
preme Court opinions would ever have expected, the questionable nature of
some of these rulings, combined with the intrinsic challenge of finding a
limited forum to be open to a challenger while faithfully employing a "gov-
ernment intent" standard, cannot help but leave one wondering, still, whether
a meaningful and workable "limited public forum" concept can be envi-
sioned. In asking this question, one may benefit by briefly considering, first,
whether the overall public forum doctrine makes sense, and, next, whether
the "permission" factor highlighted in Forbes offers a persuasive basis for
distinguishing between closed and open fora.
A. Rationalizing the Public Forum Doctrine
Arguably, the public forum doctrine, overall, does make sense. As an
overall body of rules, its primary effect is to presumptively make many go-
vernmentally-controlled properties and channels of communication "off lim-
its" to expressive activities by ordinary citizens. In each such case, the gov-
ernment, as the proprietor of property not traditionally or primarily dedicated
to speech or assembly, has made the judgment that such expressive activity is
not compatible with the intended use of the property. While judicial defe-
rence to the government's judgment in this regard is not inevitable, a signifi-
cant degree thereof is arguably defensible.275 Meanwhile, traditional public
fora, as well as private property and privately-controlled channels of com-
munication, remain presumptively accessible to speakers. We are accus-
tomed to "place" limitations on speakers (subject, of course, to intermediate
judicial scrutiny, because the restrictions are content-neutral), but the public
forum doctrine is special in that it allows even content-based distinctions to
be made, in a non-public forum, on the basis of "place" considerations. Even
those critics who have urged the Court to employ an approach that approx-
imates a "compatibility" analysis in such cases,276 however, would counten-
ance content discrimination that could not withstand strict scrutiny.
275. See the discussion of warranted judicial deference to governmental exercise of "ma-
nagerial authority" in Post, supra note 4, at 1809-24.
276. See, e.g., Post, supra note 4, at 1765-66. Similarly, Professor Gey has argued for the
use of what he calls an "interference" analysis that asks "whether expressive activity would
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The governmental property thus made "off limits" to speech is, moreo-
ver, made only presumptively unavailable to speakers, as meaningful judicial
review is employed even with respect to non-public fora, in which restric-
tions must satisfy a requirement of "reasonableness." To a surprising extent,
lower courts have put teeth into this seemingly deferential standard, not in-
frequently striking down denials of access to non-public fora as unreasona-
ble.277 More importantly, the doctrine in fact encompasses significant limita-
tions on discrimination; viewpoint discrimination is forbidden in all set-
tings, 278 and content discrimination is presumptively impermissible not only
in traditional public fora, but also in any non-traditional forum which a gov-
ernment actor has decided to treat as if it were a traditional public forum. 2 79
Under the proper understanding of the limited public forum concept, moreo-
ver, content discrimination is presumptively intolerable within the class of
speakers to whom the forum has been opened. Thus, the doctrine, in its enti-
rety, can be seen as balancing deference toward the government as proprietor
with an insistence that, at some point, discrimination among speakers is un-
acceptable.28 ° Of course, the nondiscrimination principle is undermined, in
tend to interfere in a significant way with the government's own activities in [a] forum." Gey,
supra note 4, at 1576. Professors Farber and Nowak, meanwhile, argued for a "focused ba-
lancing" approach. Farber & Nowak, supra note 4, at 1239-45.
277. See, e.g., Ariz. Life Coal., Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956, 972 (9th Cir. 2008); Initia-
tive & Referendum Inst. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 417 F.3d 1299, 1307-08 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hu-
minski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 87-88 (2d Cir. 2005); Sammartano v. First Jud. Dist. Ct.,
303 F.3d 959, 966-70 (9th Cir. 2002); Vasquez v. Hous. Auth. of El Paso, 271 F.3d 198, 203-
04 (5th Cir. 2001), reh'g granted en banc, 289 F.3d 350 (5th Cir. 2002); Kincaid v. Gibson,
236 F.3d 342, 354-55 (6th Cir. 2001); United Food & Com. Workers Union Local 1099 v.
Sw. Ohio Reg'l Transit Auth., 163 F.3d 341, 357-58 (6th Cir. 1998); Christ's Bride Minis-
tries, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242, 255-57 (3d Cir. 1998).
278. Findings of viewpoint discrimination by lower courts are also not uncommon. See,
e.g., Ariz. Life Coal., Inc., 515 F.3d at 972; Husain v. Springer, 494 F.3d 108, 127 (2d Cir.
2007) (note the court's confusion regarding the governing rules, at 124-25). See also Ridley
v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 89 (1st Cir. 2004); Child Evangelism Fellowship of
N.J., Inc. v. Stafford Twp. Sch. Dist., 386 F.3d 514, 527-30 (3d Cir. 2004); Giebel v. Sylve-
ster, 244 F.3d 1182, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001); see also cases cited supra notes 272 & 273.
279. 'The role of categorical analysis in public forum jurisprudence is to generalize about
the kinds of places where denials of access tend systematically to trigger well-founded con-
cerns about deliberate governmental abuse and distortion." BeVier, supra note 4, at 121.
280. Professor BeVier has argued that the designated public forum concept serves the
objective of preventing viewpoint discrimination:
The designated public forum category serves this purpose by calling on government to justify
selective exclusions from property that it has deliberately opened to expressive activity. When
the government itself intentionally designates public property as a forum, it announces its own
judgment that speech is compatible with the property's other uses. Thus, a policy of selective
exclusion would be presumptively suspect as the product, not of a legitimate concern with dis-
ruption, but of an illicit concern with the speaker's viewpoint.
BeVier, supra note 4, at 109.
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large part, by the fact that the government is not required to maintain the
openness of a designated public forum,2"' and may limit access to the forum
by speech content or speaker identity.
B. Does the "Permission" Factor Make Sense?
The Court's recognition of a "permission" requirement as the hallmark
of "selective access," thereby indicating that a forum is "non-public" rather
than "designated" (or "limited"), surely fits nicely into a regime that is de-
voted, above all else, to effectuating the intent of the relevant government
actor. The existence of a "gatekeeper," who grants access to some but denies
it to others, can be seen as a clear indication of an intent to keep a forum
closed. But when the gatekeeper allows some to enter, one could just as
easily conclude that the forum is "limited," meaning that it is open to some
and closed to others. A "permission" requirement, in other words, is not
inescapably an indicator of an intent to maintain a closed forum. One may
yet be grateful to Justice Kennedy for his identification of a relatively con-
crete criterion by which courts are to be guided, in what would otherwise be
a largely unstructured process of divining governmental intent. At the same
time, it must be recognized that this is a criterion that can only have the ef-
fect of reducing the number of instances in which an "open" forum will be
found to exist-particularly if every situation in which access to a forum is
granted pursuant to a formal application process (as was true even in Widmar
itself!) is viewed as one in which "permission" is required, regardless of how
often access is denied.
In Forbes, Kennedy defended the Court's "distinction between general
and selective access [as one that] furthers First Amendment interests. 282 By
not equating selective access with a governmental intent to open a forum, he
explained, "we encourage the government to open its property to some ex-
pressive activity in cases where, if faced with an all-or-nothing choice, it
might not open the property at all. ' 283 The logic of that suggestion is clear, in
the abstract, but is it likely to prove accurate, in reality? Is it not more likely
that governmental entities, advised by counsel that they will enjoy more lati-
tude with respect to "forum" determinations if they implement meaningful
"permission" requirements so as to grant only "selective" access, will do just
281. Indeed, one commentator has argued, not unreasonably, "that within the parameters
of a limited public forum, it is impossible to differentiate between an impermissible content-
based . . . restriction on speech and a valid subject-matter-based or speaker-based re-
designation of the forum." McGill, supra note 4, at 939.
282. Ark. Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 680 (1998).
283. Id.
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that? Would not a city that wished to invite local artists to submit their
works for display at city hall, for example (as in the Hopper case, discussed
above), 4 likely employ a regime pursuant to which every submission would
be screened on the basis of content?
85
C. Can the "Limited Public Forum" Be Salvaged?
The difficulties attending the concept of the limited public forum, even
when that concept is properly understood, are clear. While Justice Black-
mun's complaint that the category had effectively been eliminated may have
been overstated, the fact remains that instances of governmental fora opened
to certain categories of speaker, in which the excluded speaker is seen as
falling within the class to whom the forum was intended to be opened, are
likely to be rare. Even when a court is prepared to conclude that "general
access" to a forum has been extended to a class of speakers, that decision
will likely lead to a second difficult determination as to whom it has been
opened-i.e., how shall the favored class be defined? In Widmar, the Court
found that the university classrooms had been made available to registered
student organizations, but why did the Court not conclude that the facilities
had been opened only to non-religious student organizations? In Forbes, the
Court found that the televised debate had been opened to serious Congres-
sional candidates, but why did the Court not conclude that it had been
opened to all Congressional candidates?
The challenge of defining the forum is nicely illustrated by an exchange
between Justices Breyer and Kennedy, in dictum, in a 1996 decision, Denver
Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. Federal Communica-
tions Commission.286 Writing for a plurality of four Justices, Breyer had oc-
casion to offer the following comment:
284. See supra text accompanying notes 248-58.
285. See PETA, Inc. v. Gittens, 414 F.3d 23, 28-31 (D.C. Cir. 2005), in which the exercise
of tight governmental control over the selection of sculptures to be featured in a public art
project-and the rejection of one of plaintiff's designs-was upheld as an exercise of "gov-
ernment speech;" forum analysis was deemed wholly inapplicable in this context. A similar
ruling, in the context of specialty license plate programs, is ACLU of Tennessee v. Bredesen,
441 F.3d 370 (6th Cir. 2006). But compare Ariz. Life Coal. Inc. v. Stanton, 515 F.3d 956,
963-68 (9th Cir. 2008), and Planned Parenthood of S.C. Inc. v. Rose, 361 F.3d 786 (4th Cir.
2004). See also Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000). For a dis-
cussion of the relationship of "government speech" to forum analysis, see generally Dolan,
supra note 171.
286. 518 U.S. 727 (1996).
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[I]t is plain from this Court's cases that a public forum "may be
created for a limited purpose." Our cases have not yet determined,
however, that [the] [G]overmnent's decision to dedicate a public
forum to one type of content or another is necessarily subject to
the highest level of scrutiny. Must a local government, for exam-
ple, show a compelling state interest if it builds a band shell in the
park and dedicates it solely to classical music (but not to jazz)?
The answer is not obvious.
287
Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice Ginsburg), in a separate opinion, re-
sponded to Breyer as follows:
I do not foreclose the possibility that the Government could
create a forum limited to certain topics or to serving the special
needs of certain speakers or audiences without its actions being
subject to strict scrutiny. This possibility seems to trouble the plu-
rality, which wonders if a local government must "show a compel-
ling state interest if it builds a band shell in the park and dedicates
it solely to classical music (but not to jazz)." . . . This is not the
correct analogy. [Our case is] more akin to the Government's cre-
ation of a band shell in which all types of music might be per-
formed except for rap music.28
s
Were a case to arise, then, in which a governmental band shell was made
available only to musicians playing classical music, and a challenge was
brought by an excluded jazz musician, how should the forum (assuming the
challenger could even surmount the hurdle of persuading the court that it was
a limited as opposed to a non-public forum) be described? Would it be open
to all musicians, or open only to classical musicians? If the latter, then the
"open" character of the forum would be of no avail to the excluded jazzman.
Perhaps the key to salvaging a meaningful limited-public-forum catego-
ry is to employ two distinctions, in those cases in which the forum has clear-
ly been opened to some speakers: a distinction between speaker identity and
speech content, and a distinction between a government actor's "primary"
and "secondary" intentions. The first of these distinctions is predicated on
the fact that, while the limited public forum was initially defined as one
"created for a limited purpose such as use by [different] groups... or for the
discussion of certain subjects, 289 there is a difference between discrimina-
287. Id. at 749-50 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S.
37, 46 n.7 (1983)) (citations omitted).
288. Id. at 802 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
289. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7 (1983).
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tion on the basis of speaker identity and discrimination based on the content
of speech. Coupling that distinction with a determination of "primary" and
"secondary" intentions, while far from a fully comfortable approach, may
just be the only way to escape from the intrinsic tautology of dividing the
open or closed nature of a forum based on an assessment of governmental
intent.
The suggested approach would work as follows: When a court is per-
suaded that the primary intention of the relevant government actor is to make
a forum available to a particular category of speakers, defined without refer-
ence to the content of their speech, and that a secondary intention is to block
access to a member of the favored category based upon the content of his
speech, the forum should be deemed a limited public forum and the content-
based restriction should be subjected to strict scrutiny. Thus, Widmar may
be understood as implicitly based upon the understanding that the universi-
ty's primary intention was to make its facilities available to student organiza-
tions, to which was added a less important, secondary intention to bar student
organizations engaging in religious speech; the distinction based on speaker
identity (student organizations versus the rest of the world) reflected the uni-
versity's dominant intention. In contrast, Lehman and Greer, to take just two
additional examples from Supreme Court cases, were each situations in
which the primary intention of the relevant government actor was to bar
speech of a certain content (political campaign advertising and political cam-
paign speech, respectively), regardless of speaker identity. Compare Perry,
in which the school district's primary intention was to discriminate based on
speaker identity (in favor of the certified bargaining representative) rather
than speech content, but the excluded speaker did not fall within the favored
class of speakers. Focusing on these distinctions may, just possibly, provide
a principled basis for requiring access by speakers to limited public fora.
V. PRAYER FOR RELIEF
More than ten years have passed since the Supreme Court last de-
cided-in Forbes-whether a governmentally controlled channel of commu-
nication was or was not an open forum for expression. The Court has, in that
span of time, declined on several occasions to hear cases that would provide
it with the opportunity to do so again,29 despite the undeniable existence of
290. See, e.g., Cogswell v. City of Seattle, 347 F.3d 809 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541
U.S. 1043 (2004); Hills v. Scottsdale Unified Sch. Dist. No. 8, 329 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2003),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1149 (2004); Giebel v. Sylvester, 244 F.3d 1182 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 858 (2001); Hopper v. City of Pasco, 241 F.3d 1067 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.
denied, 534 U.S. 951 (2001); DiLoreto v. Downey Unified School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 196
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conflict within the federal courts of appeals concerning the proper under-
standing and treatment of the "middle category" of governmental fora.29" '
Meanwhile, the mystery of the legal significance of that middle category-
and, in particular, the limited public forum-persists, along with the steady
flow of cases which require, for their resolution, a decision as to whether or
not the forum in question has been opened for expressive purposes. The
uncertainty surrounding this body of First Amendment doctrine cries out for
resolution.
Therefore, your humble author beseeches the Court to grant certiorari,
soon, in a case that will afford it the opportunity to clarify the following
points: When does a limited public forum exist? What is the legal signific-
ance of that designation? If, as Forbes suggests, the need for speakers to
obtain "permission" as a condition of access to a forum is the key to the dis-
tinction between "general access" (in which the case the forum is a "desig-
nated" public forum of some kind) and "selective access" (in which case the
forum is "non-public," or closed), what does it mean to say that "permission"
is required? What is the relevance (if any), for this analysis, of a grant of
standardless discretion to the relevant government actor? If, finally, the exis-
tence of a limited public forum is ever to support a claim of access by a
speaker who has been excluded by the relevant government actor, how is a
court to decide-once it decides that the forum has been opened to some
speakers-how to identify the class of speakers to whom it has been opened?
To the extent that these questions can be answered in a way that maximizes
opportunities for expression in governmentally-controlled fora, the clarifica-
tion of doctrine prayed for herein will be even more welcome. But, above
all, give us clarity, please.
F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1067 (2000); Christ's Bride Ministries, Inc. v.
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 148 F.3d 242 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1068 (1999).
291. The persistent denial of certiorari in cases of this kind is particularly striking in light
of the fact that Chief Justice Roberts (speaking in May 2007) reportedly offered, as one expla-
nation for the Court's smaller docket in recent years, "fewer conflicts among the circuits."
Marcia Coyle, Justices' Homestretch Packed, 29 NAT'L L.J., June 4, 2007 at 17.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Unlike in prior years when the Supreme Court of Florida was active in
the juvenile law area, this year, there is not much to report from the high
court with two exceptions. On the other hand, the intermediate appellate
courts and the Second District Court of Appeal, in particular, continue to be
active in several respects. They continue to provide guidance with statutory
interpretation of Chapters 39 and 985 as well as to reverse when trial courts
make clear mistakes regarding evidentiary matters.
II. DEPENDENCY
Domestic violence has been the subject of dependency proceedings in
the Florida courts for a number of years. Chapter 39 specifically recognizes
domestic violence as grounds for dependency describing it as harm that can
take place when a person "[e]ngages in violent behavior that demonstrates a
wanton disregard for the presence of a child and [can] reasonably result in
serious injury to the child."' However, domestic violence is limited in a de-
pendency proceeding by the proposition that the harm that takes place must
occur in the presence of the child.2 The child must see the violence and be
* Professor of Law, Shepard Broad Law Center, Nova Southeastern University, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida; J.D., Boston College, 1970; B.A., Colgate University, 1967. This article
covers cases decided during the period from July 1, 2006 through June 30, 2008.
1. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(32)(i) (2008).
2. D.H. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 769 So. 2d 424, 427 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2000).
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aware of it.3 The proof may be more than the child's presence when the do-
mestic violence occurs.4 Finally, the violence must result in some mental,
physical, or sexual injury to the child5 or "prospective abuse" that is immi-
nent.6
In the second domestic violence situation, the test is whether, when the
parents' behavior occurs, it must be shown that there is a "nexus" between
that behavior and the State's assertion of prospective abuse as to the child-
ren.7 These issues came up in a pair of cases involving the same family in
the Second District Court of Appeal in L.R. v. Department of Children &
Family Services8 and J.C. v. Department of Children & Family Services.9
One of these reported cases involved the father' ° and the other involved the
mother." In each case, the appellate court found that the Department of
Children and Families (DCF) did not introduce any evidence that either par-
ent engaged in domestic violence after the children were born. 12 In fact, all
of the domestic violence occurred years before the dependency trial took
place.13 Thus, the court found, as to the father, that the findings were specul-
ative and unsupported.'4 As to the mother, the DCF alleged, inter alia, that
the mother placed the children "at substantial risk of imminent abuse" be-
cause she failed to protect them from an abuser even where the child was not
previously abused.' 5 Starting with the proposition that there was not evi-
dence that any of the children had been injured in any way, the court held
that, nonetheless, there was no nexus shown between the parents' behavior
and prospective abuse.' 6 It held that, in failure to protect situations, there are
3. D.D. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 773 So. 2d 615, 617-18 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 2000).
4. See R.V. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 939 So. 2d 200, 202 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2006); S.B. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 834 So. 2d 415, 416-17 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2003); D.H., 769 So. 2d at 427; D.D., 773 So. 2d at 617-18.
5. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2); see also M.B. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 937 So.
2d 709, 711 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); A.R. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 876 So.
2d 647, 648 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004); D.D., 773 So. 2d at 617-18.
6. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(15)(f).
7. N.D. v. Dep't of Children Family Servs., 939 So. 2d 1192, 1194 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2006).
8. 947 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
9. 947 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
10. Id. at 1247.
11. Id. at 1247; LR., 947 So. 2d at 1242-43.
12. J.C., 947 So. 2d at 1247; LR., 947 So. 2d at 1244.
13. J.C., 947 So. 2d at 1248; LR., 947 So. 2d at 1243-44.
14. J.C., 947 So. 2d at 1250.
15. L.R., 947 So. 2d at 1244-45.
16. J.C., 947 So. 2d at 1250; LR., 947 So. 2d at 1245.
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two nexuses that must be proven-the acts of the abuser shows that he or she
will continue the abuse and "the parent's behavior shows that he or she will
continue [to fail] to protect the child." 17 Under the facts of the case, neither
of these was proven.
18
Finally, in the case involving the mother, the court ruled on an eviden-
tiary matter worth expressing.19 The DCF had offered documents in evi-
dence alleging violence after the children's birth.20 It was the father's writ-
ten petition seeking a domestic violence injunction against the mother in
which he alleged, by checking a box, that the incidence took place in the
presence of the children. 21 At trial, he testified that he checked the box inad-
vertently. 22 The trial court found his explanation not credible.23 The appel-
late court found the document was hearsay and, while there is an exception
to hearsay "if the declarant testifies at trial, is subject to cross-examination
concerning the statement, and 'the statement is inconsistent with the decla-
rant's testimony [at trial,] and was given under oath.., at a trial, hearing, or
other proceeding or in a deposition,"' it may be used. 24 However, the written
statement here was not made in a matter described in the Florida Rules of
Evidence.
25
The limitation on domestic violence being grounds for dependency,
even in the presence of a child, was also before an appellate court in J.S. v.
Department of Children & Families.6 In that case, there was an incident
which "occurred when the child was only a few weeks old. 27 The mother
"'raised her hand' to the father during an argument. The father twisted her
arm, took the child from the mother's other arm, and left the residence with
the child. 28 The appellate court held that while there was an acrimonious
relationship between the parents, they were now separated and there was no
evidence that the child was affected by the incident of domestic violence.29
17. LR., 947 So. 2d at 1245.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 1244.
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. LR., 947 So. 2d at 1244.
23. Id.
24. Id. (emphasis omitted).
25. Id.
26. 977 So. 2d 705, 706 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
27. Id. at 706.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 707.
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The appellate court thus, reversed the finding of dependency as to the fa-
ther.
30
In a third domestic violence dependency case, M.B. v. Department of
Children & Family Services,31 the Second District Court of Appeal was faced
with a situation where there was a single incident of domestic violence in the
presence of the children, but where there was no evidence that the children
suffered any physical or mental harm as a result of witnessing the act or that
the parents posed any current threat of harm to the children.32 Under the
facts of the case, "the [f]ather knocked the [m]other down several times,
punched her in the chest, and kicked at her legs" after learning that she "was
cheating on him., 33 The young children were in the room and witnessed the
events.34 At the dependency hearing, the mother testified that the father had
never hit her before during their eight-year relationship, and did not touch
her since.35 Subsequently, the father and mother ended their relationship and
were currently involved in other relationships and there was no evidence that
the father had engaged in any inappropriate harm toward the children.36
Thus, there being no evidence that the safety and well-being of the children
would be threatened if they were placed in their father's care, there was in-
sufficient evidence to make a finding of dependency.37
In M.B., the Second District Court of Appeal ruled in a domestic vi-
olence dependency case interpreting what it means for the domestic violence
to occur in the presence of the child.38 It held that the "'presence' of the
child must be something more than physical proximity. '39 There must be
"evidence that the child sees or is aware of the" occurrence of the domestic
violence. 4° Thereafter, there must be a showing of "some physical, mental or
sexual injury to the child" and that the parent's harmful behavior must
present a present risk to the child based upon current circumstances.4' Under
30. Id.
31. 937 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
32. Id. at 712.
33. Id. at710.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. M.B., 937 So. 2d at 710.
37. Id. at 711.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. M.B., 937 So. 2d at 711 (citing B.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 846 So. 2d
1273, 1274 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
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the facts of the case there simply was no evidence that the child was aware of
the violence that occurred.
The nexus test described previously in the context of domestic violence
dependency cases can also arise in other factual scenarios. For example, in
G.R. v. Department of Children & Family Services,4 3 both parents appealed
from an adjudication of dependency as to a daughter, and the mother ap-
pealed as to the daughter and her two sons by her former husband who was
not a party to the proceeding." The underlying facts of the case are signifi-
cant. The parents took a three year old son of the mother to the hospital after
the father, who had noticed that the child "had wet his pants, . . . lifted the
child... off the bed [and] swung him around, [and as he did so] heard a loud
pop.''45 At the hospital, it was determined that the child had suffered a spiral
fracture of his left arm and the matter was reported to the DCF.46 As a result,
the child who was injured and his sibling, and the couple's daughter, who
was born after the incident, were sheltered.47 The Second District Court of
Appeal reversed as to the daughter and the uninjured son finding that the
evidence was not legally sufficient to support the finding that the mother
failed to protect the daughter or the other children from the father's abuse,
and that DCF "failed to establish a nexus between the [flather's abuse of [the
stepchild] and prospective abuse [of his daughter]".48 The test for whether
the mother, as the initially non-offending party, may be held accountable in
dependency is that the parent must have allegedly failed to protect the child
in that the parent "knew or should have known" that the abusive parent was
engaging in the abuse.49 DCF conceded that there was no evidence that the
mother knew or should have known that the father constituted a danger to the
baby daughter and that the mother failed to protect their baby daughter.5°
Similarly, "there was no evidence that the [m]other knew or should have
known [that] the [f]ather had a propensity toward abuse" as there had been
no prior incident. 51 Thus, there could be no showing that the mother failed to
42. Id.
43. 937 So. 2d 1257 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
44. Id. at 1259.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. G.R., 937 So. 2d at 1263.
49. Id. at 1262-63; see also A.B. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 901 So. 2d 324,
327 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005); A.R. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 876 So. 2d 647,
648 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
50. See G.R., 937 So. 2d at 1262.
51. Id.
2009]
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protect the child who was injured by her father.52 And finally, there must be
a nexus between abuse and the prospective abuse to the sibling. 53 None of
this applied to the mother but as to the father, there was just a single incident
of abuse.54 There was "no evidence [of] any psychological condition" of the
father that might indicate ongoing abuse. 5 And "there was no evidence of
any other incident[] of abuse to any of the children., 56 Thus, there was no
nexus between the abuse of the one child and the others.57 The appellate
court, therefore, reversed the adjudicatory disposition as to the father and the
young daughter and as to the mother, as to all three children.58
A second case involving a dependency proceeding charging domestic
violence and the issue of presence of children in order to substantiate the
charge is M.M. v. Department of Children & Families.5 9 In this case, DCF
alleged that the mother was not willing or able to protect the child because
she "failed to follow through with a restraining order against the father after.
. . two incidents of domestic violence against" the mother.6" The father had
been arrested twice but the mother refused to testify at trial. 61 There was
also an additional incident where the father broke into the mother's home,"
was drunk, and the mother sought and obtained a temporary restraining or-
der.62 None of these incidents occurred in the presence of the child.63 Be-
cause the trial court's judgment established that the dependency proceeding
was based solely on the "domestic acts involving violence, or the threat of
violence committed outside ... the presence of the child," and because the
undisputed testimony by the mother that she "prevented the father from hav-
ing any contact with" the child in the two situations, and there was no evi-
dence that the mother's "failure to extend the restraining order constitute[d]
imminent harm to" the child, the court reversed.'
It is possible to prove dependency based upon acts of domestic violence
that occur outside the presence of the children. As described earlier in this
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1262-63 (citing C.M. v. Dep't of Children and Family Servs., 844 So. 2d 765,
766 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
54. Id. at 1263.
55. G.R., 937 So. 2d at 1263.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 946 So. 2d 1287, 1288 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1289.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. M.M., 946 So. 2d at 1290.
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survey, it can be done if there is a showing that the acts of domestic violence
create an imminent risk of harm to the children. In C.J. v. Department of
Children & Families,65 the issue was whether incidents of domestic violence
can rise to the level of a risk of imminent neglect of the child.66 In that case,
"[t]he first incident resulted in the mother seeking a restraining order; the
second involved cuts and bruises and the mother being hospitalized; and the
third incident involved ... [the husband] grabbing and holding [the moth-
er's] sister, smashing car windows, and breaking [the] glass coffee table
[with all of] the children in the same or adjacent rooms. 67 The mother suf-
fered serious injuries and the sister called the police.68 The court concluded
that the finding of dependency was proper in that there were "multiple inci-
dents of ongoing and substantial domestic violence with [the] children
present" at the house in a short period of time which created "a risk of immi-
nent neglect."69
However, there has to be competent evidence of the domestic violence
as defined by Florida law.70 Under the facts of the case, in T.S. v. Depart-
ment of Children & Families,7' involving claims of domestic violence perpe-
trated by the father, the appellate court held that the mother's "two applica-
tions for domestic violence injunctions" did not result in the issuance of a
restraining order and the other incident in which the father and mother were
involved in a commotion at the mother's house in which the father was com-
bative when the police arrived and threw a chair which hit the door of the
house, did not constitute legally sufficient demonstration of domestic vi-
olence.72 The appellate court thus reversed.73
As the Second District Court of Appeal said in M.C. v. Department of
Children & Family Services,74 the law relating "to prospective harm to one
child by a parent based upon" the abuse and neglect or abandonment as to
another is well-settled.75 In In Re M.F.,76 the Supreme Court of Florida had
65. 968 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
66. Id. at 122.
67. Id. at 124.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 125.
70. See FLA. STAT. § 741.28(2) (2008) ("'Domestic violence' means any assault, aggra-
vated assault, battery, aggravated battery, sexual assault, sexual battery, stalking, aggravated
stalking, kidnapping, false imprisonment, or any [other] criminal offense resulting in physical
injury or death of one family or household member by another family or household mem-
ber.").
71. 944 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (per curiam).
72. Id. at 1050-52.
73. Id. at 1049.
74. 936 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
75. Id. at 765.
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originally required that the evidence necessary to prove dependency as to
other children required more than a finding as to a child against whom injury
had occurred." The court required additional proof establishing a nexus be-
tween the prior abuse and the prospective abuse of the sibling recognizing
that a flexible test was required. 8 The intermediate appellate courts have
further amplified the opinion by describing what the nexus requires. For
example, a parent who suffers from "a mental or emotional condition that
will continue [as in the case of] mental illness, drug [abuse], or pedophilia
[makes] it highly probable that" the parent in the future will abuse or neglect
another child.79 The court applied these principles in M.C., where a stepfa-
ther who had abused an eleven-year old child of the mother by a previous
marriage appealed from an adjudication of a second child, his natural child
by the mother.8"
The testimony generating a nexus between the alleged offense of sexual
abuse of the other child, which was hotly contested, in M.C., was the testi-
mony of a sexual abuse expert.8 The expert "testified that there are three
[ways] by which adults who sexually abuse a child may recidivate against
another child," but that the appellant father did not meet any of the three
"pathways" tests and that risk was not imminent to the other child.8" How-
ever, the expert was asked whether, if the court found that the first child was
a victim of sexual abuse, did the expert believe that there was "a substantial
risk that if untreated, [the father] could commit an act ... of sexual abuse
against his own child," to which the expert answered "correct. ,83 The appel-
late court rejected this hypothetical question and answer as the basis for the
finding of nexus.84 It did so because the Florida test for nexus is more than a
finding of a "sexual abuse of one child creat[ing] a substantial risk of abuse
to another child. 85 The fact that it arises in the context of testimony by an
expert witness does not disguise it as a per se rule rejected by the Supreme
Court of Florida.86
76. 770 So. 2d 1189 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
77. Id. at 1194.
78. Id.
79. See C.M. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 844 So. 2d 765, 766 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 2003).
80. M.C., 936 So. 2d at 764.
81. Id. at 765.
82. Id. at 767.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 767-68.
85. See M.C., 936 So. 2d at 768.
86. Id.
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The intermediate appellate courts also decided a series of procedural is-
sues during the past two survey years. In what can only be described as an
extraordinary failure to comply with rudimentary due process, a trial court
found a child dependent as to the mother, based upon the proffers made by
the DCF lawyer and the parent's lawyer and a short colloquy with the mother
in A.G. v. Department of Children & Families.87 At the start of an adjudica-
tory hearing, the mother's lawyer told the court the following: "Seriously, I
would truly be happy to have-DCF's attorney-proffer his evidence as to
what he believes makes this child dependent, and I'll proffer mine and let
you make a decision. 88 Apparently taking the lawyer at the lawyer's word,
and after addressing the mother directly and hearing her answer in which she
said that she had "'more than enough evidence to prove that"' she took care
of her son, the court found the child dependent.89 As the appellate court
noted in reversing, "there was no evidence, no sworn testimony, and no sti-
pulated facts presented to the trial court at [that] hearing."9 The appellate
court held that once the lawyers for the two sides had "proffered significantly
different facts which would" produce different results depending upon whose
factual assertions the court believed, "due process required the ... court to
proceed [to] an evidentiary hearing."9'
In a second case, albeit in the adoption law setting, involving the failure
to receive evidence and move immediately to a finding, a trial court heard
opening statements in an unfitness proceeding under the state adoption law,
asked the lawyers to proffer evidence, and at the conclusion of opening
statements granted the motion to dismiss with prejudice and entered final
judgment for the respondent.92 In A.N. v. M.F. -A.,9 the appellate court held
that the dismissal of a "petition with prejudice based upon a proffer of testi-
mony by the attorneys in their opening statements... prior to the completion
of appellants' case" was a violation of due process and thus there should be a
87. 938 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 606-07.
90. Id. at 607.
91. Id. at 607 (citing Lane v. Lane, 599 So. 2d 218, 219 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
In addition, the appellate court then added that even if the parent's attorney had proffered facts
to demonstrate dependency, the trial court should determine whether such an "admission or
consent to a finding of dependency was made voluntarily and with a full understanding."
A.G., 938 So. 2d at 607. If the parent's lawyer proffered testimony that would constitute
grounds for dependency, the appellate court held that there would still have to be an admission
or consent of the findings by the parent. Id.
92. A.N. v. M.F.-A, 946 So. 2d 58, 59 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
93. Id. at 58.
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reversal. 94 Under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, the appellate court
noted, the motion for judgment for a directed verdict must occur after the
party seeking affirmative relief has had an opportunity to present evidence. 95
The right to present evidence is also provided for earlier in a dependen-
cy proceeding, at the shelter care hearing stage.96 In L.M.C. v. Department of
Children & Families,97 the appellate court reversed the trial court's denial of
the parents' "request to present evidence on the issue of probable cause" at
the shelter care hearing.98 In a brief opinion, the Fifth District Court of Ap-
peal reaffirmed the proposition "that parents have a statutory right to present
evidence contesting probable cause at shelter [care] hearings. ' 99
Perhaps most disturbing among the cases reported here concerning due
process procedures is C.J. v. Department of Children & Families." In that
case, DCF alleged that the child was at a "substantial risk of imminent threat
of harm ... or imminent neglect. . . arising out of [the father's] history of
domestic violence against the mother."1°1 DCF conceded before the appel-
late court "that the trial court erred in making a 'blanket ruling' admitting
hearsay under the assumption that hearsay 'is permitted in dependency mat-
ters.""0 2 Noting that the trial court has "discretion to rely upon hearsay" in
such matters as shelter hearings, at the adjudicatory stage the Florida statute
on point is crystal clear: "'[aIdjudicatory hearing[s] shall be conducted by
the judge.., applying the rules of evidence in use in civil cases.'""03 In what
can only be described as a polite understatement, the appellate court held
"[t]hus, the trial court erred in admitting, and relying upon, inadmissible
hearsay testimony at the adjudicatory hearing.""
Rights of a parent as to whom no dependency finding was made were
before the court in C.K. v. Department of Children & Families.°5 The father
appealed "from an order finding him unfit for placement of [his] minor
child" and required him to comply with requirements of the Interstate Com-
94. Id. at 60.
95. Id. (citing FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.420(b)).
96. L.M.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 935 So. 2d 47, 47 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2006).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. (citing A.M.T. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 890 So. 2d 551, 552 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2005); S.M. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 890 So. 2d 552, 552 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam)).
100. 968 So. 2d 121 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
101. Id. at 122 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(30), (43) (2006)).
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.507(l)(b) (2006)).
104. Id.
105. 949 So. 2d 336, 337 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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pact on the Placement of Children. 10 6 The appellate court found that while
the trial court in a dependency case does have "authority to require a non-
offending parent to participate in treatment and services," the evidence must
be sufficient to require such obligations. °7 However, the court's order re-
quiring the father to comply with Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children was affirmed because that statute does apply where "the court is
transferring custody of the child to an out of state non-custodial parent,"
which was the case in the matter before the appellate court in CK. 108
Complying with principles of service of process in a dependency pro-
ceeding would seem simple enough. However, compliance with service
rules was before the Third District Court of Appeal in N.L. v. Department of
Children & Family Services.'09 Under Florida law, service of process must
be either personally on the "parent who can be located" or by a showing of
"diligent search and [an] inquiry for a parent who cannot be located."" In
N.L., "there was no personal service of the.., petition on the mother and
[there was] no affidavit of diligent search.""' Thus, there was a failure to
comply with the statute.112 Significantly, the appellate court rejected De-
partment's argument "that service of the dependency petition on the mother's
counsel was effective to accomplish ... service on the mother."" 3 Further,
the fact that the summons in the dependency proceeding "contained a warn-
ing that failure to respond or appear at the hearing constitutes consent to an
adjudication" does not dispense with the obligation of the State to serve the
petition." 4 Thus, the appellate court reversed." 5
Parents have the right to counsel by statute in Florida in dependency
proceedings as well as in termination of parental rights cases." 6 In S.K. v.
Department of Children & Families,"7 a father, in prison for life, appealed
from a trial court order adjudicating his child dependent, arguing "that the
trial court" failed to provide him with "an attorney ad litem to represent him
106. Id. at 337; see FLA. STAT. § 409.401 (2008).
107. C.K, 949 So. 2d at 337 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.521(l)(b) (2006); J.P. v. Dep't of
Children & Families, 855 So. 2d 175, 176 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
108. Id. at 337-38 (citing H.P. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 838 So. 2d 583, 586 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
109. 960 So. 2d 810, 811 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
110. Id. at 812 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.502(4)-(9) (2006)).
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. Id.
114. N.L., 960 So. 2d at 812-13.
115. Id. at 813.
116. FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1) (2008); see also L.R. v. J.F., 960 So. 2d 836, 839 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting FLA. STAT. § 39.013(1) (2006)).
117. 959 So. 2d 1209 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
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when he was indisputably incompetent," and thus denied him due process."'
The appellate court affirmed, finding that the father was represented by
counsel through the entire proceeding and that the proceeding "could not be
delayed to await" the father's restoration of competency.1 9 The appellate
court recognized that the trial court was faced with two propositions: First,
the protection of the child as well as the parent; and second, the obligations
of the lawyer representing a client under a disability pursuant to the Florida
Rules of Professional Conduct.'20
The appellate court first held that the rights of the parents "must yield to
the needs of the children."'12 ' The court then discussed at length the obliga-
tion of counsel to a client under a disability. 22 The court recognized that
"[there is no provision in any [law] for the appointment of an attorney ad
litem for a parent" although such a provision does apply for children. 13 The
rationale, according to the appellate court was quite simple-"[p]arents are
already provided with attorneys."'24 Further, the appellate court recognized
that the attorney ad litem for a child performs the duty of an attorney and the
parent already has an attorney.125
The court then recognized that the possible remedy would have been the
"appointment of a guardian for an incompetent person, . . .even within a
dependency proceeding."'' 26 However, this did not occur in this case.'2 7 The
court thus concluded that the parent was represented by obviously competent
counsel and affirmed. 28
Cases involving corporal punishment have regularly been reported upon
in this survey. 129 However, the law is clear that "one incident of corporal
punishment, even when [the] parent's behavior is uncontrolled, [does not
118. Id. at 1210.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1211-13 (quoting FLA. BARR. PROF. CONDUCT 4-1.14).
121. Id. at 1212 (quoting L.M. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 946 So. 2d 42, 46 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006)).
122. S.K., 959 So. 2d at 1212-13.
123. Id. at 1213 (citing FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.217).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. S.K., 959 So. 2d at 1213
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Michael J. Dale, 2003 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 28 NOVA L. REV.
543, 544 (2004) [hereinafter Dale, 2003 Survey]; Moore v. Pattin, 983 So. 2d 663, 665 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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suffice] to support a dependency adjudication."' 3 ° This was the issue before
the court in E.S. v. Department of Children & Families.13' The appellate
court reversed a finding of dependency based upon a single act of "inappro-
priate or excessively harsh corporal punishment" because there was only one
instance.132 The appellate court held that the facts did not support a finding
of dependency based upon the single act. 133 Then it added, "[h]ere, the trial
court conceded that it was not following the correct law, as it acknowledged
the case law in its tentative oral ruling, but stated that it disagreed with the
case law. ' 34
III. TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
The test for termination of parental rights in Florida, as in other jurisdic-
tions, requires the trial court to make two findings.135 The first is to prove a
statutory ground in abuse, neglect or abandonment. 36 The second is a de-
termination that termination is in the best interest of the child.'3 7 In KW. v.
Department of Children & Family, 38 a father whose parental rights were
terminated and who had been "convicted on nine counts of sexually abusing
his" children and his stepchildren, as well as others, and was "serving three
consecutive life sentences" appealed from the termination order.'39 He
claimed that the court failed to consider his mother who lived in Tennessee
and who indicated an interest in looking after the children for a long-term
placement, as a less restrictive means short of termination of parental
rights. 14° Florida recognizes that "[t]he least restrictive means test requires
that measures short of termination" of parental rights be undertaken "if they
would enable the child to reunite safely with the parent.'' 4  However, the
least restrictive alternative test does not apply after parental rights are termi-
130. E.S. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 984 So. 2d 647, 649 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2008) (citing C.C. v. Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 556 So. 2d 416, 417 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. FLA. STAT. § 39.802(4)(a), (c) (2008).
136. Id. §§ 39.802(4)(a), .806 (1)(b)-(c).
137. Id. § 39.802(4)(c); see I MICHAEL J. DALE ET AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT,
4-103 (2008).
138. 959 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
139. Id. at402.
140. Id.
141. Id. (citing L.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1189, 1195-96 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2002)).
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nated as part of the "task of placing the [child] in a suitable home."' 142 The
Florida courts have held, and the court in K.W reaffirmed, that "long-term
relative placement does not foreclose a termination of parental rights."'' 43
The obligation of the court is to determine whether termination is in the "best
interest of the child."' 44 It may take into account long-term placement with a
relative but it need not if to do so would not be in the best interest of the
child. 45 On this basis, the court in K.W. affirmed. 46
In a termination of parental rights case based upon abandonment, Flori-
da provides the precise statutory elements which must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence. 47 In T.S. v. Department of Children & Families,148 the
First District Court of Appeal of Florida was faced with the application of the
abandonment grounds in the context of a parent's incarceration.1 49 The law
in Florida is clear that a parent's incarceration is a factor to be considered in
"terminating parental rights based" upon abandonment, but incarceration
alone without other evidence is insufficient grounds. 5 ° In addition, for ab-
andonment to be shown, there must be proof that the parent was financially
able to provide for the child or assume parental obligations which may be
impossible in the context of incarceration.' 5' In the T.S. case, the father was
incarcerated for only eight months during a period when the child was be-
tween eight and fifteen months old.1 52 Further there was no evidence that the
father had the ability to either support the child or had meaningful contact
during that period. 5 3 Thus, the appellate court reversed on the grounds that
there was no substantial evidence of abandonment.154
It would seem obvious that a court may only terminate parental rights
on grounds alleged in the Department of Children and Family Services peti-
tion. Yet, in two recently reported opinions, L.A. G. v. Department of Child-
142. Id.
143. K.W., 959 So. 2d at 403.
144. See id. at 402.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 403.
147. FLA. STAT. § 39.809(1) (2008).
148. 969 So. 2d 494 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
149. See id. at 495.
150. Id. at 496 (citing W.T.J. v. E.W.R., 721 So. 2d 723, 723 (Fla. 1998); K.S. v. Dep't of
Children & Family Servs., 898 So. 2d 1194, 1198 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005)); J.T. v. Dep't
of Children & Family Servs., 819 So. 2d 270, 272 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
151. See FLA. STAT. § 39.01(1) (2008); C.B. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 874 So. 2d
1246, 1248 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2004); J.T., 819 So. 2d at 272.
152. T.S., 969 So. 2d at 496.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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ren & Family Services155 and Z.M. v. Department of Children & Family Ser-
vices,156 the Third and First District Courts of Appeal of Florida, respective-
ly, reversed the termination adjudications at the trial level on the same ba-
sis-that the trial courts terminated based upon grounds not asserted in the
petition.157 In LA.G., the court held that a "termination order violates due
process [when] it is based on grounds not asserted in [the] petition.' 58 Spe-
cifically, the failure to include the ground for termination in the petition de-
nies the parent notice of the charges in a proceeding that will result in "the
parental death penalty," as described in the concurring opinion.' 59 In ZM., at
the close of evidence, the court suggested a ground for termination that
seemed to be more apt than that pleaded by DCF.16° When DCF "expressly
declined to seek amendment of the petition," the trial court nonetheless ter-
minated on grounds that were neither pleaded nor added by amendment.
61
The appellate court thus reversed.
162
The issue of whether a parent's failure to appear at an adjudicatory
hearing in termination of parental rights proceedings constitutes consent to
the termination has been before the Florida appellate courts on a number of
occasions over the past half-dozen years. 63  Chapter 39 of the Florida
Statutes allows termination of parental rights by consent where a parent fails
"to personally appear at" an adjudicatory hearing where the parent was
advised in person at the advisory hearing of the obligation to appear.'
However, Florida courts have been reluctant to terminate parental rights by
default where a parent "makes a reasonable effort to be present" at the
hearing but is unable to do so due to "circumstances beyond the parent's
control."'' 65 The issue came before the Second District Court of Appeal of
155. 963 So. 2d 725 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
156. 981 So. 2d 1267 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
157. L.A.G., 963 So. 2d at 726; Z.M., 981 So. 2d at 1269.
158. L.A.G., 963 So. 2d at 726.
159. Id. at 728 (Shepherd, J., concurring) (citing Michele R. Forte, Comment, Making the
Case for Effective Assistance of Counsel in Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights Pro-
ceedings, 28 NOVA L. REV. 193, 193 (2003)).
160. See Z.M., 981 So. 2d at 1269-70.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1271.
163. See Michael J. Dale, 2005-2006 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 31 NOVA L. REV.
577, 597-98 (2007); Michael J. Dale, 2004 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 29 NOVA L. REV.
397, 417-20 (2005) [hereinafter Dale, 2004 Survey]; Dale, 2003 Survey, supra note 129, at
554-56; Michael J. Dale, 2002 Survey of Florida Juvenile Law, 28 NOVA L. REV. 1, 22-23
(2003).
164. FLA. STAT. § 39.801(3)(d) (2008).
165. T.L.D. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 883 So. 2d 910, 914-15 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2004) (citing R.P. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1212, 1214 (Fla. 4th
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Florida again in B.B. v. Department of Children & Family Services.1 66 In that
case, the trial court terminated a mother's parental rights to her three children
when she did not appear at the adjudicatory hearing, and her counsel advised
the court that the mother's caseworker had told the lawyer that the parent
informed the case worker that she was having transportation problems. 167
The lawyer requested a continuance and advised the trial court that he would
transport the mother to the next hearing.168 The trial court rejected the
request for continuance and terminated parental rights by consent. 69 The
appellate court concluded "that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
[the lawyer's] motion for a continuance." 70  Here, the mother could not
attend because of "transportation problems beyond her control" and there
was no evidence that she was "stalling" or disregarded the proceedings, or
that the children would in any way be harmed by granting the continuance.' 7 '
Relying upon earlier case law relating to transportation problems beyond the
parent's control, the appeals court reversed. 72
While the failure of a parent to appear can serve as the basis for
termination of parental rights, where the parent fails to appear at an advisory
hearing because the parent did not receive notice, it would seem obvious that
termination may not take place. In S.S. v. Department of Children & Family
Services, 73 the Third District Court of Appeal of Florida affirmed this
proposition stating "[b]ecause the delivery of . . . notice is an express
condition precedent to the draconian consequences of a parent's failure to
appear, it follows that, on that point alone, the termination of parental rights
in this case must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.' 74
Charges of abuse and neglect and efforts to seek termination of parental
rights occasionally arise in the context of divorce cases. The Florida courts
have occasionally analyzed the interplay of the two proceedings. 175  Such
Dist. Ct. App. 2003); S.C. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 877 So. 2d 831, 833 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 2004); G.A. v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs., 857 So. 2d 310, 312 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 2003)).
166. 943 So. 2d 885, 886 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 887.
171. B.B., 943 So. 2c at 887.
172. Id. at 886-87 (citing R.P. v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So. 2d 1212, 1213
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003)).
173. 976 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
174. Id. at 42.
175. See Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 2000 Survey of Florida Law, 25 NOVA L. REV.
91, 112 (2000); Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1995 Survey of Florida Law, 20 NOVA L.
REV. 191,208 (1995).
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was the case in S.S. v. D.L.176 Nearly five years after the couple's marriage
was dissolved, the former wife amended her "petition for dissolution to
include termination of [the father's] parental rights to his two younger
daughters." 177  At the time, the father was in prison and release was
imminent. 78 He "was convicted of sexual battery of the thirteen-year-old
friend of his eldest daughter.' ' 179 The mother had remarried, and at trial the
testimony presented came through the former wife, her new husband, and a
guardian ad litem.8 The appellate court recognized that "termination cases
filed by divorced parents are rare" and suggested "caution to avoid second
challenges to custody determinations.' 8 ' The appellate court overturned the
finding of termination of parental rights on several grounds, including the
fact that the opinion testimony of the guardian ad litem was speculation since
the guardian was not an expert and, more significantly, that no nexus had
been shown between the sexual abuse conviction and the future behavior of
the father toward these children. 182
The issue of proper testimony by expert witnesses in termination of pa-
rental rights cases came before the Second District Court of Appeal of Flori-
da in Department of Children & Family Services v. D. W.183 In that case, the
expert witness improperly supported "his opinion by testifying [about] the
contents of three articles published in the Journal of Neurosurgery."' 84 The
articles themselves, as inadmissible hearsay, should not have been relied
upon by the court.1 85 Merely because an expert relies upon a treatise does not
make it admissible. The opposing party, here the Department of Children
and Family Services, "was unable to cross-examine the authors of the articles
regarding their qualifications or any aspect of their studies."' 186 Thus, the
appellate court reversed for a new trial on the petition to terminate parental
rights of the parents. 187
Apparently, the procedures for changing counsel on appeal in depen-
dency and termination of parental rights (TPR) matters are not always fol-
lowed. As a result, the Second District Court of Appeal in W.G. v. Depart-
176. 944 So. 2d 553 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
177. Id. at 555.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 555-56.
181. S.S., 944 So. 2d at 557.
182. Id. at 558-59.
183. 946 So. 2d 620, 621 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
184. Id. at 622.
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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ment of Children & Family Services'88 issued orders to show cause why
sanctions should not be imposed upon appellate and trial counsel for failure
to notify the appellate court about substitution of counsel on appeal.'89 The
appellate court held that "when a trial court appoints [a lawyer] to represent a
parent in [the appellate] court in a dependency or TPR case, the trial court
should" forward a copy of the order to the appellate court.9 ° Then, because
the trial courts may fail to carry out this responsibility, the appellate court
said that "it would be prudent for trial counsel who has been granted leave to
withdraw to [forward] copies of any trial court order[s] granting leave to
withdraw and appointing [an] appellate counsel" to the appellate court.19'
And finally, "the attorney appointed as appellate counsel should" file notice
of appearance in a prompt manner in the appellate court and attach a copy of
the court's order of appointment. 92
IV. PERMANENT GUARDIANSHIP
Florida law provides that when reunification with the parent "or adop-
tion is not in the best interest of the child, the court may place the child in a
permanent guardianship with a relative or other adult [who is] approved by
the court" subject to a set of five conditions set out in the statute. 193 In C.D.
v. Department of Children & Families,94 the question was whether the evi-
dence at the trial level, placing the children in permanent guardianship and
denying the mother's Petition for Reunification, was supported by competent
evidence.' The appellate court reversed and remanded for reunification
with the mother and reinstatement the Department of Children and Family
Services' supervision.' 96 The court held that a denial of reunification "based
solely on issues existing at the time a dependency case was initiated, without
regard to the parent's progress" in overcoming the problems, is improper.
97
Further, the appellate court held that the trial court failed to follow the man-
datory language of the state law providing the six factors that must be dem-
onstrated in showing that reunification is not "in the child's best interests."' 98
188. 944 So. 2d 443 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (per curiam).
189. Id. at 445.
190. Id. at 448.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. FLA. STAT. § 39.6221(1) (2008).
194. 974 So. 2d 495 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
195. Id. at 496-97.
196. Id. at 503.
197. Id. at 500.
198. Id. at 496, 500-01; see FLA. STAT. § 39.6221(2).
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With specific reference to the case plan, the appellate court held that two
questions must be answered: "[T]he parent's compliance with the case plan
and whether reunification would be detrimental to the children."' 99 Finding
no substantial competent evidence to support the trial court's finding, the
appellate court reversed.2 °
Once a court makes a finding of permanent guardianship, it may termi-
nate protected supervision by DCF. In LZ. v. Department of Children &
Families2 1 a mother appealed from an order terminating Department super-
vision and placing the child in permanent guardianship. °2 In a short opinion,
the appellate court found that "the trial court's order met the statutory re-
quirements for terminating protective supervision and for placing the child in
a permanent guardianship" as provided by Florida law.20 3
V. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
The Florida State Legislature has provided that in certain situations
criminal justice costs and surcharges can be taxed against criminal defen-
dants.2°4 Funds from the surcharge are used to support a variety of state and
local programs.2 5 The issue before the Supreme Court of Florida in V.K.E.
v. State,2°6 the significant juvenile delinquency case decided by the Supreme
Court during the survey period, concerned the question of whether juvenile
court judges had the authority to impose surcharges on a juvenile in a delin-
quency case.20 7
The underlying facts were that an eleventh grade student "was involved
in an altercation with another ... and entered a plea of nolo contendere to
[the] delinquency petition" of simple battery.20 8 It was a misdemeanor and
the Court withheld adjudication, placing the child on probation and ordering
her, inter alia, to pay domestic violence costs of $201 and rape crisis fund
fees of $151.209 Relying upon a concurring opinion by Judge Sharp in the
Fifth District Court, the Court held that the legislative intent in creating the
juvenile justice system as a separate "rehabilitative alternative to the punitive
199. C.D., 974 So. 2d at 500.
200. Id. at 503.
201. 967 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
202. Id. at 426.
203. Id. at 427; see FLA. STAT. § 39.6221.
204. See FLA. STAT. §§ 938.08, .085 (2008).
205. See id.
206. 934 So. 2d 1276 (Fla. 2006).
207. Id. at 1277.
208. Id. at 1278.
209. Id.
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criminal justice system" did not include the assessment of costs as provided
for in the criminal justice system within the juvenile justice system 1° Jus-
tices Cantero and Bell dissented.1
The juvenile's right of privacy was before the First District Court in an
unusual case in A.H. v. State.212 A sixteen-year-old girl "challenge[d] her
adjudication of delinquency for producing, directing or promoting a photo-
graph or representation that she knew included sexual conduct of a child in
violation" of Florida law. 213 According to the appellate decision, the girl and
her seventeen-year-old boyfriend were charged under the child pornography
laws for taking a substantial number of digital photos of the two of them
"naked and engaged in sexual behavior."2 4 They then emailed the photos to
another computer from the girl's house.2'5 The photographs were not actual-
ly distributed to any third party.1 6 The girl filed a motion to dismiss, claim-
ing that the statute as applied to her was unconstitutional as an invasion of
her right to privacy under the Florida Constitution.217  The majority held
there was "no reasonable expectation of privacy" because these were photo-
graphs and they might be shown to others in the future.21 8 Further, the court
said the pictures taken were shared by the two minors involved in the activi-
ties.2 9 Neither juvenile, according to the majority, "had a reasonable expec-
tation that the other would not show the [photographs] to a third party. 22°
Then, in a statement without attribution, the court said the following: "Mi-
nors who are involved in a sexual relationship, unlike adults who may be
involved in a mature committed relationship, have no reasonable expectation
that their relationship will continue and that the photographs will not be
shared with others intentionally or unintentionally. ' 22' Apparently, the basis
for this statement is the court's stated concern about child pornography.222
The court's attempted cause and effect analysis is hard to follow. Apparently
the court thought that the "117 sexually explicit photographs [that were tak-
210. Id. at 1278, 1282-83.
211. V.K.E., 934 So. 2d at 1285-93 (Cantero, J., dissenting); Id. at 1293-94 (Bell, J., dis-
senting).
212. 949 So. 2d 234, 235 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
213. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 827.071(3) (2008)).
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. A.H., 949 So. 2d at 235; see FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23.
218. A.H., 949 So. 2d at 237.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. See id.
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en] would undoubtedly have market value., 223 The court's second argument
was that there was a compelling state interest in prosecuting the juvenile.224
The court held that "[t]he State's interest in protecting children from exploi-
tation in [the] statute is the same [irrespective] of whether the person induc-
ing the child to appear" is an adult or a child. 225  The argument is self-
defeating for at least two reasons. First, the court assumes that the child who
did not take the picture is the one to be protected.226 This apparently runs
counter to the fact that both of the juveniles were charged with acts of juve-
nile delinquency.227 Second, while the child who was photographed was a
boy and was older, there was no analysis of equal treatment of males and
females. 28 What is oddly missing from the majority's opinion is an analysis
of whether this was the least restrictive means available to the State in deal-
ing with the problem of promoting sexual conduct through photographs of
minors. 229 Rather, the court seems to believe that the compelling interest was
seeing that the photographs were never produced.230 That argument seems to
suggest that criminal penalties were in order to stop minors from "doing it
again."
The dissent in A.H. relied upon the Supreme Court of Florida's opinion
in B.B. v. State.23' B.B. was an opinion that overturned a statute "prohibiting
unlawful carnal intercourse" as applied to consensual behavior by minors. 32
In B.B., the act was carnal sexual intercourse and in A.H. the act was photo-
graphing sexual intercourse.233 According to Judge Padovano, dissenting,
this was "a distinction without a difference. 234 The dissent viewed the mat-
ter as one of privacy because in fact, the child intended to keep the photo-
graphs private. 35 As the dissent concluded, "I believe the court has commit-
ted a serious error. The statute at issue was designed to protect children, but
in this case the court has allowed the state to use it against a child in a way
223. A.H., 949 So. 2d at 237.
224. Id. at 238.
225. Id. (citing State v. A.R.S., 684 So. 2d 1383, 1387 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996)).
226. See id. at 236-39.
227. Id. at 235.
228. See A.H., 949 So. 2d at 236-39.
229. See id. at 237-39.
230. See id.
231. Id. at 239 (Padovano, J., dissenting) (citing B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995)).
232. Id.
233. A.H., 949 So. 2d at 239.
234. Id.
235. Id.
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that criminalizes conduct that is protected by constitutional right of priva-
cy."
2 36
Issues concerning restitution in delinquency cases regularly come be-
fore the intermediate appellate courts. For example, in two short per curiam
opinions, the First District Court of Appeal in T.L. v. State237 and f.M. v. State
(LM. I/),238 reversed a trial court that had entered a restitution order in the
absence of the juvenile appellant.239 In I.M. H, over the objection of counsel,
the appellate court heard testimony determining the amount of restitution.24
The court recognized that "[a] juvenile has a constitutional right to be present
at hearings to determine the imposition and amount of restitution [in the ab-
sence of] a voluntary intelligent waiver of [the] right."24' The appellate court
also held that a trial court may only order restitution for an unemployed or
incarcerated delinquent child with a showing that the child has the present
ability to pay on a finding that the child had suitable employment, and the
court must also base the amount of restitution on anticipated earnings.242
In two recent cases, the Fourth District Court of Appeal was faced with
the question of whether a trial court could go directly to a determination of
restitution without providing the delinquent with notice and a right to a sepa-
rate hearing. 243 In J. G. v. State,244 at the disposition hearing, the victim's
father testified to medical bills and lost wages.245 The "court, hearing no
objection, ordered [the child] and his parents to pay" a restitution in the
amount of over $3400.246 The appellate court reversed on this ground, hold-
ing that a trial court must conduct a restitution hearing addressing the child's
ability to pay and then the amount of restitution could be paid.247 There must
also be notice given to the juvenile that the evidence produced at the disposi-
236. Id. at 241.
237. 967 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
238. 955 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
239. See id. at 1164; T.L., 967 So. 2d at 421.
240. .M. 11, 955 So. 2d at 1164.
241. Id.; see also T.L, 967 So. 2d at 421; M.W.G. v. State, 945 So. 2d 597, 599-600 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2006); T.A.S. v. State, 892 So. 2d 1233, 1234 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(per curiam).
242. 1.M. 11, 955 So. 2d at 1165; see also M. W.G., 945 So. 2d at 601; A.J. v. State, 677 So.
2d 935, 938 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
243. See J.G. v. State, 978 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); L.S. v. State, 975 So.
2d 554 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
244. 978 So. 2d at 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
245. Id. at 272.
246. Id.
247. Id.
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tion hearing would determine the amount of restitution. 248 The court gave no
notice of either the hearing on the amount or the child's ability to pay.249
In L.S. v. State,250 the court took evidence on the amount of damage to a
vehicle in a vandalization case at the adjudicatory stage.25' Then, when im-
posing a penalty, the court held "that the child was responsible for restitution
in the amount testified by the owner., 252 The appellate court held that
"[w]hile the testimony of the owner was sufficient to prove guilt, it was not.
sufficient to [set] the amount of restitution. 253 Furthermore, it held that
there was no notice to the child that he would be obligated to offer evidence
as to the amount of restitution at a hearing to determine whether he was even
guilty of the charge. 54 The issue of how the amount of restitution is proven
at a restitution hearing was before the court in a similarly named case LM. v.
State (LM. 111). 25 5 A child was adjudicated delinquent for the commission of
an arson and burglary when "he and friends set fire to a middle-school band
room."256 On remand from a prior appellate ruling,257 a school official testi-
fied that he contacted "vendors to determine the fair market value" of proper-
ty including items like choir robes. 258 He determined that the value was
$31,143.259 The juvenile's lawyer objected that the testimony was based
upon hearsay. 260 The appellate court reversed on the grounds that the person
testifying "did not have personal knowledge of the value of the" damaged
property "but relied upon the opinions of... vendors, who did not testify. 26'
In reversing, the court noted that written estimates might "suffice, so long as
they satisfy the requirements of business records... or are uncontested. 262
A second case involving the improper alliance on hearsay testimony in
establishing the amount of restitution is T.J.N. v. State.2 63 A juvenile ap-
pealed from an order of restitution in the amount of $1910 relating to damage
248. Id.
249. J.G., 978 So. 2d at 272.
250. 975 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
251. Id. at 555.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. 958 So. 2d 1014, 1016 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam).
256. Id.
257. I.M. v. State (LM. 1), 917 So. 2d 927, 935 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (per curiam).
258. LM. III, 958 So. 2d at 1016.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id. See also B.L.N. v. State, 722 So. 2d 860, 861 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (per
curiam).
263. 977 So. 2d 770, 771 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
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caused to "a truck in connection with the commission of two batteries. ' ' "6
The appellate court recognized that, under Florida law, a "'[w]ritten opi-
nion[] or estimate[] may qualify as a business record exception to the hearsay
rule"' and thus, may be admissible.265 The court further noted that there is a
distinction between a witness who states from hearsay what someone else
said the damages might be and an individual who, qualified as an expert, can
opine as to the fair market value of the cost of repairs.2' In the case at bar,
an insurance adjuster testified on cross-examination that he based his testi-
mony on an estimate received from an auto body shop.267 The respondent
objected and on appeal, the Second District Court of Appeal reversed.268
In a case involving proof of damages at the adjudicatory stage of a de-
linquency case, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in L.D.G. v. State,269
affirmed a trial court finding that the State provided proof of damages ex-
ceeding $1000 for purposes of establishing a prima facie showing of a felony
of the third degree under Florida law. 70 The respondent had been "accused
of damaging a vehicle in a temper tantrum" and the State, through the own-
er's testimony, showed that the insurance paid $750, the insured paid a de-
ductible of $500, and the total payment was made by handing over to the
repair company the sum of $1250.271 The appellate court rejected the claim
that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay and also found that the evidence
was "prima facie proof by competent, substantial evidence [of] the damage
exceed[ing] $1000.,,272
Florida has developed a body of statutory law as well as interpretative
case law concerning the standards for secure detention for delinquents. The
statutory scheme is quite clear. First, the child may be detained for the spe-
cific reasons contained in the statute.273 Second, the statute requires that, in
the absence of a specific statutory exception, the order placing a child in de-
tention must "be based [upon] a risk assessment of the child. 274 This risk
assessment is undertaken using a standardized document known in Florida as
264. Id.
265. Id. at 773 & n.2 (quoting Butler v. State, 970 So. 2d 919, 920 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2007)).
266. Id. at 773.
267. Id.
268. T.J.N., 977 So. 2d at 773-74.
269. 960 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
270. Id. at 767 n.1; see also FLA. STAT. § 806.13(1) (b) (2006).
271. LD.G., 960 So. 2d at 767-68.
272. Id. at 768.
273. FLA. STAT. § 985.255 (l)(a)-(j) (2008).
274. FLA. STAT. § 985.245 (1) (2008).
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a "Risk Assessment Instrument." 275 A court has the power to deviate from
the level of restrictiveness required by the scoring instrument but the judge
must explain why the deviation is necessary. 6 When the court deviates, it
must provide a written statement of "clear and convincing reasons" for the
deviation. 7
Application of the Risk Assessment Instrument and the limits of statuto-
ry authority to detain a child was before the First District Court of Appeal in
K.E. v. Department of Juvenile Justice. 8 The child petitioned for a writ of
habeas corpus to challenge the validity of detention during a juvenile delin-
quency proceeding based upon the fact that "[t]he child had a total score of
two points on the Risk Assessment Instrument and therefore did not meet the
general [category] for detention.,,279 Although the matter had become moot,
the appellate court, nonetheless, issued a ruling because the matter was "ca-
pable of repetition yet evading review. 280 Under the facts of the case, the
child with a "total score of two points, which [was] not enough to justify any
form of detention without a written statement of clear and convincing rea-
sons," and who was not eligible for detention based upon a charge of domes-
tic violence because there had been no showing that secure detention was
necessary to protect the victim, nonetheless was subjected to continued se-
cure detention by the trial court based upon the mother's fear that the juve-
nile posed an ongoing threat of domestic violence even though the child was
not going to be living with the mother; and further the mother feared the
child would run away and then perhaps take drugs or engage in sexual activi-
ty. 2 1 Citing in a footnote, the fact that in the last eighteen months the appel-
late court had issued writs of habeas corpus directed to the juvenile trial
judge, the Honorable Angela Dempsey, in fourteen juvenile delinquency
cases, including the one at bar, and in ten of which writs were issued because
the judge had "failed to give adequate reasons for departing from the risk
assessment instrument or failed to give any reason at all," the court re-
versed.282 In so doing, the court stated, "[t]hese errors lead us to conclude
that our main point bears repeating. Juvenile detention is a matter that is
275. See K.E. v. Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 963 So. 2d 864, 866 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
2007).
276. See FLA. STAT. § 985.255(3)(b).
277. Id.
278. 963 So. 2d at 865.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 866.
281. Id. at 867.
282. Id. at 867-68 n.1.
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controlled by legislation. It is not for us, as judges, to question the wisdom
of the legislation. Rather, our task is simply to carry it Out. 283
Among those requirements is that a juvenile is entitled to a detention
hearing within twenty-four hours of being taken into custody.28 The issue in
D.M. v. Dobuler85 was whether a judicial circuit administrative practice pro-
cedure in Miami, which did not require a detention hearing within the twen-
ty-four hour period, violated the state statute.286 The specific issue before the
appeals court was what the term "taken into custody" meant.287 The court
held, contrary to the assertion of the State, that a child who is to be placed in
detention must receive a detention hearing within twenty-four hours of being
physically detained by law enforcement.2 88 It does not mean twenty-four
hours from the time a juvenile probation officer takes the child into custody
and determines the need for detention.289
The appellate courts often deal with questions of interpreting who gets
detained and for what. In ZB. v. Department of Juvenile Justice,29 ° the issue
was whether certain juveniles, who are alleged to be absconders from proba-
tion, could be held in secure detention.291 The definition of absconding es-
tablished by the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) in its Handbook was a
juvenile who was "gone in a clandestine manner out of the jurisdiction of the
courts in order to avoid legal process" or one who would "'hide, conceal or
absent himself clandestinely with the intent to avoid legal processes. '-292
Under the facts of this case, while the juveniles may have violated curfew
conditions of probation, "they voluntarily returned to their approved resi-
dences" and thus did not meet the definition in the DJJ Handbook. 293 There-
fore, because the juveniles did not meet the agency definition, they were not
considered absconders, and thus could not be securely detained pursuant to
the risk assessment instrument which forms the basis for evaluating secured
detention in Florida. 94
283. K.E., 963 So. 2d at 868.
284. FLA. STAT. § 985.215(2)j) (2005).
285. 947 So. 2d 504 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
286. Id. at 506.
287. Id. at 507.
288. Id. at 509.
289. See id. at 508.
290. 938 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1 st Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (per curiam).
291. See id. at 584-85.
292. Id. at 585.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 585-86.
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The use of curfew ordinances for juveniles has become popular in the
United States 295 and has been recently ruled on by the Supreme Court of
Florida.29 6 Violations of curfew ordinances often can result in delinquency
charges filed against juveniles. 97 Such was the case in State v. A.L.298 In
that case, a sheriffs department deputy observed "a young man, who ap-
peared to be a juvenile, walking on a public street" in violation of the coun-
ty's curfew order.299 The child consented to "a pat-down search," and the
search resulted in discovery of a bag of marijuana and a pipe.3°° The child
moved to suppress the evidence, and the trial court rejected the claim on the
grounds that it was proper "for the deputy to suspect that [the child] was vi-
olating the curfew ordinance.""'' The appellate court, in affirming, recog-
nized the growing body of Florida law supporting the proposition that offic-
ers may reasonably suspect that juveniles are violating curfew ordinances. °2
Juveniles have been provided the right to counsel in delinquency cases
since the United States Supreme Court's decision in 1967 in In re Gault.°3
The right to counsel includes the right to a conflict-free attorney who will
represent the juvenile vigorously, independently and avoid the appearance of
a conflict. 3°4 The issue of conflict-free counsel arose in A.P. v. State.30 5 A
fifteen-year-old girl was charged with battery on her stepfather.30 6 It turned
out that the public defender representing the child was a member of an office
which had represented the victim's stepfather on a prior domestic matter
charge.30 7 The assistant public defender advised the court in the presence of
the child that he might have a conflict of interest because of the facts that he
had asserted, and then he requested what is known in Florida as a Forsett
inquiry, from the name of the case establishing the proposition.30 8 That case
allows for voluntary waiver of a conflict if three matters are "proven: 1) the
295. See DALE ET AL., supra note 137, at 5-13.
296. State v. J.P., 907 So. 2d 1101, 1104 (Fla. 2004).
297. See e.g., State v. A.L., 956 So. 2d 1215, 1215-16 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
298. Id. at 1215.
299. Id.
300. Id. at 1216.
301. Id.
302. See A.L., 956 So. 2d at 1216 (citing C.H.S. v. State, 795 So. 2d 1087, 1091-92 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (Altenbernd, J., concurring); A.J.M. v. State, 746 So. 2d 1222, 1224-
25 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999)).
303. 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
304. See Dale, Juvenile Law: 2001 Survey of Florida Law, 26 NOVA. L. REV. 903, 904
(2002) (stating that juveniles have the right to "effective assistance of counsel").
305. 958 So. 2d 519, 520 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.; see Forsett v. State, 790 So. 2d 474, 475 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
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defendant is aware of the conflict; 2) the defendant understands that the con-
flict could affect [one's] defense; and 3) the trial court has informed the de-
fendant of the right to obtain other conflict-free counsel. '' 309 The appellate
court read the transcript of the inquiry by the trial court and found that the
three elements of the test were not proven independently as to the fifteen-
year-old who did in fact waive the conflict.310 The appellate court then held
that because the assistance of counsel is an important constitutional right, the
violation of the constitutional right cannot be viewed as harmless.
311
Issues relating to waiver of Miranda rights by juveniles come up regu-
larly in the Florida courts and elsewhere.3 2 Included among those issues is
whether juveniles can waive Miranda rights without the presence of the par-
ents.313 The states differ on the requirement for parental presence and possi-
bly parental approval of the waiver.3t 4 The issue of the role of parents in the
waiver of Miranda rights was before the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
State v. S. V.315 The State appealed an order granting the juvenile's motion to
suppress on the grounds that the trial court granted the motion "solely on the
basis that the juvenile's parents were not notified before the interview. 316
The appellate court agreed with the State, although it affirmed the suppres-
sion on other grounds in one of the two charges involving the juvenile that
was before it.3 17 In one of the two charges, when the Miranda warnings were
given, the appellate court held that they "were defective because they failed
to advise the juvenile of his right to counsel during [the] questioning."31
However, as to the issue of the ruling that the child's statements should be
suppressed because of the failure to notify the parents, the appellate court
held that "'there is no constitutional requirement that [law enforcement offi-
cials] notify a juvenile's parent[] prior to questioning.' 31 9 And further, "'if
the juvenile indicates to [the] police that [the juvenile] does not [want] to
309. A.P., 958 So. 2d at 520 (citing Forsett, 790 So. 2d at 475); see also Larzelere v. State,
676 So. 2d 394, 403 (Fla. 1996) (per curiam); Thomas v. State, 785 So. 2d 626, 628 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (per curiam); Lee v. State, 690 So. 2d 664, 667 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1997).
310. A.P., 958 So. 2d at 521.
311. Id. (quoting Lee, 690 So. 2d at 668).
312. See, e.g., State v. Roman, 983 So. 2d 731, 735 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008); M.A.B.
v. State, 957 So. 2d 1219, 1219 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (en banc) (per curiam).
313. See, e.g., State v. S.V., 958 So. 2d 609, 610 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
314. See DALE Er AL., supra note 137, at 5-60.
315. 958 So. 2d at 610.
316. Id.
317. Id. at611-12.
318. Id. at612.
319. Id. at 611 (quoting Frances v. State, 857 So. 2d 1002, 1003 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2003)).
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speak to them until he or she has had [a chance] to speak [to his or her] par-
ents, [then] the questioning must cease." 3 21
A second recent appellate opinion involving an appeal from a denial of
a motion to suppress, based in part upon the lack of involvement of a sixteen-
year-old defendant's mother, prior to a confession of participating in a rob-
bery that resulted in the victim's death, is Harris v. State.32' In that case, the
minor's "mother was home when the [police] arrived and was told that her
son was going to be taken to the police station for questioning about a recent
murder., 322 The mother did not indicate "she wanted to come to the station
or that she wanted an attorney for her son. 323 At no time did the juvenile
ever ask for his mother or an attorney to be present when he was ques-
tioned.324 On these grounds, and applying the generic totality of the circums-
tances test to the confession, the appellate court upheld it.325
In recent years most states, including Florida, have expanded the use of
the juvenile delinquency court as a means to deal with school-related is-
sues.326 For example, Florida provides that acts by juveniles which are "spe-
cifically and intentionally designed to stop or temporarily impede . . .
progress of any normal school function or activity occurring on the school[]
property" constitutes an act of juvenile delinquency. 327 J.J.V. State321 is an
example of an appellate opinion dealing with school disruption by a student
that resulted in a delinquency charge.3 29 The underlying dispute which re-
sulted in the delinquency charge was disruptive behavior by the youngster in
a school cafeteria during breakfast hours where the student "attempted to
incite two female students to engage in an altercation in the cafeteria.
330
The school employee had to call the school dean and the school's resource
officer to control the youngster.33' The appellate court affirmed, finding that
320. S.V., 958 So. 2d at 611 (quoting Frances, 857 So. 2d at 1004).
321. 979 So. 2d 372, 373-74 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
322. Id. at 374.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 375.
325. Id.
326. See Dale, 2004 Survey, supra note 163, at 398.
327. J.J. v. State, 944 So. 2d 518, 519 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (quoting T.H. v. State,
797 So. 2d 1291, 1292 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2001)).
328. Id. at 518.
329. Id. at 519.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 520.
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there was evidence to support the proposition that the youngster "intended to
disrupt school activities. 332
The school employee charged with monitoring the cafeteria testi-
fied that she asked J.J. to calm down and stop at least four or five
times, which he did not do. She believed J.J. was inciting the two
girls to fight, and he wanted to see them fight again like they did
on the bus the day before. As a result of J.J.'s behavior, the stu-
dents in the cafeteria got louder and started to crowd around the
girls' table. She further testified that the incident interfered with
the serving of breakfast and her normal duties in the cafeteria. 333
While the student's behavior was unacceptable and while the media is
full of reports about problems in the public school system, it remains to be
seen whether the use of the juvenile criminal justice system can assist in di-
minishing school disruption.
Two cases came before the Florida appellate courts during the most re-
cent reported cycle, involving delinquency cases derived from school
searches.334 In R.B. v. State,335 a student charged with possession of cannabis
appealed from an adjudication of delinquency on the grounds that there was
no reasonable suspicion to justify the school search under the United States
Supreme Court's holding in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 336 Under T.L.O., the test
for a warrantless search is reasonable suspicion rather than probable cause.337
In the case at bar, the security officer monitoring the school security camera
had a previous encounter with the youngster being under the influence of
drugs at school, saw that the youngster with his hands cupped showing
another student something and then putting the object in his pocket, and
therefore brought both students to the school office where the officer re-
moved the small bag of marijuana.338 The appellate court affirmed on these
facts.339
332. J.J., 944 So. 2d at 520. But see M.S.G., III v. State, 971 So. 2d 273, 274 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam) (finding no evidence of "deliberate intent to disrupt a school
function").
333. J.J., 944 So. 2d at 520.
334. See R.B. v. State, 975 So. 2d 546, 546 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (per curiam);
D.G. v. State, 961 So. 2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
335. R.B., 975 So. 2d at 546.
336. 469 U.S. 325 (1985); R.B., 975 So. 2d at 547.
337. T.LO., 469 U.S. at 341; R.B., 975 So. 2d at 547 (citing D.G., 961 So. 2d at 1064).
338. R.B., 975 So. 2d at 547.
339. Id. at 548.
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D.G. v. State34° involved an eighth grader who appealed from a determi-
nation of delinquency based on possession of marijuana.3 4' Here the basis
for the school search was the statement of a student informant that the res-
pondent "'may have been in possession of marijuana.' 342 The appellate
court held that information provided by an informant, who is known to the
investigator, is widely regarded as "reasonable suspicion necessary to meet
the constitutional test," 3  recognizing that other courts have similarly
found.34 The appellate court thus affirmed.345
VI. THE RIGHTS OF UNWED BIOLOGICAL FATHERS
In 2003, the Florida Legislature dramatically changed Florida's Adop-
tion Act by adding a putative father registry. 346 This statute provided that the
failure to register through the registry constituted a waiver of parental rights
for these unwed fathers when the biological mother sought to have the child
adopted.347 This statute, apparently aimed at expediting the adoption process,
was promulgated in the face of a series of United States Supreme Court opi-
nions that provided protection to unwed fathers, including Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 34 8 Quilloin v. Walcott,34 9 Caban v. Mohammed,350 and Lehr v. Robin-
son.3 5 1 In combination, these cases have held on the basis of the principles of
due process and equal protection that unwed fathers have a protected privacy
and liberty interest in their children so long as the father has evidenced some
form of involvement with the child.352 As the Court said in Lehr: "The bio-
logical connection between father and child is unique and worthy of constitu-
tional protection if the father grasps the opportunity to develop that biologi-
340. 961 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
341. Id. at 1064.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id. at 1064-65 (citing Wofford v. Evans, 390 F.3d 318 (4th Cir. 2004); Roy v. Fulton
County Sch. Dist., F. Supp. 2d 1316 (N.D. Ga. 2007); Commonwealth v. Carey, 554 N.E.2d
1199 (Mass. 1990)).
345. D.G., 961 So. 2d at 1066.
346. See FLA. STAT. § 63.054 (2003).
347. Id. § 63.054(1).
348. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
349. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
350. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
351. 463 U.S. 248 (1983); See FLA. STAT. § 63.054 (2003).
352. See, e.g., Lehr, 463 U.S. at 248-49; Caban, 441 U.S. at 380-81; Quilloin, 434 U.S. at
246; Stanley, 405 U.S. at 645.
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cal connection into a full and enduring relationship., 353 In Heart of Adop-
tions, Inc. v. J.A., 3 the Supreme Court of Florida held that an adoption
agency must serve the unmarried, biological father "known or identified by
the mother as a potential father and who" may be located, through reasonable
efforts, "with a notice of the intended adoption plan. ' 355 He should further be
advised "that he has thirty days in which to file a claim of paternity with the
Florida Putative Father Registry and to file an affidavit of commitment
[with] the court." '356 In so doing, the court recognized that Florida Statutes,
as a matter of statutory construction, should be read to provide for notice.357
The Supreme Court of Florida chose not to reach the constitutional question,
either on the basis of the Florida Constitution or the Federal Constitution, of
whether the notice requirement violated due process and privacy rights set
forth in the United States Supreme Court jurisprudence, as well as in the
Florida Constitutional jurisprudence.358
The Florida statutory scheme for adoption contains other possible short-
comings, such as the elimination of fraud as a defense for failure to register,
statutory construction, which may deny a putative father the ability to grasp
an opportunity to develop a relationship with his biological child, and a stan-
dard of care, which places the burden of proving financial and other capacity
on the putative father.359 The constitutional infirmities in the Florida statute
were described in some detail in the concurring opinion in J.A. by Chief Jus-
tice Lewis.36
VII. OTHER MATTERS
Over thirty years ago in Goss v. Lopez,361 the United States Supreme
Court held that a "10 day suspension from school is not de minimus" and
may not be imposed without complete disregard of due process rights. 362 In
353. Steven A. v. Rickie M., 823 P.2d 1216, 1228 (Cal. 1992) (en banc); see also Lehr,
463 U.S. at 262.
354. 963 So. 2d 189 (Fla. 2007).
355. Id. at 202.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 203.
358. See id. at 206 (Lewis, J., concurring) (citing N. Fla. Women's Health & Counseling
Servs. v. State, 866 So. 2d 612, 634 (Fla. 2003); Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1275
(Fla. 1996); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989)).
359. See FLA. STAT. § 63.063 (2008).
360. See J.A., 963 So. 2d at 203-10 (Lewis, J., concurring).
361. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
362. Id. at 576.
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Rigau v. District School Board of Pasco County,363 the appellate court heard
a pro se appeal by an attorney father of a student who had been suspended
from school for ten days for being under the influence of alcohol at a school-
related event, the Grad Bash Universal Studios-Orlando." Significantly, the
board failed to appear at the appeal or respond in any way.365 The appellate
court held that there was no evidence that the student had been under the
influence. 366 "Rather, the school board found that the... [youngster] was in
close proximity to ... alcohol throughout the evening., 367 There being no
evidence at all of the intoxication, indeed he was admitted to Universal Stu-
dios after the police officer conducted a field sobriety test, the appellate court
reversed the youngster's suspension.368 Significantly, the appellate court
noted that the child's father was an attorney and that less fortunate students
would not be able to appeal the board's suspension, which was not supported
by any competent evidence and, that such a suspension, would cause serious
damage to the students.369 On the other hand, in D.K v. District School
Board Indian River County,370 the school board sought dismissal of an "ap-
peal on the grounds that a suspension order is not permitted to be reviewed
under the Florida Administrative Procedure Act.",37' The appellate court
granted the motion finding that "hearings that result in expulsion fall within
the [Administrative Procedure Act] and are entitled to judicial review," but
that "suspension hearings are specifically exempted from the protections" of
the Administrative Procedure Act.372 However, the court noted in a footnote
that its ruling did "not bar [a] student who has a constitutional right violated
by a suspension from bringing action in the appropriate court. 3 73 It simply
held that the child did not allege any due process or other constitutional vi-
olation.374
Children who are in the care of the Department of Children and Fami-
lies sometimes are recipients of funds from government agencies such as the
Social Security Administration.37  When that happens, the amounts are
363. 961 So. 2d 382 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
364. Id. at 383.
365. Id.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. Rigau, 961 So. 2d at 383-84.
369. Id. at 384.
370. 981 So. 2d 667 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
371. Id. at 667.
372. Id.
373. Id. at 668 n.1.
374. Id.
375. See FLA. STAT. § 402.17 (2008).
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placed into a master trust fund by DCF for the benefit of the child.376 The
question before the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Department of Children
& Families v. R.G., was whether DCF should distribute the money in the
account directly to the juvenile upon his eighteenth birthday or send the
money back to the government agency, in the case at bar to the Social Secu-
rity Administration, and "the Social Security Administration would later
disburse the funds to" the child.3 78 DCF appealed from a trial court order
requiring it to provide the funds directly to the child.3 7 9 At the trial level,
DCF could cite no legal authority in support of its position, despite the fact
that it was offered the opportunity to "file a motion for rehearing to provide
the trial court with any federal authority" in support of its position. 3' 0 The
State filed no motion for rehearing.38" ' On appeal, the Fifth District rejected
all of the State's arguments, finding the claim under Florida law was
preempted by the federal Supremacy Clause, and finding the State's interpre-
tation of the federal statute on point "tortured., 382 Finding no support for the
State's position, the appellate court affirmed the proposition that the funds go
to the child upon reaching his or her eighteenth birthday.383
Proceedings pursuant to Florida's Domestic Violence statute may in-
volve minors. In Moore v. Pattin,384 a mother filed a petition "for an injunc-
tion for protection against domestic violence" on behalf of the parties' ten-
year-old daughter.385 The mother alleged that while she was at work, "the
father beat ... the dog, threw pots and pans, ordered [the child] to remove all
her clothing, and beat her with a belt and a shoe., 386 The appellate court af-
firmed the trial court ruling, finding first that the Florida Domestic Violence
Statute provides for injunctions of the nature sought.387 It found further that,
pursuant to chapter thirty-nine, the test "is whether the discipline imposed..
. is likely to result in physical, mental, or emotional injury and thus consti-
tute[s] excessively harsh corporal discipline., 388 Applying the standard, the
376. See id.
377. 950 So. 2d 497 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
378. Id. at 499.
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 499.
382. R.G., 950 So. 2d at 499-500.
383. Id. at 500--01.
384. 983 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
385. Id. at 664.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 663-64.
388. Id. at 665.
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court held that for purposes of the domestic violence injunction, the corporal
punishment was excessive and the injunction should stand.389
VIII. CONCLUSION
During the survey year, the intermediate appellate courts decided a sub-
stantial series of cases involving important statutory claims. In particular,
the courts provided substantial guidance in the area of domestic violence and
its application in dependency proceedings that should help the practitioner
representing all parties in juvenile court.
389. Moore, 983 So. 2d at 665.
20091
94
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss2/1
CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE DEPOSITIONS: IN SEARCH
OF A COHESIVE & WELL-DEFINED BODY OF LAW
ROBERT D. PELTZ*
ROBERT C. WEILL**
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 393
11. SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE INQUIRY ................................................... 394
A. Is Inquiry Limited to the Specific Identified Areas
on the N otice? ................................................................... 395
B. When Does Inquiry Violate a Corporation's Work
Product Privilege? ............................................................ 400
I. DESIGNATION OF AREAS ................................................................ 405
A. The "Reasonable Particularity" Requirement .................. 405
B. What Constitutes Sufficient Compliance with the
N otice? .............................................................................. 406
IV. SELECTION OF CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVES ............................. 411
A. The Importance of the Selection ........................................ 411
B. The Knowledge Base of the Representative(s) .................. 412
C. The Knowledge Level of the Representative(s) ................. 415
D. The Corporation's Use of the Rule to Avoid
H arassm ent ....................................................................... 4 16
V. THE IMPACT OF THE CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE' S
T ESTIM ONY .................................................................................... 4 17
A. Changing Testimony Through Errata Sheets .................... 417
B. Conflicting Testimony ....................................................... 422
V I. C ONCLUSION .................................................................................. 425
I. INTRODUCTION
Although corporate representative depositions' are a common discovery
tool in litigation, there are surprisingly few reported decisions discussing
* Robert D. Peitz is a partner in the Miami, Florida office of McIntosh, Sawran, Peltz,
& Cartaya, P.A., and a graduate of Duke University (A.B. 1973) and the University of Miami
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taya in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, specializing in civil appeals at all levels and civil litigation
support. Mr. Weill received his B.A. degree from Cornell University and his J.D. degree from
Nova Southeastern University.
1. Both the federal and state rules are equally applicable to other organizations, includ-
ing partnerships, governmental entities, and associations. See, e.g., Anderson Invs. Co. v.
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their scope and parameters, especially from Florida's state courts. Most of
these reported decisions involve the location of such depositions2 rather than
the scope of permissible inquiry. Therefore, while the use of corporate rep-
resentative depositions gives rise to many important legal questions, there are
very few reported answers. This article will focus on some of the more im-
portant issues presented by these depositions, the manner in which they have
been treated, and the proposed answers to those issues which are presently
unresolved.
II. SCOPE OF PERMISSIBLE INQUIRY
Although differing slightly in their wording, the substance of both Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) 3 and Florida Rule of Civil Procedure
1.310(b)(6) 4 are the same. Both rules essentially provide that a party wanting
to depose a corporation or other organization may do so through the use of a
notice, which designates the proposed areas of inquiry with reasonable parti-
Lynch, 540 So. 2d 832, 833 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (per curiam). Nevertheless, for
grammatical ease, this article will generally refer to depositions under these rules as corporate
representative depositions.
2. See, e.g., Prevost Car, Inc. v. Vehicles-R-Us, Inc., 658 So. 2d 668, 668 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1995) (holding that absent extraordinary circumstances, a non-resident employee of a
foreign corporation, which is not seeking affirmative relief, cannot be compelled to come to
Florida for deposition). In one case, the court became so flabbergasted over the parties' pro-
tracted dispute over the location of a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition that it ordered the parties to
engage in a "game of 'rock, paper, scissors."' Avista Mgmt., Inc. v. Wausau Underwriters
Ins. Co., No. 6:05-CV1430ORL31JGG, 2006 WL 1562246, at *1 (M.D. Fla. June 6, 2006).
3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) provides:
In its notice or subpoena, a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a
partnership, an association, a governmental agency, or other entity and must describe with rea-
sonable particularity the matters for examination. The named organization must then designate
one or more officers, directors, or managing agents, or designate other persons who consent to
testify on its behalf; and it may set out the matters on which each person designated will testi-
fy. A subpoena must advise a nonparty organization of its duty to make this designation. The
persons designated must testify about information known or reasonably available to the organ-
ization. This paragraph (6) does not preclude a deposition by any other procedure allowed by
these rules.
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
4. Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.310(b)(6) provides:
In the notice a party may name as the deponent a public or private corporation, a partnership or
association, or a governmental agency, and designate with reasonable particularity the matters
on which examination is requested. The organization so named shall designate one or more of-
ficers, directors, or managing agents, or other persons who consent to do so, to testify on its
behalf and may state the matters on which each person designated will testify. The persons so
designated shall testify about matters known or reasonably available to the organization. This
subdivision does not preclude taking a deposition by any other procedure authorized in these
rules.
FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.3 10(b)(6).
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cularity.5 In response, the corporation or organization selects one or more
individuals with knowledge of the matters listed who will testify on behalf of
the corporate entity.6 Since the Florida rule was patterned after the then-
existing federal rule, Florida courts have often relied on interpretations of the
corresponding federal rule.7
A. Is Inquiry Limited to the Specific Identified Areas on the Notice?
One of the first issues, which regularly arises during the taking of many
corporate representative depositions, is whether the questioning party is li-
mited in its interrogation of the witness to the specific matters identified in
the notice or whether it can go beyond these areas. Surprisingly, there are no
Florida state appellate opinions which even address this issue and only a
handful of reported federal district court cases.8
The first reported decision to consider this issue was the 1985 Massa-
chusetts' federal district court opinion in Paparelli v. Prudential Insurance
Co. of America,9 which involved a products liability claim for injuries alle-
gedly sustained as a result of the defective operation of an elevator. 1° In Pa-
parelli, plaintiffs counsel admittedly questioned defendant's corporate rep-
resentative on matters outside of the areas designated on the deposition no-
tice. 1 Defense counsel responded by instructing his "witness not to answer
the questions," which in turn prompted a motion for sanctions.'
2
The court began its inquiry by observing that there was nothing in either
the wording of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b) or the accompanying
5. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6), with FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(6).
6. United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 361 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
"Obviously it is not literally possible to take the deposition of a corporation; instead, when a
corporation is involved, the information sought must be obtained from natural persons who can
speak for the corporation." The corporation appears vicariously through it designee.... [The]
designee does not give his personal opinions. Rather, he presents the corporation's "position"
on the topic.
Id. (citations omitted).
7. See, e.g., Plantation-Simon, Inc. v. Bahloul, 596 So. 2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1992).
8. See, e.g., Harris v. N.J. Dep't of Law & Pub. Safety, Civ. No. 03-2002 (RBK), 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61457, at *13 (D.N.J. Aug. 21, 2007).
9. 108 F.R.D. 727 (D. Mass. 1985).
10. See id. at 728.
11. Id. at 729.
12. Id. at 728-29. Although concluding that the questioning was not appropriate, the
court nevertheless further held that defense counsel had improperly instructed his client not to
answer the questions, since they did not involve a claim of privilege. Id. at 731. The court,
however, ultimately declined to impose sanctions concluding that both counsel had been at
fault. Paparelli, 108 F.R.D. at 731.
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Advisory Committee notes, which expressly limited inquiry to the designated
areas. 13 Despite this lack of express restrictions, the court reasoned that in-
quiry was nevertheless limited to the stated areas for a number of reasons. 4
It began its analysis with the conclusion that:
It makes no sense for a party to state in a notice that it wishes to
examine a representative of a corporation on certain matters, have
the corporation designate the person most knowledgeable with re-
spect to those matters, and then to ask the representative about
matters totally different from the ones listed in the notice.'5
The court then went on to note that prior to the adoption of the rule, a
corporation often had no idea of the potential areas of inquiry when a specif-
ic named corporate employee or officer was noticed. 6 Often, the specifically
named individual had no relevant knowledge regarding the matter. 7 Accor-
dingly, one of the purposes behind the adoption of the rule was to allow the
corporation to determine which of its employees or officers had knowledge
of the matters sought to be discovered, to select someone with such know-
ledge, and to prepare them for the deposition. 8 Therefore, the court ex-
pressed concern that the:
[P]urpose of the rule would be effectively thwarted if a party could
ask a representative of a corporation produced pursuant to a Rule
30(b)(6) deposition notice to testify as to matters which [were] to-
tally unrelated to the matters listed in the notice and upon which
the representative is prepared to testify.
1 9
Finally, although noting the absence of an express limitation upon ques-
tioning in the rule itself, the court nevertheless concluded that the language
of the rule implicitly supported such a restriction by stating:
[T]he fact that the notice must list the matters upon which exami-
nation is requested "with reasonable particularity" also lends
weight to the notion that a limitation on the scope of the deposition
to the matters specified in the notice is implied in the rule. If a
party were free to ask any questions, even if "relevant" to the law-
13. Id. at 729; see FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b).
14. Paparelli, 108 F.R.D. at 729-30.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 730.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 729-30.
19. Paparelli, 108 F.R.D. at 730.
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suit, which were completely outside the scope of the "matters on
which examination is requested," the requirement that the matters
be listed "with reasonable particularity" would make no sense.
With this in mind, the sentence which reads that "[t]he persons so
designated shall testify as to matters known or reasonably available
to the organization" can be read in harmony with the rest of the
rule if the word "matters" has the same meaning as it does when
used earlier in the rule, i.e. "matters upon which examination is re-
quested." As to "matters upon which examination is requested,"
the representative has the duty to answer questions on behalf of the
organization to the extent that the information sought is "known to
the organization or reasonably available to it."
20
The opposite conclusion was reached ten years later, however, by the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in King v.
Pratt & Whitney (King J).21 Looking at the rule as being designed to provide
an additional discovery tool, this court concluded that while it imposed an
affirmative duty on the corporation to select an individual with knowledge of
the designated areas, it did not "confer some special privilege on a corporate
deponent," which would allow it to avoid answering questions of which it
had knowledge, just because they were outside the scope of the deposition
notice.22 The court further reasoned that, even if the inquiry had been in-
tended to be limited by Rule 30(b)(6) to the designated areas, the party taking
the deposition could simply re-notice the witness' deposition as an individual
and cover the new areas.23 Accordingly, the court concluded that the party
seeking the deposition "should not be forced to jump through that extra hoop
absent some compelling reason. 24
20. Id. But cf Reed v. Bennett, 193 F.R.D. 689, 692 (D. Kan. 2000) (holding that a
30(b)(6) notice may not contain topics broadened by the phrase including but not limited to);
Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 226 F.R.D. 118, 125 (D.D.C. 2005) (striking
"including but not limited to" from the categories in the 30(b)(6) notice).
21. 161 F.R.D. 475,476-77 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
The decision of the court is referenced in a "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions"
appearing in the Federal Reporter. The Eleventh Circuit provides by rule that unpublished
opinions are not considered binding precedent [but] may be cited as persuasive authority, pro-
vided that a copy of the unpublished opinion is attached to or incorporated within the brief, pe-
tition or motion.
King v. Pratt & Whitney (King I), 213 F.3d 647, 647 (11th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table
decision) (citing 11TH Ct. R. 36-2).
22. King 1, 161 F.R.D. at 476.
23. Id.
24. Id.
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The district court's decision was subsequently affirmed by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals in an unpublished memorandum decision,2 5 which
under the court's rules constitutes only persuasive and not binding authori-
ty. 26 This case has since been followed by several other more recent district
court decisions.27
Therefore, one line of federal cases views Rule 30(b)(6) as designed to
provide additional protection to corporations having to select representatives
and accordingly limits the inquiry to the designated areas.28 The other line,
however, looks at Rule 30(b)(6) as providing parties with additional discov-
ery tools and as a result does not limit the inquiry.29 Although more federal
district court decisions follow the latter approach, the minuscule number of
total cases coupled with the lack of binding circuit court authority clearly
fails to constitute a definitive federal rule.30
The rule limiting the inquiry to the designated matters makes more
sense from both a legal and logical standpoint, although the Paparelli court
fails to address many of the reasons supporting this conclusion.3' As dis-
cussed in more detail below, there are distinct differences between the per-
mitted uses of corporate representative depositions as opposed to those in-
volving normal witnesses.32
A corporate representative deposition is a party deposition and accor-
dingly, is not limited by the normal rules regarding witness depositions.33 As
25. King II, 213 F.3d at 647.
26. Under Eleventh Circuit Rule 36-2, a decision of the court referenced in a Table of
Decisions Without Reported Opinions appearing in the Federal Reporter is "not considered
binding precedent, but . . . may be cited as persuasive authority .... [provided that] a copy of
the unpublished opinion [is] attached to or incorporated within the" pleading. 11TH CIR. R.
36-2.
27. See, e.g., Cabot Corp. v. Yamulla Enters., Inc., 194 F.R.D. 499, 499 (M.D. Pa. 2000);
Detoy v. City & County of S.F., 196 F.R.D. 362, 367 (N.D. Cal. 2000); Overseas Private Inv.
Corp. v. Mandelbaum, 185 F.R.D. 67, 68 (D.D.C. 1999); see also Teknowledge Corp. v.
Akamai Techs., Inc., No. C 02-5741-SI, 2004 WL 2480707, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2004).
28. See, e.g., Paparelli v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 108 F.R.D. 727, 730 (D. Mass.
1985).
29. See, e.g., Cabot Corp., 194 F.R.D. at 499; Detoy, 196 F.R.D. at 367; Mandelbaum,
185 F.R.D. at 68.
30. See Wylie v. Inv. Mgmt. & Resource, Inc., 629 So. 2d 898, 900 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1993) (en banc). "When a state appellate court is asked to decide a federal question as to
which there is no Supreme Court authority directly on point, and the Circuit Courts of Appeal
are divided, there is no [definitive] rule to guide such a state court." Id. In such cases, state
courts engage in a reverse Erie analysis and "guess how the highest court is likely to decide
the issue." Id.
31. See Paparelli, 108 F.R.D. at 729-30.
32. See FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.330(a)(1)-(2).
33. See id. 1.330(a)(2).
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such, under both the federal and state rules the deposition may be used at
trial "for any purpose,"34 which means it may be read at trial regardless of the
availability of the witness and offered as substantive evidence. 35 The witness
may also be led on direct examination 36 and admissions made by a corporate
representative are binding on the corporation,37 while the same statements
made by a normal employee, even if a high-ranking one, are not binding.38
As discussed in more detail below, while most courts have not considered
such admissions "conclusive" in the same sense as "judicial admissions,"
they are nevertheless given tremendous weight when compared to the testi-
mony of a normal witness.39
Courts have also been more liberal in allowing the questioning of party
witnesses as opposed to independent ones, especially where the party has
some special expertise, such as a physician.' In such cases, opinion testimo-
ny has often been allowed.41
Although the testimony of the corporate representative in a deposition
as to designated matters is binding on the corporation, the deponent's know-
ledge as to other matters outside the designations in the deposition is not.42
Therefore, if a court is going to permit a corporate representative to be ques-
tioned on outside matters, at the very least, it must weigh the different por-
tions of the deposition testimony separately to determine each one's admissi-
bility and weight.43 If the testimony outside of the designated areas is still
admissible so that it may be read or shown to the jury, this will present a very
confusing situation for the jury, which is unlikely to be cured by a jury in-
struction. Essentially, the jury would be required to give different parts of
the same deposition different weight or consideration, which presents a high-
ly technical and unrealistic situation for the jury.'
34. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3), with FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.330(a)(2).
35. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Viskase Corp., No. 90-C-5383, 1991 WL 211647, at *2 (N.D.
11. Oct. 15, 1991) (citing Fey v. Walston & Co., 493 F.2d 1036, 1046 (7th Cir. 1974)); La-
Torre v. First Baptist Church of Ojus, Inc., 498 So. 2d 455, 458 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
36. See FLA. STAT. § 90.612(3) (2008).
37. Marker v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 121, 126 (M.D.N.C. 1989).
38. See Mitsui & Co. v. P.R. Water Res. Auth., 93 F.R.D. 62, 65 (D.P.R. 1981).
39. See discussion infra Section V.B.
40. See, e.g., Weyant v. Rawlings, 389 So. 2d 710, 711-12 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1980);
Myers v. St. Francis Hosp., 220 A.2d 693, 698-99 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1966).
41. See, e.g., Weyant, 389 So. 2d at 712.
42. See, e.g., McLellan Highway Corp. v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9-10 (D.
Mass. 2000) (excluding testimony outside of the designated areas).
43. See, e.g., id.; see also United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 359 (M.D.N.C. 1996)
(recognizing that not all discoverable matters are "necessarily admissible at trial" in dealing
with the scope of corporate representative depositions).
44. See McLellan, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 10.
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Therefore, while a party could simply re-notice the deposition of the
corporate representative in order to take a subsequent deposition as a fact
witness with reference to matters outside the notice, this is not a mere techni-
cality as suggested by the court in King I, because of the differences between
the uses and permissible manner of inquiry between the two types of deposi-
tions.45
B. When Does Inquiry Violate a Corporation's Work Product Privi-
lege ?
Another common issue, which has surprisingly received no attention by
the Florida state courts, is the question of when inquiry of a corporate repre-
sentative violates the work product privilege. A notice of corporate repre-
sentative deposition will often contain designations such as "all of the issues
raised by plaintiff's complaint" or "the facts of the accident," which impli-
cate several work product issues.
First, designations like "all of the issues raised by plaintiffs complaint"
require the corporation's counsel to exercise its legal discretion in defining
the relevant issues in the case in order to even identify the appropriate repre-
sentative. Such designations are conceptually no different than requests "to
produce 'all documents that relate to or otherwise support' each essential
allegation in the . . . complaint," or to designate all documents selected by
counsel and given to his client to review in preparation for deposition, which
have been held to constitute work product. 46 At least one federal court has
found that while "the facts of a relevant incident... are proper for a 30(b)(6)
inquiry, the contentions, i.e. [the] theories and legal positions, of an organiza-
tional party may be more suitably explored by way of interrogatories. 47
Another work product issue arises when the designated witness does not
have actual knowledge of the areas of inquiry, but instead only has informa-
tion supplied by the corporation's legal counsel. An example of this type of
problem typically occurs in a personal injury case, where the notice deli-
neates issues relating to the occurrence of the underlying accident, such as
"how the accident occurred," "the facts giving rise to the plaintiff's compara-
tive negligence," and so on. If the corporate employees actually involved in
the accident are not available for deposition, reside outside the jurisdiction,
are no longer employed, or did not personally witness the facts underlying
45. See King v. Pratt & Whitney (King 1), 161 F.R.D. 475,476 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
46. Gabriel v. N. Trust Bank of Fla., N.A., 890 So. 2d 517, 517 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
2005), overruled by Grinnell Corp. v. Palms 2100 Ocean Blvd., Ltd., 924 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2006); see also Sporck v. Peil, 759 F.2d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 1985).
47. Wilson v. Lakner, 228 F.R.D. 524, 529 n.8 (D. Md. 2005).
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the designated issues, the corporation will be forced to select a representative
without actual first hand knowledge, such as an adjuster, whose information
was provided by the company's counsel as a result of discovery and its case
investigation.a"
This situation presents a potential clash between the application of the
work product doctrine and the provisions of both the state and federal rules,
which require the representative to testify as to the matters that are known or
reasonably available to the corporation.49 Normally, information developed
by a party's attorney in preparation of the case would be privileged as work
product.5° Under Florida law, this protection cannot be circumvented by
asking a recipient of the information to set forth his or her "observations"
regarding the subject matter of the privileged information, when the observa-
tions are based upon privileged information.5" Such an inquiry is also not so
different from the type prohibited in ICI Explosives USA Inc. v. Douglas,2
where the court held that plaintiffs' counsel could not ask the defendant cor-
poration's safety director the content of witnesses' statements told to him
during the course of his work product investigation or to set forth the corpo-
ration's contentions regarding the cause of the accident giving rise to the
suit. 53 Some federal courts have reached the same conclusion, holding that
the work product privilege applies to prevent the questioning of corporate
employees as to privileged matters relayed to them by the corporation's at-
torneys5 4
At least one federal court has held that the work product doctrine cannot
be used as a shield from preparing witnesses for their 30(b)(6) depositions:
While counsel's own investigation into the facts of the case is sub-
stantially protected by the [work product] doctrine, and while the
proceedings of any investigation conducted for purposes of risk as-
sessment or peer review may be privileged by reason of the Mary-
land statute, the fact remains that a designated witness or witnesses
must still be prepared to respond to the 30(b)(6) notice. If that
48. See, e.g., id. at 530.
49. See id. at 528-29.
50. Huet v. Tromp, 912 So. 2d 336, 338 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that in-
formation provided to an adjuster by the defendant's attorneys is normally protected from
disclosure as work product); Alachua Gen. Hosp. v. Zimmer USA, Inc., 403 So. 2d 1087,
1088 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (per curiam).
51. Huet, 912 So. 2d at 341.
52. 643 So. 2d 707 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (per curiam).
53. See id. at 708.
54. See SEC v. Buntrock, 217 F.R.D. 441, 444 (N.D. II1. 2003); SEC v. Rosenfeld, No.
97 CIV. 1467 (RPP), 1997 WL 576021, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1997); SEC v. Morelli, 143
F.R.D. 42, 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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preparation means tracking much the same investigative ground
that counsel and the risk management/peer review committee have
already traversed, but independently of that investigation, so be it.
Defense counsel may wish to exercise caution in preparing the
witness or witnesses with privileged documents--otherwise the
privilege may be waived as to those documents-but it is simply
no answer to a 30(b)(6) deposition notice to claim that relevant
documents or investigations are privileged and that therefore no
knowledgeable witness can be produced.
On the other hand, the federal decisions in particular have made it clear
that the corporation has a duty to provide a representative with information
that is "known or reasonably available" to it.56 As subsequently discussed in
more detail,57 the corporation is therefore charged with the responsibility of
preparing the witness to fully and completely answer questions reasonably
related to the designated areas.5" Some have gone so far as to say the repre-
sentative must be prepared to testify about not only the corporation's know-
ledge, but "its subjective beliefs and opinions."59
A number of federal cases have tried to draw the line between the obli-
gation to prepare the corporate representative and the right to avoid disclos-
ing privileged matters. 60 These courts have concluded that where "the notice
seeks, if not the deposition of opposing counsel, then the practical equivalent
thereof. Courts... have generally taken a critical view of such a tactic. 61
Accordingly, in SEC v. Morelli,62 the court quashed the defendant's no-
tice of deposition and directed it to instead propound contention interrogato-
ries:
[T]he Court finds that the proposed Rule 30(b)(6) deposition con-
stitutes an impermissible attempt by defendant to inquire into the
mental processes and strategies of the SEC. Given plaintiffs
55. Wilson v. Lakner, 228 F.R.D. 524, 529 (D. Md. 2005) (footnotes omitted).
56. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6); FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.310(b)(E)(6); see also United States v.
Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 360 (M.D.N.C. 1996); Dravo Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 164
F.R.D. 70, 75 (D. Neb. 1995).
57. See infra Section IV.B., "The Knowledge Base of the Representative(s)."
58. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. at 360; Dravo, 164 F.R.D. at 75.
59. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. at 361. For further discussion see infra note 120 and accompany-
ing text.
60. See generally SEC v. Buntrock, 217 F.R.D. 441 (N.D. 11. 2003); SEC v. Rosenfeld,
No. 97 CIV. 1467 (RPP), 1997 WL 576021, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1997); SEC v. Morelli,
143 F.R.D. 42 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
61. Buntrock, 217 F.R.D. at 445.
62. 143 F.R.D. at 42.
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sworn, uncontroverted statement that all relevant, non-privileged
evidence has been disclosed to the defendants, the Court is drawn
inexorably to the conclusion that [defendant's] Notice of Deposi-
tion is intended to ascertain how the SEC intends to marshall the
facts, documents and testimony in its possession, and to discover
the inferences that plaintiff believes properly can be drawn from
the evidence it has accumulated.
Despite this result, [defendant] is not precluded from all inqui-
ri[es] into the contentions of the SEC.... [Contention interrogato-
ries] represent[] an appropriate method for [defendant] to inquire
into the SEC's contentions.63
In SEC v. Buntrock,64 the court noted the potential for conflict between
the case law requiring a party to properly prepare a witness to answer ques-
tions outside its own personal knowledge and the party's work product privi-
lege:
Buntrock claims that it does not seek to depose opposing counsel,
arguing that the SEC may designate any person under the rule.
While this contention may be technically true, from a practical
standpoint it is an unconvincing argument. The rule requires that
the responding party make a conscientious good faith effort to de-
signate the persons having knowledge of the matters sought by the
[discovering party] and to prepare those persons in order that they
can answer fully, completely, unevasively, the questions posed by
the [discovering party] as to the relevant subject matters. The in-
vestigation in this matter was conducted by SEC attorneys and by
SEC employees working under the direction of attorneys. Thus,
the 30(b)(6) notice would necessarily involve the testimony of at-
torneys assigned to this case, or require those attorneys to prepare
other witnesses to testify. In SEC v. Rosenfeld, 1997 WL 576021,
No. 97 Civ. 1467 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 1997), the court found that
this amounted to an attempt to depose the attorney for the other
side, because even if a non-attorney witness were designated, they
would have to have been prepared by those who conducted the in-
vestigation, and that preparation would include disclosure of SEC
attorneys' legal and factual theories. The court's comments in Ro-
senfeld are applicable here: "Although defendant is correct that a
63. Id. at 47-48.
64. 217F.R.D.at441.
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Rule 30(b)(6) witness is not required to have firsthand knowledge,
and that discovery should be conducted as efficiently as possible,
the notice of deposition clearly calls for the revealing of informa-
tion gathered by the SEC attorneys in anticipation of bringing the
instant enforcement proceedings, and if forced to designate wit-
nesses to testify fully and completely concerning the matters de-
scribed in the notice of deposition, testimony of SEC attorneys or
examiners working under the direction of the SEC attorneys con-
ducting the investigation would be necessary.,
65
As a result, designations which seek to inquire into one party's res-
ponses to the others' interrogatories and requests for production have been
found to be not only overbroad, but violative of the corporation's work prod-
uct privilege, especially since "answering requests for production and inter-
rogatories customarily is performed with the assistance of counsel."66
In an effort to balance one party's right to permissible discovery with
another's work product protections, many federal courts have focused on the
subject matter of the proposed inquiry, trying to draw the line between
"facts" and the "significance" of those facts:
There is simply nothing wrong with asking for facts from a
deponent even though those facts may have been communicated to
the deponent by the deponent's counsel. But, depending upon how
questions are phrased to the witness, deposition questions may
tend to elicit the impressions of counsel about the relative signific-
ance of the facts; opposing counsel is not entitled to his adversa-
ries' thought processes. Here the effort must be to protect against
indirect disclosure of an attorney's mental impressions or theories
of the case.
The problem in this type of situation is determining the degree
to which a particular deposition question elicits the mental impres-
sions of the attorney who communicated a fact to the deponent.
67
Where the courts have found that the designations improperly impinge
on the corporation's work product and attorney client privileges, they have
65. Id. at 444 (quoting Rosenfeld, 1997 WL 576021, at *2) (citation omitted).
66. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98C3952, 2000 WL 116082, at *9
(N.D. I11. Jan. 24, 2000) (mem.).
67. Buntrock, 217 F.R.D. at 446 (quoting Protective Nat'l Ins. Co. of Omaha v. Com-
monwealth Ins. Co., 137 F.R.D. 267, 280 (D. Neb. 1989)).
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often struck the notice and instead directed the party to propound contention
interrogatories.68
In the same vein, it seems incongruous that a designee can be compelled
to testify about the corporation's subjective beliefs and opinions but that the
same questions could not be asked to a lay witness. 69 There is no overriding
policy reason or legal rationale for treating corporate representative deposi-
tions different from individual party depositions. Therefore, to the extent
possible, corporate representative's depositions should be governed by the
same rules and limitations as individual party depositions.
I. DESIGNATION OF AREAS
A. The "Reasonable Particularity" Requirement
Both the federal and state rules require that the areas of inquiry be des-
ignated in the notice with "reasonable particularity" 70 but do not otherwise
provide guidance as to the degree of specificity required.71 Unfortunately,
the cases construing the rules fail to offer any meaningful general rule and
instead are limited to their specific facts.
In one case, a Rule 30(b)(6) notice, which stated "that the areas of in-
quiry will 'includ[e] but not [be] limited to' the areas specifically enume-
rated," was held to be overbroad and therefore failed to meet the reasonable
particularity standard.72 In another case, the district court held that a notice
which sought "to examine 'such other officers and employees of said plain-
68. See, e.g., id.; Smithkline, 2000 WL 116082, at *9; Exxon Res. & Eng'g Co. v. United
States, 44 Fed. Cl. 597, 602-03 (Fed. Cl. 1999); Rosenfeld, 1997 WL 576021, at *3-4.
69. See Exxon Research & Eng 'g Co., 44 Fed. CI. at 602-03.
70. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.3 10(b)(6). The reason for the particularity
requirement "is to give the opposing party notice of the areas of inquiry that will be pursued
so that it can identify appropriate deponents and ensure they are prepared for the deposition."
Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 226 F.R.D. 118, 125 (D.D.C. 2005).
71. The ABA's Civil Discovery Standards provide that the notice "should accurately and
concisely identify the designated area(s) of requested testimony, giving due regard to the
nature, business, size, and complexity of the entity being asked to testify." ABA SECTION OF
LITIG., CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS, § 19a (2004) available at http://www.abanet.org
/litigation/discoverystandards/2004civildiscoverystandards.pdf [hereinafter CIVIL DISCOVERY
STANDARDS]. The ABA also suggests that if a party is in doubt as to "the meaning and intent
of any designated area of inquiry [it] should communicate in a timely manner with the request-
ing party to clarify the matter so that the deposition may go forward as scheduled." Id. § 19e.
72. Reed v. Bennett, 193 F.R.D. 689, 692 (D. Kan. 2000); accord Tri-State Hosp. Supply
Corp., 226 F.R.D. at 125 (striking the phrase "including but not limited to" from six categories
in a 30(b)(6) notice because "[l]isting several categories and stating that the inquiry may ex-
tend beyond the enumerated topics defeats the purpose of having any topics at all").
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tiff as have knowledge of the matters involved in this action"' was too gener-
al.7 3 Similarly, a designation regarding Plaintiff s "'responses to Defendants'
Interrogatories and requests for production, along with the subject[] [matters]
identified therein,"' was held to be not only overbroad and burdensome, but
violative of the corporation's work product privilege as well.74
In contrast, another federal district court held that a 30(b)(6) notice
identifying the subject matter as "[t]he Group Health Insurance Plan issued
to plaintiff through his employment with Xerox, Inc., believed to be num-
bered E9387," was stated with reasonable particularity. 75 Likewise, an in-
sured's 30(b)(6) notice, seeking "a person knowledgeable about the claims
processing and claims records, and persons familiar with general file keep-
ing, storage and retrieval systems of [the] defendant" insurer, was held to be
sufficiently particular.76 Most cases have held, however, that designations
which are overly broad or general, such as "all of the issues raised in plain-
tiffs complaint," may raise work product issues as well.77
B. What Constitutes Sufficient Compliance with the Notice?
Sanctions for failure to comply with both the state and federal rules are
dependent in the first instance upon the discovering party's compliance with
the procedures set forth in the rules.78 Where the party seeking the discovery
does not properly comply with the provisions of the rules, such as by naming
a specific individual,79 or by inadequately delineating the areas of inquiry,8°
or by failing to serve a formal notice,81 sanctions for failing to produce a
73. Morrison Exp. Co. v. Goldstone, 12 F.R.D. 258, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
74. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., No. 98C3952, 2000 WL 116082, at *9-
10 (N.D. I11. Jan. 24, 2000) (mem.).
75. Steil v. Humana Kansas City, Inc., 197 F.R.D. 442, 444 (D. Kan. 2000).
76. Marker v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 121, 125-26 (M.D.N.C. 1989); see
also Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 137, 140 (D.D.C. 1998) (holding that a Rule 30(b)(6) no-
tice which stated "that the subject matter of [the] inquiry will be 'the computer systems com-
monly known as or referred to as "Big Brother" and/or "WHODB,' .... was stated with "rea-
sonable particularity").
77. See supra Section II.B.
78. CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 71, § 3.
79. See Anderson Invs. Co. v. Lynch, 540 So. 2d 832, 833 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(per curiam) (holding that a corporation is not subject to sanctions for failing to produce a
specifically named employee in response to notice under Florida rule).
80. See King v. Pratt & Whitney (King 1), 161 F.R.D. 475, 476 (S.D. Fla. 1995) (finding
that a corporate party may not be sanctioned for a representative's inability to answer ques-
tions outside the designated areas).
81. Bank of N.Y. v. Meridien BIAO Bank Tanzania Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 135, 145-46
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (finding that plaintiff could not be sanctioned for violating Rule 30(b)(6) by
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knowledgeable corporate representative are generally not appropriate.82 As
stated rather unceremoniously by the court in King I, "if the deponent does
not know the answer to questions outside the scope of the matters described
in the notice, then that is the examining party's problem.,
83
Where the proper procedures are followed, however, the failure to pro-
duce individuals with sufficient knowledge of the matters asserted 84 can lead
to a variety of sanctions, which normally become progressively more severe
as noncompliance continues. 85  Typically, the court's first reaction to the
failure to provide a witness with sufficient knowledge of the designated mat-is t entr an86ters is to enter an order compelling production, sometimes even identifying
the specific individual(s) to appear.87 The types of escalating sanctions that
can follow are documented in Precision Tune Auto Care, Inc. v. Radcliffe.88
producing purportedly inadequate witnesses when defendants' informal requests for deposi-
tion witnesses did not constitute "notice" under the rule).
82. See, e.g., id.; King I, 161 F.R.D. at 476; Lynch, 540 So. 2d at 833. A party must be
careful though not to sit on its rights and then try to justify its designation of a plainly unquali-
fied deponent. For example, in Arctic Cat, Inc. v. Injection Research Specialists, Inc., the
district court sanctioned the plaintiff for designating an unqualified deponent even though
plaintiff contended that its faulty designation was caused "by the vagueness of the [defen-
dant's] Deposition Notice." 210 F.R.D. 680, 682-84 (D. Minn. 2002). The court disagreed
with the plaintiff since it "voiced no uncertainty to [the defendant], after [it] amended its De-
position Notice, about the intended scope of inquiry, nor did it seek the assistance of the Court
in bringing further clarity to [the] scope of [the] questioning." Id. at 683; see also Cont'l Cas.
Co. v. Compass Bank, No. CA04-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL 533510, at *19 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 3,
2006) (suggesting that objections to the areas of inquiry must be made and ruled upon prior to
the commencement of the deposition).
83. King 1, 161 F.R.D. at 476.
84. The inadequate designation of a corporate employee for deposition, or even the fail-
ure to appear for the deposition, is sometimes considered tantamount "to a refusal or failure to
answer a deposition question." Marker v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 125 F.R.D. 121, 126
(M.D.N.C. 1989); see also Barron v. Caterpillar, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 175, 177 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
But see Alexander v. FBI, 186 F.R.D. 137, 142-43 (D.D.C. 1998) (finding that designee's
inability to answer all deposition questions was not "tantamount to a failure to appear" be-
cause designee "testified adequately in numerous respects" and "generally provided the name
of the person that could answer" the questions).
85. See, e.g., Precision Tune Auto Care, Inc. v. Radcliffe, 804 So. 2d 1287, 1288 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 2002). There is some authority supporting the proposition that "[b]oth in pre-
paring and in responding to a notice," the corporation or designated "witness is expected to
interpret the designated area(s) of inquiry in a reasonable manner consistent with the entity's
business and operations." CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS, supra note 71, at § 19d.
86. See, e.g., Chiquita Int'l Ltd. v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, N.V., 705 So. 2d 112, 113
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam); Medero v. FPL, 658 So. 2d 566, 567-68 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam).
87. See Precision Tune, 804 So. 2d at 1288.
88. Id. at 1287, 1290-91.
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In Precision Tune, the plaintiff noticed the deposition of the foreign de-
fendant's corporate representative in Florida.89 Although the defendant filed
a motion for protective order, it never set it down for a hearing.90 Subse-
quently, the court granted the plaintiff's ensuing motion for sanctions and
required the corporate defendant to produce an employee for deposition in
Florida.91 Although the corporation produced an employee in response to the
order, the witness had only "very limited knowledge of the case, but identi-
fied three others with knowledge in the requested areas." 92  The plaintiff
"again moved for sanctions, which the court granted" and ordered the defen-
dant to produce the three named individuals for deposition in Florida, in ad-
dition to various specific documents by a specified date or its pleadings
would be stricken.93 The corporate defendant subsequently provided two of
the three employees, but failed to produce the documents or the third wit-
ness.94 Following a hearing, the court concluded that the corporation's con-
duct had demonstrated "'deliberate and contumacious disregard of the
Court's previous orders,"' and struck the defendant's pleadings.95 The trial
court's action was subsequently affirmed on appeal.96
The federal courts have taken a much stricter approach with respect to
compliance with the corporate representative rule than their Florida state
counterparts. In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Southern Union Co.,97 the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a corporation's failure to produce a
sufficiently knowledgeable representative was the equivalent of producing no
representative; in upholding an award of fees and costs in the absence of a
prior court order, the court stated:
When a corporation or association designates a person to testify on
its behalf, the corporation appears vicariously through that agent.
89. Id. at 1289.
90. Id. The defendant's initial objection appears to have been well taken, since the gener-
al rule recognized in Florida is that absent extraordinary circumstances, a non-resident em-
ployee of a foreign corporation, which is not seeking affirmative relief, cannot be compelled
to come to Florida for deposition. See, e.g., Prevost Car, Inc. v. Vehicles-R-Us, Inc., 658 So.
2d 668, 668 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995). Although not discussed by the appellate court, it
appears as if the defendant's failure to notice its own motion for hearing was treated by the
trial court as a waiver of its fight to insist upon requiring the plaintiff to come to its principal
place of business. See Precision Tune, 804 So. 2d at 1289.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Precision Tune, 804 So. 2d at 1290.
96. Id. at 1293.
97. 985 F.2d 196 (5th Cir. 1993).
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If that agent is not knowledgeable about relevant facts, and the
principal has failed to designate an available, knowledgeable, and
readily identifiable witness, then the appearance is, for all practical
purposes, no appearance at all.9 8
The next logical question is what happens when the corporate repre-
sentative does not know the answer to a question or series of questions.
Rule 30(b)(6) implicitly requires the designated representative
"to review all matters known or reasonably available to it in prepa-
ration for the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition. This interpretation is ne-
cessary in order to make the deposition a meaningful one and to
prevent the sandbagging of an opponent by conducting a half-
hearted inquiry before the deposition but a thorough and vigorous
one before the trial....
[A party] does not fulfill its obligations at the Rule 30(b)(6)
deposition by stating it has no knowledge or position with respect
to a set of facts or area of inquiry within its knowledge or reasona-
bly available." 99
But the question then becomes to what lengths must a corporate repre-
sentative conduct research in order to competently testify as to the designated
areas. Courts appear to apply a reasonableness standard, requiring the corpo-
ration to "'prepare the designee to the extent matters are reasonably availa-
ble, whether from documents, past employees, or other sources.1'1 00 "Rea-
sonably available" has been defined to mean those documents that are in a
party's control.'0 ' "[lit need not make extreme efforts to obtain all informa-
tion possibly relevant to the requests."' 10 2 Courts have enforced this interpre-
tation "in order to make the deposition a meaningful one and to prevent the
'sandbagging' of an opponent by conducting a half-hearted inquiry before
the deposition but a thorough and vigorous one before... trial.' ' 3
98. Id. at 197.
99. Starlight Int'l, Inc. v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 638 (D. Kan. 1999) (quoting United
States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 362 (M.D.N.C. 1996)).
100. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Compass Bank, No. CA04-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL 533510, at *18-
19 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2006) (emphasis added) (quoting Bank of N.Y. v. Meridien BIAO Bank
Tanzania, Ltd., 171 F.R.D. 135, 150-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
101. See Calzaturficio S.C.A.R.P.A. S.P.A. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 201 F.R.D. 33, 38-39
(D. Mass. 2001). For example, a corporate representative was held obligated to review tax-
related documents in the possession of a non-employee accountant. See id. at 39.
102. In re JDS Uniphase Corp. Sec. Litig., No. C-02-1486 CW, 2007 WL 219857, at *1
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2007). Likewise, "the rule may not require absolute perfection in prepara-
tion." Wilson v. Lakner, 228 F.R.D. 524, 528 (D. Md. 2005).
103. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. at 362.
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At the bare minimum, a corporation must prepare its representatives "by
having them review prior fact witness deposition testimony as well as docu-
ments and deposition exhibits, . . . [so it] can state its corporate position at
the Rule 30(b)(6) deposition [about] . . . prior deposition testimony."' 4 At
least one case has gone so far as to hold that the corporate representative
must also review all corporate documentation that might have a bearing on
the 30(b)(6) deposition topics, "[e]ven if the documents are voluminous and
the review of those documents would be burdensome."' 0 5 In short,
[w]hile the rule may not require absolute perfection in preparation.
. it nevertheless... requires a good faith effort on the party of the
designate to find out the relevant facts-to collect information, re-
view documents, and interview employees with personal know-
ledge just as a corporate party is expected to do in answering inter-
rogatories.
1°6
"There is no obligation to produce witnesses who know every single fact,
only those that are relevant and material to the incident or incidents that un-
derlie the suit.'
0 7
Although the length of time involved in preparation will not be deter-
minative of whether the corporation has reasonably prepared its deponent,
courts do consider it. 0 8 In one case, the court found that a corporate repre-
sentative failed to "appear" when the deponent spent a total of three hours
reviewing materials, merely glancing at some; conducted no investigation
into the corporation's role in the case; and spent a "scant" one and one-half
hours meeting with the corporate attorney prior to the deposition.0 9
In light of the above, some courts consider the production of an unpre-
pared designee to be "tantamount to [the] failure to appear" at a deposition.' 0
"[I]f it becomes obvious during the course of a deposition that the designee is
deficient, the corporation ...[must] provide a substitute.""' In addition,
"'[m]onetary sanctions are mandatory under Rule 37(d) for [the] failure to
appear by means of ... failing to [adequately] educate a Rule 30(b)(6) wit-
104. Id.
105. Calzaturficio, 201 F.R.D. at 37.
106. Wilson, 228 F.R.D. at 528-29.
107. Id. at 529 n.7.
108. See id. at 528.
109. See Calzaturficio, 201 F.R.D. at 37.
110. E.g., United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 363 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
111. Dravo Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 164 F.R.D. 70,75 (D. Neb. 1995).
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ness, unless the conduct was substantially justified.""' 2 The rule provides
that a "court must require the party failing to act, the attorney advising that
party, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees,
caused by the failure."' 13 In some cases where there is a repeated violation of
the rule, courts have held the corporation bound to the initial level of the
response and have precluded any later contradiction or supplementation."l
4
IV. SELECTION OF CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVES
A. The Importance of the Selection
Before 1970, it was generally held that if a corporation was to be ex-
amined through its officers, directors, and managing agents, the individual to
be questioned had to be identified in the notice."5 Now that the corporation
selects the witnesses to testify as corporate representatives, this has become
an extremely important decision for two reasons.
First, since the deposition will be treated at trial as the testimony of a
party and not just an independent witness, the deposition may be used at trial
"for any purpose.""' 6 This means that the deposition may be read at trial and
offered as substantive evidence, regardless of the availability of the witness
to testify in person."
7
Second, and most obviously, the corporate party is bound by testimony
of the corporate representative, and the representative's statements can be
admitted as an admission of the corporation. 18 In other words, "[a] corpora-
tion is 'bound' by its Rule 30(b)(6) testimony, in the same sense that any
individual deposed under Rule 30(b)(1) would be 'bound' by his or her tes-
timony, however, this does not mean that the witness has made a judicial
admission that formally and finally decides an issue. ' '119
112. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d
479, 489 (D. Md. 2005) (quoting In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 168, 174 (D.D.C.
2003)).
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(3).
114. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 491.
115. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6).
116. See FED. R. Civ. P. 32(a)(3); FLA. R. Crv. P. 1.330(a)(2).
117. See, e.g., LaTorre v. First Baptist Church of Ojus, Inc., 498 So. 2d 455, 458 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
118. McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 185 F.R.D. 70, 79 (D.D.C. 1999).
119. Canal Barge Co. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., No. 98-C-0509, 2001 WL 817853, at
*1 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2001) (citing W.R. Grace & Co. v. Viskase Corp., No. 90-C-5383, 1991
WL 211647, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 1991)).
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Accordingly, a corporation should be careful not to choose a representa-
tive whose testimony will contradict other testimony offered on behalf of the
corporation.12° The situation would probably be likened to a party who alters
its deposition testimony in order to create a genuine issue of material fact to
preclude the entry of summary judgment. "'When a party has given clear
answers to unambiguous questions which negate the existence of any ge-
nuine issue of material fact [for summary judgment], that party cannot the-
reafter create such an issue with an affidavit that merely contradicts without
explanation, previously given clear testimony.""90
2
'
B. The Knowledge Base of the Representative(s)
The testimony elicited at [a corporate representative's] deposi-
tion represents the knowledge of the corporation, not of the indi-
vidual deponents. The designated witness is "speaking for the
corporation," and this testimony must be distinguished from that of
a "mere corporate employee" whose deposition is not considered
that of the corporation and whose presence must be obtained by
subpoena. 122
Under both the state and federal rules, the corporate representative has a
duty to provide information that is "'known or reasonably available to the"'
corporation. 23 As such, "the duty to present and prepare a Rule 30(b)(6)
designee goes beyond matters personally known to that designee or to mat-
ters in which that designee was personally involved."'2 4 For this reason, the
120. See United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 361-62 (M.D.N.C. 1996). As stated by
one court:
The designee, in essence, represents the corporation just as an individual represents him or her-
self at a deposition. Were it otherwise, a corporation would be able to deceitfully select at trial
the most convenient answer presented by a number of finger-pointing witnesses at the deposi-
tions. Truth would suffer.... The attorney for the corporation is not at liberty to manufacture
the corporation's contentions. Rather, the corporation may designate a person to speak on its
behalf and it is this position which the attorney must advocate.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
121. McCormick v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 333 F.3d 1234, 1240 n.7 (11 th Cir. 2003)(per
curiam) (quoting Van T. Junkins & Assocs. v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 736 F.2d 656, 657 (11th Cir.
1984)).
122. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. at 361. See also lerardi v. Loillard, Inc., No. 90-7049, 1991 WL
158911, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 1991)(mem.).
123. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. at 360 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6)).
124. Id. at 361 (citing Buycks-Roberson v. Citibank Fed. Say. Bank, 162 F.R.D. 338, 343
(N.D. Ill. 1995); SEC v. Morelli, 143 F.R.D. 42, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)).
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corporate representative does not need to have "personal knowledge of the
facts to which he testifies. ' 25
The corporation "must make a conscientious good-faith [effort] to de-
signate the person[] [who has] knowledge [about] the matters sought by" the
party noticing the deposition. 12 6 But the corporation's "duty extends beyond
the mere act of presenting a human body to speak on the corporation's be-
half." 127 Therefore, the corporation is not relieved of producing a representa-
tive simply because it has no employee who participated in the underlying
event or transaction or who "has sufficient [personal] knowledge to provide
the requested information.' 28 In such situations, a number of district court
decisions have held that the corporation must make a good faith effort to
prepare the representative to answer fully and completely any questions
posed as to the relevant subject matters based on any reasonably available
information including documents, past employees, or other sources. 129 It
may not be enough for the representative to simply review documents pre-
viously produced in deposition and to confer with the corporation's attorney
if this will not sufficiently prepare him to testify as to the designated areas.
130
The corporation's duty to provide information through a knowledgeable
representative has been equated to its obligations in answering interrogato-
ries:
The Advisory Committee said: "This burden is not essentially dif-
ferent from that of answering interrogatories under Rule 33 ...."
As with interrogatories, depositions should be answered directly
and without evasion, in accordance with the information the de-
posed party possesses, after due inquiry. [The corporation] must
make a conscientious good-faith endeavor to designate the persons
having knowledge of the matters sought by [the noticing party] and
to prepare those persons in order that they can answer fully, com-
125. PPM Fin., Inc. v. Norandal USA, Inc., 297 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1085-86 (N.D. I11.
2004).
126. Mitsui & Co. v. P.R. Water Res. Auth., 93 F.R.D. 62, 67 (D.P.R. 1981); see also
Buycks-Roberson, 162 F.R.D. at 342.
127. Quantachrome Corp. v. Micromeritics Instrument Corp., 189 F.R.D. 697, 699 (S.D.
Fla. 1999).
128. Dravo Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 164 F.R.D. 70, 75 (D. Neb. 1995); see also
Taylor, 166 F.R.D. at 361-62; Morelli, 143 F.R.D. at 45; Mitsui, 93 F.R.D. at 67.
129. See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Compass Bank, No. CA04-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL 533510 at
*14, 18-19 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2006); Buycks-Roberson, 162 F.R.D. at 343; Dravo, 164 F.R.D.
at 75; United States v. Mass. Indus. Fin. Agency, 162 F.R.D. 410, 412 (D. Mass. 1995) (cases
cited therein); Morelli, 143 F.R.D. at 45; CrViL DISCOvERY STANDARDS, supra note 71, §
19(f).
130. See Starlight Int'l, Inc. v. Herlihy, 186 F.R.D. 626, 638 (D. Kan. 1999).
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pletely, unevasively, the questions posed by Mitsui as to the rele-
vant subject matters.' 31
As previously discussed in more detail in Part H.B., a number of federal
district courts have limited inquiry under Rule 30(b)(6) to factual matters in
order to avoid allowing litigants to use the rule to circumvent a corporation's
work product protections. 32 There is, however, a line of federal district opi-
nions which state that the corporate representative "must not only testify
about facts within the corporation's knowledge, but also its subjective beliefs
and opinions" and its "interpretation of documents and events."1 33 In Lapen-
na v. Upjohn Co.,134 the court qualified this requirement by stating: "Before
compelling such a witness to testify regarding the subjective beliefs of the
corporation, a court should first be satisfied that the employee has the requi-
site knowledge and authority to make an accurate statement."'
' 35
Unfortunately, these cases do little to explain how a corporation can
have a "subjective belief," much less give any clue as to how it could ever be
determined. Is the subjective belief of the corporation the belief of its CEO?
How about a majority of its directors? Its stockholders? Its attorneys?
Perhaps even more importantly, such a requirement creates a very high
risk of violating a corporation's work product privilege. 136 It is one thing to
require a corporate representative to testify about factual matters, but quite
another to require testimony about conclusions and interpretations which
clearly enter the realm of the attorney's mental impressions, strategy, advice,
and legal conclusions.
While many of these courts have given lip-service to the proposition
that "[t]he designee, in essence, represents the corporation just as an individ-
ual represents [himself], 13 7 these courts, in fact, hold the corporation to a
much higher standard. 38 Although an individual is not required to speculate
131. Mitsui & Co. v. P.R. Water Res. Auth., 93 F.R.D. 62, 66-67 (D.P.R. 1981) (citations
omitted).
132. See, e.g., Morelli, 143 F.R.D at 47.
133. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Compass Bank, No. CA04-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL 533510, at *19
(S.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2006); United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356, 361 (M.D.N.C. 1996) (rely-
ing on Lapenna v. Upjohn Co., 110 F.R.D. 15, 21 (E.D. Pa. 1986)); see also A.I.A. Holdings,
S.A. v. Lehman Bros., No. 97-CIV-4978, 2002 WL 1041356, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2002);
lerardi v. Lorillard, Inc., No. 90-7049, 1991 WL 158911, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 13,
1991)(mem.) (opposing party entitled to discover corporation's "interpretation" of docu-
ments).
134. Lapenna, 110 F.R.D. at 15.
135. Id. at 20.
136. See id. at 21-22.
137. A.LA. Holdings, 2002 WL 1041356, at *2.
138. See generally United States v. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. 356 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
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as to matters of which he or she has no direct knowledge, these cases require
the representative to testify as to matters of which the corporation itself may
have no knowledge.' Similarly, while an individual would not be required
to give expert opinions in areas where he or she is not an expert, this line of
cases in effect requires the corporation to do so by compelling the representa-
tive to testify concerning the corporation's "subjective beliefs and opi-
nions."' 4 Since an individual litigant would not be required to divulge opi-
nion work product or speculate as to expert opinions, why should a corpora-
tion be required to do so?
C. The Knowledge Level of the Representative(s)
A common misconception among litigants, and sometimes even
courts, 41 is that the rules require the production of the person with the
"most" knowledge regarding the designated issues. 142 Neither the state nor
federal rule contains such a requirement, and instead only provide that the
witness be able to "testify about matters known or reasonably available to the
organization."'
143
Both the state and federal rules clearly call for the selection of the wit-
ness to be made by the corporation.'" The party seeking to take the deposi-
tion may not name a particular employee or individual under this rule.145 To
require the corporation to produce the individual with the "most" knowledge
of a designated issue, however, would nullify the corporation's choice in the
matter and, in many cases, would be tantamount to requiring the production
of a specific employee.
46
For example, if the case involved a suit for personal injuries arising
from an accident, those corporate employees with the "most" knowledge of
139. Seeid.at361.
140. Id.; see also Lapenna, 110 F.R.D. at 20; A.LA. Holdings, 2002 WL 1041356, at *2.
141. See Paparelli v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 108 F.R.D. 727, 729-30 (D.
Mass. 1985).
It makes no sense for a party to state in a notice that it wishes to examine a representative of a
corporation on certain matters, have the corporation designate the person most knowledgeable
with respect to those matters, and then to ask the representative about matters totally different
from the ones listed in the notice.
Id. (emphasis added).
142. See id.
143. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(b)(6); see also King v. Pratt & Whitney (King 1), 161 F.R.D.
475, 476 (S.D. Fla. 1995).
144. See Chiquita Int'l Ltd. v. Fresh Del Monte Produce, N.V., 705 So. 2d 112, 113 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998) (per curiam).
145. See id.
146. See id. at 112-13.
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how the accident occurred would be the ones who actually witnessed it. The
same could be true in a products liability suit; the employee with the "most"
knowledge concerning the operation of the product would likely be the engi-
neer who designed it. In these cases, the corporation would therefore be de-
prived of its right to make a selection of the representative to speak for it as
guaranteed by the rule.
Such a construction would pose other problems. If, for instance, the ac-
cident in the first example occurred on a cruise ship sailing in the Mediterra-
nean Sea, the crew members who witnessed it would likely reside and work
in Europe. Similarly, if the product in the second example was manufactured
in Japan, the engineer who designed it would likely live and work in Asia.
To require their employers to bring them to Florida, as the witnesses with the
"most" knowledge, would violate the well-established rule that witnesses
who work and reside outside of the state cannot be required to come to the
state for a deposition.147
It is also important to note that under both the state and federal rules, the
corporation, or other organization is not limited to designating an officer,
director, or managing agent, but may also select anyone who consents to act
as a corporate representative, which may include an employee, attorney, or
consultant. 48 An individual may decline to appear as a corporate representa-
tive, particularly if they have an independent interest from, or conflicting
interest with, the corporation in the pending litigation. 149
Finally, if there is no single individual that can offer testimony on each
of the designated areas, the corporation is obligated to produce as many rep-
resentatives as necessary to satisfy the request. 5 °
D. The Corporation's Use of the Rule to Avoid Harassment
While the state and federal rules provide an important tool for the liti-
gant seeking to depose a corporation, they may help corporations reduce ha-
rassment in the form of having to produce excessive numbers of corporate
147. See, e.g., United Teachers Ass'n Ins. Co. v. Vanwinkle, 657 So. 2d 1232, 1232-33
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per curiam).
148. FED. R. Crv. P. 30 advisory committee's note, subdivision (b)(6) (1970) (explaining
that a person who is not an officer, director, or managing agent may be designated to testify
only with their consent).
149. See id.
150. See Reilly v. NatWest Mkts. Group, Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 268 (2d Cir. 1999); Cont'l
Cas. Co. v. Compass Bank, No. CAO4-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL 533510, at *18 (S.D. Ala. Mar.
3, 2006) ("[A] corporation served with a Rule 30(b)(6) notice of deposition has a duty to 'pro-
duce such number of persons as will satisfy the request."'); Quantachrome Corp. v. Microme-
ritics Instrument Corp., 189 F.R.D. 697, 699 (S.D. Fla. 1999).
[Vol. 33
118
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss2/1
CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE DEPOSITIONS
employees for deposition. In Plantation-Simon, Inc. v. Bahloul,151 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal concluded that while a party seeking to depose cor-
porate employees was not required to use Rule 1.3 10(b)(6) and could instead
set the depositions of specific employees as provided elsewhere in the Flori-
da Rules of Civil Procedure, "if the trial court finds that seriatim depositions
of corporate officers has created a burden on the corporate party, the court is
empowered to alleviate that burden in a proper case by, e.g., limiting the
examining party to the designation procedure.0
52
Where, however, a corporate officer or employee has specific additional
personal knowledge of matters in controversy, it is erroneous to prevent the
opposing party from deposing such a witness. 153 Likewise, a corporation
may insist on the designation of a corporate representative as an alternative
to deposing high-ranking corporate officers who possess no unique, superior,
personal knowledge of the matter in issue.
154
A 30(b)(6) deposition may not be justified where, assuming
the witness is properly prepared, the entity establishes that the wit-
ness's testimony as a 30(b)(6) witness would be identical to his
testimony as an individual and the 30(b)(6) is limited, or substan-
tially limited, to topics covered in the deposition taken in the wit-
ness's individual capacity. In such a situation, there appears to be
no obstacle to the entity's complying with its obligations under
Rule 30(b)(6) by adopting the witness's testimony in his individual
capacity.'55
V. THE IMPACT OF THE CORPORATE REPRESENTATIVE'S TESTIMONY
A. Changing Testimony Through Errata Sheets
As with most other aspects of corporate representative depositions,
there is scant law dealing with the subject of what changes can be made in
the transcript after the deposition is completed. Even resort to the rules ap-
plicable to depositions, in general, offers little help. Although the federal
151. 596 So. 2d 1159 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
152. Id. at ll61.
153. See, e.g., Medero v. FPL, 658 So. 2d 566, 567 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (per
curiam).
154. See, e.g., Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia, 904 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex. 1995);
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Super. Ct., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 363, 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Baine v.
GMC, 141 F.R.D. 332, 334 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
155. A.I.A. Holdings, S.A. v. Lehman Bros., No. 97-CIV-4978-LMMHBP, 2002 WL
1041356, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2002).
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and state rules are worded somewhat differently, they both provide depo-
nents with the opportunity to review the transcript after it is completed and to
make "changes in form or substance" on a written signed statement, which
also must set forth the reasons given by the deponent for each change. 56
Despite the similarity of their respective rules, Florida and federal courts
have interpreted their rules differently. 57
Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.310(e) provides in pertinent part that
"[a]ny changes in form or substance that the witness wants to make [to the
transcript] shall be listed in writing by the officer with a statement of the
reasons given by the witness for making the changes.' 5 8 As is clear from the
language of the rule, a "deponent can make changes of any nature [to the
transcribed deposition,] no matter how fundamental or substantial.' 59
If, however, the changes are substantial the opposing party can reopen a
deposition to inquire about the changes. 160 While a party may inquire as to
whether the substantive changes originated with the deponent or his attorney,
the attorney-client privilege precludes inquiry into the substance of the com-
munications between the deponent and his or her counsel.' 6' The errata
sheet, indicating the changes and corrections to the witness's deposition tes-
timony, is admissible in evidence since it becomes a part of the testimony. 62
While earlier interpretations of the federal rule allowed a deponent to
make any change whatsoever to the deposition transcript, recent decisions,
including cases in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, have limited the
changes to matters of form and not the substance of the testimony given un-
der oath.'63
156. FED. R. Cry. P. 30(e); FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.310(e).
157. See Greenway v. Int'l Paper Co., 144 F.R.D. 322, 325 (W.D. La. 1992). But see
Feltner v. Internationale Nederlanden Bank, 622 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1993) (per curiam).
158. FLA.R.CIv.P. 1.310(e).
159. Feltner, 622 So. 2d at 124; see also Lugtig v. Thomas, 89 F.R.D. 639, 641 (N.D. Ill.
1981); Allen & Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 49 F.R.D. 337, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
160. See Motel 6, Inc. v. Dowling, 595 So. 2d 260, 262 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)
(citing Sanford v. CBS, Inc., 594 F. Supp. 713, 715 (N.D. Ill. 1984)).
161. Feltner, 622 So. 2d at 125.
162. Dowling, 595 So. 2d at 262.
163. See Greenway v. Int'l Paper Co., 144 F.R.D. 322, 325 (W.D. La. 1992); see also
Bums v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Jackson County, 330 F.3d 1275, 1281-82 (10th Cir.
2003); Garcia v. Pueblo Country Club, 299 F.3d 1233, 1242 n.5 (10th Cir. 2002) ("We do not
condone counsel's allowing for material changes to deposition testimony and certainly do not
approve of the use of such altered testimony that is controverted by the original testimony.");
Thorn v. Sundstrand Aerospace Corp., 207 F.3d 383, 389 (7th Cir. 2000); Harrell v. Wood &
Assoc. of Am. (In re Harrell), 351 B.R. 221, 240 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006); Reynolds v. IBM
Corp., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2004), aft'd, 125 F. App'x 982 (11 th Cir. 2004)
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The rationale for these more restrictive interpretations of Rule 30(e) was
set forth in the oft-quoted Greenway v. International Paper Co.: 6
The purpose of Rule 30(e) is obvious. Should the reporter
make a substantive error, i.e., he reported "yes" but I said "no," or
a formal error, i.e., he reported the name to be "Lawrence Smith"
but the proper name is "Laurence Smith," then corrections by the
deponent would be in order. The Rule cannot be interpreted to al-
low one to alter what was said under oath. If that were the case,
one could merely answer the questions with no thought at all then
return home and plan artful responses. Depositions differ from in-
terrogatories in that regard. A deposition is not a take home ex-
amination. 165
In Greenway, a plaintiff sought to make sixty-four corrections to her
deposition testimony. 66 The majority of the changes, indicated on the plain-
tiff s errata sheet, sought to materially alter the testimony given at deposi-
tion. 67 The reasons given for the changes were "(1) [the plaintiff's] belief
that the correction is a more accurate and complete answer or (2) that she
subsequently recalled more accurate information or (3) that she wished to
clarify her answer."
16 8
Cases from both the United States Middle District Court of Florida and
the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals have followed the more recent inter-
pretation of Rule 30 and disallowed substantive changes to depositions.' 69 In
Reynolds v. IBM Corp.,'70 a former IBM employee sued the company, assert-
ing that he was fired because of discrimination.' 7' The plaintiff alleged that
after he sent an e-mail to a supervisor on February 27, 2001 requesting in-
formation about medical leave, the company set up a March 6, 2001 meeting
(unpublished table decision); SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless L.L.C., 156 F.R.D. 529, 535-36
(D.D.C. 1994) ("Defendant Gerstner argues that Rule 30(e) allows her to make any substan-
tive change she so desires. While older cases appear to support this position, later cases have
often limited this blank check; perhaps because of the potential for abuse.") (footnote omit-
ted); Rios v. Bigler, 847 F. Supp. 1538, 1546-47 (D. Kans. 1994) ("The court will only con-
sider those changes which clarify the deposition, and not those which materially alter the
deposition testimony as a whole.").
164. 144 F.R.D. at 322.
165. Id. at 325.
166. Id. at 323.
167. See id. 323-25.
168. Id. at 325.
169. See, e.g., Reynolds v. IBM Corp., 320 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1301 (M.D. Fla. 2004),
aff'd, 125 F. App'x 982 (11 th Cir. 2004) (unpublished table decision).
170. Id. at 1290.
171. Id. at 1298.
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with him to discuss either his resignation or placement in a performance im-
provement plan.'72 In his deposition, though, the plaintiff stated that the
meeting was actually scheduled two to three weeks before he had requested
information about medical leave. 73 This testimony refuted the plaintiffs
contention that the meeting was set up in response to his e-mail, since the
meeting was clearly set up prior to the e-mail.'74 Realizing that his testimony
destroyed his case, the plaintiff attempted to submit an errata sheet changing
"'two to three weeks' to 'a little before the meeting,' and indicated [that] he
could not recall if [his supervisor] called him 'a week or a few days before'
the March 6, 2001 meeting."'' 75  The plaintiffs reason given for these
changes was "confusion.'
176
The court disallowed the plaintiffs changes, adopting the rule that subs-
tantive changes to deposition testimony are impermissible:
Although the Eleventh Circuit has not spoken, the Seventh and
Tenth Circuits have dealt with situations where a deponent filed an
errata sheet that materially changed original deposition testimony.
Both courts analogized the situation to the rule that an affidavit
may not be used to contradict a witness's prior sworn testimony. 77
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Reynolds decision 78 in an unpub-
lished opinion, which under its rules makes it persuasive, although not bind-
ing as precedent. 179
In Amlong & Amlong, P.A. v. Denny's, Inc.,180 Judge Hill, in a dissent-
ing opinion, discussed the competing rules regarding changes to errata
sheets, noting that the rule followed in the Eleventh Circuit is that substan-
tive changes to a deposition are not permitted. 8' There, a district court sanc-
tioned a law firm over $400,000 "for their conduct in representing a Title VII
plaintiff in a sexual harassment lawsuit."'' 82 Originally, the district court "re-
ferr[ed] the issue of sanctions to a magistrate judge for an evidentiary hear-
172. Id. at 1299-1300.
173. Id. at 1300.
174. Reynolds, 320 F. Supp. 2d at 1301.
175. Id. at 1300.
176. Id.
177. Id. (citations omitted).
178. Reynolds v. IBM Corp., 125 F. App'x 982, 982 (11 th Cir. 2004) (unpublished table
decision).
179. ITH Cm. R. 36-2.
180. 457 F.3d 1180(11th Cir. 2006).
181. Id. at 1220-21 (Hill, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 1184 (majority opinion).
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ing," report, and recommendation.'83 One of the issues presented to the ma-
gistrate was whether the law firm's submission of an errata sheet to the plain-
tiffs deposition with over 868 changes to the plaintiffs testimony-
consisting of 1200 pages-showed that the law firm had brought the plain-
tiffs suit in bad faith and knew that the suit was totally baseless.184  Al-
though the magistrate judge found that the law firm had not acted improper-
ly, he further noted that the submission of the errata sheet was improper.1 85
The district court subsequently discarded the magistrate's findings and
"substituted its own findings of fact," entering sanctions without conducting
an evidentiary hearing.
186
In a two to one decision, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district
court had abused its discretion when it rejected the magistrate's findings and
entered an order of sanctions without a hearing of its own or the calling of a
single witness. 87 Although the majority did not address the propriety of the
errata sheet filed by the plaintiff, Judge Hill noted in his dissenting opinion:
"Although early cases may have given the impression that such [substantive]
changes are permissible, the rule is, and was at the time the Amlongs filed
the Errata Sheet, to the contrary."'
' 88
Even more recently, a Middle District bankruptcy court disregarded an
errata sheet that made substantive changes to a deposition, citing to both Am-
183. Id.
184. See id. at 1185-86.
185. Amlong & Amlong, 457 F.3d at 1200.
186. Id. at 1184.
187. Id. at 1202 n.6 ("Our holding.., is simply this: the district court abused its discre-
tion and clearly erred when it squarely rejected the magistrate judge's findings of fact and
credibility determinations and substituted its own, without hearing so much as a single witness
at a sanctions hearing.") (emphasis added).
188. Id. at 1220 (Hill, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Judge Hill's dissenting opinion
also states:
The Amlongs maintain that Rule 30(e) "in no way limits the types and number of
changes" that an errata sheet is permitted to make to a prior deposition. The majority seems to
agree, noting without comment or objection that Norelus's sworn testimony was changed 868
times by the Errata Sheet.
Id. (footnote omitted). However, as Judge Hill points out, the majority in Amlong & Amlong
never ruled on the issue of whether errata sheets could be used to make substantive changes to
a deposition, instead they only noted that it was attempted below. Amlong & Amlong, 457
F.3d at 1200 (Hill, J., dissenting). The Eleventh Circuit also noted, without comment, that the
magistrate found the submission of the errata sheet to be improper, which based on the reason-
ing stated above, would instead support the conclusion that the Eleventh Circuit agreed that
the errata sheet was improper because it made substantive changes. Id. at 1194 (majority
opinion).
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long and Reynolds as precedent in Harrell v. Wood & Associates of America,
Inc. (In re Harrell):' 89
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 30(e) permits a depo-
nent to modify or make corrections to a deposition for form or sub-
stance. However, while older case law has taken a broader view of
the rule, the modem trend, one that is bolstered by the Eleventh
Circuit, is to view Rule 30(e) with a restrictive eye. The Eleventh
Circuit recently broached the issue in Amlong & Amlong P.A. v.
Denny's, Inc., 457 F.3d 1180 (1lth Cir. 2006). The Amlong court
surveyed case law which articulated the narrow view of Rule
30(e). For example, in quoting Greenway v. Int'l Paper Co., 144
F.R.D. 322, 325 (W.D. La. 1992), the Eleventh Circuit echoed that
"[a] deposition is not a take home examination."...
The Eleventh Circuit continued its analysis by stating a broad-
er interpretation of Rule 30(e) holds "potential for abuse." In addi-
tion, the Amlong court noted that the Eleventh Circuit itself had af-
firmed a district court's decision to disregard an errata sheet that
attempted to contradict a deposition when the deponent claimed
confusion at the deposition.
19
B. Conflicting Testimony
Another important issue that has not been fully addressed by either the
rules or the Florida state courts is whether a party is permitted to call other
witnesses at trial to refute or contradict the testimony of the corporate repre-
sentative.
Numerous federal district courts have repeated the standard: "[A] cor-
poration served with a Rule 30(b)(6) notice of deposition has a duty to 'pro-
duce such number of persons as will satisfy the request [and] more impor-
tantly, prepare them so that they may give complete, knowledgeable and
binding answers on behalf of the corporation.""9 1
189. 351 B.R. 221, 240 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006).
190. Id. (citations omitted).
191. Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Compass Bank, No. CA04-0766-KD-C, 2006 WL 533510, at *18
(S.D. Ala. Mar. 3, 2006) (emphasis added) (citing Marker v. Union Fid. Life Ins. Co., 125
F.R.D. 121, 126 (M.D.N.C. 1989)); see Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Marvel Enters.,
Inc., No. 01-CIV-3016(AGS)(HB), 2002 WL 1835439, at *2, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2002) ("A
30(b)(6) witness testifies as a representative of the entity, his answers bind the entity ....")
(emphasis added); Prokosch v. Catalina Lighting, Inc., 193 F.R.D. 633, 638 (D. Minn. 2000);
Dravo Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 164 F.R.D. 70, 75 (D. Neb. 1995) (citing Marker, 125
F.R.D. at 126).
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The unanswered question, however, is what does "binding" mean in this
context? In a statement that has been repeated by a number of other cases,'92
the court in United States v. Taylor93 concluded:
The designee, in essence, represents the corporation just as an in-
dividual represents him or herself at a deposition. Were it other-
wise, a corporation would be able to deceitfully select at trial the
most convenient answer presented by a number of finger-pointing
witnesses at the depositions. Truth would suffer.
... The attorney for the corporation is not at liberty to manu-
facture the corporation's contentions. Rather, the corporation may
designate a person to speak on its behalf and it is this position
which the attorney must advocate. 
194
Although the foregoing quote would appear to prevent the subsequent
introduction of contrary evidence, the court softened its stance on the conclu-
sive nature of such testimony in a footnote:
When the Court indicates that the Rule 30(b)(6) designee
gives a statement or opinion binding on the corporation, this does
not mean that said statement is tantamount to a judicial admission.
Rather, just as in the deposition of individuals, it is only a state-
ment of the corporate person which, if altered, may be explained
and explored through cross-examination as to why the opinion or
statement was altered. However, the designee can make admis-
sions against interest under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3) which are
binding on the corporation. 1
95
In W.R. Grace & Co. v. Viskase Corp.,196 cited in Taylor, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois went on to further
define the meaning of "binding" in this context by explaining:
It is true that a corporation is "bound" by its Rule 30(b)(6) testi-
mony, in the same sense that any individual deposed under Rule
30(b)(1) would be "bound" by his or her testimony. All this means
is that the witness has committed to a position at a particular point
192. See, e.g., A.I.A. Holdings, S.A. v. Lehman Bros, No. 97-CIV-4978, 2002 WL
1041356, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2002); Exxon Res. & Eng'g Co. v. United States, 44 Fed.
CI. 597, 600 (Fed. Cl. 1999).
193. 166 F.R.D. 356 (M.D.N.C. 1996).
194. Id. at 361-62 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp., 2002 WL 1835439, at *3.
195. Taylor, 166 F.R.D. at 362 n.6 (citations omitted).
196. No. 90-C-5383, 1991 WL 211647 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 15, 1991).
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in time. It does not mean that the witness has made a judicial ad-
mission that formally and finally decides an issue. Deposition tes-
timony is simply evidence, nothing more. Evidence may be ex-
plained or contradicted. Judicial admissions, on the other hand,
may not be contradicted. Viskase ignores the differences between
evidentiary testimony and judicial admissions.197
Other cases have gone further, however, indicating that courts could in
fact bar inconsistent testimony. 198 In Wilson v. Lakner,'99 the United States
District Court for the District of Maryland warned that: "[D]epending on the
nature and extent of the obfuscation, the testimony given by the non-
responsive deponent (e.g. 'I don't know') may be [designated] 'binding on
the corporation' so as to prohibit it from offering contrary evidence at tri-
al.,,Q00
Similarly, in Rainey v. American Forest & Paper Ass'n,20 1 the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia refused to allow a corporate
party to present evidence which conflicted with the testimony of its corporate
representative in opposition to a subsequent motion for summary judgment:
In light of this factual predicate, plaintiff reads Rule 30(b)(6)
as precluding defendant from adducing from Ms. Kurtz a theory of
the facts that differs from that articulated by the designated repre-
sentatives. Plaintiffs theory is consistent with both the letter and
spirit of Rule 30(b)(6). First, the Rule states plainly that persons
designated as corporate representatives "shall testify as to matters
known or reasonably available to the organization." This makes
clear that a designee is not simply testifying about matters within
his or her own personal knowledge, but rather is "speaking for the
corporation" about matters to which the corporation has reasonable
access. By commissioning the designee as the voice of the corpo-
ration, the Rule obligates a corporate party "to prepare its designee
to be able to give binding answers" in its behalf. Unless it can
prove that the information was not known or was inaccessible, a
197. Id. at *2 (citation omitted); see also A & E Prods. Group, L.P. v. Mainetti USA, Inc.,
No. 01 Civ. 10820 (RPP), 2004 WL 345841, at *6-7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2004).
198. See generally Wilson v. Lakner, 228 F.R.D. 524 (D. Md. 2005); Rainey v. Am. For-
est & Paper Ass'n, 26 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D.D.C. 1998).
199. 228 F.R.D. at 524.
200. Id. at 530.
201. Rainey, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 82. In reaching this holding the court did not rely upon the
principle that a party cannot change its sworn testimony by a subsequent affidavit to defeat a
motion for summary judgment, but instead ruled squarely on its analysis of Rule 30(b)(6), so
that its holding would be equally applicable at trial. See id. at 102.
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corporation cannot later proffer new or different allegations that
could have been made at the time of the 30(b)(6) deposition.2 °2
VI. CONCLUSION
The varying interpretations of the respective state and federal rules go-
verning corporate representative depositions lead to the inescapable conclu-
sion that the rules need to provide better guidance on the noticing, prepara-
tion for, conduct of, and use of corporate representative depositions. Given
the potentially harsh sanctions for what courts may deem to be non-
compliance with the rules, the parties need clear parameters on how to pro-
ceed. The courts and the rules committees cannot take a wait-and-see ap-
proach because most of these issues never reach the appellate courts given
the stringent appellate requirements to obtain review of discovery matters.
When the rules committees decide to improve the rules, they should
carefully analyze and consider that, to the extent possible, corporate repre-
sentative depositions should be governed by the same rules and limitations as
individual party depositions with regard to work product, speculative testi-
mony, and the rendering of expert opinions. This will facilitate the process
of bringing the corporate representative rules into focus for litigants on both
sides of the bar, while at the same time, leveling the playing field so that
corporations are not unfairly penalized simply because they are corporations.
202. Id. at 94 (citations omitted).
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I. INTRODUCTION
Today, money is worshiped as if it is the Great Oz. It is presumed to
have an unquestionable power and it is the answer to everything. Best sellers
like Robert T. Kiyosaki and Sharon L. Lechter's Rich Dad, Poor Dad, teach
readers to become wealthy by spending as little as possible, accumulating
savings, investing those savings, and then living off the investment earnings.'
But Mr. Kiyosaki fails to ask: What would happen if everyone did that? The
investor is glamorized throughout society. College students dream of work-
ing on Wall Street, where they will be well compensated and live lavish life-
styles for investing other people's money.2 Books, television shows, and
radio shows on stock picking abound, and everyone thinks that if they could
* Alireza M. Gharagozlou, J.D., Loyola Law School; Associate of the Society of Actu-
aries; Enrolled Actuary; B.S. Theoretical Mathematics, B.S. Applied Mathematics, Stony-
Brook University; currently pursuing a Masters of Law in taxation from New York Universi-
ty. I would like to thank Lee C. Buchheit for his encouragement and advice throughout the
writing process.
1. See generally ROBERT T. KIYOSAKI & SHARON L. LECHTER, RICH DAD, POOR DAD:
WHAT THE RICH TEACH THEIR KIDS ABOUT MONEY-THAT THE POOR AND MIDDLE CLASS Do
NOT! (2000).
2. See, e.g., WALLsTREET (20th Century Fox 1987).
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just pick the right stock they would be rich. But you hardly hear anyone
ask: Where does this investment return come from? Every year people ea-
gerly read the Forbes' list of billionaires.4 But the writer does not ask: Ex-
actly how did this person accumulate wealth, and what effect did this accu-
mulation have on the people he interacted with?
Things were not always like this. In the past, savers like Kiyosaki may
have been held in high esteem, but they could have just as easily been stig-
matized as misers. Charles Dickens' character, Scrooge,5 was not on the
cover of Forbes magazine, he was undergoing an epiphany and learning the
error of his ways.6 Letting your money work for you was not a brilliant
strategy, it was the immoral act of usury.7 These ideas are missing from the
current discourse on the economy.
The first part of this paper connects the past to the present. Through a
series of stories, this paper explains why there is social value to stigmatizing
cheapness, labeling avarice as a sin, and prohibiting usury. This paper then
applies these ideas to a specific issue that has received a lot of attention-
America's national debt. 8 Finally, this paper explains why criticism of the
nation's debt is misplaced.
3. See, e.g., Mad Money with Jim Cramer (CNBC television broadcast).
4. See Luisa Kroll & Allison Fass, The World's Richest People, FORBES, Mar. 8, 2007,
http://www.forbes.com/2007/03/06/billionaires-new-richest_07billionaires-cz1k-af_
0308billieintro.html.
5. See generally CHARLES DIcKENs, A CHRISTMAS CAROL AND OTHER STORIES (Random
House 1995) (1843).
6. See generally id. Note that some doubt the credibility of Scrooge's epiphany. Elliot
L. Gilbert, The Ceremony of Innocence: Charles Dickens' A Christmas Carol, 90 PMLA 22
(1975), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable146/345. It is termed "the Scrooge problem"
in American Literature. Id.
Shall we ask what Scrooge would actually be like if we were to follow him beyond the
frame of the story? Unquestionably, he would relapse, when the merriment was over-if not
while it was still going on-into moroseness, vindictiveness, suspicion. He would, that is to
say, reveal himself as the victim of a manic-depressive cycle, and a very uncomfortable per-
son.
Id. (quoting EDMUND WILSON, THE WOUND AND THE Bow 64 (Martin Secker & Warburg Ltd.
1942). However, this author hopes that miserliness is not a permanent character trait.
7. See id. There are numerous examples of usurer villains in Elizabethan era British
plays. See generally Celeste Turner Wright, The Usurer's Sin in Elizabethan Literature, 35
STUD. IN PHILOLOGY 178 (1938). This author cannot think of a modem movie with such a
character. See generally id.
8. See, e.g., Gail Russell Chaddock, Deficit Projection 'Stuns' Congress, CHRISTIAN
Sc. MONITOR, Jan. 9, 2009, at 3.
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II. WHAT Do I Do wiTH THIS MONEY?
There are five things a person can do with money. They can spend it,
give it as a gift, save it, make an equity investment, or lend it.9 Each of these
actions has an effect on the economy.
One preliminary question is: How do you know if something is benefi-
cial or harmful to society? This paper answers that question by proposing
that all else being equal, a society is better off when its citizens are produc-
tive. In other words, society is better off when a person is working, than if
he is doing nothing all day.
Note, this is not a monetary based measure. Rather, it measures socie-
ty's ability to use a person's potential. Ultimately the value of a society is
not measured by how much money it has. Rather, a society is measured by
the productivity of its people.' ° Ancient Egypt is remembered for its pyra-
mids, not its money. The United States is not valued for its wealth. In fact,
the country is in tremendous debt. Rather, it is valued for its art, its inven-
tions, its infrastructure, its farming, its healthcare, its schools, and so on.
These were all created by inducing its citizens into productive activity. So,
throughout this paper, the measuring stick will be the productivity of a socie-
ty's citizens.
A. Spend It
To simplify the world, let us imagine a closed world with only seven
people: Dopey, Grumpy, Doc, Happy, Bashful, Sneezy, and Sleepy. In this
world, there is only $100 of money, and it is all in Dopey's hands. So what
should Dopey do with it? Dopey decides to give it to Grumpy in exchange
9. There are also more exotic investments, such as derivatives, forwards and short sales.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 475 (8th ed. 2004). To avoid straying too far from the paper's
topic, these options will not be discussed except to note that their payoffs are generally based
on (derivative of) an underlying debt or equity investment. For curiosity's sake, I will also note
that burning or destroying money is a crime in the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 333 (2006).
10. See John L. Hopkins, Beware the Spending Panacea, 6 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 55, 56
(1946).
Wealth, as Henry George defined it in an analysis that time has tested, "consists of natu-
ral products that have been secured, moved, combined, separated, or in other ways modified by
human exertion, so as to fit them for the gratification of human desires. It is, in other words,
labor impressed upon matter in such a way as to store up... the power of human labor to mi-
nister to human desires." Wealth, then, is created when natural resources are modified by the
expenditure of labor so as to fit them for human use.
Id. (quoting HENRY GEORGE, PROGRESS AND POVERTY 41-42 (Centenary ed. Robert Schalken-
bach Found. 1979) (1879)). Note, this does not foreclose environmentalism. For example,
you can imagine Bashful paying Doc to plant trees or clean pollution, so long as those activi-
ties "minister to human desires." Id.
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for a good or service. Grumpy then gives it to Doc for a good or service.
Doc then gives it to Happy for a good or service. It cycles in this manner all
the way back to Dopey.
This simple model begs a number of questions. What good or service
was provided in each of these transactions? The answer is whatever the buy-
er wanted. It is a free market and the citizens produce whatever society
wants. Assuming a good was manufactured: Where did the seller get the
materials with which to produce the good? We will add that nuance later,
but for now assume the materials were abundant. For example, if the good
was ice cream, pretend the manufacturer found the cow and fruit in nature.
The point is, they are all induced into productive activity. This society
has 100% employment. Every citizen is busy doing something productive.
B. Gift It
Gifts are not pertinent to the subject matter of this paper, but they are
addressed here for completeness. Let us go back to the world above and
assume that Dopey gives the $100 to Grumpy. He does so not in exchange
for goods or services, but rather as a gift. Everything else is the same as
above. The $100 flows through everyone's hands in exchange for goods and
services, except during the Dopey to Grumpy exchange. Dopey does not
receive a good or service in exchange for the $100 and Grumpy does not do
any work.
Going back to the measuring stick, society's productivity has gone
down. Previously, Grumpy was doing a productive activity, but now he is
not. That is why gifts are thought to be bad for society." It would be better
if Grumpy had to do something-anything-for the money than if he rece-
ives it for doing nothing.
C. Save It
Now, let us say a new citizen enters the world-Scrooge. Scrooge is
hard working but cheap. Scrooge asks Bashful for a job. Bashful happily
hires him, and Scrooge diligently works to provide a good or service to
Bashful. But Scrooge does not spend the money he receives. He saves it
under his mattress. 2 It is not that what Scrooge desires is not on the market.
11. See generally Paul Theroux, The Rock Star's Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2005, at
A35. This editorial blames gifts for Africa's lack of development. See generally id. Dambisa
Moyo, Why Foreign Aid Is Hurting Africa, WALL ST. J., Mar. 21, 2009.
12. The reader may note that today money is saved in banks, and that banks invest that
money. One common defense of saving is that because banks invest your money, saving is
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The other seven are willing to do whatever he asks, but he still refuses to
spend money.13
What is going to happen if Scrooge keeps doing this? Eventually
Scrooge will hold the society's entire $100. What are the other seven indi-
viduals doing? Nothing; no one has any money with which to hire each oth-
er. The only person with money is Scrooge and he loves it too much to part
ways with it.
This society is now completely unproductive. No one is working. Not
even Scrooge, because the others do not have any money with which to hire
him. The society was running perfectly, until Scrooge's cheapness brought it
to a grinding halt. 4 This illustration explains why, for example, former Pres-
ident Bill Clinton says we will spend our way out of the recession.' 5 It is
why Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke hints that during a recession,
equivalent to investing. The defense goes on to say that investing benefits society just as
much as spending; thus, saving benefits society just as much as spending. The first response
to this defense is that not all savings are invested. Some forms of saving are the equivalent of
putting your money under a mattress. Furthermore, although the above defense seeks to
equate investing and spending, the two are different activities. For more on why investing is
not a replacement for spending, and for a response to the above defense, see infra note 27 and
accompanying sections.
13. See JEAN BAPTISTE MOLIERE, THE MISER act 2, sc. 5.
There is no service great enough to induce him to open his purse.... [T]he mere sight of any-
one making demands upon his purse sends him into convulsions; it is like striking him in a vi-
tal place, it is piercing him to the heart, it is like tearing out his very bowels!
Id.
14. Lack of spending is thought to be at least a contributing factor, if not the primary
cause, of the great depression. See Barry L. Anderson & James L. Butkiewicz, Money, Spend-
ing, and the Great Depression, 47 S. EcON. J. 388, 388 (1980).
[Tlhe factors responsible for [the Great Depression's] origin and severity have long been in
dispute. In the 1930s Keynes argued that the instability of his day originated in the private sec-
tor where it was caused by fluctuations in the level of business investment. In 1963 Friedman
and Schwartz challenged the Keynesian view with the assertion that monetary shocks were the
true cause of the Depression. In particular, they blamed the Federal Reserve for failing to pre-
vent the waves of bank failures that occurred between 1930 and 1933. These failures and the
resulting monetary chaos were presented as the catalysts that turned a "normal" recession into
a major depression. Recently Peter Temin has argued that the case for monetary instability as
the major cause of the Depression is not supported by the existing evidence. He puts forth the
alternative hypothesis that an autonomous and largely unexplained fall in consumption was
the precipitating factor.... While these hypotheses are not mutually exclusive, advocates of
either one tend to see one factor as primary and all others as mere contributing causes.
Id. at 388-89 (emphasis added) (citing PETER TEMIN, DID MONETARY FORCES CAUSE THE
GREAT DEPRESSION? 68 (1976)) (other citations omitted).
15. Bill Clinton: US Must Spend Its Way Out of Crisis, HUFFINGTON POST, Dec. 5, 2008,
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/12/06/bill-clinton-us-must-spen_n_148931.
html. "We have to stimulate the economy which means in the short run, [President Obama]
has to take America into even more debt .... [Obama has to] use the government's spending
ability to trigger economic activities." ld.
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he would do what is the equivalent of using a helicopter to throw bags of
money onto the street. 16 You cannot let misers like Scrooge bring the econ-
omy to a halt.
17
Again, this simple model begs a number of questions. Do people not
need to save? For example, what if they become disabled and cannot work?
Should they not have saved for that possibility? This is why the insurance
industry is so valuable. It allows citizens to prepare for such remote contin-
gencies, without saving more than is necessary. 8 For example, say you will
need $100,000 in case of disability, but there is only a 1% chance of disabili-
ty. Through an insurance scheme, you can attain that coverage for only
about $1000-1% of $100,000. So, instead of having to save $100,000, you
only have to save $1000.9
The point of this section is that saving is harmful to society.2 ° When
you save money, you are taking a job from someone; you are robbing them
16. See Martin Wolf, 'Helicopter Ben' Confronts the Challenge of a Lifetime, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 2008, at 9. Mr. Bemanke acquired this nickname as a result of a speech he made in
2002. See Governor Ben S. Bernanke, Deflation: Making Sure "It" Doesn't Happen Here,
Remarks Before the National Economists Club (Nov. 21, 2002), available at http://www.fed
eralreserve.gov/BOARDDOCS/SPEECHES/2002/20021121.
17. See id.
18. See, e.g., Menno Pradham & Adam Wagstaff, Health Insurance Impacts on Health
and Nonmedical Consumption in a Developing Country (World Bank Policy Research, Work-
ing Paper No. 3563, 2005), available at http://go.worldbank.org/9FJUO8MS30.
19. What about saving for retirement? Issues surrounding retirement are widely debated
and beyond the scope of this paper. See Jeannine Aversa, Bernanke: Baby Boomers Will
Strain U.S., WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Oct. 4, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/10/04/AR2006100401596.html. However, I do want to note that
some commentators think that an increase in the retirement age is the only solution. See, e.g.,
William Saleton, Curse of the Young Old, Why Should We Pay Them?, WASH. POST, Mar. 19,
2006, at B2. That is consistent with the measuring stick of this paper. Whether a retiree is
living off of government programs, savings, or investment income, he is an unproductive
member of society, and the manner by which he is being taken care of is one of form rather
than substance. Finally, I will note that like attitudes towards miserliness and usury, attitudes
towards retirement have also changed. In 1880, 80% of Americans ages sixty-five or older
were gainfully employed. See DORA L. COSTA, THE EVOLUTION OF RETIREMENT 8 fig.2.1
(1998). In 1990, only about 20% of Americans ages sixty-five or older are gainfully em-
ployed. Id. This is especially surprising when you realize that people over sixty-five are
much healthier today due to modern medicine. It may very well be that people retiring too
early and saving too much for a decades-long retirement, but that is a topic for another paper.
20. See, e.g., Kelly Evans, Hard-Hit Families Suddenly Get Frugal, Aggravating Na-
tion's Economic Woes, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2009, at Al. Marjorie E. Kornhauser writes an
interesting history of how America struggles to maintain the contradictory values of saving
and spending. See generally Marjorie E. Komhauser, The Morality of Money: American
Attitudes Toward Wealth and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119 (1994). The first Americans
followed Max Weber's Protestant ethic, and Calvinism, which valued work and thriftiness.
See id. at 125. Eventually, Americans realized that spending and working are interdependent.
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of their potential for productivity. In exchange, you only receive money-
something that has no innate value. This is why avarice was thought to be
one of the seven deadly sins-it is the choosing of money-or more specifi-
cally the demon Mammon 2 -- over your fellow man.22
D. Equity Investment
Now let us add some sophistication to the model. Previously, there was
no capital required to provide the good or service. For example, if Bashful
made and sold ice cream, he was able to find all the ingredients abundant in
nature. But that is not realistic. He will need to buy the ingredients. If
Bashful wants to provide medical services, he cannot just wake up one day
and practice medicine. He needs to buy an education. To provide a good or
service, Bashful needs not just his labor, but also capital.
Let us go back to the example above. Say Scrooge has not yet accumu-
lated the entire $100. He has only managed to save $75 and the other $25 is
floating around the world. The $25 is in Grumpy's hands, and he wants to
buy ice cream from Bashful. The ingredients for the ice cream are no longer
freely available. They now cost $10. So to make $25 of ice cream, Grumpy
needs to buy $10 of ingredients. But he does not have $10. He needs some-
one to finance this operation. This is when Scrooge appears. He will give
Bashful the $10 for a share of the profits, or alternatively a share of the
losses. The arrangement is as follows: If Bashful makes the ice cream and
sells it for $25, he will give Scrooge $15 and keep $10. If he can only sell it
for $15-perhaps the quality is bad-then Scrooge will receive $11 and
See id. at 129. This debate is still far from being resolved, and regularly finds a forum in tax
policy. Id. Of course some saving is necessary. You cannot spend every penny you earn a
second after it comes into your possession. For example, if you want to buy a $500 computer,
yet you only make $100 a week, then you will have to save to buy the computer. For a de-
fense of saving as a "consumption reserve," see G.P. Watkins, Economics of Saving, 23 AM.
ECON. REv. 61, 61 (1933). While the author agrees that hoarding "is the negation of spend-
ing" he points out that the line between spending and saving is not always so clear. Id. at 62.
21. Robert C. Fox, The Character of Mammon in Paradise Lost, 13 REv. OF ENG. STUD.
30, 30 (1962).
22. For a modem paper arguing for the criminalization of hoarding, see Note, A Look
Inward: Blurring the Moral Line Between the Wealthy Professional and the Typical Crimi-
nal, 119 HARv. L. REv. 2165, 2165 (2006).
But, as Dickens reminds us, the sufferings of the poor masses are also causally linked to
Scrooge's hoarding of material resources. We simply forget (or fail to see) because the con-
nection is more indirect, and thus the responsibility more easily diffused and less likely to give
rise to feelings of personal and moral accountability.... Moreover, this economic behavior is
fundamentally similar to the significant subset of criminalized behavior discussed previously.
Id. at 2170.
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Bashful will keep $4. If no one buys the ice cream-perhaps it is ruined-
then neither side gets anything.
Returning to the original measuring stick, let us see if society is produc-
tive. Bashful is working to make ice cream. But Scrooge is not productive.
If the venture is successful, then Scrooge will get money for nothing. He has
gotten his money "to work for him."23 In fact that is not what is happening.
Money cannot work. Bashful is doing all the work and Scrooge is taking
some of the rewards of Bashful's labor. Is this fair? In history, this ar-
rangement is thought to be fair because it is an equity investment.2 4 An equi-
ty investment is one where the investor shares in the upside and the downside
of the venture. 5
23. Robert Kiyosaki repeats this phrase throughout his book. KIYOSAKI & LECHTER,
supra note 1, at 30.
24. See, e.g., Brian M. McCall, Unprofitable Lending: Modem Credit Regulation and
the Lost Theory of Usury, 30 CARDozo L. REv. 549, 563 (2008). For example, an early Chris-
tian authority states that renting your field to a farmer in exchange for fruit is not a "cursed
act" of usury. Id.
The palea Ejiciens, a fifth-century Christian comment on usury, later incorporated in the
twelfth-century canon law collection entitled the Decretum, reads: "Of all merchants, the most
cursed is the usurer... [but] is not he who rents a field to receive the fruits... similar to him
who lends his money at usury? Certainly not."
Id. at 562 (quoting JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE SCHOLASTIc ANALYSIS OF USURY 38-39
(1957)). See, e.g., M. Siddieq Noorzoy, Islamic Laws on Riba (Interest) and Their Economic
Implications, 14 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 3, 6 (1982) ("The argument [against interest] is
aimed at encouraging capitalists to invest directly, through proprietorships or active partner-
ships, or indirectly through silent partnerships (mudaraba) and purchases of shares in corpora-
tions ....").
25. See generally Jelle C. Riemersma, Usury Restrictions in a Mercantile Economy, 18
CAN. J. ECON. & POL. SCI. 17 (1952). A history of this idea is presented in Riemersma. "'You
saye, that, yf trading for money upon money be a hurtefull thing, and an offence to God, then
is buying and selling also unlawfull. God forbidde. And thys is my reason. In buying and
selling your gayne is not always certaine, as it is in usurie."' Id. at 20-21 (citing THOMAS
WILSON, A DISCOURSE UPON USURY (R.H. Tawney ed., London, G. Bell 1925) (1572)).
Tawney remarks in his introduction that "the essence of usury was that it was certain," but he
does not develop the implications. The linking of usury and certain gain is to be found already
in St. Thomas, who, around 1270, said that "the lender must not sell that which he has not yet
namely the benefits accruing from the use of money and may be prevented in many ways from
having." The full passage is: "Recompensationem vero damni quod consideratur in hoc quod
de pecunia non lucratur, non potest in pactum deducere: quia non debet vendere id quod non-
dum habet et potest impediri multipliciter ab habendo." A pre-arranged reward ("in pactum")
is condemned, because there is a vivid realization of uncertainty. Sancti Thomae Aquinatis...
Opera Omnia (Rome, 1847), Summa Theologica, T. IX, Qu. LXXVIII, Art 11, 159. In the Or-
dinance of London of 1390 we find: "si ascum apreste ou mette en mayns dascuny or ou ar-
gent, pur gaigner eut receivire ou promys en carteigne sans aventure, eit la punissement pur
usurers..... Georg Schanz, Englische Handelspolitik (Leipzig, 1881), L 556. The same
theme occurs again in the English usury prohibition of 1487: Any bargain is void in which
"eny certeyn somme shall be lost by eny covenaund or promys betwyx eny persone or per-
sones." Tudor Economic Documents, I, 135-6. The ecclesiastical authorities assembled at
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Note this arrangement is equivalent to Scrooge buying the ingredients
and hiring Bashful to prepare the ice cream. This insight is especially help-
ful because you can contrast it with slavery. Here, Bashful does not have to
continue working for Scrooge. Scrooge has agreed that if the venture makes
no money, then Scrooge gets nothing. Bashful does not owe him anything.
At any point, Bashful can leave Scrooge with half prepared ice cream.26 No-
tice also that this is not a sustainable way of making money. If too many
people try to make money by saving and investing, and too few people spend
money, then the investments will fail.27  Putting Scrooge's money at risk
the 5th Lateran Council (1517) also linked usury and certain gain. See article "Wucher" in
Lexiconfiir Theologie und Kirche, ed. M. Buchberger, X, 977.
Id. at 21 n.16 (citations omitted); see also Jerry Useem, Banking on Allah, FORTUNE, June 10,
2002, at 154 ("[Flailure to repay a loan could mean slavery. By outlawing interest, Islam
advocated an economy based on risksharing, fair dealing[s], and equity-in both the financial
and social-justice senses of the word.").
26. But what if they enter into a contract? Could Scrooge not use the contract to force
Bashful to work, and is that not similar to slavery? Karl N. Llewellyn, one of the principal
figures in contract law and the principal drafter of the Uniform Commercial Code, describes
the evolution of contract law away from slavery:
With prohibition of slavery and peonage, abolition of imprisonment for debt, refusal of courts
to enforce penalties although expressly agreed upon, all buttressed by usury legislation and li-
mitations on the transfer of wages and future property, modem law moves definitely onto the
basis of reparation for breach as the main purpose of legal remedy. Specific reparation-
which, it will be noted, presupposes that the defendant has the wherewithal to perform-we
have limited largely to the case of land. In the case of irreplaceable personal services we seek
a compromise with the peonage-prohibition by enjoining against a competing employment and
against inducement.
Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 737
(1931).
27. Notice how an investor in a failed venture has begrudgingly turned into a spender. In
the example above, if the venture fails, then Scrooge has spent $10 for ice cream ingredients.
This transformation of investor into spender provides a self-correcting mechanism by which
society can balance the two activities. If too many people invest and too few people spend
money on the products produced by those ventures, then the ventures will fail. The money
invested in those ventures will be in the hands of the people who provided the labor and mate-
rials for the venture. Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson referred to this phenomenon in a re-
cent interview regarding the economic crisis. Krishna Guha, Paulson Says Crisis Sown by
Imbalance, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2009, at 1.
The US Treasury secretary said that in the years leading up to the crisis, super-abundant
savings ... put downward pressure on yields and risk spreads everywhere.
This, he said, laid the seeds of a global credit bubble that extended far beyond the US
sub-prime mortgage market and has now burst with devastating consequences worldwide.
"Excesses ... built up for a long time, [with] investors looking for yield, mis-pricing
risk," he said. "It could take different forms. For some of the European banks it was eastern
Europe. Spain and the UK were much more like the US with housing being the biggest bub-
ble. With Japan it may be banks continuing to invest in equities."
This argument-already advanced by a number of economists and largely endorsed by
Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bemanke-suggests that the roots of the crisis do not simply lie
in failures within the financial system.
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provides a self-correcting mechanism by which society can balance spending
and investing.
In conclusion, Scrooge's equity investment is troubling, as it allows him
to earn money without working. But it is generally thought to be an accepta-
ble arrangement because: 1) capital investment is necessary in society; 2)
Scrooge's money is at risk; and 3) Bashful continues the arrangement
through his own free will.
E. Lend It
Now, let us say Scrooge does not want to make an equity investment.
He wants to make an investment of pure debt. Pure debt, as the term is used
here, means that Scrooge is absolutely entitled to a return. For example,
Scrooge will give Bashful $10, and Bashful must pay Scrooge back $10 plus
3% interest per week. It does not matter what happens with the ice cream;
Bashful still has to pay this amount. It does not matter if Bashful wants to
quit. He cannot quit the arrangement. He will always be under the obliga-
tion to pay.
Remember that the equity investment was equivalent to Scrooge buying
the ingredients and hiring Bashful to prepare them. A debt investment also
can be analogized to an employment situation, except with one difference.
Bashful cannot quit the arrangement. If he refuses to work now, the interest
will pile up and he will have to do more work later. If his work does not
generate the required payment to Scrooge, he will have to do more work
until it does. Thus, it is no longer employment, but rather, it is slavery.28
Id. Surprisingly, even savers can unwittingly turn into spenders. This is because when you
save money in a bank, the bank invests a portion of it. This is called fractional reserve bank-
ing. If those investments fail, then the bank has effectively spent the depositors' money.
However, unlike the transformation of investor into spender, the transformation of saver into
spender is inconsistent with basic notions of property rights. Whereas the investor voluntarily
risked his money, the saver did not. For this reason, numerous government agencies are
tasked with monitoring banks and seizing them when their depositors are about to be trans-
formed into failed investors. As expected, such seizures become more frequent during reces-
sions. See Eric Dash & Andrew R. Sorkin, Government Seizes WaMu and Sells Some Assets,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at Al ("'This institution was a big question mark about the health
of the deposit fund,' Sheila C. Bair, the chairwoman of the F.D.I.C., said on a conference call
Thursday."). Law professor Eric A. Posner, economist Bryan D. Caplan, and economist Wal-
ter Block recently debated whether fractional reserve banking was fraudulent. Posting of Eric
Posner to The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.composts/l1225805194.shtm (Nov. 4, 2008).
28. See Note, Protection of Borrowers in Distribution Finance, 60 YALE L.J. 1218, 1218
n.l (1951).
[U]sury laws have recognized that he who is under economic necessity is not really free. To
put no restriction [sic] on the freedom of contract would logically lead not to a maximum of
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This is why usury was historically made illegal.29 It harms society in
two ways. First, it allows Scrooge to make money without doing anything
and without bearing any risk of loss. Second, assuming the arrangement is
enforced, in other words, that Bashful will be punished if he does not comp-
ly, 30 then it can turn into slavery.3  By a combination of his cheapness and
individual liberty but to contracts of slavery, into which, experience shows, men will "volunta-
rily" enter under economic pressure.
Id. (quoting Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 587
(1933)).
29. See J. Wayne Baker, Heinrich Bullinger and the Idea of Usury, 5 SIXTEENTH
CENTURY J. 49, 49-50 (1974).
The canon law definition of usury as anything added to the principal had dominated European
thought for five hundred years; the practice of usury had been forbidden by the church since
the fifth century .... [There were two key reasons for this prohibition.] One was the theory,
first stated by Aristotle, then formulated in Roman law and reformulated by Aquinas, that
money was sterile or barren; it was a medium of exchange, but not productive. The other ob-
stacle came from the Biblical prohibitions, particularly Deuteronomy 23: 19-20: "Thou shalt
not lend upon usury to thy brother; usury of money, usury of victuals, usury of anything that is
lent upon usury: unto a stranger thou mayest lend upon usury: but unto thy brother thou shalt
not lend upon usury."
Id.; see generally Joseph Persky, Retrospectives: From Usury to Interest, 21 J. ECON. PERSP.
227 (2007) (providing a good summary of the debates surrounding the legality of usury in
1780s Britain); Barbara L. Seniawski, Note, Riba Today: Social Equity, the Economy, and
Doing Business Under Islamic Law, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 701 (2001); see also supra
notes 27, 28 and 31. But see generally Mir Siadat Ali Khan, The Mohammedan Laws Against
Usury and How They Are Evaded, 11 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 233 (1929) (explaining ways
Islamic laws against interest were historically evaded); Mahmoud A. E1-Gamal, Incoherence
of Contract-Based Islamic Financial Jurisprudence in the Age of Financial Engineering, 25
WIS. INT'L L.J. 605 (2008) (arguing that financial engineering is being used to evade Islamic
laws against interest). Islam's prohibition on interest continues to today. Dr. Abdulaziz Sa-
chedina, The Issue of Riba in Islamic Faith and Law, Am. MUSLIM, Feb. 6, 2009, http://www.
theameficanmuslim.org/tam.php/features/articles/theissue-of-fiba-in-islamicfaith-and
law/0017175.
30. In the 17th and 18th centuries, the failure to pay a debt was punished with physical
mutilation and/or debtor's prison. For an article describing these punishments, and seemingly
lobbying for a return to harsh punishments, see D.N. Ghosh, Debt Defaulters as Darlings of
Society, 34 EcoN. & POL. WKLY. 866, 866 (1999).
31. For a modern example of debt-slavery, see SHAF1Q LONGI, UNABATED USURY, 4
(Middle East Research & Information Project) (1973).
In the interior of Sindh it is a frequent practice that when a peasant or a needy person
borrows money from a moneylender, the wife of the oppressed borrower becomes the physical
property of the moneylender, as a security against the loan. Until such time as the loan is repa-
id, with exorbitant interest, to the usurer, the moneylender, who is often a landlord or Wadera,
uses the wife of the needy borrower for his sexual pleasures as and when he pleases.
Id. See also A. Yasmine Rassam, International Law and Contemporary Forms of Slavery:
An Economic and Social Rights-Based Approach, 23 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 809, 820 (2005)
("Bonded laborers work in India's agricultural sector and Pakistan's agricultural and brick-
making sectors. In both systems, laborers work to pay off exorbitant debts that can be inhe-
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debt, Scrooge can enslave a person. He can enslave the entire population.
He will no longer have to pay them for their goods and services; rather he
can get them to produce it for free, as interest payments on his debt.
You are probably wondering why we have debt in society today. The
response is that we do not.32 In the United States there is no such thing as
pure debt of this form. When you buy a bond, it may be called debt, but the
corporation is not under an absolute obligation to pay. If it cannot pay you, it
simply declares bankruptcy 33 and you could receive nothing.34 Thus, under
the definition used by this paper, that bond was equity because you shared in
the downside. Some obligations are not dischargeable in bankruptcy, but
even in those situations, the lender shares in the downside. The lender does
not have an absolute right to repayment. For example, student loans are not
dischargeable.35 However, even in these situations, the borrower does not
have to pay the lender until he earns income.36 Even then, the borrower only
rited by their families. Any wages paid to these laborers rarely even equal their living
costs.").
32. Despite the fact that we do not have pure debt in the United States, the tax code de-
cided to treat "debt" and equity differently, allowing a deduction for payments to "debt" hold-
ers, but no deduction for dividends paid to equity holders. See Katherine Pratt, The Debt-
Equity Distinction in a Second-Best World, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1055, 1058-60 (2000). Not
surprisingly, courts have struggled to implement this fictitious distinction and tax planners
regularly manipulate this fiction to reduce their tax bill. See, e.g., Nathan R. Christensen,
Comment, The Case for Reviewing Debt/Equity Determinations for Abuse of Discretion, 74 U.
CI. L. REv. 1309, 1313-14 (2007)(listing thirty factors used by courts to distinguish debt
from equity); see generally Pratt supra (describing the difficulty of distinguishing debt from
equity and evaluating various treasury proposals to eliminate the debt-equity distinction).
33. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 101-1532 (2006). The bankruptcy provisions are codified
in Title Eleven of the United States Code from 2006. Id.
34. See, e.g., Jonathan Stempel, American Home to Pay Fraction of Bankruptcy Claims,
REUTERS, Aug. 19, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/businessNews/
idUSN193472020080819. "In a disclosure statement filed Friday with the U.S. bankruptcy
court ... the company said many unsecured creditors will recover zero to 2.2 cents on the
dollar on their claims." Id. One author argues that bankruptcy mainly benefits the profession-
als who handle the bankruptcy, at the expense of the creditors. See, e.g., SIDNEY RUTBERG,
TEN CENTS ON THE DOLLAR, OR, THE BANKRUrcY GAME 91-92 (1999).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006); John A.E. Pottow, The Nondischargeability of Student
Loans in Personal Bankruptcy Proceedings: The Search for a Theory, 44 CAN. Bus. L. J. 245,
246 (2006).
36. See 15 U.S.C. § 1673 (2006). Generally the limit is 25% of disposable income. 15
U.S.C. § 1673(a) (2006). If the garnishment is for child or spousal support, the limit increases
to 50% or 60% of disposable income, depending on whether the debtor is supporting another
spouse or child. 15 U.S.C. § 1673(b)(2) (2006). States can further restrict garnishment, and
these limits will override the federal law. 15 U.S.C. § 1677 (2006); see also Richard M.
Hynes, Broke but Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State Courts, 60 FLA. L. REv.
1, 13 (2008).
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has to pay a small percentage of his disposable income. 7 Until the debtor
earns sufficient income, the required payment will be so small that the debt is
effectively void. So, the prohibition against usury is still alive 38 and well in
American law. 39  But, there is one area where pure debt still exists4°-
sovereign debt.4
37. See Hynes, supra note 36, at 13.
38. See Paul B. Rasor, Biblical Roots of Modem Consumer Credit Law, 10 J.L. &
RELIGION 157, 172-75 (1993) (connecting modem lending law to Biblical prohibitions on
usury). But see Vincent D. Rougeau, Rediscovering Usury: An Argument for Legal Controls
on Credit Card Interest Rates, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 31-32 (1996) (arguing that credit card
companies are charging "usurious" interest rates); John D. Skees, Comment, The Resurrection
of Historic Usury Principles for Consumption Loans in a Federal Banking System, 55 CATH.
U. L. REV. 1131, 1132, 1145 (2006) (citing Michael S. Barr, Banking the Poor, 21 YALE J. ON
REG. 121, 159 tbl.l (2004)) (arguing that payday loans, which charge an average of 470%
interest, and which are legal in America, would have been prohibited by middle ages usury
laws).
39. However, please note that the term usury has a specific meaning in American law,
and that meaning is different from the historic definition used in this paper. Although the case
law varies by state, generally four elements are required: 1) a loan; 2) of money; 3) that is
absolutely repayable; 4) at a greater rate of interest than is allowed by the state. 9 SAMUEL
WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 20:4 (4th ed.
1999). Sometimes an additional element of intent is required. Id. For a paper arguing that
interest rate limits inhibit a state's economic growth, see Edward L. Glaeser & Jos6 Scheink-
man, Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and
Usury Laws, 41 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2 (1998). The authors, however, miss the point that the cur-
rent legal definition of usury is very different from the historic definition of usury. See gener-
ally WILLISTON & LORD, supra. As described above, even if states allowed unlimited interest
rates, it would still not amount to usury-in the historic sense-because bankruptcy laws and
wage garnishment limits void the obligation to repay.
40. One paper suggests that the reason pure debt exists in the international realm is be-
cause there is no international government. See Alain Testart, The Extent and Significance of
Debt Slavery, 43 REVUE FRANCAISE DE SOCIOLOGIE 173, 197-99 (2002). He hypothesizes that
debt slavery helped give rise to the state, i.e. a national government. Id. at 199. One reason
debt slavery and government cannot coexist is that there can only be one master. Id. at 200.
The king needs everyone's allegiance, and he cannot lose subjects via debt slavery. Id. Ex-
tending this to the sovereign world, perhaps the lack of an international government is the
reason why pure debt still exists in the sovereign world. Id. at 200-01.
41. Sovereign debt is the debt owed by a nation's government. See Charles Seavey, The
Anomalous Lack of an International Bankruptcy Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 499, 499-501
(2006). Although foreign creditors may agree to restructure sovereign debt, there is no bank-
ruptcy or similar regime where by the sovereign government can free itself of the debt. See
generally id.; Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Inside the Black Box: How Should a
Sovereign Bankruptcy Framework Be Structured?, 53 EMORY L.J. 763 (2004).
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F. Summary
The first section of this paper showed the problem with saving. If there
is too much saving then people are not induced into productive activity. The
next section described the problem with excessive investing. If there is too
much investing and too little spending then the investments will fail. The
last section described the danger of pure debt. If there is too much lending
and too little spending then the lenders will enslave the debtors. Neither
activity can replace spending. A world with too much saving-misery-and
an inordinate desire to make money by investing or lending-usury-is dys-
functional.
Ill. THE SOVEREIGN WORLD
The world of international economics is very much like the world de-
scribed above.42 Nations can spend. For example, the people of the United
States can pay the Japanese for goods or services. Of course, people from
other countries can also hire Americans to produce goods and services. Na-
tions can also save. For example, if you pay a Japanese person $500 for a
new computer, he does not have to use that money to buy a good or service
from you. He can save it.
Now let us add some economic terminology. When an American pur-
chases a Japanese computer for $500, it is a $500 export from Japan and a
$500 import into the United States. The United States is now running a trade
deficit of $500. If you add these trade deficits--or surpluses-up for the
year, and add a few other items, the amount is called the current account.
The other key term is the capital account-sometimes called the finan-
cial account. The capital account represents the total sum of wealth located
in4 3 America and that is owned by people from other countries. This wealth
could be in the form of American dollars, American real estate, American
bonds, and so on. In the above example, the Japanese seller gained $500,
and so the capital account went up by $500.
42. What follows below is a simplified explanation of international balance of payments
accounting. For other sources, see ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
15-19 (John H. Jackson ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d ed. 2008). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF
COM., BUREAu OF ECON. ANALYSIS, THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
(1990), available at http://www.bea.gov/scb/pdf/intemat/bpa/meth/bopmp.pdf.
43. The term "located in" is this author's simplification of the actual lengthy definition of
the capital account.
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The current account and capital accounts must be equal."a The Japanese
person is not going to give an American a computer unless the American
gives him something of equal value in return. If the American gives him an
equivalent good or service, then there is no trade deficit and no capital ac-
count. If the American gives him dollars, there is a $500 current account
trade deficit and a $500 capital account.45
Of course the Japanese person can also use the $500 to make an equity
investment in an American company, gift it to an American, or he can make
a pure debt loan to an American.
How can the Japanese make a pure debt loan, when such arrangements
are outlawed in American courts? He can do so by purchasing American
bonds. This is called sovereign debt-the debt owed by a nation's govern-
ment. There is an absolute payment requirement on sovereign debt.46 It does
not matter if the venture financed by the debt failed. It does not matter if the
country does not have the money to pay. The debt has to be paid. In history,
lender countries have gone to abhorrent lengths to enforce sovereign debt,
including wars.47
44. Any difference between the two is labeled "Errors or Omissions" or "Statistical Dis-
crepancy." For example, see News Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Com.,
U.S. International Transactions: Third Quarter 2008 (Dec. 17, 2008), at tbl. 1, row 71, availa-
ble at http://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/transactions/2008/pdf/trans308.pdf.
Note that although the above method is the most commonly used, there are other ways to do
balance of payments accounting. See BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, EXCHANGE RATES, AND
COMPETITIVENESS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 100--04 (Mario I. Blejer & Marko Skreb eds.,
1999) [hereinafter BALANCE OF PAYMENTS].
45. For the third quarter 2008 accounting of the United States current and capital ac-
counts, see News Release, Bureau of Econ. Analysis, U.S. Dep't of Com., supra note 49
(showing that in the third quarter of 2008, Americans: 1) exported $346.5 billion of goods
and imported $561.2 billion, for a deficit of $214.7 billion; 2) exported $142.5 billion of ser-
vices and imported $104.3 billion, for a surplus of $38.2 billion; 3) American ownership of
assets located in other countries decreased by $9.5 billion, and foreign ownership of assets
located in America increased by $125.7 billion, increasing the capital account-this release
calls it the financial account-by $135.2 billion; 4) there are other inflows and outflows-
investment earnings and unilateral transfers-but those will be ignored here as they more or
less offset each other). In sum, you see a current account deficit of $176.5 billion-214.7
billion minus $38.2 billion-and a capital/financial account of $135.2 billion. Id. The differ-
ence between these two numbers is about $40 billion, and this is a measure in the error in the
calculation. See id. It is labeled "Statistical Discrepancy" in the spreadsheet that accompanies
the press release. Id. at tbl.1. For a detailed list of exports and imports, by type of product,
see U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. International Trade Statistics, http://censtats.census.gov/sitc/
sitc.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
46. See supra note 41.
47. MICHAEL TOMZ, SOVEREIGN DEBT AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION 176-77 (Oct.
2006) (unpublished draft on file with the Princeton University Press).
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Now let us bring everything together. Let us list all the problems with
sovereign debt: 1) the only reason the Japanese lender is owed this debt, is
because he chose to be a miser. Rather than buy American goods or servic-
es, he chose to be cheap and save the $500; 2) this is not an equity invest-
ment by the Japanese. It is pure usurious debt, and if it is enforced it could
potentially enslave the debtor nation; 3) it is robbing the world of productivi-
ty. Instead of hiring an American to do something productive, the Japanese
has parked his money.
What is especially ironic is that the Japanese has also harmed himself.
If the American does not earn any money, then he will not have money with
which to buy additional Japanese goods. Saving does not just rob the Amer-
ican of productivity; it also robs the Japanese of productivity. This is ana-
logous to what happened when Scrooge's miserliness caused the eight person
economy to completely shut down. Granted, the Japanese can lend money to
the American, which the American uses to buy Japanese goods. In this case,
the Japanese is induced into productive activity. But the American is still
unproductive. He is borrowing to pay for his goods and services rather than
working for them. So as you can see, the Japanese person's decision to save
the $500 is problematic.
IV. CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES
Over the last decade, China has played the role of Scrooge in interna-
tional economics. China has accumulated the largest balance of trade surplus
in world history. China's vision for the world is apparently one where coun-
tries buy from them, but they buy as little as possible from other countries.48
The relationship with the United States is particularly egregious. During the
years 2001 through 2007, China exported $1.43 trillion of goods to the Unit-
The gunboat hypothesis has many adherents. Jack Donnelly, for example, writes that mi-
litarized debt collection was "a well-accepted part of international relations" in the nineteenth
century, and Martha Finnemore concurs that it was "accepted practice" until the Hague Peace
Conference of 1907. Laurence Whitehead judges that such behavior was "fairly standard" be-
fore World War I, and Rudi Dombusch describes the era as a time when "rich countries wrote
the rules" and "had the gunboats to collect debts."
Other commentators argue that great powers were more selective. Gunboat diplomacy,
in their estimation, was "sporadic," not axiomatic. Bondholders often petitioned for military
assistance, but creditors took up arms in only a few spectacular instances.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
48. See summary of China's balance of payments below. Notice how the money earned
by way of a trade surplus is mostly being accumulated as foreign exchange reserve. Interna-
tional Monetary Fund Data and Statistics, http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/ (click country
tables under the heading of PDFs and Documents, then February 2009, then click "China,
P.R.: Mainland" ) (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
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ed States, while importing only $0.27 trillion from the United States.49 This
expectedly robbed Americans of jobs and productivity, and an estimated two
million jobs were exported to China over this period.5"
China's behavior is analogous to that of the miser because as it accumu-
lates foreign exchange reserves of $2 trillion,5" private savings of $3 tril-
lion,52 and almost no sovereign debt,53 it does so by depriving itself of needed
goods and services. China is one of the most polluted countries in the
world. 54 They could hire Americans to solve this problem. Infrastructure is
(in $ billions) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Goods & services exported 299 365 485 656 837 1,062 1,342
Goods & services imported (271) (328) (449) (607) (712) (853) (1,035)
Other items in current account (11) (2) 10 20 36 44 65
Current account 17 35 46 69 161 253 372
Cap. Acct. excluding for. exch. reserves 35 32 53 Ito 62 7 74
Foreign exchange reserves (47) (75) (117) (206) (207) (247) (462)
Statistical discrepancy (5) 8 18 27 (16) (13) 16
Capital account (17) (35) (46) (69) (161) (253) (372)
End of year cumulative for. exch. resrvs. 216 292 408 614 822 1,069 1,530
49. U.S. Census Bureau, Trade in Goods Imports, (Imports, Exports and Trade Balance)
with China, http://www.census.gov/foreign-tradelbalance/c5700.html (last visited Feb. 21,
2009).
(in $ billions) 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Goods exported to China from the U.S. 19 22 28 35 42 55 65 267
Goods imported from China into the U.S. 102 125 152 197 243 288 321 1,429
50. Robert E. Scott, The China Trade Toll: Widespread Wage Suppression, 2
Million Jobs Lost in the U.S., (EPI Briefing Paper #219, July 30, 2008), available at
http://epi.3cdn. net/7fe94bbd84dcdd3c0c 7km6i2zsi.pdf.
51. See Yao Jingyuan: China's Foreign Exchange Reserves Exceed U.S. $2 Trillion,
PEOPLE'S DAILY ONLINE, Nov. 28, 2008,
http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90776/90882/6542790.html.
52. Mary Hennock, Why China Is Too Scared to Spend, NEWSWEEK INT'L, Dec. 22, 2008,
at 24.
53. See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, Rank Order-Public Debt,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2186rank.html (last
visited Feb. 21, 2009). China's public debt was only 16% of their GDP as of 2008, where as
the United States had a 61% public debt to GDP ratio, and Japan had a 170% public debt to
GDP ratio. Id.
54. Jacques Leslie, China's Pollution Nightmare Is Now Everyone's Pollution Night-
mare, CHRISTIAN SCi. MONITOR, Mar. 19, 2008, at 9.
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underdeveloped in rural areas.55 Americans could build it for them. There is
a shortage of education and healthcare in parts of China. Americans could
provide these services. China needs a social insurance scheme.56 Americans
can help create this scheme. But China refuses to spend money. Going back
to the Dickens analogy, this is like when Scrooge saved money by eating a
dinner of inexpensive gruel in a dark and cold room.5
In addition, China is accused of appropriating intellectual property from
American companies.58 China could have paid for this intellectual property.
There are hundreds of other ways China could spend their surplus, but they
refuse to, preferring to hoard money into an exorbitant pile.
What is particularly curious about China's behavior is that it is hard to
understand its goal.59 If they do not spend money on American goods and
services, Americans will not have money to spend on their goods and servic-
es. They are not only robbing Americans of productivity, but they are also
55. See Shenggen Fan & Xiaobo Zhang, Infrastructure and Regional Economic Devel-
opment in Rural China, 15 CHINA ECON. REV. 203, 213 (2004) ("[T]he lower productivity in
the western region is explained by its lower level of rural infrastructure, education, and
science and technology."); Melinda Liu, Amb. Wu Jianmin: China's Economy and Environ-
ment in 2009, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 12, 2009 (quoting China's Ambassador Wu Jianmin, "Now
there are about 320 million people with no access to safe drinking water, and 75 percent of
disease comes from water pollution.").
56. See Nick Young, World Bank Puts Economic Case for Health, Social Spending,
CHINA DEV. BRIEF, Nov. 9, 2005, http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.com/node/290/print.
The World Bank report states:
"Household savings appear to be affected by uncertainty about future costs of health care and
education." In other words, the inadequacy of social protection makes people reluctant to
spend money they may need for their old age and future health care. "Removing this uncer-
tainty and providing more insurance would support private consumption."
Id.
57. DICKENS, supra note 5, at 18.
[He] sat down before the fire to take his gruel. It was a very low fire indeed; nothing on such a
bitter night. He was obliged to sit close to it, and brood over it, before he could extract the
least sensation of warmth from such a handful of fuel.
Id.
58. Eric Krangel, Microsoft: Piracy Makes China an Irrelevant Market, SILICON ALLEY
INSIDER, Nov. 10, 2008, http://www.businessinsider.com/2008/ 1/microsoft-piracy-makes-
china-an-irrelevant-market. It should be noted that China is starting to enforce intellectual
property rights. Microsoft Case Shows China's Resolve in IPR Protection, CHINA DAILY, Jan.
4, 2009, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-01/04/content_7365062.
htm.
59. In December of 2008, Zhou Xiaochuan told Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Paul-
son, "the US should take the initiative to... reduce its trade and fiscal deficits." Geoff Dyer,
Chinese Officials Lecture Paulson, FIN. TIMEs, Dec. 5, 2008, at 2. What is remarkable about
this comment is that the United States trade deficit is caused by its relationship with China. Is
Mr. Wang telling Americans to stop buying Chinese goods? If not, how else are Americans
supposed to eliminate the trade deficit?
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robbing themselves of productivity. It is very likely that, had China spent
their trillions in foreign exchange, the world could have avoided the current
recession, 6° and the Chinese government would not have to worry about em-
ployment riots.61
V. THE ARGENTINA EXAMPLE
Finally, the last section of this paper looks at how Argentina dealt with
its sovereign debt crisis. This is intended to give a sense of what America's
worst case scenario could look like. Of course, America is not Argentina.
America has approximately eight times the population of Argentina.62 Amer-
ica possesses human and natural resources that Argentina did not possess.
America has a gigantic military and political sway in the world. Most impor-
tantly, America does not need to default on the debt; the debt is denominated
in dollars and America could simply inflate the debt away.63 But by studying
Argentina, and seeing that even a weak nation like Argentina can overcome
60. See Sebastian Mallaby, What OPEC Teaches China, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2009, at
B7 ("Starting around the middle of this decade... [t]he earnings from [China's trade] surplus
poured into the United States [as deposits and loans]. The result was the mortgage bubble.");
When a Flow Becomes a Flood, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 22, 2009) ("The deep causes of the
financial crisis lie in global imbalances-mainly, America's huge current-account deficit and
China's huge surplus").
61. See Peter Harmsen, China Warns Economic Woes Could Trigger Major Unrest,
YAHOO! NEWS, Jan. 7, 2009, http://news.yahoo.comls/afp/20090107/ts-afp/financeeconomy
chinariotmedianewsmlmmd/print; see also Gideon Rachman, China's Economy Hits the
Wall, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008 ("Laid-off workers in factories in southern China have staged
protests that had to be contained by riot police."); Jamil Anderlini & Geoff Dyer, Downturn
Causes 20m Job Losses, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2009, at 5.
62. See Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook: United States,
https://www. cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/us.html (last visited Feb.
21, 2009) [hereinafter The World Factbook: United States]; Flagcounter.com, Argentina,
http://flagcounter.com/factbook/ar (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
63. See Gerald P. O'Driscoll Jr., Washington Is Quietly Repudiating Its Debts, WALL ST.
J., Aug. 22, 2008, at A15. The United States was able to borrow in dollars because the dollar
is a global currency. However, some governments do not have this luxury and are forced to
borrow in a currency other than their own. For example, Argentina had to issue debt in dol-
lars, not their home currency, the peso. See also Gabriel Gomez-Giglio, A New Chapter in the
Argentine Saga: The Restructuring of the Argentine Sovereign Debt, 20 J. INT'L BANKING L.
& REG. 345 n.2 (2005) ("[A]s of June 30, 2004, Argentina's total gross public debt was US
$181.2 billion (113.1% of GDP), 69.1% of which is owed to bondholders. Peso-denominated
debt totaled US $43.6 billion and foreign currency-denominated debt totaled US $137.6 bil-
lion."). For an example of an Argentinean dollar denominated offering, see Argentina Issues
$2 Billion of Global Bonds Through J.P. Morgan and Merrill Lynch, Bus. WRE, Jan. 22,
1997.
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its debt problem, arid thrive, it becomes clear that concerns over America's
debt are overblown.
There were numerous reasons for Argentina's debt. One was its current
account deficit. Between 1992 and 1999, Argentina imported $252 billion in
goods and services and exported only $222 billion.' What exacerbated Ar-
gentina's situation was the government's promise to convert pesos into dol-
lars on a 1:1 basis, even though an Argentinean peso was not worth one dol-
lar.6' This made the problem worse because it caused imports to be cheaper
than their true value, increasing the trade deficit.'
This convertibility policy67 caused problems in other ways. It is hard to
see why anyone would hold a peso when they could trade it for a dollar.
Banks and citizens wanted to deal in dollars, and they converted their pesos
into dollars to facilitate these deals.6" In addition, Argentina privatized a
64. Argentina's imports and exports. International Monetary Fund Data and Statistics,
http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/ (click country tables under the heading "International Finan-
cial Statistics", select Argentina, select the variables "Goods: Exports f.o.b.", "Goods: Imports
f.o.b.", "Services: Credit", "Services: Debit" and" Balance on Goods & Services",
then retrieve the data) (last visited Apr. 3, 2009).
(in $ billions) 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Exports of goods and services 15 14 15 16 19 25 28 31 31
Imports of goods and services 7 11 19 22 27 26 30 38 39
Balance on goods and services 8 3 (4) (6) (8) (1) (2) (7) (8)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Exports of goods and services 28 31 31 29 34 40 47 54 66
Imports of goods and services 33 33 27 13 19 28 35 41 53
Balance on goods and services (5) (2) 4 16 15 12 12 13 13
65. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Argentina, Shortchanged: Why the Nation That Followed the
Rules Fell to Pieces, WASH. POST, May 12, 2002, at B 1.
66. Id.
The strong (most would say, overvalued) dollar has meant enormous American trade deficits.
But with the Argentine peso pegged to the dollar, an overvalued dollar means an overvalued
peso. And while the United States has been able to sustain trade deficits, Argentina could not.
Whenever you have a massive trade deficit, you have to borrow from abroad to finance it.
Id.
67. Most seem to think the convertibility policy was at least promoted by the IMF, if not
the IMF's idea. See id. The IMF itself accepted some blame in an internal audit. Paul Bluste-
in, IMF Says Its Policies Crippled Argentina: Internal Audit Finds Warnings Were Ignored,
WASH. POST, July 30, 2004, at El (referencing INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, THE IMF
AND ARGENTINA, 1991-2001 (2004), available at http://www.imf.org/EXTERNALNP/IEO/
2004/ARG/ENG/pdf/report.pdf [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND]).
68. See Roberto Frenkel, Argentina: A Decade of the Convertibility Regime, 45
CHALLENGE 41, 54 (2002) ("[P]rivate-sector savers have shown preference for dollar-
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number of its utilities. 69 In these arrangements, wealthy foreigners would
buy Argentina's utilities, and charge them for things like water.70 The prob-
lem is that these foreigners would demand not just the cost of producing the
water, but also an additional amount as profit, which again had to be paid in
dollars.7' Where did the Argentinean government get the dollars needed to
pay all these demands? By borrowing it? Obviously this could not continue.
As long as other countries refused to buy Argentinean goods and services,
Argentineans would never have the money to pay this debt back.
Eventually it all came to a boil.72 The debt service was impossible to
meet, and Argentina had one of two choices.73 One was to follow an austeri-
ty plan recommended by the International Monetary Fund (IMF).74 Argenti-
na was to raise taxes, further hurting its already beleaguered economy, 75 cut
subsidies to the poor and otherwise sacrifice, so the revenue gained could be
used to pay the debt.76
In a sense, this is like Scrooge telling Bashful to donate blood or a kid-
ney, so as to raise money to pay the interest on Scrooge's loan. Bashful
would never do that. He would remind Scrooge that the only reason he owes
denominated deposits while banks hedged (or so they thought) balance sheets against ex-
change-rate risk by offering dollar-denominated credits.").
69. See id at 42 ("Argentina embraced a comprehensive economic reform effort at the
beginning of the 1990s. In addition to convertibility, it included a massive privatization of
public utilities ...."). During the 1990s, the privatization of utilities was thought to be bene-
ficial. See e.g., Elizabeth Brubaker, Toronto Water Fight: Toronto Faces a Motion to Reject
the Idea of Privatizing Its Water and Sewage Systems. Worldwide Experience Shows That
Could Be a Mistake, NAT'L POST, Feb. 25, 1999, at C7.
70. See id.
71. See LOWENFELD, supra note 42, at 727. Once Argentina defaulted on its debt, it also
immediately froze the fees paid for privatized gas, electricity, telephone, and water utilities.
See id. In addition, these fees were now paid in pesos, which were no longer convertible into
dollars on a 1:1 basis. Id. ("In an effort to restrain inflation, as well as to calm the population,
tariffs on privatized public utilities-gas, electricity, telephone, and water-were frozen inde-
finitely at their nominal level, now expressed in pesos no longer equivalent to, or convertible
into dollars.")
72. See Stiglitz, supra note 65.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. Id.
Like most economists outside the IMF, I believe that in an economic downturn, cutting
expenditures simply makes matters worse.. . . Yet the IMF said make cuts, and Argentina
complied, trimming expenditures at the federal level (except interest) by 10 percent between
1999 and 2001. Not surprisingly, the cuts exacerbated the downturn; had they been as ruthless
as the IMF had wanted, the economic collapse would have been even faster. Social unrest
would have come earlier.
Id.
76. See Stiglitz, supra note 65.
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this debt is because the miser Scrooge refused to buy his goods and services.
Had Bashful known that Scrooge would behave this way, Bashful would not
have hired Scrooge. No one would have hired Scrooge. Scrooge would not
have earned the money that he is now attempting to use to enslave the
dwarves. The dwarves' society was functioning perfectly well until
Scrooge's cheapness ruined it. The dwarves would not allow this and that is
exactly how Argentina responded. Ngstor Kirchner, the newly elected Ar-
gentinean President said: 'It is not possible to return to paying the debt at
the cost of the hunger and exclusion of Argentines, generating more poverty
and social conflict."' 77 Drawing thunderous applause, he continued: "'Cred-
itors have to understand that they can only collect if Argentina is doing
well."
78
What happened next was that Argentina limited its dealing with other
countries. 79  Rather than buy foreign goods, Argentineans produced the
goods domestically.80 If foreigners were not going to hire Argentineans to
produce products, they would hire themselves to do it. 81 The privatization
contracts were all immediately put up for renegotiation.82 Argentineans were
not going to allow someone in another country to charge them high rates for
their own water. The convertibility regime was also ended.83 From that
point on Pesos were converted at about a four peso to one dollar basis.
84
What followed is, not surprisingly, one of the biggest economic turnarounds
77. Larry Rohter, Argentina's Chief Is Sworn in and Comes Out Fighting, N.Y. TIMES,
May 26, 2003, at A3.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Between 2000 and 2002, Argentina's imports of goods and services dropped from
$33B to just $13B. See supra note 64.
81. See, e.g., Tony Smith, Generics Shake Up a Drug Industry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,
2003, at WI (describing how Argentineans eschewed foreign brand name pharmaceuticals for
domestically produced generics); Federico O'Conor, Astonishing Recovery of Argentina's
Pharmaceutical Industry, FROST & SULLIVAN MKT. INSIGHT, June 7, 2006, http://pharmalic
ensing.com/public/articles/view/I 150298291_449028b36bb56 (describing the continued
growth of Argentina's drug industry).
82. Legal Tango, FOREIGN DIRECr INV., Aug. 1, 2005, available at http://www.fdirnag
azine.com/news/fullstory.php/aid/1336/Legal-tango.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009). Of
course this was a breach by Argentina of their original agreements. See id. This led to efforts
by the other parties to enforce the agreements. See id. Many of these were arbitrated at the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes. Id. For a paper describing poten-
tial difficulties in enforcing these awards, see Charity L. Goodman, Comment, Uncharted
Waters: Financial Crisis and Enforcement of ICSID Awards in Argentina, 28 U. PA. J. INT'L
EcON. L. 449 (2007).
83. See INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, supra note 67, at 728.
84. Id.
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in recent memory.85 Argentina no longer had a trade deficit, but instead it
had a large trade surplus. 86 Its GDP started growing at an amazing 8% per
year.87 In summary, things worked out for Argentina. Going back to the
original example, it is as if the Dwarves decided to stop interacting with
Scrooge and return to their pre-Scrooge society.
VI. CONCLUSION
Over the past decade Americans have spent trillions of dollars on Chi-
nese goods and services. This created employment in China and helped the
country achieve its potential. The Chinese responded by taking that money
and hoarding it. But a relationship where Americans spend and Chinese save
and lend is not viable. Miserliness and usury are pernicious economic strate-
gies that were discredited centuries ago. 8
The United States magnanimously took the first step and spent to estab-
lish a trading relationship. It is now China's turn to spend to continue that
relationship. Only when China takes the money Americans spend to employ
Chinese, and uses it to employ Americans, will there be a sustainable rela-
tionship that can tap the productive potential of both countries.89
85. See Center for Economic & Policy Research, A Latin American Success Story: Five
Years of Extraordinary Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction in Argentina, Apr. 12, 2007,
http://www.cepr. net/index.php/event-a-latin-american...april- 12-2007/.
86. See supra note 64.
87. Argentina GDP Real Growth Rate, http://www.indexmundi.com/argentina/gdp-real
growthrate.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
88. Recently, China's leaders have responded to criticism of China's refusal to spend.
Geoff Dyer and James Blitz, China to Go on European Spending Spree, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 2,
2009.
China will set up "procurement missions" to buy goods and technologies in Europe in an effort
to stem protectionist sentiment in the region against its exports. Wen Jiabao, the Chinese
premier who was talking in London on Monday at the end of a five-day trip to Europe, said the
procurement trips would be established as soon as possible. "Confidence is the most important
thing, more important than gold or currency," Mr Wen said at a meeting with Gordon Brown,
the British prime minister, and business leaders. China would seek to purchase commodities
and technologies needed by its companies in an attempt to "help us restore and shore up confi-
dence in the market."
Id.
[China's central bank governor], Mr. Zhou, published his thoughts on high savings rates, the
flip side of US borrowing. China resents suggestions that its "excess savings" are linked to
excess spending elsewhere. In his paper, Mr Zhou argues that, contrary to mechanistic argu-
ments that savings rates can be influenced by policy, the Chinese propensity to save has cultur-
al roots, specifically a Confucianism that "values thrift, self-discipline . . . and anti-
extravagancy."
David Pilling, China Is Just Sabre-Rattling over the Dollar, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2009.
89. See Calla Wiemer, Wrong on the Yuan, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2009, at 13 ("The
policy focus should be on stimulating consumption in China.").
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Thus, criticism of America's debt is misplaced. It is not America who
should be criticized, but rather China, whose refusal to spend deprives itself
of needed goods and services, deprives the world of productivity, threatens
international trade, 9° and may have sent the global economy into a depres-
sion. Further, concerns about China using debt to control the United States
are overblown.9 The days when a lender could turn into enslaver, even in
the sovereign world, are long gone. Finally, characterizing China's accumu-
lation of dollars as "currency manipulation" may pave the way for legal re-
taliation,92 but it fails to address the underlying cause. China does not accu-
mulate foreign currency to manipulate the exchange rate.93 It accumulates
foreign currency because it does not want to spend. China's holdings of for-
eign exchange are roughly equal to its cumulative trade surplus over the past
decade. China is not intervening in the currency markets. Rather, it is simp-
ly not spending the foreign currency received in trade.
90. See Willem Buiter, Beware Trade Wars, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2009, at 8.
[M]uch of what Congress and some members of the Obama administration have in mind [in
response to China's currency accumulation] is likely to be in clear violation of America's
WTO obligations. It would provoke a response from China. The bilateral trade war that is
likely to result could easily spread to the European Union, Japan and emerging markets.
Id.
91. See, e.g., Jeff Mason, Clinton Says U.S. Debt to China Threatens Security, CHINA
POST, Mar. 31, 2008, available at http://www.chinapost.com.tw/print/149593.htm.
92. Alan Beattie et al., Obama: China Manipulating Renminbi, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2009, at 1; FACTBOX, What US Law on Currency Manipulation Says, REuTERS, Jan. 26,
2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKN2639024620090126.
93. See Robert W. Staiger & Alan 0. Sykes, "Currency Manipulation" and World Trade
11 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14600, 2008), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14600. Note that it is not even clear that currency intervention
has any effect on trade. See id.
But before we conclude that a devaluation should unambiguously be seen as a violation
of WTO commitments, we must consider the implications of price flexibility. In fact, on that
assumption, a devaluation ... has no real effect on any economic magnitudes for China or any
of its trading partners. This well-known proposition simply reflects the "long-run neutrality"
of money in a setting in which all prices are fully flexible.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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I. INTRODUCTION
For years, the legal and medical communities have fused their know-
ledge in an attempt to honor the decision of individuals regarding their life-
sustaining treatment and end-of-life care. In 1914, Justice Cardozo laid the
foundation for patients to take control over their own health care decisions
when he stated that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has
a right to determine what shall be done with his own body."' Today, patients
and their families are often presented with a host of medical options concern-
ing life-sustaining treatment and end-of-life care. Developed as tools for
* Keith E. Sonderling is a Litigation Associate at Gunster, Yoakley, and Stewart, P.A.;
B.S., magna cum laude, 2005, University of Florida; J.D., magna cum laude, 2008, Nova
Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center. The author expresses his sincerest grati-
tude to Professor Kathy Cerminara, for all of her guidance and support with this article and
throughout his tenure in law school. He would also like to thank his family, Professor Joel
Mintz, Seth Bogin, and all of his colleagues on Nova Law Review.
1. Schloendorff v. Soc'y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92,93 (N.Y. 1914).
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patients and their families to take control of these difficult medical decisions,
advance directives specify the care and treatment patients wish to receive or
refuse.2 Advance directives also identify individuals authorized to make
treatment decisions if the patient is incapacitated.3 Both the medical and
legal communities advocate the use of advance directives as a way for "each
patient to shape the course of his or her medical care," especially when pa-
tients are unable to communicate their own preferences.4
Unfortunately, due to a variety of obstacles, the original intent of ad-
vance directives often is not accomplished.5 In an attempt to correct the
problems associated with advance directives, health care professionals, attor-
neys, and bioethicists have worked together, developing new forms of docu-
mentation to enhance traditional advance directives and effectively imple-
ment patients' wishes concerning end-of-life care.6 One such model is the
Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST) form.7 The
POLST form is a medical document designed to translate a patient's end-of-
life care desires "into actual physician orders."8  Heralded as "revolutio-
nary,"9 "unique,"'" and a "progressive" advance directive," the POLST form
does not replace traditional advance directives, but does convert existing
advance directives into written medical orders, which attending caregivers
can easily understand.' 2 Surveys demonstrate that medical professionals are
concerned about administering end-of-life care, and they have asked for in-
2. SUSAN E. HICKMAN Er AL., THE HASTINGS CTR., HOPE FOR THE FUTURE: ACHIEVING
THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF ADVANCE DIREcTIvES, IMPROVING END OF LIFE CARE: WHY HAS IT
BEEN So DIFFICULT? S26 (2005) [hereinafter HICKMAN ET AL., HASTINGS CTR. REPORT].
3. Id.
4. See Joan M. Teno et al., Do Advance Directives Provide Instructions That Direct
Care?, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS Soc'Y 508,508 (1997).
5. See HICKMAN ET AL., HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, supra note 2, at S26. Traditional forms
of advance directives include the living will and the designation of a health care surrogate. Id.
6. See id. at S27.
7. Id. at S28.
8. Washington State Medical Association, Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treat-
ment POLST Form, available at http://www.wsma.org/patient-resources/polst.cfm'#faq (last
visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter WSMA].
9. Ron Wyden, Steps to Improve Quality of Life for People Who Are Dying, 6 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL'Y & L. 575, 577 (2000).
10. Charles P. Sabatino, Survey of State EMS-DNR: Laws and Protocols, 27 J.L. MED. &
ETHICS 297, 298 (1999) [hereinafter Sabatino, Survey].
11. Susan E. Hickman et al., A Viable Alternative to Traditional Living Wills, 34
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 4, 5 (2004) [hereinafter Hickman et al., Viable Alternative]. Although
the authors refer to the POLST form as an example of an advance directive, the POLST form
is a new model of medical documentation designed to enhance and eventually replace existing
advance directives. See id.
12. See WSMA, supra note 8.
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creased care planning and better documentation of treatment desires. 3 One
of the most notable features of the POLST form is that it is not a complicated
legal document, which can be difficult for caregivers to interpret."i
Various studies demonstrate the effectiveness of the POLST form in
achieving the original intent of a patient's wishes.'5 However, Florida,
whose advance directives statutes are considered to be contemporary guide-
lines for other states, 16 in 2006 failed to pass House Bill 1017, which would
have created a POLST form. 7 Almost three years later, the political and
social issues that plagued the passage of House Bill 1017 have diminished.
As the state with the largest population of elderly residents as well as signifi-
cant populations of persons with AIDS and heart disease,'8 Florida has a
vested interest in strengthening and enhancing its current advance directive
laws. Accordingly, Florida must follow the lead of other states that have
taken a proactive approach to the development and implementation of
POLST initiatives.
It was surprising, in the wake of the national attention that Florida and
the subject of end-of-life decision making received surrounding Terri Schia-
vo's end-of-life care,' 9 that the Florida Legislature did not pass the proposed
POLST legislation.2 ° Supporters of the bill believe that the legislation failed
for a number of reasons, including the legislature's reluctance to deal with
controversial end-of-life legal issues in the wake of the Terri Schiavo legal
battle.2' The timing of book releases by Terri's parents and husband,2 as
13. See HICKMAN ET AL., HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, supra note 2, at S26-S27.
14. See id. at S28.
15. See id.
16. Theodore P. Gustitus, Note, A Comparative View of Advance Health Care Directives
in Florida and North Carolina, 11 QUINNIPIAC PROB. L.J. 163, 165 (1997) (comparing Flori-
da's contemporary approach with North Carolina's traditional approach to statutory construc-
tion of advance directive laws).
17. H.B. 1017, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006) (identical to S. 2572, 2006 Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Fla. 2006)).
18. Act effective Oct. 1, 1999, ch. 99-331, § 1, 1999 Fla. Laws. The legislature also
found that Florida has the third highest population of individuals with AIDS, as well as the
fourth highest rate of deaths "from heart disease and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease in
the nation." Id. at 3455.
19. See Kathy L. Cerminara, Tracking the Storm: The Far-Reaching Power of the
Forces Propelling the Schiavo Cases, 35 STETSON L. REv. 147, 147 (2005). Terri Schiavo,
gained national attention in 2005 due to the conflict between her husband and her parents
regarding her life-sustaining care desires. Id.
20. H.B. 1017, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006). House Bill 1017 died in health care
regulation committee on May 6, 2006. Id. Senate Bill died on May 5, 2006. S-2572, 2006
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006).
21. See, e.g., Cerminara, supra note 19, at 147.
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well as then Governor Jeb Bush's reluctance to make changes to the advance
directive laws during his final term have also been identified as factors con-
tributing to the failure of the bill. Additionally, in 2005, the Florida Senate
Committee on Health Care reviewed Florida's advance directive statutes and
recommended no changes be made to the current law.24
House Bill 1017 would have required the Florida Department of Health
to create a POLST form and to make the form available on its website.25 The
proposed bill also would have required both a licensed health care profes-
sional and the patient to complete and sign the POLST form and to place the
completed form in the patient's medical record.26 Under House Bill 1017,
the POLST form would have been a type of advance directive pursuant to
chapter 765 of the Florida Statutes.27 As this article will demonstrate, the
POLST form serves to promote the intent and effectiveness of advance direc-
tives by clearly documenting a patient's end-of-life treatment decisions as a
physician's order.
Accordingly, new POLST legislation should be reintroduced pursuant
to chapter 401 of the Florida Statutes, authorizing the use of the POLST
form as a written medical order to be used as an alternative to, replacement
for, or enhancement of, the Do Not Resuscitate Order. Part II of this article
describes the history, the purpose, and the effectiveness of the POLST form.
Additionally, this section presents an analysis of those states that have im-
plemented POLST legislation or are in the process of developing a POLST
form. Part II of this article analyzes Florida's advance directive laws. This
section also distinguishes the POLST form from Florida advance directives.
Part IV of this article addresses problematic issues associated with Florida's
advance directives and demonstrates how the POLST form attempts to re-
solve these issues. Part V discusses how the POLST form satisfies advance
directive reforms suggested by the medical, legal, and bioethical communi-
22. See generally MICHAEL SCHIAVO, TERRI: THlE TRUTH (2006) (detailing husband's
account of the legal debate); MARY & ROBERT SCHINDLER ET AL., A LIFE THAT MAITERS: THE
LEGACY OF TERRI SCHIAVO-A LESSON FOR Us ALL 1 (2006). Terri Schiavo's husband and
parents released their books on March 27, 2006. David Sommer, Characters in Schiavo Case
Live in Its Wake, TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 29, 2006, at 8.
23. See Maya Bell, Bush Drops End-of-Life Push-Legislators Not Willing to Reopen
Schiavo Debate, SUN-SENT., Apr. 13, 2006, at 12B.
24. The Florida Senate Interim Project Report 2006-137, Committee on Health Care,
Review Procedures for Sustaining and Safeguarding Written and Oral Advance Directives and
Purpose Methods for Increasing Floridians' use of Written Advance Directives (Nov. 2005),
available at http://www.flsenate.gov/data/Publications/2006/Senate/reports/interim-reports/pd
f/2006-137he.pdf.
25. H.B. 1017, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006).
26. See id.
27. Id.
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ties. This section also briefly details potential problems of the form's im-
plementation. Part VI concludes with a recommendation to the Florida Leg-
islature for the reintroduction of POLST legislation as a medical order under
chapter 401 of the Florida Statutes and not as an advance directive under
chapter 765.
II. PHYSICIAN ORDERS FOR LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
An overview of the POLST form is presented in Part A of this section.
The origin and history of the form is outlined in Part B. The purpose of each
section of the POLST form is reviewed in Part C. Part D provides statistical
evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of the form. Part E details the use
of the POLST paradigm in various states throughout the nation.
A. Overview
Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment is a medical order form
known by the acronym "POLST. '28 "The form is an example of an actiona-
ble advance directive that is specific and effective immediately. 29  This
makes the POLST form the most efficient advance planning mechanism for
patients with terminal or life-threatening conditions. 30 The form "is a short
summary of treatment preferences... [which] centralizes information, facili-
tates record keeping, and ensures transfer of appropriate information among
health care providers."'3  The physician documents the patient's treatment
and care decisions on the form.32 The neon colored form serves as the "cover
sheet to the [patient's] medical record. '33 The information contained in the
form will be followed in the same manner as other physician orders.34 As
part of the medical record, "the POLST form travels with the patient" be-
tween health care settings.35 Accordingly, the receiving health care provider
28. HICKMAN ET AL., HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, supra note 2, at S28.
29. Id.
30. See Maureen Henry, Update on End-of-Life Issues in Utah, 19 UTAH B. J. 6, 9 (2006).
31. See WASHINGTON STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, POLST PHYSICIAN ORDERS FOR LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT iii (2003) [hereinafter WASHINGTON].
32. See Charles P. Sabatino, National Advance Directives: One Attempt to Scale the
Barriers, 1 NAT'L ACAD. OF ELDER L. Ar-r'Ys J. 131, 153 (2005) [hereinafter Sabatino, Na-
tional].
33. Id. at 153; see Terri A. Schmidt et al., The Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining
Treatment Program: Oregon Emergency Medical Technicians' Practical Experiences and
Attitudes, 52 J. AM. GERIATRics Soc'y 1430, 1431 (2004).
34. WSMA, supra note 8.
35. Sabatino, National, supra note 32, at 153.
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has the appropriate information and documentation regarding the patient's
end-of-life requests, "thus, promoting continuity of care decisions.
'
"36
The most important and unique aspect of the POLST form is that it
translates end-of-life discussions between patients and their doctors into ac-
tual treatment decisions.37 The form is a clearly recognizable "set of physi-
cian orders" that health care providers must follow. 38 POLST documentation
provides clarity to health care providers and a sense of comfort to patients
ensuring that their treatment preferences will be properly interpreted and
implemented. 39  Unlike advance directives, which merely document a pa-
tient's end of life care decisions, the POLST form clearly translates a pa-
tient's requests into specific written medical orders.40 These orders are un-
derstandable and executable by all health care providers, even those who are
unfamiliar with the individual patient.4' Because it is a medical order signed
by a physician, "it is immediately actionable without further interpretation. 42
The POLST form clarifies treatment desires, which reduces confusion for the
attending health care provider, especially in emergency situations. 3 As part
of the patient's medical record, the POLST form is intended to travel with
the patient upon transfer to another care setting.' POLST documentation is
particularly helpful to receiving health care providers who are unfamiliar
with the patient, such as emergency room physicians or paramedics.4 5 These
health care providers are often first responders who are in a position to admi-
nister life sustaining treatments to incapacitated patients.46 The POLST form
allows the receiving medical facility or health care provider to follow specif-
36. Id.
37. WSMA, supra note 8.
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. See HICKMAN ET AL., HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, supra note 2, at S28.
41. See Hickman et al., Viable Alternative, supra note 11, at 5.
42. Id.
43. See WSMA, supra note 8.
44. Jim Newman, Converting Patient Wishes into Medical Orders, OHSU Studies Pro-
gram, MED. NEWS TODAY.COM, Oct. 12, 2005, http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/medical
news.php?newsid=31884.
Because the POLST form travels with a person from nursing home, to hospital to other
health care settings, they are particularly useful in cases where input about health care options
is immediately needed. For instance, if a seriously ill person is incapacitated when paramedics
arrive, the form provides the emergency medical technicians with orders for treatments that are
consistent with patient preferences.
Id.
45. Milton Zadina & Lisa Weber-Devoll, A New Era in Advance Directives, 5 NEB. MED.
10, 10 (2006).
46. See id.
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ic doctor's orders regarding the patient's end-of-life wishes. 4 The POLST
form also eliminates the need for redundant questioning regarding life-
sustaining treatment wishes because it provides pertinent information related
to the requirements of the Patient Self Determination Act (PSDA).48 Cur-
rently, there is no other form that streamlines the documentation process
related to life sustaining treatment decisions and end-of-life care in this man-
ner.
49
Although the design of the POLST form is intended to efficiently and
effectively expedite a patient's end-of-life medical care, the most important
goal of the form is to ensure "that treatment wishes are honored in the event
that a patient is unable to speak for him or herself."5° Unlike advance direc-
tives, which are often created by patients and their attorneys, the POLST
form is designed to facilitate discussion between the physician and the pa-
tient concerning a wide range of end-of-life care options specifically tailored
to a patient's current medical condition.5' This physician-patient dialogue
results in a POLST form clearly documenting the patient's end-of-life treat-
ment decisions as standardized physician's orders.52 Typically, these orders
include the patient's desires in relation to such life-sustaining measures as
resuscitation, antibiotic use, and food and fluid administration. 53 The POLST
form is modified according to changes in the patient's condition and desires,
thus ensuring that the form accurately reflects the patient's wishes. 54 In addi-
tion to providing clarity to the patient's health care providers, the POLST
form provides definitive direction to family members and significant oth-
ers.55 Accordingly, the burden of life-sustaining treatment options and deci-
sions that often plague family members in times of crisis can be reduced by
the knowledge that the POLST form documents a clear articulation of the
patient's treatment wishes, which will be carried out as standardized physi-
cian's orders.56
47. WSMA, supra note 8.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Erin B. Furlong, Legal Trends in End-of-Life Health Care Decision-Making, 27
BIFOCAL 21, 26 (2005).
51. See Sabatino, National, supra note 32, at 153.
52. WSMA, supra note 8.
53. Hickman et al., Viable Alternative, supra note 11, at 5.
54. See Zadina &Weber-Devoll, supra note 45, at 10.
55. See id.
56. See id.
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B. Origin
In 1990, various Oregon ethics committees convened to discuss prob-
lems associated with Oregon's advance directive law.57 Committee members
consisted of doctors, nurses, and emergency personnel who were concerned
about the difficulties patients and their families encountered when dealing
with end-of-life decisions.5 8 The committee raised additional concerns re-
garding the inadequacy of Do Not Resuscitate Orders (DNRO), especially
upon the transfer of patients to and from health care facilities.5 9 Identifying a
need for a new type of DNRO or advance directive that would summarize a
patient's end-of-life preferences as a portable physician order led to the crea-
tion of the POLST Task Force.60 Over the next five years, the POLST Task
Force developed a form which converted end-of-life treatment preferences
into written medical orders, known as the Physician Orders for Life-
Sustaining Treatment form.6'
In an attempt to escape legislative scrutiny, impacting the comprehen-
siveness of the newly created form, the POLST Task Force decided to "by-
pass the Oregon State Legislature" and recommended voluntary rather than
mandated use of the POLST form.62 The POLST Task Force was also suc-
cessful in persuading the Oregon Board of Medical Examiners to modify its
administrative rules, which defined how emergency medical technicians
(EMTs) should comply with DNROs.63 With strong support from the EMT
community, amendments to administrative rules provide that EMTs should
comply with the POLST form in the same manner as a DNRO.64 Additional-
ly, this ruling provided immunity to EMTs from liability for good faith com-
pliance with the POLST form.
65
57. See Jeri Spann, Implementing End-of-Life Treatment Preferences Across Clinical
Settings, STATE INTIATVES IN END-OF LIFE CARE, at 1, 3 (National Program Office for Cmty.-
State P'ships to Improve End-of-Life Care, Issue 3, 1999), available at http://www.rwjf.
org/files/publications/other/State InitiativesEOL3.pdf.
58. See Susan W. Tolle et al., A Prospective Study of the Efficacy of the Physician Order
Form for Life-Sustaining Treatment, 46 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 1097, 1098 (1998).
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. Id.
62. Spann, supra note 57, at 1-2. Circumventing the Oregon legislature prevented altera-
tions to the form and allowed the task force to effectively expedite the implementation of the
POLST form. See generally id.
63. Id. at 2.
64. See id.
65. See id.
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Between 1992 and 1995, the POLST Task Force focused on finalizing
the form through extensive research and a test pilot program.66 The pilot
study showed that health care providers were eager to use this form. 67 By
1995, health care providers were utilizing the form throughout Oregon, and
in 1996, modifications made the form more patient-friendly.68 Since the
modifications, the POLST Task Force distributed over one million forms to
nursing homes, hospices, and hospitals throughout the state.69 Consequently,
in 2002, the majority of Oregon medical facilities used the POLST form.70
In November 2004, the task force again modified the form to enhance its
clarity and utility.7' The success of the Oregon POLST program serves as an
impetus and model for other states.
C. The Form
The Oregon POLST form is a two-sided document printed "on bright
pink card stock. '72 The top of the form includes a standard Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) statement, 73 which allows each
health care provider to legally disclose the form to other receiving health
care providers.74 The upper-right comer of the form contains the patient's
name and date of birth. 75 The form instructs the receiving health care pro-
vider to follow the documented orders and contact the patient's listed physi-
66. See Spann, supra note 57, at 2.
67. See id.
68. See id. The 2004 modifications included eliminating confusing statutory language
and complicated medical terminology, and creating questions regarding medical options re-
quiring only a yes or no response. See generally WASH. PUB. HosP. DISTS., SUMMARY OF
CHANGES TO THE POLST FORM-Nov. 2004 (2004) http://www.awphd.org/EndOtLife/Table
ofPOLSTFormChanges2004.pdf.
69. POLST, History of the POLST Paradigm Initiative, http://www.ohsu.edu/ethics/polst/
developing/history.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter History of the POLST].
70. See id.
71. See generally WASH. PUB. Hosp. DISTS., supra note 68.
72. Melinda A. Lee et al., Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (POLST):
Outcomes in a PACE Program, 48 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 1219, 1220 (2000).
73. See CENTER FOR ETmcs IN HEALTH CARE, POLST FORM (2008), http://www.ohsu.
edu/ethics/polst/programs/documents/POLST.August.2008.sample.pdf [hereinafter POLST
FORM].
74. See generally Health Insurance Portability & Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.). The Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 is a federal law containing administrative, technic-
al, and regulatory mandates regarding the organization and documentation of medical records
and health information. See generally id. Criminal and civil penalties can be imposed for
violations. Id. at § 217; 45 C.F.R § 150.305 (2008).
75. See POLST FORM, supra note 73.
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cian or nurse practitioner.76 The form also notifies the health care provider to
administer full treatment in the event any section is left blank.77
Divided into five treatment sections, the front page contains information
regarding: Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation (CPR), Medical Interventions,
Antibiotics, Artificially Administered Nutrition, and Reason for Orders and
Signatures.78 The CPR section is similar to a DNRO, instructing the health
care provider regarding treatment if the patient "has no pulse and is not
breathing. '79 The patient has the choice to be resuscitated or not to be resus-
citated. 0 If the patient is breathing or has a pulse, the Medical Interventions
section applies. 1 The patient may choose Comfort Measures Only, which
includes food, fluids, medical measures to relieve pain and suffering, other
limited interventions, including oxygen, cardiac monitoring, and manual
treatment of obstructed airways.82 A patient may also choose Full Treatment,
including "mechanical ventilation and cardioversion. '83 Under the Antibio-
tics section, the patient may choose to receive no antibiotics, limited antibio-
tics, or all antibiotics that are medically indicated. 84 The Artificially Admi-
nistered Nutrition section is applicable when the patient is unable to take
food or liquid by mouth.85 The patient may decline tube feedings, or may
request a trial period for a specified number of days, or choose to receive
long-term artificial nutrition.86 The final section, identified as the Reason for
Orders and Signatures, documents with whom the patient discussed his or
her final treatment preferences.87 Both the patient and physician must sign
the bottom of the front page.88 A designated surrogate may sign on behalf of
the incapacitated patient.89 The back of the form contains an option for a
guardian, surrogate, or other contact person to be notified, as well as instruc-
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See POLST FORM, supra note 73.
81. See id.
82. Id. This option prevents transfers to another medical facility if the current location is
adequate. See id. This option does transfer the patient to the hospital, but avoids the intensive
care unit, if possible. See id.
83. POLST FORM, supra note 73.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. ld.
87. Id.
88. POLST FORM, supra note 73.
89. Id.
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tions on the form's use and revision.90 The back of the form also contains a
chart documenting the form's previous modifications.91
D. Effectiveness
Since its inception in the mid 1990s, the POLST form has been "[o]ne
of the most studied systems of advance care planning. '92 Various studies
show that the POLST form is effective in ensuring one of its primary goals,
which is the prevention of unwanted life-sustaining treatment.93 Generally,
the research has concluded that emergency medical providers who are re-
sponsible for administering treatment regularly follow and can easily interp-
ret the POLST form in situations where life-sustaining treatment is re-
quired.94
After being widely used throughout Oregon, researchers conducted stu-
dies to determine the effectiveness of the form.95 The first study, by Susan
Tolle, was conducted over a one-year period, of 180 nursing home residents
who had completed a POLST form. It was designed to assess the actual im-
plementation of the documented orders and the level of comfort care admi-
nistered.96 All of the patients requested not to be resuscitated and asked to be
transferred to a hospital only if the requested comfort measures could not be
provided in the nursing home.97 Of these patients, none were resuscitated or
received ventilator support. 98 Most importantly, the study found adherence
to the form in 98% of the cases.99 Furthermore, the high degree of the form's
portability across health care settings was evidenced by the finding of the
proper location of the form in 94% of the patient's records.' 0 The most
widely credited finding of the study is that POLST orders are followed regu-
larly and result in "low rates of transfer for aggressive life-extending treat-
ments" and "high levels of comfort care."' 1 Tolle credited these positive
outcomes to several aspects of the form's design. 102
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. HICKMAN ET AL., HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, supra note 2, at S28.
93. See Spann, supra note 57, at 3.
94. See id.
95. See, e.g., Tolle et al., supra note 58, at 1097.
96. Id. at 1098.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1097.
99. See id.
100. Tolle et al., supra note 58, at 100.
101. Id. at 1097.
102. See id. at 1101.
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Following Tolle, Melinda A. Lee conducted a study of fifty-eight pa-
tients in an Oregon nursing home "[t]o evaluate whether terminal care was
consistent with" the patient's POLST form. 3 The study revealed that 98%
of the participants had completed a POLST form."° Results of the study
indicated that "care was consistent with POLST instructions regarding CPR
for 91% of participants, antibiotics for 86%, IV fluids for 84%, and feeding
tubes for 94%. ' 05 Additionally, only one patient's form was missing and
only two forms were completed improperly. 0 6 In conclusion, Lee found that
the POLST form "shows promise as a tool for promoting that patients' prefe-
rences regarding end of life care are carried out."'0 7
A third study, by Terri A. Schmidt, evaluated the attitudes and practical
experiences of EMTs regarding their use of the POLST form in multiple care
settings. 108 The study indicated that 75% of the EMTs readily located the
POLST form."° Furthermore, EMTs reported proper completion of 87% of
the forms and adherence to orders in 90% of the forms." 0 Most importantly,
93% of the EMTs surveyed thought "the POLST form was useful in deter-
mining which treatments to" administer."' Most significantly, this study
found that EMTs modified their standard treatment plan pursuant to a pa-
tient's preferences as documented on the POLST form."2 Overall, the
"[fjindings suggest that the . . .POLST program is effective in providing
instructions to EMTs regarding life-sustaining treatments."' 13
These studies demonstrate that the POLST form is a patient and provid-
er-friendly planning tool which clearly documents life-sustaining and end-of-
life treatment decisions in a form that is readily accessible and easily inter-
Several features appear to add to the effectiveness of the POLST form. The form has been
standardized statewide, which enhances [the] recognition and respect on transfer. The shock-
ing pink color of the form makes it hard to ignore. The orders to limit life sustaining treatment
are clearly stated.... making them easy to locate. The form contains physician orders about
specific medical treatments in language acceptable and understandable to nursing home staff,
home hospice, covering physicians, and emergency medical services. The form's specific lan-
guage requiring that comfort measures must be provided is designed to encourage attention to
pain and suffering.
Id.
103. Lee et al., supra note 72, at 1219.
104. Id. at 1222.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 1221.
107. Id. at 1224.
108. See Schmidt et al., supra note 33, at 1430.
109. See id. at 1433.
110. See id. at 1432.
111. Id.
112. See id. at 1434.
113. Schmidt et al., supra note 33, at 1434.
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preted by a variety of health care providers." 4 Finally, these studies show
that the POLST form "offer[s] insight[] that health care systems should not
ignore. It is time to make sure that patients get what they want, [and] not just
what we think they need."'"
5
E. Use in Other States
Due to success in Oregon, POLST paradigm programs are spreading ra-
pidly. 16 Many states simply use the Oregon form, while other states use
modified versions of the Oregon form.1 7 The following provides a policy
analysis of those states that pioneered and enacted original POLST legisla-
tion.1"8 Washington State implemented a POLST form replacing the state's
EMS-No-CPR form." 9 Additionally, Washington State, like Oregon, altered
its administrative code, protecting emergency medical service providers from
liability for following the POLST form in good faith. 2° Similarly, West Vir-
ginia passed legislation in 2002 codifying their own version of the POLST
form, known as the "physician's orders for scope of treatment (POST)."'' 21
Recognized as a Do Not Resuscitate Order (DNRO), the POST form pro-
vides legal protection to health care providers for good faith compliance. 122
Utah has also enacted POLST legislation. 23  Added to the Personal
Choice and Living Will Act, the POLST form in Utah has in effect replaced
114. See Lee et al., supra note 72, at 1224; Schmidt et al., supra note 33, at 1434; Tolle et
al., supra note 58, at 1097.
115. Michael D. Cantor, Improving Advance Care Planning: Lessons from POLST, 48 J.
AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 1343,1344(2000).
116. See POLST, POLST State Programs, http://www.ohsu.edu/ethics/polst/pro
grams/state+programs.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter POLST State Programs].
In 2004, a National POLST Paradigm Initiative program was created to assist the development
of POLST programs around the county. See POLST, History of the POLST Paradigm Initia-
tive, http://www.ohsu.edu/ethics/polst/developing/history.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2009)
[hereinafter History of the POLST]. Other states developing POLST forms include Wiscon-
sin, Idaho, Tennessee, Minnesota, Texas, and Main. POLST State Programs, supra note 115.
117. See History of the POLST, supra note 116.
118. For a detailed national analysis of current POLST legislation, pilot programs, and
other initiatives see generally Kathy L. Cerminara & Seth M. Bogin, A Paper About a Piece of
Paper: Regulatory Actions as the Most Effective Way to Promote Use of Physician Orders for
Life-Sustaining Treatment, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 479 (2008).
119. See WASHINGTON, supra note 31, at 7. The EMS-No-CPR notifies the EMS of the
patient's request not to be resuscitated. See id.
120. See WASH. REv. CODE § 43.70.480 (2009).
121. W. VA. CODE § 16-30-25 (2008).
122. See id. The statute requires a physician's signature to become effective. See id.
123. See Henry, supra note 30, at 9.
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the DNRO form.' 24 Additionally, Utah EMTs are permitted to honor the
POLST form and health care providers are required to make an effort to de-
termine if the patient has a POLST form. 125 In 2004, Maryland enacted, what
is now called, the Instructions on Current Life-Sustaining Treatment Options
(ICLTO) form. 26 The ICLTO form requires a provider's review of the form
upon a patient's arrival from another health care facility.2 7  Unlike the
POLST form, the ICLTO is not recognized as an official medical order.
1 28
The form is only the physician's summary of the patient's wishes, or of an
existing advance directive. 29 In May of 2006, Hawaii enacted legislation
which charged the Hawaii Department of Health with developing and im-
plementing a POLST program. 130 The POLST form will replace Hawaii's
current system of bracelets and necklaces used to notify emergency person-
nel of the existence of an advance directive. 3 '
Finally, in November 2006, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives
passed Senate Bill 628, establishing a task force to create and test the POLST
form in nursing homes throughout the state. 3 2 These legislative enactments
demonstrate that other state lawmakers have recognized the value of POLST.
Yet despite the enactment of contemporaneous POLST legislation in other
states, Florida has failed to successfully enact its own POLST initiative.
III. ADVANCE DIRECTIVES IN FLORIDA
The successful utilization of the POLST form in other states provides
Florida with a frame of reference for its incorporation into Florida law. This
section will detail Florida's advance directive law and will distinguish the
POLST form from these advance directives.
With rapid advances in medical technology, health care providers are
able to sustain life for extended periods of time.'33 Very often, health care
providers and family members must make decisions without information
124. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2a-106 (Supp. 2008).
125. See id.
126. See MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-608.1 (d) (LexisNexis 2005). At its inception
this form was named the Parents Plan of Care (PPOC), however, the name of the form was
changed to Instructions on Current Life-Sustaining Treatment Options (ICLTO) in 2007. MD.
CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-608.1 (d) (LexisNexis Supp. 2008).
127. MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 5-608.1 (d).
128. See Furlong, supra note 50, at 26.
129. Id.
130. See H.B. 3126, 23d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2006).
131. Id.
132. See S.628, 2005 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2006).
133. See The Florida Senate Interim Project Report 2006-137, supra note 24, at 1.
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regarding the level of care the patient actually wanted to receive. 34 Efforts
to alleviate these life and death decision making situations began in the
1970s, when medical professionals began asking their patients to state the
level of care they wished to receive in the event of their incapacitation.1 35
Today, through the use of advance directives, patients effectuate their "own
choice, thereby honoring self-determination even when individuals no longer
possess the capacity for self-determination., 136 An advance directive is "[a]
legal document explaining one's wishes about medical treatment if one be-
comes incompetent or unable to communicate.' 37 It can also be "[a] docu-
ment that takes effect upon one's incompetency and designates a surrogate
decision-maker for healthcare matters."' 38 Currently, every state has at least
one type of advance directive codified into law. 139
The Florida Statutes chapter 765 codifies Florida's health care advance
directive laws." In 2002, the Last Acts Initiative rated Florida's advance
directive statute as one of the best in the nation.'14 This recognition resulted
from years of public and professional input finally leading to the enactment
of the Life-Prolonging Procedures Act of Florida of 1984.142 The Florida
Legislature decided that "every competent adult has [a] right of self-
determination ... [and] the right to choose or refuse medical treatment. ' '113
Under Florida law, an advance directive is a "witnessed written document or
oral statement in which instructions are given by a principal or in which the
principal's desires are expressed concerning any aspect of the principal's
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT TO DIE: THE LAW OF END-OF-LIFE
DECISION MAKING § 7.01, at 7-16 (2006). Advance directives have four general purposes: To
preserve the autonomy of the patient's degree of control over medical care when that person
lacks the ability to do so; to avoid recourse to the judicial process, when there is confusion
about the patient's wishes; to protect health care professionals from civil and criminal liability
by following the patients wishes in good faith; and to reduce medical costs, by not administer-
ing unwanted medical treatment. Id. at 7-16, 7-18-7-19.
137. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 57 (8th ed. 2004).
138. Id.
139. MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 136, at 7-7.
140. FLA. STAT. § 765 (2008).
141. LAST ACTS, MEANS TO A BETTER END: A REPORT ON DYING IN AMERICA TODAY 11
(2002), http://www.rwjf.org/files/publications/other/meansbetterend.pdf. The study rated the
"quality of state advance directive laws" in 2002. Id. Florida was one of seven states to re-
ceive an "A" rating. Id.
142. See generally Meta Calder, Chapter 765 Revisited: Florida's New Advance Direc-
tives Law, 20 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 291 (1992) (detailing the history of Florida's advance direc-
tive law).
143. FLA. STAT. § 765.102(1).
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health care."'" Pursuant to the statute, advance directives include, but are
"not limited to, the designation of a health care surrogate, a living will, or
anatomical gift."' 4 5 Although not officially listed as an advance directive
under chapter 765, the durable power of attorney is considered an advance
directive."4  House Bill 1017, Florida's failed POLST legislation, would
have added the POLST form as a type of advance directive under chapter
765.147
A. Living Will, Health Care Surrogate Designation, Durable Power of
Attorney
Florida law defines a living will as a witnessed document or "oral
statement made by the principal" (patient) that expresses "instructions con-
cerning life-prolonging procedures."' 1 8 A competent adult may create a liv-
ing will at any time. 49 Typically, a living will contains information regard-
ing a person's desire to receive or withhold treatment in the event of a ter-
minal illness, an end-stage medical condition, or "a persistent vegetative
state.' 150 The statute requires that the living will be signed in front of two
witnesses, one of whom cannot be related to the principal.' 5' Once com-
pleted, it is the principal's responsibility to notify the health care provider of
the existence of a living will.152 If the principal is incapacitated, any person
may provide notification to the health care provider, so that the living will is
made part of the medical record.153  Under the Patient Self-Determination
Act (PSDA), federal law requires that federally funded medical facilities
inform incoming patients of their right to make a living will, and inquire
144. FLA. STAT. § 765.101(1). "'Principal' means a competent adult executing an advance
directive and on whose behalf health care decisions are to be made." Id. § 765.101(14).
145. Id. § 765.101(1).
146. See FLA. STAT. § 709.08; see also FLA. STAT. § 401.45.
147. H.B. 1017, 2006 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2006).
148. FLA. STAT. § 765.101(11)(a), (b) (2008). "'Life-prolonging procedure' means any
medical procedure, treatment, or intervention ... which sustains [or] restores . . . a spontane-
ous vital function." Id. § 765.101(10).
149. FLA. STAT. § 765.302(1) (2008).
150. Id. "'Terminal condition' means [an injury] or illness from which there is no ...
probability of recover[ing] ... without treatment, can be expected to cause death." FLA. STAT.
§ 765.101(17). "'End-stage condition' means an irreversible condition [which] treatment of
the condition would be ineffective." Id. § 765.101(4). "'Persistent vegetative state' means a
permanent and irreversible condition of unconsciousness .. " Id. § 765.101(12).
151. FLA. STAT. § 765.302(1).
152. Id. § 765.302(2).
153. Id.
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whether that patient has executed such a document.'54 Once the health care
provider has received the living will, a change or revocation will only be
effective when communicated directly to the health care provider.155 A prop-
erly executed living will "establishes a rebuttable presumption of clear and
convincing evidence of the principal's wishes."'
' 51
Although the POLST form is not a substitute for a living will, it is a
supplement to this type of advance directive. 57 In effect, the POLST form
translates a patient's wishes regarding life-sustaining treatment and end-of-
life care, including resuscitation measures, antibiotic administration, and the
administration of nutrition into standard medical orders. 5 8 Health care pro-
fessionals can easily interpret and implement POLST orders, which "sur-
mounts the disconnect between [the living will] and the functioning of [the]
health care systems."
159
A second type of advance directive under Florida law is the designation
of a health care surrogate.' 6° This is a written document that designates a
person to whom the principal has given the legal authority to make medical
decisions in the event the principal is incapacitated.' 6' These decisions are
based upon what the surrogate "believes the principal would have" wanted if
they were able to speak for themselves. 162 The procedure for naming a health
care surrogate is similar to that of creating a living will. Two adults must
witness the execution of the document. 163 Once completed and delivered to
the surrogate, the surrogate designation form, like the living will, creates "a
rebuttable presumption of clear and convincing evidence of the principal's
[desire regarding the] designation of the surrogate."'" However, the surro-
gacy does not commence until the attending physician finds and documents
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395cc (2000).
155. FLA. STAT. § 765.104(3) (2008).
156. FLA. STAT. § 765.302(3); see also In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258,
273 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (holding surrogate's decision "to forego life-sustaining
treatment [must be supported by] clear and convincing evidence").
157. See Sabatino, National, supra note 32, at 153.
158. See POLST FORM, supra note 73.
159. Sabatino, National, supra note 32, at 153.
160. See FLA. STAT. § 765.202 (2008).
161. See id. § 765.202(1).
162. FLA. STAT. § 765.205(1)(b) (2008).
163. Id. § 765.202(1). If the principal cannot sign, he or she may direct that another "sign
the principal's name" in front of the witnesses. Id. The statute states that the surrogate cannot
be a witness to the signing of the document, and at least one of the witnesses cannot be a
blood relative or spouse. Id. § 765.202(2). Additionally, the document can name an alterna-
tive surrogate. Id. § 765.202(3).
164. Id. § 765.202(7).
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the principal's lack of capacity to make health care decisions.'65 If at any
time the principal regains capacity, the surrogate's authority ceases.
66
An alternative to the designation of a health care surrogate is the desig-
nation of a durable power of attorney. 67 Although the durable power of at-
torney does not appear under Florida's advance directive statute, it functions
in the same manner as an advance directive. 68 Under the durable power of
attorney, principals can designate individuals to serve as their attorneys-in-
fact. 169 Relating to health care, an attorney-in-fact is given full authority to
"make all health care decisions on behalf of the" incapacitated patient. 7°
Under Florida law, the attorney-in-fact can be any competent person over the
age of eighteen.' 7 ' The document must be in writing, it must clearly identify
the person being appointed as the attorney-in-fact, and it must state that au-
thority is conferred upon the principal's incapacitation.17 1 Once completed,
the attorney-in-fact has the same power as the health care surrogate.
73
The POLST form is useful to both the health care surrogate and the at-
torney-in-fact. '7 POLST forms reduce the need for much of the critical
health care decision making that is required of the health care surrogate or
attorney-in-fact. 75 ff the incapacitated patient has not completed a POLST
form, the surrogate or attorney-in-fact can communicate with the health care
provider regarding the completion of the form. 76 Under the Summary of
Goals section of the POLST form, the physician will document that the
health care surrogate or attorney-in-fact has completed the form on behalf of
the patient.
77
165. See FLA. STAT. § 765.204(2)-(3) (2008). If a question regarding capacity arises,
another physician must evaluate the principal, and if in agreement, record a similar finding of
incapacity. Id. § 765.204(2).
166. See id. § 765.204(3).
167. See FLA. STAT. § 709.08(1) (2008).
168. See id.
169. Id.
170. Id. § 709.08(7)(c).
171. Id. § 709.08(2).
172. See FLA. STAT. § 709.08(1). The statute also requires that the document be signed in
front of two witnesses. Id.
173. See id. In addition to the living will and health care surrogate, section 765 of the
Florida Statutes provides guidelines for the donation of body organs as an anatomical gift.
FLA. STAT. § 765.510 (2008).
174. See POLST FoRM, supra note 73.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See id.
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B. Do Not Resuscitate Orders
Do Not Resuscitate Orders (DNRO), established under Chapter 401 of
the Florida Statutes, are prepared in advance to memorialize a person's life-
sustaining treatment wishes. 7 8 A DNRO is a physician's order signed by
both the doctor and the patient.179 The DNRO authorizes health care provid-
ers to withhold or withdraw resuscitation in the event that an individual
needs to be resuscitated. 180 Generally, emergency medical service personnel
must "resuscitate a patient to the point of stabilization of vital signs.'' The
DNRO allows the patient to choose not to receive resuscitation in the event
of cardiac or pulmonary arrest. 182 Produced by the Florida Department of
Health, the DNRO form must "be printed on yellow paper.' ' 183 A DNRO is
generally used by patients who suffer from a terminal condition, an end-stage
condition, or are in persistent vegetative states. 184
Although the DNRO and the POLST form are both medical orders,
there are significant differences between these two directives. The POLST
form requires a discussion between the patient and the health care provider
regarding different levels of treatment, including, but not limited to, resusci-
tation. "'85 The orders on the POLST form must also be reviewed periodical-
ly.' 86 On the other hand, the DNRO, pursuant to the patient's wishes, only
informs the health care provider not to resuscitate. 8 7 As it has in many other
states, the POLST form could replace the DNRO in Florida.'88 The POLST
form would provide greater detail and specification for patient care desires,
while still fulfilling the purpose of the DNRO.1'89
IV. PROBLEMS WITH ADVANCE DIRECTIVES
The purpose of an advance directive is to allow an individual to control
decisions related to life-sustaining treatments and end-of-life care. 90 Unfor-
178. FLA. STAT. § 401.45(3)(a) (2008).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 15 JEROME IRA SOLKOFF, FLORIDA ELDER LAW § 26:54 (2006 ed.).
182. FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 64J-2.018 (2008).
183. Id. at r. 64J-2.018(2)(a). A miniature copy of the DNRO form is available, which the
EMSs must honor. Id. at r. 64J-2.018(2)(b).
184. See FLA. STAT. § 765.101 (2008).
185. See POLST FORM, supra note 73.
186. Sabatino, National, supra note 32, at 153.
187. See FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 64J-2.018.
188. See POLST State Programs, supra note 116.
189. See POLST FORM, supra note 73.
190. See Sabatino, National, supra note 32, at 151-52.
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tunately, research over the past several decades has demonstrated that current
statutory advance directives have not produced their intended results.' 91 Of-
ten, patients lose their ability to ensure that their end-of-life care preferences
are honored. 192 Many legal and health care professionals believe
"[s]ystematic efforts are urgently needed to improve advance care planning
and end-of-life care.' 93  The American Medical Association stresses that
"[m]ore rigorous efforts in advance care planning are required in order to
tailor end-of-life care to the preferences of patients so that they can expe-
rience a satisfactory last chapter in their lives.' 94 This section will detail the
problems associated with current advance directives, as well as demonstrate
how the POLST form represents "[p]romising new models" which can
"move us closer to achieving the original intent of advance directives."'95
Studies have found that only 18% of Americans have completed ad-
vance directives. 96 Even if efforts are made to educate the public regarding
the need for advance directives, simply having an advance directive does not
guarantee that it will be followed. 97 Often advance directives raise "more
questions for doctors than the document answers," and may force doctors to
make treatment choices against the patient's desires.1 98 Additionally, patients
191. HICKMAN ET AL., HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, supra note 2, at S26.
192. Id.
193. Karl A. Lorenz & Joanne Lynn, Editorials, Oregon's Lesson for Improving Advance
Care Planning, 52 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC'Y 1574, 1575 (2004).
194. Code of Medical Ethics § 2.225 (AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs 2004-
05).
195. HICKMAN ET AL., HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, supra note 2, at S26.
196. Angela Fagerlin & Carl E. Schneider, Enough: The Failure of the Living Will,
HASTINGS CTR. REP. 30, 32 (2004). "People widely say they want a living will.... [d]espite
this, and despite decades of urging, most Americans lack them." Id. "Few individuals pro-
vide explicit oral or written instructions regarding their intent to refuse medical treatment
should they become incompetent." Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 289
(1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring). "Physicians should encourage their patients to document
their treatment preferences or to appoint a health care proxy with whom they can discuss their
values regarding health care and treatment." Code of Medical Ethics § 8.081. See also
CAROL KROHM & SCOTT SUMMERS, ADVANCE HEALTH CARE DIRECTIVES: A HANDBOOK FOR
PROFESSIONALS 51-54 (2002) (stating various reasons why most people do not create an ad-
vance directive).
197. See R. Sean Morrison et al., The Inaccessibility of Advance Directives on Transfer
from Ambulatory to Acute Care Settings, 274 J. AM MED. ASS'N 478,478 (1995).
198. April Frawley Birdwell, For Advance Directives, a Picture's Worth a Thousand
Words, U. OF FLA. NEWS, July 18, 2005, http://news.ufl.edu/2005/07/18/videowill. Doctors
tend to make more conservative treatments when unable to interpret an advance directive. Id.
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are under the false assumption that after writing their advance directives,
planning is complete.99
A. What Does It Say?
Generally, standard advance directives assume that at some point an in-
dividual "would prefer to die rather than continue" on life support.2" Ad-
vance directives are often completed by patients and their lawyers who are
unfamiliar with the specific treatments administered during life threatening
medical situations and terminal illnesses.2"1 Unfortunately, these advance
directives do not detail the various medical conditions that may arise, thus
leaving the health care provider and family to decide what the patient would
have wanted under these circumstances.2"2 One study showed that out of
4804 patients with advance directives, only ninety provided specific instruc-
tions that the health care provider could follow.20 3 Often, when patients write
their advance directives, they are written in layman's terms, thus leading to
vague and confusing instructions.2°4 Researchers attribute this lack of clarity
to the unpleasantness of the subject and the lack of adequate information
regarding the types of treatment available.2 5 Advance directives are often
created under urgent circumstances, which "trigger[s] emotional and existen-
tial turbulence, enhancing the likelihood of unstable decisions, 2 6 leading to
"technically inaccurate statements," which are medically impossible to hon-
or.20 7 Essentially, the health care provider and family is in the same position
as if the patient had never created an advance directive.208  Accordingly,
199. See Vicki Joiner Bowers, Comment, Advance Directives: Peace of Mind or False
Security?, 26 STETsON L. REv. 677, 719-20 (1996).
200. See Teno et al., supra note 4, at 508.
201. See Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 196, at 33.
202. See id.
203. Teno et al., supra note 4, at 511. "Even if all of [the advance directives] had been
noted and had been rigorously followed, the effects upon the overall population would have
been imperceptible." Id.
204. See id. (stating examples of vague and confusing instructions). See also Bowers,
supra note 199, at 719 (discussing vague and ambiguous terms used in advance directives);
Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 196, at 34.
205. See Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 196, at 34. The research also revealed that
most "people are functionally illiterate, and most of the literate cannot express themselves
clearly in writing." Id.
206. Am. Med. Assoc. Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs, Optimal Use of Orders Not to
Intervene and Advance Directives, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 668, 670 (1998).
207. Teno et al., supra note 4, at 511.
208. See id.
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many researchers believe that advance directives cannot "effectively direct
care decisions for seriously ill adults."'
Even with clearly documented advance directives, a survey of Florida
doctors revealed that physicians felt uncomfortable and reluctant to decide a
patient's fate simply by "relying on a legal document., 210 One study con-
cluded that overall, advance directives "do not influence the level of medical
care" and found that 25% of the patients studied received care "inconsistent
with their living will." '' Additionally, problems associated with reading and
interpreting advance directives may lead health care providers to interpret
documents in the light of their own preferences."' At times, doctors simply
ignore advance directives because they are reluctant to prematurely declare
that a patient is in an end-stage of a terminal illness which would require
reliance on an advance directive.213 Consequently, by the time the physician
actually determines that the patient has reached the threshold of imminent
death, the advance directive is often regarded as no longer applicable.1 4
By converting a patient's wishes into actionable medical orders, the
POLST form avoids problematic issues relating to vagueness and lack of
clarity of instructions commonly associated with traditional advance direc-
tives.21 5 Like any medical order, the attending health care provider can
quickly read and interpret the POLST form and successfully implement the
instructions.2 6 Unlike advance directives prepared by attorneys, the POLST
form is completed by patients and their physicians, and is drafted using ap-
propriate medical terminology in a standard medical order format.1 7 There-
fore, both the physician and the patient have an increased level of confidence
that care will be administered in accordance with the patient's wishes.218 The
standard medical order format provides clarity and guidance to health care
providers who may be unfamiliar with the patient to whom they are provid-
ing care.21 9 The POLST form removes barriers associated with traditional
209. Id. at 508.
210. See Birdwell, supra note 198.
211. Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 196, at 36.
212. See id. at 35-36.
213. Morrison et al.,supra note 197, at 481.
214. Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 196, at 36.
215. See Sabatino, National, supra note 32, at 153.
216. See HIcKMAN Er AL., HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, supra note 2, at S28.
217. Id.
218. See id.
219. Zadina & Weber-Devoll, supra note 45, at 10.
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advance directives including unclear legal jargon that is difficult to interpret,
especially in emergency situations.20
B. Where Is It?
In addition to containing clear and specific instructions, the advance di-
rective must be readily accessible to health care providers.22' Most advance
directives are completed years before being actually needed, consequently
their "existence and location may vanish in the mists of time. 222 A study
found that half of all advance directives created often remain in the lawyer's
office.223 As many as 62% of the study's patients failed to provide their ad-
vance directives to their doctors.224 Upon admission to a health care facility,
most patients are too overwhelmed and nervous "to recall and mention their
advance directives. ' '225 The study also discovered that only 16% of reviewed
patients' charts actually contained an advance directive form.22 6 Other stu-
dies have found that patients often believe that their condition is not serious
enough to mention the existence of their advance directive.227 Fear of early
withdrawal of treatment is also identified as a reason why patients are hesi-
tant to mention the existence of an advance directive 8.22  The increase in pa-
tient transfers between health care facilities has also added to problems asso-
220. See Susan E. Hickman et al., The POLST (Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining
Treatment) Paradigm to Improve End-of-Life Care: Potential State Legal Barriers to Imple-
mentation, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHics 119, 119 (2008) [Hickman et al., The POLST]. "[T]he
wording of the standard living will may impede decision-making and lead to decisions con-
trary to a patient's true preferences if' there are no discussions between patient and doctor.
Teno et al., supra note 4, at 511.
221. See David Martin, Using Implantable Devices to Improve End-of-Life Care, 91 AM. J.
CARDIOLOGY 583, 583 (2003).
222. Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 196, at 35.
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. Id. See Morrison et al., supra note 197, at 481 (finding responsibility for identifying
advance directives are delegated to clerks who are untrained to deal with "these types of dis-
cussions"). See also Am. Med. Assoc. Council on Ethical & Jud. Affairs, supra note 203, at
670 (stating inquiry to existing advance directives "was assigned to the medical student or
nurse").
226. Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 196, at 35.
227. Morrison et al., supra note 197, at 481.
228. Id.
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ciated with current advance directives.229 Unfortunately, advance directives
"often fail to accompany" patients when they are transferred.23°
Unlike the lack of portability of traditional advance directives, the
POLST form serves as the cover sheet for the patient's medical record. 3
Easily recognized when transferred across health care settings, the POLST
form is reviewed upon the patient's admission to the receiving medical facili-
ty.232 In those states that use the POLST form, "providers have committed to
ensuring that the POLST form travels with the patient whenever transfers
from one setting to another are made, thus, promoting continuity of care de-
cisions. ' ' 23' Because the form is placed on top of the medical record, the
health care provider is alerted to the fact that the patient has an advance di-
rective, eliminating the need to ask as required under the PSDA.234 However,
to comply with the PSDA, the health care provider must still ask patients
whether the POLST form belongs to them.235 Additional efforts were made
by the POLST form developers to ensure that the form would not "become
buried in the [medical] record. '236 For instance, to increase visibility, the
POLST form is printed on brightly colored neon paper.237 Clearly, the
POLST form is designed to address the availability and portability issues that
plague traditional advance directives.238
C. Things Change
"Unlike most legal documents which gain credence over time, direc-
tives tend to lose credibility. The greater the time span or change in circums-
tances between the directive's creation and its implementation, the greater
the uncertainty that the previous and present desires are identical., 239 Writ-
229. See Foundation for Healthy Communities, Physician Orders Regarding Treatment
(PORT) Program, Fact Sheet (2005), available at http://www.healthynh.com/fc/initia
tives/performance/eol/PORT FACT SHEET SEACoast.pdf.
230. See Tolle et al., supra note 58, at 1098. But see Raymond L. Parri, If! Call 911, Is
My Living Will Any Good? The Living Will v. the DNRO, 70 FLA. B. J. 82, 84 (1996). Most
states recommend that a copy of advance directives should be made available to the EMT as
they transport a patient from one facility to another, and while in the home, the advance direc-
tive should be near the patient at all times. Id.
231. Sabatino, National, supra note 32, at 153.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See WSMA, supra note 8.
235. See HICKMAN ET AL., HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, supra note 2, at S27.
236. Furlong, supra note 50, at 26.
237. See Sabatino, National, supra note 32, at 153.
238. See WSMA, supra note 8.
239. Bowers, supra note 199, at 719-20.
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ten well before a person becomes terminally ill, most advance directives only
address hypothetical possibilities for the future, which rarely occur.' 4 With
the passage of time and life changes, very often a patient's personal prefe-
rence regarding life-sustaining treatments and end-of-life care may change. 24'
Because a "decision made at age thirty may be different from a decision one
would make at age eighty," 24 2 it is unlikely that one could create an advance
directive that accurately reflects changes in personal feelings. 43 Moreover,
with advances in medical technology, of "paramount concern is the possibili-
ty that medical practice will change between the time of making the directive
and [its] implementation." 2' For example, vaccinations and cures may be-
come available for diseases considered terminal at the time of the drafting of
the advance directive. 45 Unfortunately, advance directives are rarely re-
viewed or updated.246
In contrast to a traditional advance directive, the POLST form addresses
the issue of medical advances and personal changes impacting one's life-
sustaining treatment and end-of-life care wishes.247 Through its requirement
of periodic review and updates, the form ensures the patient's wishes are
current and accurately documented.248 Specifically, the back of the form lists
instructions regarding its review.249 Consequently, the POLST form accu-
rately documents the patient's wishes in light of his or her most current per-
sonal and medical circumstances.
2 0
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Bowers, supra note 199, at 719-20.
245. See ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO Di 350(1989).
246. See HICKMAN ET AL., HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, supra note 2, at S27. "Once advance
directives are completed, planning is typically considered finished. A systematic effort to
reopen the conversation . . . is rarely made. The only repeated question that a patient might
hear is, 'Do you have an advance directive?' as required by the Patient Self-Determination
Act." Id.
247. See Bowers, supra note 199, at 719.
248. See Sabatino, Survey, supra note 10, at 299.
249. POLST FORM, supra note 73. The POLST form specifies that a review should be
completed when: "The person is transferred from one care setting or care level to another, or
[t]here is a substantial change in the person's health status, or [tihe person's treatment prefe-
rences change." Id.
250. See Sabatino, Survey, supra note 10, at 298-99.
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D. The Surrogate's Burden
Patients who designate health care surrogates often neglect to provide
information regarding their specific health care treatment preferences. 5
Although a study demonstrated that seventy percent of surrogates correctly
predicted their principal's preferences, the burden of surrogacy is still signif-
icant. Even when the patient has left general guidance regarding his or her
end-of-life care, studies have shown those statements are often unclear and
confusing. 253 Lacking information concerning the patient's health care wish-
es often results in stress and anxiety that leaves surrogates "overwhelmed
with their own concerns and [they cannot] effectively advocate for the pa-
tient. '254 Furthermore, some surrogates are not readily available for imme-
diate decision making. 255 Finally, in fear of potential litigation from the pa-
tient's family members, some physicians are cautious when dealing with
surrogates. 2
56
Because of its intent and design, the POLST form can serve as a valua-
ble planning tool for the patient and the health care surrogate.257 If the form
is completed prior to the patient's incapacitation, it will provide the surrogate
with detailed instruction and guidance regarding the principal's current and
future treatment preferences. 58 In fact, the surrogate may assist the patient
and physician in completing the form. 59 In the event that a patient becomes
incapacitated, a health care surrogate may complete a form on behalf of the
patient, which "should remove much of the burden of medical decision mak-
ing from a family's shoulders in a time of crisis. ' 2 °  Additionally, the
POLST form's periodic review requirement allows surrogates to update the
treatment preferences in light of the patient's current condition. 26'
251. See Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note 196, at 35-36.
252. Id. at 36.
253. Teno et al., supra note 4, at 511.
254. Fagerlin & Schneider, supra note at 196, at 37.
255. Id. at 36.
256. Id. at 37 ("[D]octors intent on avoiding litigation may realize that the only plausible
plaintiffs are families.").
257. See Milton Zadina & Lisa Weber-Devoll, A New Era in Advance Directives, 5 NEB.
MED. 10, 10 (2006).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See, e.g., Charles P. Sabatino, National Advance Directives: One Attempt to Scale
the Barriers, 1 NAT'L ACAD. OF ELDER L. ATr'Ys J. 131, 153 (2005), available at
http://www.agingwithdig nity.org/ Natform.pdf.
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V. POLST: Is IT THE ANSWER?
Clearly, problems associated with advance directives significantly im-
pact patients, their families, and the legal and health care communities.262
However, most health care providers, legal professionals, and bioethicists
believe "the initial goal of advance directives was laudable and is worth pre-
serving. ' '263 Numerous studies on advance directives "demonstrate that in the
right system, the rate of advance care planning can be high, clinically impor-
tant, available," and effective. 2' Fortunately, there are promising new mod-
els which move us closer to achieving the original intent of advance direc-
tives., 265 Health care providers have requested a model that converts tradi-
tional advance directives into "specific, immediately actionable medical or-
ders that transfer with the patient throughout the health care system.' 266 This
section will demonstrate how the POLST form represents a model that ful-
fills recommendations regarding advance directive reforms.
Hickman identified several factors that would contribute to the creation
of successful advance directives.2 67 First, patients and their doctors should
develop advance directives which include individualized medical plans.
268
This allows patients to define what is acceptable rather than simply stating
that they wish to refuse or to receive treatment.269 The POLST form satisfies
this recommendation because it is a medical order individualized to the pa-
tient's desires completed by patients and their health care providers. 27 ° Addi-
tionally, in contrast to the DNRO and a living will, which Hickman states
"simply list[] the right to refuse treatment," the form provides the patient
with a variety of treatment options.2 7 ' The second factor contributing to a
successful advance directive is portability. 72 The directive must be easily
transferred across patient settings and provide medical instructions in "spe-
cific language that is actionable in all settings. 273 The POLST form also
fulfills this recommendation. 4 Unlike advance directives, the POLST form
262. See HICKMAN ET AL., THE HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, supra note 2, at S26.
263. Id.
264. Hickman et al., Viable Alternative, supra note 11, at 5.
265. HICKMAN ET AL., HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, supra note 2, at S26.
266. Hickman et al., Viable Alternative, supra note 11, at 5.
267. See HICKMAN ET AL., HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, supra note 2, at S28-30.
268. See id. at S28.
269. See id.
270. See id.
271. Id.
272. HICKMAN ET AL., HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, supra note 2, at S28.
273. Id.
274. See id.
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is a clearly documented physician's order, which serves as a cover sheet to
the patient's medical record and must accompany the patient during trans-
fer.275 Furthermore, the form is generally created by a state's department of
health, ensuring its standardization, so it is easily recognized by the transfer-
ring and receiving medical facilities. 276 According to Hickman, the final
recommendation of a stringent periodic review represents "the most crucial
element[] of [a] more successful advance directive program[]. ' ' 277 Once
again the form fulfills this recommendation by requiring regular review and
updates of a patient's POLST form.
278
The American Medical Association (AMA) has also suggested advance
directives reforms which are satisfied by the POLST form.279 For example,
the AMA suggests that physicians receive immunity from malpractice when
honoring patient's wishes found in statutory documents.280 States which
have enacted POLST legislation have amended their statutes and administra-
tive codes providing immunity to heath care providers who, in good faith,
follow the POLST form.28 ' Additionally, the POLST form clearly follows
the AMA suggestion that advance directives be created on worksheet-type
documents to ensure treatment can be recorded and "applicable to medical
decisions. 282 The form also provides an understandable standard medical
format and allows for an accurate interpretation of the patient's wishes.283
The POLST form clearly conforms to the AMA's suggestion that advance
directives ensure reasonable confidence in the patient and the provider.28
Like Hickman, the AMA has also suggested that advance directives be readi-
ly accessible, periodically updated, and easily transferable.2 85 The POLST
form clearly conforms to these suggestions.
Although the POLST form fulfils many of the recommended advance
directive reforms, it is important to note that the success of the POLST form
275. See id.
276. See id.
277. HICKMAN ET AL., HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, supra note 2, at S30.
278. See id. at S30.
279. See, e.g., Code of Medical Ethics § 2.225 (AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs 2004-05).
280. See id. at 101.
281. See id.
282. Id.
283. See Kathy L. Cerminara & Seth M. Bogin, A Paper About a Piece of Paper: Regula-
tory Actions as the Most Effective Way to Promote Use of Physician Orders for Life-
Sustaining Treatment, 29 J. LEGAL MED. 479, 484 (2008).
284. See HICKMAN ET AL., HASTINGS CTR. REPORT, supra note 2, at S28.
285. See Code of Medical Ethics § 2.225 (AMA Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs
2004-05).
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is contingent upon statewide education programs. 2 6 According to Susan W.
Tolle, part of the success of Oregon's POLST program may be traced to a
five-year statewide education effort, as well as the fact that Oregon provides
more end-of-life care funding than any other state.287 Tolle, expressed con-
cern that other states may not achieve the same success rates without such a
fully supported state system.288
States must also be prepared for new dilemmas resulting from the
POLST form. 289 For instance, if a conflict exists between a POLST form and
a previously completed advance directive, the most recent form generally
takes priority, but in an emergency situation the physician may ignore the
POLST form if the existing advance directive provides for more aggressive
life-sustaining treatment.29° Although this situation is not common, it can
potentially open the door to future litigation.29
V. CONCLUSION
The POLST form is a valuable planning tool that effectively translates a
patient's end-of-life decisions into standardized, clearly defined medical or-
ders, thus eliminating many problems associated with traditional advance
directives. Although House Bill 1017 previously would have amended chap-
ter 765 of the Florida Statutes, that POLST legislation was not enacted. It is
imperative that Florida now enact new legislation under the appropriate Flor-
ida statute.
Although the POLST form can be used as an advance directive, it is
more likely that the legislature would approve the POLST form as an alterna-
tive or replacement to the DNRO under chapter 401 of the Florida Statutes.
Accordingly, the POLST form should be re-introduced pursuant to chapter
401 of the Florida Statutes. As this article demonstrates, unlike advance
directives, the POLST form is a document included in the patient's medical
record that clearly memorializes the patient's treatment care decisions and
end of life wishes into actionable standardized physician's orders. The
286. Tolle et al., supra note 58, at 1101.
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. See, e.g., Hospice Foundation of America (HFA), Living With Grief: Ethical Di-
lemmas at the End of Life, Questions and Answers, http://www.hospicefoundation.org/tele
conference/2005/qa.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2009).
290. See id.
291. See id. Although conflicts between POLST forms and previously executed advance
directives could be a potential source of future litigation, this "problem is not common in
Oregon or in other states using the POLST" form. Id.
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POLST form may be used in conjunction with advance directives, effectively
translating the patient's treatment care wishes into actionable medical orders.
Many states that have successfully enacted POLST legislation have
done so by authorizing the POLST form as an alternative or replacement to
the existing DNRO form. Enacting such legislation would not require
amending chapter 765, which the legislature has been hesitant to reform be-
cause of political, religious, and social reasons. Accordingly, because the
POLST form is a medical order, like the DNRO, and not a traditional ad-
vance directive, new POLST legislation should be introduced under chapter
401 of the Florida Statutes.
Finally, to ensure the proper development and implementation of the
POLST form, the Florida Department of Health should initiate a statewide
POLST program. Efforts to educate the public and the medical and legal
communities regarding the purpose and practical use of the POLST form
should be diligently implemented. Pilot programs in a variety of health care
settings will provide relevant and reliable data and findings regarding the
utility of the form in practical health care settings. Results of the pilot pro-
gram can be used to modify the POLST form in accordance with the identi-
fied needs and requirements of Florida patients, their physicians, and Florida
law. Ultimately, Florida's enactment of POLST legislation under chapter
401 of the Florida Statutes will prove that the form is the cure for the com-
mon advance directive.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The recent military operations, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Op-
eration Enduring Freedom (OEF), embody the most pronounced military
engagements involving U.S. armed services since the Vietnam War.' Over
* J.D Candidate 2010, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center; MS
in Clinical Psychology 2007, Florida Institute of Technology; BS in Psychology 2005, Uni-
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"1,500,000 members of the Armed Forces have been deployed in" these op-
erations.2 More wounded soldiers have survived from these operations than
from any other war. However, many of these survivors wake up each day
only to be reminded of their traumatic injuries or debilitating mental disord-
ers.4 A great majority of soldiers in combat experience traumatic events of-
ten considered horrific in a civilized society, such as seeing dead bodies or
remains, or witnessing both friends and enemies killed in violent manners.
5
Consistent with society's view of the heroic braveness of the men and wom-
en in uniform, war veterans are often left to overcome substantial mental
anguish with little professional assistance, receiving nothing more than a
mere "cursory mental health screening" upon return.6
The rate of homicides committed by war veterans has drastically in-
creased amid the return of thousands of those who have served in combat
roles in Iraq and Afghanistan.7 States have responded to the increase in
crime by combat veterans by beginning to carve out "a class of privileged
offenders." 8 At least one Florida court has already extended war related
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from a mere mitigating factor in a
murder trial to a basis for acquittal by reason of insanity. 9 Other state legis-
latures have sought to enact legislation to protect war veterans who commit
crimes from punishment offenders would otherwise receive.' °
Congress has taken note of these events and has introduced and passed
several pieces of legislation in an effort to bring more focus to the growing
versity of Florida. The author would like to thank her family and colleagues at Nova Law
Review for their support and encouragement. Lastly, this article is dedicated to the loving
memory of the author's grandmother, Marie Bocolo.
1. Karen H. Seal et al., Bringing the War Back Home, 167 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED.
476, 476 (2007).
2. Veterans' Mental Health and Other Care Improvements Act of 2008, S. 2162, 110th
Cong. § 301(1) [hereinafter Veteran's Mental Health Act].
3. Seal et al., supra note 1, at 476.
4. See id.
5. Charles W. Hoge et al., Combat Duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, Mental Health Prob-
lems, and Barriers to Care, 351 NEw ENG. J. MED. 13, 18 (2004) [hereinafter Hoge et al.,
Barriers to Care].
6. Deborah Sontag & Lizette Alvarez, Across America, Deadly Echoes of Foreign Bat-
tles, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2008, at Al [hereinafter Sontag & Alvarez, Across America].
7. Id.
8. Lauren Sonis, Local Iraq War Vet Found Not Guilty of Murder, DAYTONA BEACH
NEws-J., Mar. 8, 2008, at Al.
9. See id.
10. See generally TheNationalCouncil.org, States Respond to Veterans' Call: Overview
of Veterans Behavioral Healthcare Legislation in 2007 (Dec. 2007), http://www.thenational
council.org/cs/veterans (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) [hereinafter National Council].
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crisis." In particular, the Veterans' Mental Health and Other Care Improve-
ments Act of 2008 (Veterans' Mental Health Act) demonstrates that Con-
gress has taken note of the source of the problem, and is seeking a solution.'
2
This paper will address the adequacy of the current efforts of Congress and
the states in addressing the drastic increase in violent crimes. The first part
of this paper will highlight specific instances of the war being brought home
to local towns and neighborhoods with the return of combat veterans. Next,
this paper will offer a detailed background and explanation of post-traumatic
stress disorder, the frequently diagnosed mental disorder causing much of the
chaos. Then, this paper will discuss the states' responses, including a
precedent setting Florida case which has failed to receive much recognition.
Finally, this paper will examine the various recent congressional responses to
the inadequate mental health regulatory scheme regarding returning combat
veterans.
II. BRINGING THE WAR HOME
Carol Trevino and her nine-year-old son were startled awake from a
deep sleep by several consecutive loud booms. 13 With only seconds passing
between the booms and Carol Trevino reaching for her pepper spray, her
estranged husband, Jon Trevino, shot her five times, including one bullet to
her head, and then took his own life. 4 Their nine-year-old son watched si-
lently as his family exploded before his eyes. 5 Instead of remembering days
of playing catch with his father, he will forever be able to recall that "[h]is
father used a silver gun [which] 'didn't have a wheel on it, like the cowboys
used,"' and the picture of the glowing numbers on the clock, of 4:32 a.m.,
staring back at him as the time his mother died.' 6 Prior to the murder-
suicide, Jon Trevino suffered from an array of psychiatric problems, and
despite the military's awareness, Jon Trevino was certified by the military to
handle the increasingly taxing position of evacuating the wounded. 7 In a
health assessment following his return from Iraq, Jon Trevino reported, "that
11. See generally Veteran's Mental Health Act, S. 2162, §§ 101-705; National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 1585, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. Res. 1098,
110th Cong. (2008).
12. See generally Veteran's Mental Health Act, S. 2162, §§ 101-705.
13. Lizette Alvarez & Deborah Sontag, When Strains on Military Families Turn Deadly,
N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 15, 2008, at Al [hereinafter Alvarez & Sontag, Strains on Military Fami-
lies].
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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he had 'serious problems' dealing with the people he loved and that he was
feeling 'down, helpless, panicky or anxious."",18 The Air Force restricted him
from "special operational duty" and diagnosed him with "acute PTSD."' 9
However, in 2005, he was deemed "well enough to be deployed domestical-
ly."' 2° But his family, which once saw him as an "affable, quick-witted ser-
geant," instead could not see past the unpredictable changes in temper, para-
noia, erratic behavior, continuous spousal abuse, and certain unpredictable
behavior which frightened his son.2'
Needing alcohol to fall asleep, Matthew Sepi, an Iraq combat veteran,
left his apartment in Las Vegas to make a trip to the nearest 7-Eleven.
Dreading his venture outside, Matthew Sepi placed his assault rifle inside his
trench coat before leaving.23 He was consistently plagued by lurking danger
and could not rid himself of nightmares concerning the death his unit brought
upon an Iraqi civilian.24 As Matthew Sepi stepped out into the darkness and
continued to hurry down an alley, he ignored the screaming and threats from
gang members.2 5 After obtaining his alcohol, Mr. Sepi was confronted by
two armed gang members.26 In Mr. Sepi's interview, he explained "that he
spied the butt of a gun, heard a boom, saw a flash and 'just snapped."' 27 As a
28
result, one gang member was injured and the other died on the pavement.
When the police caught up with Matthew Sepi he was shaking and crying,
and he asked, "'Who did I take fire from?"' 2 9 Matthew Sepi explained that
he was "ambushed and then instinctively 'engaged the targets.' '30 Following
Matthew Sepi's arrest, his public defender questioned him about PTSD. 31 As
he started to tell her about Iraq, his eyes suddenly were filled with tears and
he hysterically exclaimed, "'We had the wrong house! We had the wrong
house!' 32 Matthew Sepi recounted the nights where his unit was provided
lists instructing them on their nightly captures.33 He graphically explained
18. Alvarez & Sontag, Strains on Military Families, supra note 13.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Sontag & Alvarez, Across America, supra note 6.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Sontag & Alvarez, Across America, supra note 6.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. ld.
31. Id.
32. Sontag & Alvarez, Across America, supra note 6.
33. Id.
[Vol. 33
185
: Nova Law Review 33, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
THE WAR COMES HOME
that on one particular night, after blowing a gate, his unit found a man on fire
just inside the gate, and after searching the home they realized they blew up
the wrong house?4 Matthew Sepi never imagined that the mental picture of
the blazing, staggering Iraqi civilian would stay with him forever."
Soon after returning from Iraq, Lance Corporal Walter Rollo Smith was
dispatched to undertake a marksmanship instructor course in Quantico, Vir-
ginia.36 Upon setting foot in the firing range in Quantico, he peered through
the scope of his gun and began shaking.37 Instead of viewing the inanimate
targets in front of him, Smith explained that he saw "vivid, hallucinatory
images of Iraq: 'the cars coming at us, the chaos, the dust, the women and
children, the bodies we left behind."' 38 Upon every pull of the trigger,
Smith's crying worsened until he was pulled away from the firing range.39
Smith was discharged from the Marines and sent off to get help from the
veteran's hospital for his PTSD.4 ° Smith recalls his unit filling out mental
health questionnaires prior to their arrival in the United States.4 ' In an inter-
view, Smith said, "Then they sat us down one after the other with an officer,
and he looked over the form, and said, 'Are you doing OK?' and, no matter
what we wrote, we'd say yup, and then he'd say, 'Next! ' '"" 2 After being
discharged from the Marines, Smith visited a psychiatrist a few times, at-
tempted to take prescription medication for his trouble sleeping and anxiety,
tried to end his life with one of his guns, and even left goodbye messages for
his friends and family. 3 The police were able to prevent Smith from taking
his life and escorted him to a nearby mental health center." In 2004, Smith
met Nicole Marie Speirs, who later became pregnant with twins.45 When
learning of Speirs' pregnancy, Smith broke up with her and it was not until
seven months later that the couple reunited.46 They appeared to be a happy
couple to everyone, including her family. 7 One night they took a bath and
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Deborah Sontag, From Iraq to Utah, a Veteran's Chain of Death Postwar Plunge
into Chaos Shaped Fate of Ex-Marine Who Drowned Girlfriend, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 21,
2008, at 2 [hereinafter Sontag, From Iraq to Utah].
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Sontag, From Iraq to Utah, supra note 36.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Sontag, From Iraq to Utah, supra note 36.
47. Id.
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when Speirs put her head under the faucet to rinse off her hair, Smith held
her head underwater until she drowned. 8
I1. RECOGNIZING THE PROBLEM
These three stories are just a few, among the many cases, where veter-
ans are suffering from debilitating mental health problems and innocent vic-
tims are suffering the violent consequences.49 Tragically, there have been
121 cases found, in this country alone, in which Iraq and Afghanistan veter-
ans, upon returning from war, have either been charged with killing someone
or have actually killed another human being. ° Spouses, significant others,
children, and relatives make up about one-third of these victims. 5' A New
York Times study found that many veterans coming back from war are expe-
riencing great difficulty with the transition from war life to civilian life, but
the commission of violent crimes is not the only behavior that deserves atten-
tion.52 Veterans throughout the world are homeless, engage in substance
abuse, and commit suicide. 3 A Pentagon task force study, released in June
of 2007, revealed that the military's mental health system is "'woefully in-
adequate"' to meet all of the 'daunting and growing' psychological prob-
lems" of military members.54 The study found "that hundreds of thousands
of the more than 1 million U.S. troops who have served at least one war-zone
tour in Iraq or Afghanistan are showing signs of [PTSD], depression, anxiety
48. Id.
49. See generally Johnny Waltz, Problems Transitioning Out of Warrior Mode,
VETERANS TODAY, Jan. 9, 2008, http://www.veteranstoday.com/modules.php?name=News&
file=article&sid=2745. Krisiauna Calaira Lewis, a two-year-old, was slammed against a wall
by her father. Sontag & Alvarez, Across America, supra note 6. Richard Davis, a specialist
of the Army, was hidden in the woods after being stabbed and set on fire by fellow soldiers.
Id.
50. See id. "More than half the killings involved guns, and the rest were stabbings, beat-
ings, strangulations and bathtub drownings." Id. A New York Times study found an 89%
increase of homicides, from 184 cases to 349, during the current wartime period. Id. Only
one-quarter involves veterans from wars other than Iraq and Afghanistan. Sontag & Alvarez,
Across America, supra note 6.
51. Id. Service member made up another quarter of those who were killed, and the rest
of the victims were either acquaintances or strangers. Id.
52. Waltz, supra note 49.
53. Id. On average eighteen veterans commit suicide daily and around 300,000 veterans
are homeless per year. Id.
54. Ann Scott Tyson, Pentagon Report Criticizes Troops' Mental-Health Care, WASH.
POST, June 16, 2007, at A2. Close to 40% of soldiers report symptoms of psychological prob-
lems. Id.
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or other potentially disabling mental disorders."55 However, even when men-
tal health screenings are in place, they are often administered too early and
only once.56 Members of the military are more likely to report symptoms of
mental health problems months after retuning from war than immediately
upon leaving Iraq.5 7 To adequately assess military members for psychologi-
cal disorders, the Department of Defense should intervene prior to the sol-
diers leaving active duty and again post-deployment. 58 Of the 121 cases pre-
viously mentioned, many of the veterans, despite an apparent display of
combat trauma, were only evaluated and diagnosed with PTSD once they
were arrested.59 In fact, only a few of them were evaluated with "more than
a cursory mental health screening at the end of their deployments. ''60 "Pre-
vious research conducted after other military conflicts has shown that dep-
loyment and exposure to combat result in increased risk of [PTSD], major
depression, substance abuse, [and] functional impairment in social and em-
ployment settings ..... 61 In an interview with the New York Times, one
criminal defense lawyer stated, "'To deny the frequent connection between
combat trauma and subsequent criminal behavior is to deny one of the direct
societal costs of war and to discard another generation of troubled heroes."' 62
In the decades following the Vietnam War, PTSD's strong presence in
the media dwindled during the relative peacetime. 63 However, in 2002, at
Fort Bragg, North Carolina, the tables turned and the recollection of veterans
suffering from mental health problems came to the forefront of everyone's
mind.64 Four husbands, who were in the Special Forces, murdered their
55. Id.; see also Charles S. Milliken et al., Longitudinal Assessment of Mental Health
Problems Among Active and Reserve Component Soldiers Returning from the Iraq War, 298
JAMA 2141, 2141 (2007). Military surveys, conducted once at 90 days upon return from
deployment and again at 120 days, revealed "that 38 percent of soldiers, 31 percent of Ma-
rines, 49 percent of Army National Guard members and 43 percent of Marine reservists re-
ported symptoms of PTSD, anxiety, depression or other problems." Tyson, supra note 54.
56. Milliken et al., supra note 55, at 2141.
57. Id. The percentage of active troops that showed signs of PTSD rose from 12% on the
initial screening to 17% at the second screening. Id. at 2143. The same trend happened for
guard troops and reservists. Id. Their numbers increased from 13% when leaving the war to
almost 25% while at home. Id.
58. See Milliken et al., supra note 55, at 2145, 2147.
59. Sontag & Alvarez, Across America, supra note 6.
60. Id.
61. Charles W. Hoge et al., Mental Health Problems, Use of Mental Health Services, and
Attrition from Military Service After Returning from Deployment to Iraq or Afghanistan, 295
JAMA 1023, 1023 (2006) [hereinafter Hoge et al., Mental Health Problems].
62. Sontag & Alvarez, Across America, supra note 6.
63. ILONA MEAGHER, MOVING A NATION TO CARE: POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER
AND AMERICA'S RETURNING TROOPS 20-21 (2007).
64. Id. at 21.
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wives upon return from Afghanistan.65 Three of the men committed suicide,
two by self-inflicted gun shot wounds, and the other by hanging.66 Follow-
ing the wave of combat zone suicides in 2003, the Army and Marines sent a
team of doctors to assess the reasons for these suicides, and in 2004, began
sending mental health personnel with every combat division being deployed
to provide help to the U.S. troops serving in OIF and OEF.67 The goal was to
treat the soldiers and return them to duty as quickly as possible.68 In re-
sponse to the Fort Bragg killings, Congress passed legislation in which the
protection orders for civilians on military bases were binding, and the Army
made changes which slowed the soldiers' transition from military life to civi-
lian life to aid in their adjustment.69 Since then, many reports assessing the
mental health treatment of American troops have been issued. 70 According
to the May 2007 Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, the number of
veterans in State and Federal prison increased by more than 50,000 between
1985 and 2000, but this number has decreased between 2000 to 2004 by
13,100 veterans.7 Although this statistic seems promising, the Bureau has
hypothesized that one reason behind this decline is that the decrease in num-
bers is directly proportional to the decline in the number of veterans current-
ly residing in the United States.72 Another contributing factor is that the
number of U.S. Armed Forces active duty personnel decreased by 34%.73
Moreover, although the prison population is comprised of more nonveterans
than veterans, veterans account for a greater percentage of the incarcerated
population with reference to violent crime.74 In State prison, where 57% of
veterans were violent offenders, less than half of nonveterans, 47%, were
65. Id.
66. Alvarez & Sontag, Strains on Military Families, supra note 13.
67. See MEAGHER, supra note 63, at 21.
68. Id.
69. Alvarez & Sontag, Strains on Military Families, supra note 13.
70. See, e.g., MARGARET E. NOONAN & CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT VETERANS IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISON, 2004 (2007), available
at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/vsfp04.pdf; OFFICE OF THE SURGEON MULTINATIONAL
FORCE-IRAQ & OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN. U.S. ARMY MED. COMMAND, MENTAL HEALTH
ADVISORY TEAM (MHAT) IV OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM 05-07 (2006); DEF. HEALTH BOARD
TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH, AN ACHIEVABLE VISION: REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH (2007) [hereinafter TASK FORCE]; INSPECTOR
GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., No. IE-2008-003, OBSERVATIONS AND CRITQUE OF THE DOD
TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH (2008) [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL].
71. NOONAN & MUMOLA, supra note 70, at 2.
72. Id. The United States' veteran population has decreased by virtually 3,500,000 since
1985. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 4.
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serving time for violent offenses.7 5 The same trend follows for veterans and
nonveterans in Federal prison.76 Veterans in State prison victimized females
and minors at a higher percentage rate, nearly 20% more, than nonveterans.
77
Finally, the veterans in State prison were more likely to be first time offend-
ers and have shorter criminal histories than nonveterans.78
IV. THE MENTAL TOLL OF THE BATTLEFIELD: POST-TRAUMATIC
STRESS DISORDER
A. Detailed Explanation of PTSD
The American Psychiatric Association (APA) formally recognized
PTSD as an official diagnosis in 1980 when the APA published the disorder
in their Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders II.79 Various
labels such as "soldier's heart, shell shock, Vietnam disorder," and combat
fatigue were used in earlier eras to describe the psychological injuries suf-
fered by members of the military. 80 PTSD is characterized as an anxiety dis-
order which can most succinctly be defined as "the reexperiencing of an ex-
tremely traumatic event accompanied by symptoms of increased arousal and
by avoidance of stimuli associated with the trauma.",8' The duration of
symptoms can be identified as either acute, which describes symptoms last-
ing less than three months, or chronic, in which the symptoms last for three
months or longer.82 There is typically a delayed onset between the traumatic
event and the manifestations of the disorder.83 The manifestations begin
once the stressor is removed and a period of relief follows.8n PTSD often
surfaces when a person encounters a situation which symbolizes or resem-
bles the original trauma." This stressor is often re-experienced by recurring
75. NOONAN & MUMOLA, supra note 70, at 4. Fifteen percent of veterans and 12% of
nonveterans were serving time for homicide, and 23% of veterans and 9% of nonveterans
were serving sentences for rape/sexual assault. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Ann R. Auberry, Comment, PTSD: Effective Representation of a Vietnam Veteran in
the Criminal Justice System, 68 MARQ. L. REv. 647, 649 & n.19 (1985).
80. Sontag & Alvarez, Across America, supra note 6.
81. AM. PSYCHIATRIC Ass'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 429 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
82. Id. at 465.
83. See Constantina Aprilakis, Note, The Warrior Returns: Struggling to Address Crimi-
nal Behavior by Veterans With PTSD, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 541,543-44 (2005).
84. Id. at 543.
85. Id.
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nightmares, distressing recollections, hallucinations, or dissociative flash-
backs.8
6
PTSD manifestations are classified within four behavioral motivations:
1) overreaction to perceived danger; 2) flashbacks during a dissociative state;
3) stimulation-seeking behavior; and 4) attempts to rid survivor's guilt by
engaging in dangerous activity.8" Most often these behavioral motivations
result in destructive actions by a veteran.88 Veterans suffering from PTSD,
especially those who experienced intense trauma, are hypersensitive to dan-
ger cues and in turn overreact to inconsequential threats.89 Often times
PTSD sufferers will apply greater force than necessary to a perceived threat,
and that force often results in perilous situations for others. 90 Other times,
veterans may get lost in a dissociative state, typically called a flashback.9 A
flashback causes distortions in reality with the surrounding setting or with
one's own body.92 When in this dissociative state one is inhibited from con-
sciously appraising his or her own actions or the actions of others. 93 Stres-
sors that are connected to the traumatic event in some way can bring forth
the flashback.94 For some veterans, benign stimuli such as car alarms or the
smell of cleaning chemicals could trigger a flashback.95 A veteran can re-
main in this dissociative state for as little as a couple minutes or for several
days at a time. 96 Other veterans suffering from PTSD may seek out stimula-
tion by changing their lifestyle or by engaging in risk taking behaviors such
as criminal activity and substance abuse. 97 The veterans who generally en-
gage in risk taking behavior are survivors of war living with the constant
86. DSM-IV, supra note 81, at 468.
87. Aprilakis, supra note 83, at 553.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Aprilakis, supra note 83, at 553-54.
93. See id.
94. Id. at 554.
95. See Lizette Alvarez. After the Battlefield, Fighting the Bottle at Home, N.Y. TIMES,
July 8, 2008, at Al [hereinafter Alvarez, After the Battlefield]. One veteran described the
experience:
Smells bring back the horror. "A barbecue pit-throw a stake on the grill, and it smells a lot
like searing flesh .... You go to get your car worked on, and if anyone is welding, the smell
of the burning metal is no different than burning caused by rounds fired at it. It takes you back
there instantly."
William M. Welch, Trauma of Iraq War Haunting Thousands Returning Home, USA TODAY,
Feb. 28, 2005, at Al.
96. Aprilakis, supra note 83, at 554.
97. Id. at 554-55.
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feeling of guilt and shame that they survived and others perished.98 Some
other reasons for seeking stimulation include overcoming anxiety and de-
pression; enlivening the exhilaration of combat; and counteracting the numb-
ing detached feeling they continue to experience since returning from war."
The effect that PTSD may have on troops serving in OIF and OEF, and
the veterans returning from these operations is of utmost concern." A his-
torically higher percentage of OIF and OEF veterans have taken the initiative
to sign up for Veterans Affairs (VA) health care.' An estimated 29% of
OEF and OIF veterans have registered compared to the 10% of registered
Vietnam veterans.'02 One study revealed that 13% of OEF and OlIF veterans
have been diagnosed with PTSD, a percentage much higher than the 3.5%
prevalence among the general U.S. population. 0 3 Another study, which ex-
amined the mental health impact that these operations have had on members
of the military, found that the estimated risk for PTSD from serving in Iraq is
18% and the estimated risk for PTSD from serving in Afghanistan is 11%.'04
A RAND Corporation study released in April 2008, found that around half of
the U.S. service members "who need treatment for PTSD seek it," and of the
service members who receive treatment, "only slightly more than half get
'minimally adequate care."' 10
5
The severity of the traumatic experiences from being in combat is high-
ly correlated with the risk of developing PTSD in the future.' 6 Many reports
reveal that members of the military are at an increased risk for developing
chronic PTSD as they become more involved in intense and frequent com-
bat.107 The component that lends itself to an almost inevitable development
of PTSD is the prolonged contact with trauma during extended tours." 8 One
study clearly sets out statistics which depicts the intensity of combat and
severity of traumatic experiences witnessed by members of the military.' 9
This study indicates that 95% of marines in Iraq reported being attacked or
ambushed, 97% were shot at or received small-arms fire, 94% saw dead bo-
98. Id. at 555.
99. Id.
100. See generally MEAGHER, supra note 63, at 123.
101. Seal et al., supra note 1, at 479.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 480.
104. Hoge et al., Barriers to Care, supra note 5, at 19 tbl.3.
105. Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1062-63 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
106. See Aprilakis, supra note 83, at 546.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See Hoge et. al, Barriers to Care, supra note 5, at 18 tbl.2.
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dies or remains, 87% knew someone who was critically injured or killed,
65% were responsible for the death of an enemy combatant and 28% for a
death of a noncombatant. "0
B. The Pentagon Investigation
The VA provides health care for 7.8 million enrollees nationwide."' A
Pentagon task force report addressed availability of professional care, policy,
training, and existing procedures."12 The task force report revealed that sev-
eral barriers exist which prevent veterans and current members of the mili-
tary from obtaining the appropriate care." 3 These barriers include stigma
related to seeking help from mental health providers, poor access to the men-
tal health care providers and appropriate facilities, and disruption in mental
health treatment as the members of the military are transferred to different
locations.'
"Stigma in the military remains pervasive" and consequently prevents
members of the military from accessing the necessary and appropriate
care." 5 The existing processes, which assess members of the military for
psychological disorders, "are insufficient to overcome the stigma inherent in
seeking mental health services."" 6 The subjects of a 2004 study were sol-
diers and marines who have already met the screening criteria for a mental
disorder.' '7 Of this subject pool, 50% believed that seeking mental health
services would harm their career, 59% believed that less confidence would
be instilled in them by members of their unit, 63% believed they would be
treated differently by their unit leaders, and 65% believed they would be
viewed as weak."8
After assessing military treatment facilities, TRICARE benefits for
mental health needs, people holding positions in the mental health care pro-
fession, and sufficiency of fiscal resources, the task force study found that
110. Id.
111. VA Benefits & Health Care Utilization (Oct. 27, 2008), http://wwwl.va.gov/vetdata/
docs/4X6_spring08_sharepoint.pdf.
112. INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 70, at 2.
113. Tyson, supra note 54.
114. Id.
115. INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 70, at 2. One marine who was later diagnosed with
PTSD explained, "I was trying to be the tough marine I was trained to be-not to talk about
problems, not to cry .... I imprisoned myself in my own mind." Alvarez, After the Battle-
field, supra note 95.
116. TASK FORCE, supra note 70, at ES-3.
117. See Hoge et. al, Barriers to Care, supra note 5, at 21 tbl.5.
118. Id.
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the number of people holding positions in the mental health care profession
is inadequate.119 Additionally, treatment facilities are unable to provide ade-
quate mental health care to members of the military and their families be-
cause of insufficient resources. 120 Veterans often face long waits to receive
appropriate care from mental health care professionals.' 2' Disappointingly,
there is also a shortage of active duty mental health professionals and the
number of health care professionals leaving the military is growing rapid-
ly.122 Twenty percent of mental health professionals in the Air Force re-
signed from active duty between 2003 and 2007.123 In addition, the percent
of active duty mental health professionals decreased by 15% and 8% for the
Navy and Army respectively. 12 4 In a Pentagon news conference, Donald
Arthur, co-chairman of the Department of Defense Mental Health Task
Force, stated, "Not since Vietnam have we seen this level of combat ....
With this increase in ... psychological need, we now find that we have not
enough providers in our system."'125 He further explained that post Vietnam,
this nation tragically learned too late that as time goes by, untreated mental
illness increases dramatically. 126  Seeing as history repeats itself and by
learning from past mistakes, action needs to be taken to adequately serve the
veterans' mental health needs. 27 Steve Robinson, a veteran from the Persian
Gulf War and Veterans for America spokesman stated:
The biggest message I want to say besides it's a tragedy for [a
soldier] asking for help and not getting it, is there are going to be
119. INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 70, at 4.
120. TASKFORCE, supra note 70, at ES-3.
121. See Daniel Zwerdling, Soldiers Say Army Ignores, Punishes Mental Anguish, NPR
Dec. 4, 2006, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=6576505. One soldier
explains that once he finally had the courage to seek help from the Army hospital they told
him he "had to wait a month and a half before [he could be] seen." Id. Another OIF veteran
described his feelings prior to seeking help, "I was on the verge of having a serious nervous
breakdown or seriously hurting someone ... It was getting to a point where the restraints I
had were slipping away." Don Terry, Bringing the War Home, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 3, 2008, at 8.
After seeing a psychiatrist on the Army base for thirty minutes, one soldier was prescribed an
antidepressant and sent on his way. Id. Not long after his first meeting with the psychiatrist
he finished his tour in Iraq and sought help at his army base where he checked "yes" on a
questionnaire as to whether he was suicidal or homicidal. Id. Even in the face of this answer,
the social worker explained to this veteran that he would have to wait a minimum of one
month before he could make an appointment to receive help from a therapist. Id.
122. TASK FORCE, supra note 70, at ES-3.
123. Tyson, supra note 54.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See generally id.
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more veterans having the courage to go for help and not getting it.
... It's the biggest betrayal, to seek the care that has been prom-
ised to you and be told to come back another day.
28
The task force report revealed insufficient continuity of care, gaps in
service, inadequate treatment plans and monitoring, and insufficient mechan-
isms for aiding family members.'29 The effectiveness of care is not measured
by an objective source and no universal method is in place to track patient
progress, especially when members are transitioned among providers. 130
Furthermore, feedback is rarely given to the service members who seek
treatment.'3 ' By not monitoring the effectiveness of mental health treatment
and making psychological assessments part of normal military life, members
of the military can easily terminate treatment unnoticed.'32
One final barrier depriving veterans from accessing adequate mental
health services is the denial of health care benefits due to a preexisting men-
tal health condition or due to a discharge on "less-than-honorable" terms. 33
When a veteran who is suffering from PTSD is later diagnosed with a perso-
nality disorder, the veterans are no longer eligible to receive the benefits and
care they need.' 31 Since 2001, over 22,500 members of the service were dis-
charged from the military due to a Personality Disorder diagnosis. 35 To be
eligible for benefits, a veteran must make a claim proving that his or her
"prior existing condition was aggravated or worsened by military service
which is difficult to do."'136 For service members suffering from PTSD, men-
128. Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, Concerns Mount Over Waiting Lists at Veterans Affairs
Mental Health Centers, FOXNEWS.coM, Feb. 13, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/
0,2933,251580,00.html.
129. INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 70, at 3.
130. Id. at4.
131. Id. at 3.
132. See id. at 4.
133. See Gregg Zoroya, Troubled Troops in No-Win Plight, USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 2006, at
Al; Kelly Kennedy, Why Were Soldiers With PTSD Discharged?, ARMY TIMES, Apr. 19,
2007, at 22, available at http://www.armytimes.com/news/2007/04/military-personality-
discharge_070419w/.
134. Kennedy, supra note 133. One soldiers explains:
I had obvious symptoms of PTSD, and I was going to do the medical evaluation board ....
But they sent me to psychiatrists who said I had a personality disorder .... My commander
told me it wouldn't affect my benefits .... [b]ut I lost everything, and had to pay the Army
$3,000 back because I re-enlisted and got a bonus. That's what I got for seven years of ser-
vice.
Id.
135. Press Release, House Veteran's Affairs Committee, "Personality Disorder": A Deli-
berate Misdiagnosis to Avoid Veterans' Health Care Costs! (July 25, 2007), available at
http://veterans.house.gov/news/PRArticle.aspx?NewsID=l 11.
136. Id. One journalist who interviewed soldiers expressed his suspicions:
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tal health benefits appear to be awarded to those who act on their best beha-
vior. 37 This notion is verified each time a veteran diagnosed with PTSD is
punished for engaging in behavior knowingly linked to PTSD, such as drink-
ing and drug abuse. 3 Once a service member is discharged because of less-
than-honorable behavior, their VA benefits are denied and they are prevented
from receiving adequate help to treat their combat stress.'3 9
V. STATES RESPOND TO THE INCREASED VIOLENCE
A. Insanity Defense and PTSD
PTSD has become judicially accepted in state courts where introduction
of evidence of PTSD in various mitigating circumstances has been permit-
ted. 4° The Supreme Court of Kansas notes that the majority of cases where
PTSD is asserted as a basis of an insanity defense are cases where "the de-
fendant has claimed he experienced a dissociative state at the time of the
crime, during which he believed he was back in Vietnam."' 14' However, most
instances of asserting PTSD as a basis for an insanity defense have failed due
to the difficulty of establishing "severe" mental distress at the time of the
offense. 1
42
Florida follows the M'Naghten Rule for determining insanity. "4' To be
legally insane under the M'Naghten Rule, "the defendant must have been
unable to understand the nature of his act or its consequences, or incapable of
"Recruits who have a severe, pre-existing condition like a Personality Disorder do not pass the
rigorous screening process and are not accepted into the army." [This journalist] interviewed
soldiers that passed the first screening and were accepted into the Army. "They were deemed
physically and psychologically fit in a second screening as well, before being deployed to Iraq,
and served honorably there in combat .... In each case, it was only when they came back
physically or psychologically wounded and sought benefits that their pre-existing condition
was discovered."
Id.
137. See Zoroya, supra note 133.
138. Id.
139. Id. One Lieutenant Colonel expressed his dissatisfaction with the military's actions
by stating: "'The Marine Corps has created these mental health issues' in combat veterans...
and then we just kind of kick them out into the streets."' Id.
140. See Masterson v. State, 516 So. 2d 256, 258 (Fla. 1987) (allowing evidence of PTSD
during sentencing as a mitigating factor); State v. Mizell, 773 So. 2d 618, 620 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2000) (allowing evidence of PTSD at a murder trial in support of a claim of self-
defense); Washington v. Bottrell, 14 P.3d 164, 169 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000) (allowing evidence
of PTSD to support a claim that defendant could not form specific intent to murder).
141. State v. DeMoss, 770 P.2d 441,444 (Kan. 1989).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Cartagena-Carrasquillo, 70 F.3d 706, 712 (1st Cir. 1995).
143. Reynolds v. State, 837 So. 2d 1044, 1048 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2002).
2009]
196
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss2/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
distinguishing right from wrong. ' "' The Supreme Court of Florida has es-
tablished that the mental disease, infirmity, or defect necessary to maintain a
defense under the M'Naghten Rule for insanity does not include abnormal
mental defects that do not impair the ability to distinguish between right and
wrong. 4 5 To distinguish from mitigating factors, insanity, if proven, excuses
a defendant from all responsibility for criminal acts.
146
PTSD as exculpatory evidence and the M'Naghten Rule for insanity
combined in Florida when Brian Christopher Wothers, an Iraq war veteran,
was charged with the murder of a twenty six year old construction worker. 147
Wothers argued, with the support of psychiatrists, that "he was having a
flashback when he shot and killed a man." '148 After a non-jury trial, Wothers
"was found not guilty by reason of insanity."'' 49 Instead of prison for murder,
Wothers was ordered to "live in a mental health treatment facility until he is
no longer" a societal threat. 50 Circuit Judge Kim C. Hammond, who pre-
sided over Wothers' trial, apparently determined that his conduct while act-
ing under the stress of military flashbacks brought him within the boundaries
of the M'Naghten standard.'
5
'
B. States Seek to Codify Protected Class
Other states have taken more proactive measures and "have passed laws
or begun programs to encourage alternative sentences, often including treat-
ment, for veterans with substance-abuse and mental-health problems."' 15 2 In
2007, almost half of the states in the country filed over fifty pieces of legisla-
tion to address these issues. 153 Of those states, "Colorado, Hawaii, Iowa,
Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New York, Texas, Utah and Wyoming enacted 23 bills,"'5 4 and laws have
been passed in California, Connecticut, and Minnesota. 55 California's law
144. Reese v. Wainwright, 600 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir. 1979).
145. Chestnut v. State, 538 So. 2d 820, 820 (Fla. 1989).
146. Spencer v. State, 889 So. 2d 868, 870 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
147. Sonis, supra note 8.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Alvarez, After the Battlefield, supra note 95.
153. National Council, supra note 10.
154. Id. In Maryland, Oregon, Texas, and West Virginia, six bills were denied. Id. As of
December 2007, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin were still
in session and thirteen bills were pending. Id.
155. Alvarez, After the Battlefield, supra note 95.
[Vol. 33
197
: Nova Law Review 33, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
THE WAR COMES HOME
gives judges the power to mandate veterans who have been convicted to
treatment instead of jail. 56 The sentencing guidelines are no longer applied
and the judge is given complete discretion.'57 The Minnesota courts tried to
push the law implemented in California further when they enacted a law that
allowed judges to send veterans on trial for criminal acts to treatment prior to
any decision being rendered. 5 ' However, after much "[oipposition from
prosecutors and victims advocates," the Minnesota law was rewritten to be
similar to the law in California. 159
VI. CONGRESS RESPONDS TO THE GROWING CRISIS
Unsatisfied with the VA's attempts, the absence of disability compensa-
tion and medical care the veterans deserve and need, and the lack of access to
mental health services, a veterans' advocacy group took their concerns a step
further when they filed a law suit against the VA.' 6° Two non-profit advoca-
cy groups, Veterans for Common Sense and Veterans United for Truth, are
dedicated to improving veterans' lives. 161 In July 2007, these two groups
filed suit against "the VA on behalf of 320,000 to 800,000 veterans who they
expect will seek treatment for [PTSD] by the end of the current wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan."' 162  Specifically, the groups wanted the court "to grant a
preliminary injunction that would force the VA to spend about $60 million to
provide immediate care to the roughly 600,000 veterans they say have pend-
156. Russell Carollo, Suspect Soldiers: Is There a Link Between Postwar Stress and
Crime?, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 14, 2008, at A16. The California Act specifically amended
legislation from 1982 to be sufficient for the returning OIF and OEF combat veterans. See
Assem. 2586, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2006). This Act recognized PTSD and the fact that a signifi-
cantly large number of service members retuning from combat are suffering from the disease.
Id. Moreover, the Act recognized that a significant amount of these veterans engaged in be-
haviors associated with their "misunderstood and untreated PTSD." Id. It was the intent of
the California Legislature to:
[E]xtend the opportunity for alternative sentencing to all combat veterans, regardless of where
or when those veterans served our country, when those veterans are found by the court to be
suffering from PTSD.... It is the intent of the Legislature to ensure that judges are aware that
a criminal defendant is a combat veteran with these conditions at the time of sentencing and to
be aware of any treatment programs that exist and are appropriate for the person at the time of
sentencing if a sentence of probation is appropriate.
Id.
157. Carollo, supra note 156.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See generally Veterans for Common Sense v. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d 1049 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
161. Id. at 1055.
162. Adam Gorlick, Group Sue for Veterans' Mental Health Care, DAILY J., Mar. 3, 2008,
at 1.
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ing claims." 163 The lawyer representing the two advocacy groups expressed,
"'There is a crushing caseload that the VA can't keep up with.... You could
easily wait 15 years before you get any treatment." '' 4 After reviewing all
items of relief asked for by the advocacy groups, the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California concluded that the grievances
were misdirected.'65 This court lacked jurisdiction to remedy "the problems,
deficiencies, delays and inadequacies complained of."' 66 Instead, the au-
thority to remedy this problem "lies with Congress, the Secretary of the De-
partment of VA, the adjudication system within the VA, and the Federal Cir-
cuit" Court.'6 7 Congress has entrusted the VA Secretary to handle decisions
pertaining to veterans' medical care. 168 Among the statutes that explain the
limited jurisdiction of the courts is 38 U.S.C. section 511.169 This section
states:
The Secretary shall decide all questions of law and fact necessary
to a decision ... by the Secretary to Veterans or the dependants or
survivors of veterans .... [T]he decision of the Secretary as to any
such question shall be final and conclusive and may not be re-
170viewed by any other official or by any court ....
A. History of Reintegration
"Throughout history, societies have made 'special efforts to protect or
restore the souls of their warriors during times of war."", 171 Soldiers found
163. Id.
164. Id. The advocate groups explain that like William Rogers, a veteran of the Persian
Gulf War who sought help multiple times and had his claims denied, too many veterans are
prevented from obtaining the help they need. Id. Not until fifteen years after he first sought
help and told his story, the same story, to every doctor, was William Rogers finally diagnosed
with PTSD. Id. William Rogers commented on his long and drawn out journey to finally
have someone take his problems seriously:
I just don't know why it was such a huge uphill battle.... If they don't do something to make
it easier for other people, there's going to be more veterans who are going to do drugs and al-
cohol. There are going to be more veterans on the street. And there will be more in prison. I
guarantee you that.
Gorlick, supra note 162.
165. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 1055.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.; 38 U.S.C. § 511 (2008).
170. Peake, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 1055 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 511(a) (2006)).
171. MEAGHER, supra note 63, at 122 (quoting EDWARD TICK, WAR AND THE SOUL:
HEALING OUR NATION'S VETERANS FROM POST-TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 17 (2005)).
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comfort in the rituals which, after completion, allowed them to feel welcome
in the communities they left and cleansed from all of the guilt resulting from
actions taken in war. t1 2 By taking part in such rituals with men who expe-
rienced the same trauma, soldiers felt comfortable reliving their battle expe-
riences without feeling vulnerable.173 Although most societies afford clean-
sing rituals to soldiers returning from war, most modem western societies
fail to provide such rituals to acknowledge the soldiers' importance.'7 4 The
contemporary western society's idea of reintegrating soldiers back into the
community is a "Welcome Home" parade, which shows the community's
support but leaves the soldier without a method for decompression.
17 1
Providing soldiers with a method of decompression allows for an easier
transition from military life back to civilian life. 7 6 In the absence of such
methods, veterans may brood over their guilt and emptiness which in turn
increases the soldiers' risk for developing PTSD. 177  One major lesson
learned from the years following the Vietnam War was that denying a sol-
dier's need for societal acceptance is a critical mistake. 78 In an attempt to
learn from mistakes made after the Vietnam War, legislation is being drafted
to try to prevent the same mistakes from being made. 79
172. Id. (quoting RICHARD A. GABRIEL, No MoRE HEROES: MADNESS AND PSYCHIATRY IN
WAR, 155-56 (1988)).
173. Id. Cleansing rituals date back to 1879 when Zulu fighters, "'underwent many days
of cleansing before they were free enough of their contagious pollution to be permitted to
present themselves to King Cetshwayo at the royal kraal."' Id. at 122-23 (quoting ROBERT B.
EDGERTON, LIKE LIONS THEY FOUGHT: THE ZULU WAR AND THE LAST BLACK EMPIRE IN
SOUTH AFRICA 45 (1988)).
174. Id. at 123.
175. MEAGHER, supra note 63, at 123.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. Veterans returning to a life with "'little acknowledgment and much misunders-
tanding by their families and society at large"' may have been a contributing factor to many
soldiers' diagnosis of PTSD. Id. at 123-24 (quoting David Read Johnson et al., The Impact of
the Homecoming Reception on the Development of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: The West
Haven Homecoming Stress Scale (WHHSS), 10 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 259,261 (1997)).
179. See, e.g., H.R. Res. 1098, 110th Cong. (2008); Veterans' Mental Health and Other
Care Improvements Act of 2008, S. 2162, 110th Cong.; National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 1585, 110th Cong. (2007).
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B. A Good Step: The Veterans' Mental Health and Other Care Im-
provements Act of 2008
On June 3, 2008 the United States Senate passed the Veterans' Mental
Health and Other Care Improvements Act of 2008.180 The "'bill is for Justin
Bailey, a young veteran of the Iraq war who died tragically while under VA
care"' where he was receiving treatment for PTSD and a substance use dis-
order, "'and all veterans who suffer with invisible wounds because of their
service to this Nation,"' stated U.S. Senator, Daniel Akaka, when he an-
nounced that the Senate unanimously consented to the bill being passed.18'
In his press release, Senator Akaka further commented:
Returning home from battle does not necessarily bring an end to
conflict. Service members return home, but the war often follows
them in their hearts and minds. Their invisible wounds are com-
plicated and wide-ranging, and we must provide all possible assis-
tance .... Solid and reliable information is critical to our under-
standing of the issues.'82
This bill addresses several vital issues facing U.S. veterans. 183 The Vet-
erans' Mental Health and Other Care Improvements Act of 2008 consists of
seven major components: 1) Health Care Matters; 2) Pain Care; 3) Sub-
stance Use Disorders and Mental Health Care; 4) Mental Health Accessibili-
ty Enhancements; 5) Mental Health Research; 6) Assistance for Families of
Veterans; and 7) Homeless Veterans Matters. 1"4 Of focus for this note are
components three, four, five, and six.
1. Addressing Substance Use Disorders and Mental Health Care
Section 301 acknowledges the comorbidity of substance abuse with sui-
cide, mental disorders, deterioration of family support, and heightened risk
for unemployment and homelessness. 85 This provision also recognizes that
"[w]hile the Veterans Health Administration has dramatically increased
health services for veterans from 1996 through 2006, the number of veterans
180. Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Veterans Affairs, Senate Passes Veterans'
Mental Health Care Improvements (June 3, 2008), available at http:llwww.senate.gov/
-veterans/public/index.cfm?pageid=12&releaseid= 11733.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. See id.
184. Veterans' Mental Health Act, S. 2162, § 101-705.
185. Id. § 301(2).
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receiving specialized substance abuse treatment services decreased 18 per-
cent during that time." 186 In response to the inadequate treatment received by
veterans, section 302 ensures that veterans enrolled in the VA's health care
system who seek treatment will be guaranteed appropriate care. 187 For veter-
ans suffering from comorbid disorders of both substance use and a mental
health disorder, section 303 ensures that treatment for the comorbid disorders
will be provided for concurrently by a licensed professional with training and
expertise in the treatment of both disorders. 88 Of most relevance, section
304 requires the Secretary to establish at least "six national centers of excel-
lence on [PTSD] and substance use disorders" for the purpose of "inpatient
or residential treatment and recovery services for veterans diagnosed with
both [PTSD] and a substance use disorder."'89 In addition the Secretary must
"conduct a review of all residential mental health care facilities, including
domiciliary facilities, of the Veterans Health Administration; and not later
than two years after... the completion of the review.., conduct a follow-up
review.'
190
2. Mental Health Accessibility Enhancements
Section 401 of this Act requires the Secretary to carry out a three year
"pilot program to assess the feasibility and advisability of providing" peer
outreach services, peer support services, readjustment counseling services,
and other services pertaining to mental health of OIF and OEF veterans.' 9'
For veterans living in rural areas and who cannot adequately access the ser-
186. Id. § 301(4). In the 1990's the VA cutback "its alcohol and drug-abuse services" for
veterans, leaving only a few programs for extreme addicts, because the veteran population was
relatively low during those years. See Alvarez, After the Battlefield, supra note 95. Veterans
living in rural areas where the clinics are smaller have trouble obtaining the help they need
because these smaller clinics only offer the bare-minimum when it comes to treatment, if any
treatment is even offered. Id.
187. Veterans' Mental Health Act, S. 2162 § 302. Each veteran should receive: "(1)
Short term motivational counseling services; (2) Intensive outpatient or residential care ser-
vice; (3) Relapse prevention services; (4) Ongoing aftercare and outpatient counseling servic-
es; (5) Opiate substitution therapy services; (6) Pharmacological treatments aimed at reducing
craving for drugs and alcohol; (7) Detoxification and stabilization services; (8) Such other
services as the Secretary considers appropriate." Id.
188. Id. § 303.
189. Id. § 304. These centers will collaborate with the National Center for PTSD on all
current research. Id.
190. Veterans' Mental Health Act, S. 2162 § 305. The Secretary is required to submit a
report to the veterans' committees following the initial review. Id.
191. Id. § 401. This pilot program is interested in focusing on National Guard members or
Reserve members. Id. The peer support to be provided will be given by licensed providers or
veterans who have experienced mental illness before. Id.
2009]
202
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss2/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
vices, the Secretary will ensure that such services will be provided by com-
munity mental health centers or through the Indian Health Service. 192 This
program requires the mental health centers to report to the Secretary all clini-
cal information on every veteran seeking help from the mental health cen-
ter.193 The Secretary must carry out training programs for all clinicians who
will work in any of the mental health centers to guarantee that all clinicians
can provide adequate services. 94 The clinicians must be trained to respond
to the unique experiences of all veterans deployed to serve in OIF or OEF on
active duty, and must be able to counsel in a manner that takes these special
factors into consideration. 195 Each center must submit an annual report in-
cluding the number of veterans treated, the types of treatment provided, and
the "demographic information for such services, diagnoses, and courses of
treatment."'' 96 The Secretary must assess the impact that the implementation
of these mental health programs had on veterans and whether such imple-
mentation affected veterans' mental health needs.' 97
3. Mental Health Research
Section 501 mandates that a program be created to research the comor-
bidity of PTSD and substance use disorder.' 98 The National Center for Post-
traumatic Stress Disorder (NCPTSD) will be conducting the research.' 99
Through this program the NCPTSD will develop goals for the program and
will research the comorbidity of the disorders, the integration of treatment
involving both disorders, and will develop protocols to assess the care veter-
ans with these disorders are receiving.2°
192. Veterans' Mental Health Act, S. 2162 § 401(b)(1)-(2).
193. Id. § 401(a)(2).
194. Id. § 401(h)(1)-(2).
195. Id.
196. Id. § 401(i)(l)-(2).
197. See Veterans' Mental Health Act, S. 2162 § 401(j). The Secretary must assess the:
Access to mental health care by veterans in need of such care; the use of telehealth services by
veterans for mental health care needs; the quality of mental health care and substance use dis-
order treatment services provided to veterans in need of such care and services; and the coor-
dination of mental health care and other medical services provided to veterans.
Id. § 401(j)(2)(A)-(D).
198. Id. § 501(a).
199. Id. § 501(b).
200. Id.
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4. Assistance for Families of Veterans
In a sign of progress, section 602 describes "a pilot program to assess
the feasibility and advisability of providing readjustment and transition assis-
tance ... to veterans and their families., 201 This pilot program will be lead
by a non-VA entity and entail "[r]eadjustment and transition assistance that
is preemptive, proactive, and principle-centered., 20 2 Veterans and their fami-
lies will learn to cope with everyday difficulties and confrontations related to
transitioning back to civilian life from life in the military. °3
C. National Defense Authorization Act for 2008
On October 1, 2007, Congress passed the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act for Fiscal Year 2008.2" As part of this Act, section 1611 discusses
how members of the armed forces will be provided the care they need, and
transitions will be made easier when the service members return from war. °5
This Act focuses on service members currently in active duty and the veter-
ans who have recently returned.20 6 One goal of this comprehensive plan is to
implement "[p]rocesses, procedures, and standards for" service members to
have a smoother transition between the care they receive from the Depart-
ment of Defense and the treatment they will receive from the Department of
Veterans Affairs.20 7 The Secretary of Defense will ensure that the family
members of service members will readily have access to "medical care and
counseling., 20 8 Section 1631 requires the Secretary of Defense to submit a
plan "to prevent, diagnose, mitigate, treat, and otherwise respond to traumat-
ic brain injury (TBI) and [PTSD]."2 °9 Goals for this section are to identify
gaps in the Department of Defense's current capabilities to prevent, diag-
nose, mitigate, treat, and rehabilitate service members suffering from PTSD,
improve the methods of detecting and treating PTSD, further research on the
201. Veterans' Mental Health Act, S. 2162 § 602(a).
202. Id. § 602(b)(1).
203. Id. § 602(b)(2).
204. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, H.R. 1585, 110th
Cong. (2007).
205. See id. § 1611.
206. Id.
207. Id. § (a)(D)(i). The transition should be "[a] uniform, patient-focused policy to en-
sure that the transition occurs without gaps in medical care and the quality of medical care,
benefits, and services." Id. Cooperation between the case managers from each site is guaran-
teed to aid in this transition. National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 1585 § 161 l(a)(D)(ii).
208. Id. § 1626(a)(3).
209. Id. § 1631(a).
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disorder, and develop uniform criteia for the disorder which will "be em-
ployed uniformly across the military departments. 2 ° In addition, the means
of detecting, assessing, and monitoring service members with PTSD will be
more developed and effective, and an awareness training program on PTSD
will be established to reduce the stigma related to the disorder and treat-
ment.
211
Also under this Act, a program for all service members suffering from
PTSD will be implemented ensuring that all members will:
[B]e provided the highest quality of care possible based on the
medical judgment of qualified medical professionals in facilities
that most appropriately meet the specific needs of the individual;
and be rehabilitated to the fullest extent possible using the most
up-to-date medical technology, medical rehabilitation practices,
and medical expertise available.
212
Furthermore, Section 1691 of this Act reveals that further study will
commence "on the physical and mental health and other readjustment needs
of members and former members of the Armed Forces who deployed in
[OIF] or [OEF] and their families as a result of such deployment. '213 The
study consists of two phases. 1 4 The first phase will assess all service mem-
bers' current "physical and mental health and other readjustment needs."2 5
The second phase includes the administration of a comprehensive assessment
of the same needs on the same subject pool, but also will include:
[A]n assessment of the psychological, social, and economic im-
pacts of ... deployment . . . ; an assessment of the particular im-
pacts of multiple deployments.. . ; an assessment of the effects of
undiagnosed injuries such as [PTSD] .... an estimate of the long-
term costs associated with such injuries, and an assessment of the
efficacy of screenings and treatment approaches for [PTSD] and
other mental health conditions within the Department of Defense
and Department of Veterans Affairs.
216
Reports on "the completion of each phase of the study" and preliminary
plans addressing the finding in each report will be exchanged between the
210. Id. § 1631(b)(5), (11).
211. Id. § 1631(b)(8).
212. National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 1585 § 1631(b)(16)(B)(i)-(ii).
213. Id. § 1691(a).
214. Id. § 1691(b).
215. Id. § 1691(b)(1)(A).
216. Id. § 1691(b)(2) (A)-(B), (D).
[Vol. 33
205
: Nova Law Review 33, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2009
THE WAR COMES HOME
National Academy of Sciences and the Department of Defense and Depart-
ment of Veterans Affairs. 7 Congress will then receive a report from the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Veterans Affairs on the established
joint plan."'
D. Getting the American People Involved in the Solution
In an effort to make the transition from military life to civilian life one
which is less jarring, the House of Representatives passed a resolution en-
couraging Americans to take a more proactive approach.2 '9 This resolution
recognizes that there are over 25,000,000 veterans living in the United States
221and every veteran has honorably served and sacrificed for our country.
Through this resolution, the House of Representatives hopes to show that the
American people truly appreciate all sacrifices made by veterans from all
wars by:
(1) [E]ncourag[ing] the American people to recognize and ac-
knowledge the sacrifices the American veteran demonstrates in the
name of freedom; (2) encourag[ing] the education of the American
people on the many great contributions of the American veteran to
American society; and (3) [showing] support[] [of] the goals and
ideals of the Year of the American Veteran.22'
VII. THE WAY FORWARD: THE REGULATORY SCHEME THAT MUST BE
ESTABLISHED
Americans demonstrate great pride and patriotism when speaking of
those who serve in the armed forces. Often, domestic political debates re-
garding war and foreign policy turn into competitions of who can paint the
opponent as someone who disparages the military and the brave men and
women in the war zone. However, common sense tells us that individual
soldiers do not decide whether to go to war, but rather are ordered to go by
elected officials. American citizens do not individually decide whether to
engage in military conflict, but elect those who do every election cycle.
While there is no doubt that Americans take great pride in those that volun-
teer to serve, our pride and proclamation of undying support for our military
men and women is grossly misplaced. Criticizing a decision to engage in a
217. See National Defense Authorization Act, H.R. 1585 § 1691(f).
218. Id. § 1691(g)(4).
219. See H.R. Res. 1098, 110th Cong. (2008).
220. Id.
221. Id.
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war does not criticize those men and women who bravely serve any more
than flying an American flag above a garage door supports them. While
citizens of this country try to demonstrate military pride on both sides of the
political spectrum, American citizens caught up in the fighting have failed to
support our military veterans and active duty soldiers in the most important
way that they can. While troops may be greeted with homecoming parades
and Congressmen may repeatedly express their love for those in uniform,
Congress and the American citizenry have largely abandoned our soldiers in
their toughest battle once they return home, coping with the extraordinary
mental readjustment to civilian life and suppressing horrifying battlefield
images. Congress must act quickly to implement a new approach and regula-
tory scheme to avoid the tragic consequences that they have failed to learn
from after the Vietnam War.
Congress has taken an important step in moving towards a proper rein-
tegration and treatment program in the Veterans Mental Health and Other
Care Improvements Act of 2008. But Congress must do more than just im-
plement a pilot program regarding reintegration and treatment. Such practic-
es must be made mandatory as soon as possible for both returning combat
soldiers and veterans who have already returned and reintegrated back into
society. If soldiers returned from the battlefield with a treatable but highly
contagious and dangerous physical ailment, the solution would be clear.
Quarantine would be necessary to avoid the dangers of such an ailment to the
general population, and to effectuate the proper treatment of those affected.
It is important to recognize mental disorders, such as PTSD, as treatable
conditions with dangerous consequences to the general public. It is impera-
tive to treat all returning servicemen and women for battlefield mental condi-
tions before a full reintegration into society takes place. Only then can prop-
er treatment be offered without risk to the unsuspecting public.
Availability of resources and treatment options is simply not enough.
The very culture of the military makes it unlikely for suffering soldiers to
seek mental health treatment at the risk of being stigmatized by their fellow
soldiers. Additionally, many soldiers fail to acknowledge the need for treat-
ment and consider such thoughts as signs of weakness. A uniform and man-
datory screening and treatment program will abolish all effects of stigmatiza-
tion and launch a period where such treatment is simply a normal step in the
reintegration process for all soldiers. Such a feeling of normalcy will likely
increase cooperation by soldiers and lead to more effective treatment overall.
Additionally, Congress and the military must cooperate to fill a danger-
ous gap in military medical benefits. Discharged soldiers, such as Chris
Packley, who was expelled from the Marines for misconduct after he left the
base without permission and took other steps to escape the mental trauma of
the battlefield, lost all access to free counseling and medication needed to
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treat those very mental traumas that led to discharge.222 Congress and the
military must acknowledge this issue, and mandate that soldiers discharged
due to an underlying mental ailment suffered during active duty continue to
receive mandatory treatment as if no discharge occurred.
States have begun to establish a dangerous precedent and are beginning
to carve out a "class of privileged offenders. 223 In Florida, extending PTSD
suffered in the war zone from a mitigating factor during sentencing to a basis
for acquittal of murder charges establishes a means for an entire class of de-
fendants to commit violent crimes with little consequence. Other states have
taken efforts to codify such an approach, eliminating mandatory sentencing
for criminal acts committed by war veterans suffering from PTSD. State
legislatures recognize the responsibility in failing to offer adequate treatment
to war veterans, but excusing criminal conduct to an entire class of potential
defendants is unconscionable and leaves an entire class of innocent victims
without proper closure to violent crimes. Instead of protecting a class from
prosecution out of guilt, the government, including the states, must take
proactive measures to eliminate the problem from the source. Adequate
mandatory treatment may substantially reduce the occurrences of violent
crimes from war veterans. Such an approach will truly demonstrate society's
concern for war veterans' well-being and safeguard potential victims from
violence.
VIII. CONCLUSION
For many years, and throughout many military conflicts, Congress and
state governments have taken a passive approach regarding the reintegration
of combat veterans into society. Today, an extraordinary number of war
veterans suffer from untreated mental disorders, which often manifest them-
selves in violent ways on city streets. States, taking a sympathetic approach
to the plight of America's heroes, began to establish an entire class of crimi-
nal defendants to which the laws of justice would not apply. Extending ap-
plicability of the insanity defense, and actually codifying PTSD as a criminal
excuse into law, establishes a system where violent crimes against innocent
victims are foreseeable and yet excused, with justice for victims unattainable.
While the sympathy for war veterans is justified, policies of avoiding prose-
cution are unconscionable to the victims who suffer. While Congress has
shown signs in recent years to implement mandatory treatment programs, no
regulatory schemes so far enacted are nearly sufficient to deal with this ma-
222. Zoroya, supra note 133.
223. Sonis, supra note 8.
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jor crisis. As Americans who love to show support for the men and women
in uniform, it is time to establish the proper legal framework to carry out that
support by offering protection from the evils of the battlefield that follow
them home.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Both parents love their child, perhaps the problem is that they show that
love in very different ways. He works hard every day to support his family.
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He knows that by doing this, he sacrifices time with his child. He misses out
on the daily routines and even some bedtime stories. But in his eyes, he be-
lieves that being able to provide opportunities for his child, is taking care of
his child. This is the way he shows his love for his child. She stays home
every day and takes care of her child. She knows all the child's favorite
things and is involved in every aspect of her child's life. She helps her child
with homework, cooks for her child, and plays with her child. She sacrifices
working outside the home so that she can devote herself to being available to
her child. This is the way she shows her love for her child.
One day, this arrangement no longer works for this family and the par-
ents decide to get a divorce. This is a clear portrait of so many families. But
what happens after the parents dissolve the marriage? Should one parent be
entitled to more time and more rights regarding the child simply because
they have spent more time with the child? Or should any parent who desires
equal time and access to his or her child be automatically given such things?
Unfortunately, the way a parent has shown love for his or her child in the
past, can effectively determine how much time he or she will get to spend
with that child in the future.
This comment provides a critical analysis of the recently enacted Flori-
da Senate Bill 2532.' It begins with a brief look at the history and evolution
of child custody determinations, with a special emphasis placed on such de-
cisions in Florida. The following section is an introduction of Florida Senate
Bill 2532 and a discussion of how it significantly changes and reshapes the
statutes governing child custody in Florida.2 Next, the comment addresses
the practical implications of Florida Senate Bill 2532 and questions whether
it preserves a longstanding bias against fathers.3 Following that, the article
explores the difficulty involved in modifying child custody arrangements.
Finally, this comment proposes a solution to the injustice that seems inherent
in child custody disputes: one that promotes parental equality and is truly in
the best interests of the child.
It deserves mention that the following analysis is predicated upon the
assumption that the parents are competent, capable, and fit parents who de-
sire equal access to their child. Following that assumption, customarily,
mothers are more likely to stay home with the child, while fathers typically
work outside the home.4 The statutory bias that exists in many child custody
1. Act effective Oct. 1, 2008, ch. 2008-61, 2008 Fla. Laws 439-481 (codified as
amended in scattered subsections of FLA. STAT. § 61 (2008)).
2. Id.
3. See id.
4. ELEANOR E. MACCOBY ET AL., DIVIDING THE CI-LD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS
OF CUSTODY 282 (1992).
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disputes is directed against the parent who works outside the home, and thus
the practical effect perpetuates the bias against fathers due to the traditional
roles held by men and women.5 If the mother worked outside the home, the
bias would affect her.6 Consequently, the pursuit of parental equality is often
thwarted by the conventional gender norms associated with child rearing.
II. HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS
Historically, under Roman law, women "had no legal rights" to their
children.7 Fathers retained exclusive control and custody over children as
they were simply regarded as the father's property.8 This concept was
known as the chattel rule,9 and continued through early English common
law.10 The courts upheld this notion that fathers had superior rights to their
children, and often awarded custody to them. 1 In Busbee v. Weeks, 2 the
father gave the care of his three day old daughter to the child's maternal
grandparents after the mother died during childbirth. 3 The grandparents
were to keep the child until the father could properly care for her. 14 Despite
the fact that the girl, who was then four years old, had been cared for by her
grandparents, the Supreme Court of Florida awarded the father custody after
he showed that he was able to care for her with the support of his parents,
with whom he was living. 5 The Court stated "[alt common law the father
has the paramount right to the custody and control of his legitimate minor
children.'
16
It was not until the early nineteenth century that a custodial preference
favoring mothers emerged.' 7 This transfer of legal preference was founded
upon the idea that mothers were better suited to raise young children than
fathers.'8 In Fields v. Fields,'9 the husband's father was initially awarded
5. See id. at 283.
6. See id.
7. JONATHAN W. GOULD & DAVID A. MARTINDALE, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF CHILD
CUSTODY EVALUATIONS 34 (2007).
8. Id.
9. ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD
CUSTODY, AND MEDIATION 73 (1994).
10. GOULD & MARTINDALE, supra note 7, at 34.
11. See id.
12. 85 So. 653 (Fla. 1920).
13. Id. at 653.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. EMERY, supra note 9, at 73.
18. Id.
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custody of his three minor children.2' However, noting the young age of the
children, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida amended the decree and
awarded custody to the mother.2' The Court's rationale was influenced by a
decision rendered by the Supreme Court of Alabama, which held that moth-
ers were more capable to care for infants and children of a tender age.22 This
presumption became known as "the tender years doctrine ' 23 and was virtual-
ly unchallenged as the standard in child custody decisions until the 1960s.24
During this time, the tender years presumption was heavily criticized for its
bias towards women. As a result, the National Conference of Commission-
ers created the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, which gave birth to the
standard which is still applied today, the best interests of the child standard. 6
This new standard was implemented to shift the focus toward the best inter-
ests of the child, with no judicial preference given to either parent.27
Under Florida law, child custody has been primarily governed by sta-
tute.28 In the determination of child custody and visitation rights, the court
would designate one parent as the primary residential parent. 29 This power-
ful label described "the parent with whom the child maintains his or her pri-
mary residence."3 The other parent would be labeled as the noncustodial
parent.3' The noncustodial parent's contact with the child would be referred
to as visitation.32 Throughout the country, "there is [a] bias in the courts for
designating one parent as the 'primary parent"' regardless of whether the
parenting responsibilities are shared.33 Many critics have noted that this type
of statutory language attaches a negative stigma to the noncustodial parent
19. 197 So. 530 (Fla. 1940).
20. Id. at 530-31.
21. Id. at 531.
22. Id. (citing Gayle v. Gayle, 125 So. 638,639 (Ala. 1930)).
23. GOULD & MARTINDALE, supra note 7, at 34.
24. Id. at 35.
25. Id.
26. Dana E. Prescott, Machiavelli and a Unified Theory of Economic Parental Responsi-
bility: A Proposed Statute, 12 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 95, 105-06 (1999).
27. GOuLD & MARTINDALE, supra note 7, at 34.
28. See generally FLA. STAT. § 61 (2007) (scattered subsections amended by Act effec-
tive Oct. 1, 2008, ch. 2008-61, 2008 Fla. Laws 439-481).
29. See FLA. STAT. § 61.046(3) (2007), amended by Act effective Oct. 1, 2008, ch. 2008-
61, § 2, 2008 Fla. Laws 439, 440.
30. Id.
31. Id. § 61.046(12), amended by Act effective Oct. 1, 2008, ch. 2008-61, § 2, 2008 Fla.
Laws 439,441.
32. See id. § 61.13(4)(a), amended by Act effective Oct. 1, 2008, ch. 2008-61, § 8(4)(a),
2008 Fla. Laws 439, 448; see also EMERY, supra note 9, at 72.
33. JOHN HARTSON & BRENDA PAYNE, CREATING EFFECTIVE PARENTING PLANS: A
DEVELOPMENTAL APPROACH FOR LAWYERS AND DIVORCE PROFESSIONALS 5 (2006).
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who has been assigned a secondary status with a right to merely visit his or
her own child. 4 As a result, many states' legislatures have amended this
type of language in an attempt to minimize the negative connotations asso-
ciated with the terminology of most child custody statutes.35
III. FLORIDA SENATE BILL 2532: A PLAN FOR CHANGE
Recently, Florida Senate Bill 2532 was enacted into law and will signif-
icantly change child custody determinations in Florida.36 Florida Senate Bill
2532 deletes the outdated terminology and definitions associated with cus-
todial parent, primary residential parent,37 and noncustodial parent.38 In an
effort to promote shared parental responsibility, those labels have been re-
moved from the statute,39 and the terms primary residence, custody, and visi-
tation have been replaced with the term "parenting plan."4
"Parenting plan" means a document created to govern the relation-
ship between the parties relating to the decisions that must be
made regarding the minor child and shall contain a time-sharing
schedule for the parents and child. The issues concerning the mi-
nor child may include, but are not limited to, the child's education,
health care, and physical, social, and emotional well-being. In
creating the plan, all circumstances between the parties, including
the parties' historic relationship, domestic violence, and other fac-
tors must be taken into consideration.41
If the parents cannot agree on a parenting plan, the court will create a custo-
mized parenting plan to establish the rights and responsibilities of each par-
ent.42 The parenting plan must consist of a detailed account of each parent's
responsibility of daily activities, a time-sharing schedule which arranges
exactly how much time each parent will spend with the child, and a determi-
nation of which parent will be responsible for decisions regarding the minor
34. EMERY, supra note 9, at 72; see also HARTSON & PAYNE, supra note 33, at 5.
35. EMERY, supra note 9, at 72.
36. See generally Act effective Oct. 1, 2008, ch. 2008-61, 2008 Fla. Laws 439-481
(codified as amended in scattered subsections of FLA. STAT. § 61 (2008)).
37. Id. § 2, 2008 Fla. Laws at 440 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.046(3) (2007)).
38. Id. § 2, 2008 Fla. Laws at 441 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.046(12) (2007)).
39. See id. § 8(2)(c)1, 2008 Fla. Laws at 445-46 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2)(b)
(2007)).
40. Id. § 3(3), 2008 Fla. Laws at 442 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.052(3) (2007)).
41. Ch. 2008-61, § 2(13), 2008 Fla. Laws at 441 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.046 (2007)).
42. Id.
20091
214
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss2/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33
child.43 Additionally, the specifically designed parenting plan must be in the
best interests of the child.' It must be noted that the best interests of the
child standard has often been criticized for being overly vague, discretionary,
and producing unpredictable outcomes.45
A. The Best Interest of Whom?
The best interests of the child standard is subjective and as such, there is
no scientific way to determine which type of parenting plan will truly benefit
the child.46 As a result, "different judges employ different ideas about the
best child-rearing strategies and/or the most relevant parenting values, yield-
ing a court system in which each judge defines his or her own version" of the
best interests of the child standard.47 In order to assist judges in establishing
a proper parenting plan, Florida Senate Bill 2532 introduces several new
factors that must be evaluated by the court in order to determine the best
interests of the child.48 Specifically, several new factors to be considered by
43. Id. § 8(2)(b), 2008 Fla. Laws at 445 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2) (2007)).
44. Id. § 8(3), 2008 Fla. Laws at 446 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (2007)).
45. GOULD & MARTINDALE, supra note 7, at 32; see also EMERY, supra note 9, at 74.
46. See GOULD & MARTINDALE, supra note 7, at 32.
47. Id. at 37.
48. Ch. 2008-61, § 8(3)(a)-(t), 2008 Fla. Laws at 446-48 (amending FLA. STAT. §
61.13(3) (2007)). The complete list of factors that must be evaluated by the court include:
(a) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to facilitate and encourage a
close and continuing parent-child relationship, to honor the time-sharing schedule, and to be
reasonable when changes are required. (b) The anticipated division of parental responsibilities
after the litigation, including the extent to which parental responsibilities will be delegated to
third parties. (c) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to determine, con-
sider, and act upon the needs of the child as opposed to the needs or desires of the parent. (d)
The length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment and the desirability
of maintaining continuity. (e) The geographic viability of the parenting plan, with special at-
tention paid to the needs of school-age children and the amount of time to be spent traveling to
effectuate the parenting plan. This factor does not create a presumption for or against reloca-
tion of either parent with a child. (f) The moral fitness of the parents. (g) The mental and
physical health of the parents. (h) The home, school, and community record of the child. (i)
The reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient intelli-
gence, understanding, and experience to express a preference. (j) The demonstrated know-
ledge, capacity, and disposition of each parent to be informed of the circumstances of the mi-
nor child, including, but not limited to, the child's friends, teachers, medical care providers,
daily activities, and favorite things. (k) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each
parent to provide a consistent routine for the child, such as discipline, and daily schedules for
homework, meals, and bedtime. (1) The demonstrated capacity of each parent to communicate
with and keep the other parent informed of issues and activities regarding the minor child, and
the willingness of each parent to adopt a unified front on all major issues when dealing with
the child. (m) Evidence of domestic violence, sexual violence, child abuse, child abandon-
ment, or child neglect, regardless of whether a prior or pending action relating to those issues
has been brought. (n) Evidence that either parent has knowingly provided false information to
the court regarding any prior or pending action regarding domestic violence, sexual violence,
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the court are highly presumptuous and could potentially continue a custodial
preference for mothers.49 According to Florida Senate Bill 2532, one of the
new factors the court must consider in determining the best interests of the
child is "[t]he demonstrated knowledge, capacity, and disposition of each
parent to be informed of the circumstances of the minor child, including, but
not limited to, the child's friends, teachers, medical care providers, daily ac-
tivities, and favorite things."5 Another factor the court must now consider is
"[t]he demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to provide a con-
sistent routine for the child, such as discipline, and daily schedules for
homework, meals, and bedtime."'" The court must also consider "[t]he par-
ticular parenting tasks customarily performed by each parent and the division
of parental responsibilities before the institution of litigation and during the
pending litigation., 52 Are these factors present to ensure that the best inter-
ests of the child are met, or have they been included to facilitate the pre-
sumed best interests of the parents?53 Often in child custody decisions, there
is an assumption that whatever arrangement is "best for the parents" must be
"best for the child."5 4 This type of thinking neglects what should be the
court's primary concern-the needs of the child.
child abuse, child abandonment, or child neglect. (o) The particular parenting tasks customari-
ly performed by each parent and the division of parental responsibilities before the institution
of litigation and during the pending litigation, including the extent to which parenting respon-
sibilities were undertaken by third parties. (p) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of
each parent to participate and be involved in the child's school and extracurricular activities.
(q) The demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to maintain an environment for
the child which is free from substance abuse. (r) The capacity and disposition of each parent to
protect the child from the ongoing litigation as demonstrated by not discussing the litigation
with the child, not sharing documents or electronic media related to the litigation with the
child, and refraining from disparaging comments about the other parent to the child. (s) The
developmental stages and needs of the child and the demonstrated capacity and disposition of
each parent to meet the child's developmental needs. (t) Any other factor that is relevant to the
determination of a specific parenting plan, including the time-sharing schedule.
Id.
49. See id. § 8(3)(j), (k), (o), 2008 Fla. Laws at 447 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)
(2007)).
50. Id. § 8(3)(j), 2008 Fla. Laws at 447 (amending FLA. STAT.§ 61.13(3) (2007)).
51. Id. § 8(3)(k), 2008 Fla. Laws at 447 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (2007)).
52. Ch. 2008-61, § 8(3)(o), 2008 Fla. Laws at 447 (amending FLA. STAT. §
61.13(3)(2007)).
53. See id.§ 8(3)j), (k), (o), 2008 Fla. Laws at 447 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)
(2007)).
54. HARTSON & PAYNE, supra note 33, at 3.
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IV. A STEP IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, OR JUST GOOD INTENTIONS?
While it is the public policy of the State of Florida to order shared pa-
rental responsibility," this custodial right refers to a shared power to make
decisions regarding the child's welfare.16 Shared parental responsibility al-
lows the parents to make joint decisions affecting the child's education,
healthcare, and religion.57 This type of joint legal custody does not encom-
pass joint physical custody.58 Therefore, in addition to both parents having
the legal right to participate in decision making, a time-sharing schedule
must be created to establish the physical custody rights and essentially de-
termine how much time each parent will be allowed to spend with his or her
child.5 9
A. Favorite Things
Although Florida Senate Bill 2532 specifically denotes that "[t]here is
no [statutory] presumption for or against" either parent and that its goal is to
encourage both mothers and fathers to experience the joys and responsibili-
ties of parenting,' some of the new factors to be considered in determining
the best interests of the child indicate otherwise.61 Specifically, the court
must now consider "[t]he demonstrated knowledge, capacity, and disposition
of each parent to ... [know] the child's friends, teachers, medical care pro-
viders, daily activities, and favorite things. 62 Despite the legislature's inten-
tion to create a more egalitarian parenting relationship by designing a custo-
mized parenting plan,63 this new factor to be evaluated by the court is clearly
biased against the parent who spent the least amount of time with the child
during the marriage. 64 While this bias is not directly intended to be against
fathers, the practical effect is such because customarily, mothers are the pri-
55. Ch. 2008-61, § 8(2)(c)1-2, 2008 Fla. Laws at 445-46 (amending FLA. STAT. §
61.13(2) (2007)).
56. Id. § 2(16), 2008 Fla. Laws at 441 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.046 (2007)).
57. Smith v. Smith, 971 So. 2d 191, 195 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2007).
58. See Ch. 2008-61, § 2(16), 2008 Fla. Laws at 441 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.046
(2007)).
59. Id. § 2(22), 2008 Fla. Laws at 442 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.046 (2007)).
60. Id. § 8(2)(c)1, 2008 Fla. Laws at 445-46 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.13(2) (2007)).
61. See id. § 8(3)(j), (k), (o), 2008 Fla. Laws at 447 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)
(2007)).
62. Id. § 8(3)(j), 2008 Fla. Laws at 447 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (2007)).
63. See Ch. 2008-61, § 8(2)(c)1, 2008 Fla. Laws at 445-46 (amending FLA. STAT. §
61.13(2) (2007)).
64. See id. § 8(3)(j), 2008 Fla. Laws at 447 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (2007)).
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mary caretakers and have more daily contact with the child than fathers.65
Mothers will typically be presenting evidence demonstrating the knowledge
that comes with being the primary caretaker. They will be able to recite all
of the child's friends and teachers names, and they will know the child's
favorite color, favorite toys, and favorite foods. Whichever parent is not the
primary caretaker, mother or father, is clearly at a severe disadvantage. The
parent who has spent less time with the child because of working outside the
home will essentially be punished for providing financial stability for the
family.
B. The Past Predicts the Future
Another new factor which seems to reinforce the gender bias that per-
meates child custody disputes is how the court must now consider "[t]he
demonstrated capacity and disposition of each parent to provide a consistent
routine for the child, such as discipline, and daily schedules for homework,
meals, and bedtime. '66 It seems obvious that the primary caretaker who has
provided the daily routine and structured the child's schedules and daily ac-
tivities will be better able to demonstrate their ability to do so. How could a
father's plea that he will or he can, measure up against a mother's already
accomplished success of providing such things? If actions really do speak
louder than words, then how will a father's words ever compare to a moth-
er's actions?
One factor introduced by Florida Senate Bill 2532 seems to do no more
than preserve the historical division of labor and responsibilities that existed
during the marriage. 67 The court must consider "[t]he particular parenting
tasks customarily performed by each parent and the division of parental re-
sponsibilities before the institution of litigation.' '68 Maintaining whatever
caretaking arrangement existed before the separation will be considered in
the determination of the child's best interests. 69 This factor fails to consider
the devastating effect of losing the availability of one parent. Essentially,
mothers are recognized and rewarded for their past parenting, while fathers
are penalized for their inability to match the mothers' involvement due to
having to work outside the home. 70 Research shows that parents who took
65. MACCOBY ET AL., supra note 4, at 282.
66. Ch. 2008-61, § 8(3)(k), 2008 Fla. Laws at 447 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)
(2007)).
67. See id. § 8(3)(o), 2008 Fla. Laws at 447 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (2007)).
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. MACCOBY ET AL., supra note 4, at 273.
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on less parental responsibility during the marriage have the ability to learn
how to evolve into a parenting role with more responsibilities." Unfortu-
nately, however, when the assessment of one's parenting skills is based upon
past behavior, the parent who had less responsibility will never have an op-
portunity to become more responsible-even if he or she possesses the ability
and desire to do so.
Perhaps even more concerning is the vast discretion given to the court.
In addition to the aforementioned factors, the court may also consider "[a]ny
other factor that is relevant to the determination of a specific parenting plan,
including the time-sharing schedule. 72 By what standard is relevance being
measured? Effectively, the court can consider any factor it deems important
to the welfare of the child.73 The broad discretion given to family courts in
determining the child's best interests may explain why gender biases contin-
ue to dominate child custody cases.
C. The Practical Effect
This type of statutory language promotes excessive litigation and will
be burdensome on the courts.74 These new factors introduced by Florida
Senate Bill 2532 promote competition between the parents and undoubtedly
continue to give mothers an advantage and reinforce the bias against fa-
thers.75 The specificity of the new factors encourage the parents to present an
enormous amount of factual material to demonstrate or prove that they know
the child best and therefore must be in the child's best interest. 76 Having to
present witnesses and provide testimony to persuade the judge that the fac-
tors balance in one's favor can have a devastating effect on a family's fin-
ances.7 7 Unfortunately, most child custody cases resemble warfare rather
than a peaceful determination about the child's needs. 78 "[M]any separated
or divorced parents have widely conflicting perspectives on their own and
71. COMM. ON THE FAMILY OF THE GROUP FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF PSYCHIATRY, NEW
TRENDS IN CtULD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS 89 (1980) [hereinafter NEW TRENDS].
72. Ch. 2008-61, § 8(3)(t), 2008 Fla. Laws at 448 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)
(2007)).
73. See id.
74. See id. § 8(3)j), (k), (o), 2008 Fla. Laws at 447 (amending FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)
(2007)).
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See Interview with Roberta G. Stanley, Board Certified Marital and Family Law
Attorney, Brinkley, Morgan, Solomon, Tatum, Stanley, Lunny, Crosby, L.L.P., in Plantation,
Fla. (July 31, 2008).
78. See NEw TRENDS, supra note 71, at 67.
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each other's marriage."79 Parents often have different recollections of how
much involvement each former spouse had in the child's life.80 Motivated by
"the high stakes involved in custody" cases, each parent will attempt to por-
tray him or herself in the most favorable light and devalue the other parent's
contribution.8"
Roberta G. Stanley, Board Certified in Marital and Family Law, and a
Fellow and President Elect of the American Academy of Matrimonial Law-
yers, stated, "[t]he intentions were great, but practically, I am not sure it is
going to have its intended effect" when referring to Florida Senate Bill
2532.82 While she acknowledged the legislature's intention to reduce child
custody disputes, she remains skeptical of whether Florida Senate Bill 2532
can actually accomplish such a goal.83 She noted that in cases where the
parents are cooperative and amicable, it could result in a parenting plan that
has a fair and accommodating time-sharing schedule.84 On the other hand,
"[f]or the cases in which the legislation will actually apply, in cases of high
conflict, [Florida Senate Bill 2532] could create even more controversy be-
cause the day to day lives of each parent in relation to the child will be
brought into court. '85 Consequently, the legislative intent conflicts with the
practical application of the factors.86 Ms. Stanley also acknowledged that the
new factors present a bias against the parent who works outside the home.87
This could affect either the mother or the father, depending on the division of
labor and responsibilities within the household.88 "The practitioners need to
start thinking outside of the box" to prohibit gender biases from pervading
the creation of fair and equal time-sharing schedules.89
V. WILL THE GENDER PREFERENCES EVER BE ERADICATED FROM
CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES IN FLORIDA COURTS?
Divorce is a reality of the modem world that cannot be ignored. It af-
fects approximately forty percent of America's children. 90 Fortunately, the
79. EMERY, supra note 9, at 6.
80. See MACCOBY ET AL., supra note 4, at 272.
81. EMERY, supra note 9, at 6.
82. Interview with Roberta G. Stanley, supra note 77.
83. See id.
84. See id.
85. Id.
86. See id.
87. Interview with Roberta G. Stanley, supra note 77.
88. See id.
89. Id.
90. GOULD & MARTINDALE, supra note 7, at 31.
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vast majority of child custody arrangements following a divorce are settled
outside the courtroom.9 1 Although legal conflict is atypical, it is usually in-
itiated because the father wants equal custodial rights.92 Nevertheless, when
two competent and capable parents both want primary responsibility for their
child, mothers typically receive the primary custodial rights.93 It seems that
the best interests of the child are tainted by the social presumption that a
primary relationship with a fit mother is in the child's best interest, regard-
less of whether the father is a capable, fit, and loving parent.94 Society is
more concerned that fathers financially support their children after a divorce
than continue to build and nurture a relationship with those children.95 Be-
cause a strong maternal preference still exists among the courts, fathers seek-
ing equal custodial rights have a difficult burden to overcome. 96
A. Florida Is Determined to Continue the Gender Bias
The custodial preference for mothers is so strong that it exists even in
cases where the parents took on the traditional roles of the opposite gender.97
This judicial bias is evidenced by Young v. Hector,98 in which the mother
was the primary breadwinner and worked outside the home, and the father
was the primary caretaker of the two children. 99 Alice Hector and Robert
Young were married and had two daughters.1" While living in New Mexico,
Hector was working as an attorney in her own practice and Young was an
architect and entrepreneur. 1' The couple had always employed someone to
either help care for the two children or help with household chores.0 2 After
the birth of their youngest child, the mother found a job working at a suc-
cessful law firm in Florida and the couple decided to relocate.'0 3 Initially, the
mother moved to Miami with the children. 104 The father stayed in New Mex-
ico to complete prior business arrangements and make improvements on
91. See id.
92. See MACCOBY ET AL., supra note 4, at 272.
93. See id. at 283.
94. See id. at 282.
95. See EMERY, supra note 9, at 75.
96. See MACCOBY ET AL., supra note 4, at 283.
97. See generally Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998), rev'd
per curiam, aff'd on reh'g en banc, 740 So. 2d 1158 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1999).
98. Id. at 1153.
99. See id. at 1154-55.
100. Id. at 1154.
101. Id.
102. Young, 740 So. 2d at 1154.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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their house to improve its resale value.'0 5 During this time, he regularly vi-
sited with the children.' 6 After the father had rejoined the family, he tra-
veled to Arkansas to care for his dying brother and to manage his estate.'0 7
He also had to return to New Mexico to direct a treasure hunt and was away
from his wife and children for approximately fourteen months.'0 8 At this
time, the children were being cared for by a nanny while the mother was at
work.' 9 When the father eventually returned to Florida, he passed the Flori-
da contractor's exam"0 and began looking for employment."' Due to his
lack of computer skills, Young was unable to find work as an architect." 2
The mother, on the other hand, had accepted a new position as a shareholder
in a large firm and was earning a salary of $300,000 a year." 3 While there
was no express verbal agreement that the father should stop seeking em-
ployment and stay home as the primary caretaker, 4 that became the ar-
rangement for three consecutive years preceding the divorce.15
Young was an extremely dedicated father and very involved in his
daughters' lives." 6 He "started and led one of the children's Brownie troop
[sic], coached one of the children's soccer team [sic], regularly volunteered
at the children's school, and [took] the children to doctor and dentist ap-
pointments.""' 7 Testimony from neighbors, teachers, and friends illustrated
that while the father spent more time with the children, both parents were
loving and capable parents." 8 During the trial, the guardian ad litem's report
stated that the father was "phenomenal" while interacting with the children
and the report described the father as "warmer" towards the children than
their mother." 9 Despite the guardian ad litem's praise of Young's parenting,
the report still recommended that the mother be designated as the primary
residential parent.' 20 Under Florida law, this meant that the children would
105. Id. at 1159.
106. See id. at 1154.
107. Young, 740 So. 2d at 1160.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1159.
111. Id. at 1155.
112. Young, 740 So. 2d at 1155.
113. Id. at 1154.
114. Id. at 1160.
115. Id. at 1161.
116. Id. at 1155.
117. Young, 740 So. 2d at 1155.
118. See id. at 1156.
119. Id. at 1155.
120. Id.
20091
222
Nova Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol33/iss2/1
NOVA LAW REVIEW
live with the mother in her home, and the father would have visitation
rights.1
21
The guardian ad litem based his recommendation on three factors. 122 He
considered the mother's financial stability, as well as the fact that prior to
taking on the primary caretaker role, the father was absent from the children
for extended periods of time, and stated that the mother managed anger
around the children better than the father. 123 The trial court followed the
recommendation and awarded the mother primary residential custody over
the two children. 24 The father appealed the judge's decision2 5 claiming that
it was predicated upon gender bias. 126
1. One Step Forward, Two Steps Back in Young v. Hector
Initially, a three-judge panel of Florida's Third District Court of Appeal
agreed with Young and reversed the trial court's decision to award primary
residential custody to the mother.2 7 The panel declared that when determin-
ing custody in accordance with the best interests of the children, the judge
"should attempt to preserve and continue the caretaking roles that the parties
had established."'' 28 The panel found that the trial judge had abused his dis-
cretion by granting primary residential custody to the parent who was not the
children's primary caretaker. 129 Furthermore, the panel found that the factors
that were considered by the guardian ad litem were unreasonable. 30 The
panel of the court of appeal stated that a parent's economic stability and fin-
ances should not be considered as a "determinative factor" when establishing
the allocation of custodial rights. 31 The panel also noted that the father be-
ing away from the family for lengthy amounts of time should not have been
considered in light of the fact that for the last three years, he had been the
primary caretaker in the children's lives on a daily continuous basis. 32
121. See FLA. STAT. § 61.046(3), (12) (2007), amended by Act effective Oct. 1, 2008, ch.
2008-61, § 2, 2008 Fla. Laws 439, 440-41.
122. Young, 740 So. 2d at 1155.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1156.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1159.
127. Young, 740So. 2dat 1158.
128. Id. at 1157.
129. Id. at 1158.
130. See id. at 1157-58.
131. Id. at 1157.
132. See Young, 740 So. 2d at 1157-58.
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Just when it seemed that the panel of the court of appeal was becoming
aware of the gender bias that exists in many trial courts across the state, the
panel granted a rehearing en banc over the matter and withdrew its former
opinion, which had reversed the trial judge's initial decision.133 Upon reex-
amining the record, the court en banc concluded that the trial court had suffi-
cient evidence to award primary residential custody to the mother and that
the father's accusation of gender bias was not supported by evidence. 34 The
appellate court reiterated the fact that there was no agreement between the
parents that the father would remain unemployed to stay home and care for
the children.1 35 The appellate court grew skeptical of the father's role as the
caretaker because the mother had employed a housekeeper/babysitter who
worked in the home five days a week.136 Ultimately, the appellate court
asked the father "why there was a need for a full-time nanny.' ' 37 In response
to the court's questioning, the father replied, "She cooks. She cleans. I
could do a lot of that .... [We] can afford the luxury of having help, hired
help. I am not the kind of person that sits around and watches soap operas. I
try to do meaningful, worthwhile things." 138 The appellate court reevaluated
the factors that were originally considered by the guardian ad litem and
found that they were properly balanced by the trial judge when awarding
primary residential custody to the mother.1 39 The court stated that it was
proper for the trial court to consider the fact that the mother had remained
continuously employed throughout the children's lives, as opposed to the
father who, although licensed, chose not to pursue a career.' 4° Additionally,
the appellate court found that it was reasonable for the judge to weigh the
fact that the father had been missing from the children's lives for extended
periods of time.1 4' The court also expressed that the trial court was correct to
place more importance on the parent who had been continuously present
throughout the children's entire life, rather than on the parent who had been
most present in the years immediately preceding the divorce.' 4 Moreover,
the appellate court noted that the guardian ad litem had witnessed the father
have an angry outburst in front of the children.'4 3 The court found this to be
133. Id. at 1158.
134. See id. at 1159.
135. See id. at 1163.
136. Id. at 1160-61.
137. Young, 740 So. 2d at 1161.
138. Id. at 1162.
139. See id. at 1162-63.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 1163.
142. See Young, 740 So. 2d at 1163.
143. Id.
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a credible factor that tipped the balance in favor of granting primary residen-
tial custody to the mother.' 44 In a concurring opinion, Judge Levy remarked
that the record most likely supported a finding of either parent being desig-
nated as the primary residential parent, but that it is not the job of the appel-
late court to "second-guess" the trial court's determination. 45
2. A Glimmer of Hope
Not all the judges agreed with the majority. Three members of the
bench, including Chief Judge Schwartz, concluded that there was no reason-
able or logical explanation, based on the evidence, that supported the desig-
nation of the mother as the primary residential parent.'" The daughters are
well rounded children and well adjusted as a result of the division of caretak-
ing responsibilities established by the parents. 147 A prior arrangement should
not be changed or modified if it has been proven to be successful. 4' The
majority allowed its personal beliefs to influence the determination of the
children's best interests. 1
49
In my opinion, there is no question whatever that the result below
was dictated by the gender of the competing parties .... I believe
that this is shown by contemplating a situation in which the gend-
ers of the hard working and high earning lawyer and the stay at
home architect were reversed, but everything else remained the
same. The male attorney's claim for custody would have been vir-
tually laughed out of court, and there is no realistic possibility that
the mother architect would have actually "lost her children,"' 150
The majority opinion emphasized the fact that the parents had never
agreed that the father would be the stay at home parent and primary caretaker
while the mother supported the family. 15' Nevertheless, despite not having
an expressed mutual agreement, the parents clearly acquiesced to such an
arrangement by allowing the father to continue to tend to the children's pri-
mary care and daily needs.'52 As to the factors that were considered in de-
144. See id.
145. Id. at 1164 (Levy, J. concurring).
146. Id. at 1172 (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting).
147. See Young, 740 So. 2d at 1172.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1175.
150. Id. at 1173-74.
151. Id. at 1177 (Goderich, J., dissenting).
152. Young, 740So. 2dat 1177.
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termining the custodial arrangement, had the roles been reversed, the guar-
dian ad litem would not have even assessed the father's economic stability as
a factor. 153 Also, because the father had legitimate reasons that kept him
away from his family, it was improper to consider the fact that he was not a
constant presence in the children's lives.'14
The record indicates three instances in which the father was away from
the family. 155 The first absence occurred when the father remained in New
Mexico for three months after the mother and children had already moved to
Florida. 56 The father stayed behind to finish prior business deals and to
make renovations on their home to raise its resale value.'57 The second in-
stance occurred when the father traveled to Arkansas for approximately three
to four weeks so that he could care for his dying brother and help manage his
estate.58 The third absence occurred while the father was away from the
family for fourteen months to lead a treasure hunt for gold in New Mexico, a
project in which the family had invested money.'59
The final factor that had been considered was the guardian ad litem's
testimony that the father had an angry outburst in front of the children.
160
This was not relevant as a determinative factor because the father's anger
was regarding their finances and never directly involved the children.'
16
The effect of designating the mother as the primary residential parent is
that the children receive their daily primary care from an unrelated employee
instead of their father. 62 The appellate court is constrained by the long es-
tablished gender bias "that a mother will not lose her entitlement to become
the primary residential parent unless her unfitness is demonstrated; no matter
how actively she is engaged outside of and away from the home, even
though the other parent is fit and willing to serve in that capacity."'' 63 The
gender bias in this situation is unique and perhaps not as obvious to the ma-
jority because typically when one parent stays home as the primary caretaker
it is the mother.' 64 Nevertheless, Young illustrates how gender biases can
153. Id. at 1178.
154. Id. at 1179.
155. Id. at 1178-79.
156. Id. at 1178.
157. Young, 740 So. 2d at 1178 (Goderich, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 1178-79.
159. Id. at 1179.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. See Young, 740 So. 2d at 1177 (Nesbitt, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1179 (Goderich, J., dissenting).
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pervade the courts and influence its decisions. 65 Even in the most excep-
tional circumstances, the desire to grant women superior custodial rights
seems to exist regardless of whether the facts support an opposite finding to
be in the best interests of the child.1
66
VI. MODIFICATION OF CHILD CUSTODY: A HEAVY BURDEN TO
OVERCOME
The enormous difficulty involved in modifying custody arrangements is
one reason it is so important that judicial discretion and gender biases do not
influence the initial custody determinations. 167 "[W]hen a trial court is asked
to modify a final child custody order, the petitioner carries the burden of
proof, and that burden is extraordinary."'168 Appellate courts are far more
likely to affirm the trial court's decision than to reverse it. 69 Although a
consensus exists that the person seeking to modify custody carries a heavy
burden, the district courts of appeal have not always agreed upon the test that
should be applied. 7°
A. The First District Court of Appeal
In Cooper v. Gress,'71 the parents had decided to share equal physical
custody of their two children following the divorce. 7 The parents acknowl-
edged that they were both fit and capable parents who could provide proper
care to their children.7 7 The parents also agreed that all decisions regarding
the children would be made together.174 This joint custody arrangement was
included in the final judgment for the dissolution of marriage.175 One year
later, the father filed a petition to enforce the custody arrangement. 76 The
father claimed that the mother was interfering with his visitation rights and
making negative comments about him in front of the children. 7 7 In re-
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Enyeart v. Stull, 715 So. 2d 320, 321 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
168. Id.
169. Interview with Roberta G. Stanley, supra note 77.
170. See Wade v. Hirschman (Wade If), 903 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 2005).
171. 854 So. 2d 262 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
172. Id. at 263.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 264.
176. Cooper, 854 So. 2d at 264.
177. Id.
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sponse, the mother filed a petition seeking to modify the custody arrange-
ment and designate herself as the primary residential parent.'78 The mother
alleged that she and the father were no longer communicating, that the hus-
band was unable to care for their children at times due to a new illness, and
that the children wanted to live with her.179 The father counter petitioned to
be designated as the primary residential parent, alleging a lack of communi-
cation, and the mother's failure to follow the guidelines of the final judgment
by interfering with his visitation rights. 8° The trial judge weighed the factors
that are typically used to determine the best interests of the child in an initial
custody arrangement and made findings about each parent.' The judge
found that the parents' lack of communication had hindered the children's
social skills and prevented them from participating in extracurricular com-
munity activities.8 2 Although both parents were found to be devoted and
committed to their children's needs, the trial court held that it was in the best
interests of the children to award primary residential custody to the moth-
er.
183
The father appealed the trial court's decision alleging that it had used
the wrong legal standard to determine whether modification of the custody
arrangement was appropriate.'84 Florida's First District Court of Appeal re-
versed the trial court's decision and held that the trial judge erred by not
holding the mother to the heavy burden of proof that is required in all mo-
tions for modification of custody.'85 The appellate court described the law as
a two-part test and declared that the party seeking to modify custody "must
show both that the circumstances have substantially, materially changed
since the original custody determination and that the child's best interests
justify changing custody. Furthermore, the substantial change must be one
that was not reasonably contemplated at the time of the original judg-
ment." 86 The mother's allegations were insufficient to meet the requirement
that a substantial and material change had occurred.'87 The appellate court
found that a lack of communication was not enough to satisfy the first part of
the test. 88 The court also addressed the mother's allegations that the father
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Cooper, 854 So. 2d at 265.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 268.
186. Cooper, 854 So. 2d at 265 (citations omitted).
187. ld.
188. Id. at 266.
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was unable to provide care to the children due to an illness. 189 The appellate
court noted that this issue was no longer relevant because the father was in
remission.'90 Additionally, the appellate court stated that there was no evi-
dence behind the mother's claim that the children wanted to live with her,
and if there was, the children's preference would not be considered because
of their young ages.' 91 Therefore, by only assessing whether a modification
of custody was in the best interests of the children, the trial judge improperly
held the mother to a much lower burden of proof than what is required by
law.
192
B. The Fifth District Court of Appeal
In Wade v. Hirschman (Wade J),193 the parties had agreed to share phys-
ical custody of their child, which was incorporated into the parents' dissolu-
tion decree. 94 Both parents sought to modify the custody arrangement alleg-
ing that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred. 195 Also, both
parents wanted the designation of primary residential parent. 96 The trial
judge found that the mother was extremely uncooperative and refused to
uphold the joint custody arrangement. 197 Similar to the trial court in Cooper,
the trial court in Wade I also balanced the factors that are used in initial cus-
tody decisions to determine the best interests of the child, 98 but granted pri-
mary residential custody to the father. 199 The mother appealed to the Fifth
District Court of Appeal alleging that the trial judge applied the wrong stan-
dard in failing to use the substantial change prong of the two-part test and
only considering the best interests of the child.00 Unlike Cooper, the Fifth
District Court of Appeal held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion 20 1
and declared the two-part test of finding a substantial and material change
and a consideration of the best interests of the child inapplicable in cases
189. See id. at 267-68.
190. Id. at 268.
191. Cooper, 854 So. 2d at 268.
192. Id. at 265, 268.
193. 872 So. 2d 952 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
194. Id. at 953.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Wade 1, 872 So. 2d at 955; see Cooper v. Gress, 854 So. 2d 262, 265 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 2003).
199. Wade I, 872 So. 2d at 953.
200. See id. at 953-54.
201. Id. at 955; see Cooper, 854 So. 2d at 268.
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where neither parent is the primary residential parent and the physical custo-
dy is shared equally. °2 The appellate court stated that under such circums-
tances, once it established that joint physical custody is no longer functioning
properly, the trial judge can reassess custody as if it were making an initial
determination, using only the best interests of the child standard.2 °3
C. The Supreme Court of Florida: The Final Authority
A discrepancy existed between the Florida district courts of appeal re-
garding which test should be applied in determining custody modifica-
tions. 2' The First District Court of Appeal in Wade I is in direct conflict
with the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Cooper.20 5 Thus, in Wade II, the
Supreme Court of Florida granted review of Wade I to determine the test that
should be applied by all Florida courts.2' The Court concluded that the two-
part test used in Cooper should be applied in all custody modifications, re-
gardless of whether the parents shared custody or one parent was designated
as the primary residential parent. 27 The Court also noted that while it is not
necessary to prove that the child will suffer a detriment if the custody ar-
rangement is not modified, there must be evidentiary proof of a substantial
and material change in order to warrant any kind of modification. 20 8 Accord-
ing to the Court, dissatisfaction with the arrangement or lack of cooperation
in carrying out the custody arrangement is not sufficient to satisfy a substan-
tial change in circumstances. 2' Nevertheless, this requirement must be satis-
fied before a trial court can begin to consider the best interests of the child.21°
The Supreme Court of Florida adopted the test that requires the greater bur-
den of proof.211 With such a difficult burden to satisfy, the vast majority of
child custody determinations remain unmodified, regardless of whether they
meet the child's or the family's needs. Therefore, it is imperative that courts
are unbiased in the initial custody determinations to ensure that the parenting
plan is in the best interests of the child.
202. Wade 1, 872 So. 2d at 954.
203. Id. at 954-55.
204. Wade v. Hirschman (Wade 11), 903 So. 2d 928, 930 (Fla. 2005).
205. Id.
206. Id. at 932.
207. See id.
208. Id. at 934.
209. See Wade 11, 903 So. 2d at 934.
210. See id. at 935.
211. See id. at 933.
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VII. THE EVOLUTION OF JOINT CUSTODY AND THE EMERGENCE OF
EGALITARIAN PARENTING RELATIONSHIPS
The predominant outcome in most child custody cases has been to pre-
serve the mother-child relationship by awarding mothers superior custodial
rights and leaving fathers with limited physical custody.212 However, more
recently, society has begun to take notice of the negative consequences asso-
ciated with restricted access to the father, as well as the valuable aspects that
a continuing father-child relationship can have on a child's overall wellbe-
ing.21 '3 Research shows that frequent paternal involvement in a child's daily
activities has a profound positive impact on the child.24 A child custody
arrangement that facilitates joint and equal physical custody between both
parents would support fathers' participation and would encourage fathers to
fully embrace a more involved role in their child's life.215 It is necessary for
both parents to experience a broad range of activities with the child to streng-
then and nurture the child's bond with each parent.216 "There is an emerging
consensus that the benefits of maintaining contact with both parents exceed
any special need for relationships with the mother or the father. 2 7 There-
fore, between two loving and capable parents, a parenting plan that is in the
best interests of the child is one in which the child has equal access to both
parents.2 8
A. A Glimpse at Parental Equality Following a Divorce
The current goal of Florida Senate Bill 2532 is to design a parenting
plan that promotes the best interests of the child.2 9 How can any parenting
plan that can potentially limit one parent's time with the child be in that
child's best interest? As long as both parents desire to maintain a continuing
relationship with their child and want physical custody of the child, there
should be a legal presumption towards joint physical custody. Parents may
have decided that one of them would be responsible for the primary caretak-
ing of the child, while the other worked outside the home to support the
family. They most likely chose this arrangement because it was in the best
212. GOULD & MARTINDALE, supra note 7, at 164.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 149.
215. Id. at 166.
216. Id. at 163.
217. GOULD & MARTINDALE, supra note 7, at 163.
218. See id.
219. See Act effective Oct. 1, 2008, ch. 2008-61, § 8(3), 2008 Fla. Laws 439, 446 (amend-
ing FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3) (2007)).
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interest of their child and not necessarily because they wanted to or because
they felt obligated to based on their gender. This division of responsibilities
was functional and enabled each other to better care for the child's needs.
The efforts of both parents should be rewarded and the financial support
should be given just as much value and consideration as the daily child rear-
ing, regardless of which parent performed each task.
Additionally, establishing a parenting plan that grants joint physical
custody would create more predictable outcomes in disputes between parents
who want equal access and time with their child. It would encourage more
cooperative settlements and would be less burdensome on the courts. It
would also eliminate the opportunity for parents to demean each others' pa-
renting skills and personally attack each other for the sake of the children. A
tactic which is unfortunately used all too often in custody disputes and is
never in the best interests of the child.
Finally, a presumption of joint physical custody would encourage pa-
rental responsibility. Parents will be challenged to rethink their role as care-
takers and providers and perhaps develop into more balanced examples for
their children. More importantly, the focus would be on the future co-
parenting relationship. Fathers will no longer be judged and bound by their
past parenting roles. Instead, both parents will have the opportunity to truly
share all the benefits that come with parenting. Child custody determinations
should not be based on past behaviors. Following a divorce, the family unit
has been divided and has changed. It is only logical that the parental respon-
sibilities should also change. Because one arrangement worked in a prior
setting does not necessarily mean that the same arrangement will continue to
work in a completely new setting. Child custody determinations should be
aimed at the future best interests of the child. A parenting plan that gives
both parents equal access and time with the child would ensure that gender
biases and parenting stereotypes could no longer influence child custody
decisions or be a factor in determining the best interests of the child. Every
loving and capable parent deserves the right to pursue parental equality, free
from the longstanding constraints of gender bias.
1. A Moment of Reflection
I feel very passionate about this subject matter because of the enormous
impact it has had on my own life. My parents divorced when I was about six
years old. I was fortunate enough to have two loving and capable parents.
Both my mother and father wanted to remain involved in every aspect of my
life and continue to nurture the parent-child bond we shared. My father chal-
lenged the societal norms that supported the popular belief that children
should remain with their mothers after a divorce. He knew that he had more
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to offer his child than financial support. And he knew that there was more to
being a parent than sustaining an income. He wanted to go through all the
experiences and privileges that come with being a parent. He wanted to ex-
perience helping me get ready for school, cooking me dinner, reading me
bedtime stories, and all the other simple joys that are the building blocks to a
healthy parent-child relationship. He knew that the only way to do this was
to share joint physical custody of me with my mother. Together, they devel-
oped a plan that allowed me to have continuous contact with both parents
throughout each week. I spent every Monday and Thursday with my mother,
and every Tuesday and Wednesday with my father. Every weekend would
be spent with one of my parents and would rotate each week. This coopera-
tive and equal parenting plan also allowed me to spend every holiday with
both of my parents. I would spend the first half of the day with one parent
and the remaining half of the day would be spent with the other.
This is just one example of how parenting plans can be designed to al-
low each parent to spend the same amount of time with their child. I never
felt abandoned by one of my parents or experienced intense separation anxie-
ty. I always felt each of my parents' presence in my daily life. I do not think
that my parents structured this plan out of convenience or their own prefe-
rence. I believe that my parents truly considered my future well being and
what was in my best interest. I am very grateful for the fact that my relation-
ship with both of my parents never suffered as a result of their divorce. I feel
that I benefitted tremendously from having consistent and continuous access
to and availability of both of my parents throughout my life.
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